Hollis J. Larson, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1887

Hollis J. Larson,
Appellant,

vs.

The Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CV-17-512

Hollis J. Larson, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Janine Ki mble, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his complaint against Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (MSOP) employees and the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS),
asserting that the district court erred by: (1) dismissing his defamation claims on grounds
of absolute and qualified privilege, and altern atively ruling that the allegedly defamatory
2
statements, which were for libel but not slander, were not published; (2) holding that Minn.
Stat. § 144.651 (2016) does not cr eate a private right of action; (3) dismissing his claims
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress for failure to plead the requisite
level of distress; and (4) dismissing all of his claims with prejudice. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2017, appellant Hollis J. Lars on filed a complaint against respondents
MSOP, DHS, and 15 DHS employees in their individual and offi cial capacities, alleging
defamation generally, slander per se, libel, negligent retention and supervision of
employees, negligence under Minn. Stat. § 144.651, vicarious liability, and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In an amended complaint filed in April 2017 (hereinafter complaint), Larson, who
has been civilly committed to MSOP, admitted that on three separate occasions he
threatened the lives of MSOP employees, but alleged that his threats were misquoted in
incident reports contained in his MSOP file. The complaint also alleged that, on a fourth
occasion, Larson jumped through a door and made statements to MSOP employees and
that the employees then falsely quoted his stat ements as threats to kill everyone. Larson
attached incident reports generated in response to his behavior as exhibits to his original
complaint and referred to them throughout the amended complaint.
Larson alleged the defamation caused MS OP employees to treat him with
discourtesy, contempt, and exaggerated security measures, and that he was moved from his
general-population unit to an isolation unit as a result of at least one of the reports. The
complaint further alleged the defamation had exacerbated all of Larson’s existing mental
3
illnesses, including major depression, gene ralized anxiety diso rder, and avoidant-
personality disorder. Finally, Larson allege d that he experience d frequent insomnia,
recurrent nightmares, panic attacks, suicidal thoughts, and self-isolation, and that as a direct
result of the defamation, he “s uffered and will continue to suffer great pain of mind and
body, severe and permanent emotional distre ss, physical manifestations of emotional
distress, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, humiliation, and psychological injuries.”
Respondents moved to dismiss the comp laint, arguing they are immune from
defamation claims based on theories of absolute and qualified privilege. Respondents also
argued they are statutorily immune from clai ms of negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision. Alternatively, respondents argue d Larson failed to state claims of negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision because such claims require physical injury, and Larson
only alleged emotional distress. With respec t to Larson’s negligence claim, which cited
Minn. Stat. § 144.651, respondents argued that the statute creates no private right of action.
Respondents argued that plaintiff’s vicarious -liability claim required an underlying tort,
which Larson failed to establish because his other claims failed. Finally, respondents
argued that Larson’s claims for intentional a nd negligent infliction of emotional distress
should be dismissed because Larson did not allege appropri ate damages to support the
claims.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that respondents were
required as part of their job duties to keep internal records of
incidents such as those at issu e . . . . Therefore, [respondents]
are absolutely immune to defa mation claims by [Larson] as
they were acting in the course and scope of their employment
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by observing and creating reports about [Larson’s] conduct in
MSOP.

The district court also noted that, even if respond ents were not immune, Larson’s claims
did not meet the criteria to be considered libelous, and Larson had not alleged verbal
statements to support a count of slander.
The district court concluded that respondents were statutorily immune from claims
of negligent hiring, retention, and supervisi on. The district court also concluded that
Larson’s negligence claim citing Minn. Stat. § 144.651 failed for lack of a private right of
action, and that there could be no claim for vicarious liability because Larson had no viable
underlying torts. Finally, the district court concluded that Larson’s claims for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress were not supported by sufficient facts. Larson
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Larson contends that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “On
review of a Rule 12 dismissa l, [appellate courts] will not uphold the dismissal if it is
possible on any evidence which might be produc ed, consistent with the pleader’s theory,
to grant the relief demanded.” Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Grps., Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807, 811
(Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Our review is de novo, and we consider only the facts
alleged in the complaint, a ccepting those facts as true and construing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes , 744 N.W.2d
226, 229 (Minn. 2008).
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I. Defamation
“In order for a statement to be considered defamatory it must be communicated to
someone other than the plaintiff, it must be fa lse, and it must tend to harm the plaintiff’s
reputation and to lower him in th e estimation of the community.” Stuempges v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
A. Absolute Privilege
Larson contends that the district court erred by concluding respondents were
absolutely immune from defamation claims by virtue of their public duties. The
applicability of absolute privilege is a quest ion of law, which we review de novo. Minke
v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn. 2014). “Whether an executive officer
is absolutely immune from defamation liability depends on many factors, including the
nature of the function assigned to the officer and the relations hip of the statements to the
performance of that function.” Carradine v. State, 511 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. 1994).
In Carradine, the supreme court held that a police officer was immune from
allegedly defamatory statements made in an arrest report because writing reports is closely
related to the performance of an officer’s du ties, and because protecting an officer from
civil liability ensures an officer will fearlessly perform his duty and better serve the public.
Id. at 735-36. The supreme court focused on the following facts: (1) creating accurate
reports is a key part of a police officer’s job; (2) police reports are useful to both department
superiors and legal counsel in making decisions ; (3) police reports play a significant role
at trial, helping to refresh an officer’s recollection and providing material useful for cross-
6
examination; and (4) possible defamation liability may deter an officer from preparing a
detailed report.
Similarly, the reports generated by MSOP employees are closely related to the
performance of the employees’ du ties. It is clear from the e xhibits attached to Larson’s
complaint that MSOP employees routinely generate reports in connection with disruptive
behavior. The reports show that after each incident, MSOP staff prepare summaries that
include detailed descriptions of dialogue, actions, and MSOP responses. The reports record
MSOP employees’ contemporaneous observa tions and are useful in MSOP decision-
making. Drawing upon the supreme court’s reasoning in Carradine, if MSOP employees
were exposed to civil liability for potentially defamatory statements in their reports, they
would be deterred from recordin g their complete and truthful impressions, which would
undermine their ability to perform their executive duties. Because generating accurate and
thorough reports is closely related to the performance of respondents’ duties, we conclude
that the district court did not err when it di smissed Larson’s claims on absolute-privilege
grounds.
Larson argues that the statements in respondents’ reports are not privileged because
they were not made within th e scope of respondents’ employm ent. He asserts that the
statements were malicious and willfully false and that res pondents were not required to
make false reports as part of their duties. “[I]n the case of a communication recognized as
absolutely privileged even the presence of express malice does not destroy the privilege.”
Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954). Larson’s argument
that the statements were malicious and willfu lly false addresses qualified privilege rather
7
than absolute privilege. “[A]bsolute privile ge means that immunity is given even for
intentionally false statements, coupled w ith malice, while a qualified or conditional
privilege grants immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are
publicized in good faith and without malice.” Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). Although absolute privilege is a sufficient ground for affirming
the district court’s dismissal, in the interest of thorough review we next consider the district
court’s ruling that the statements in resp ondents’ reports were protected by qualified
privilege.
B. Qualified Privilege
“Qualified privilege applies when a court determines that statements made in
particular contexts or on certain occasions should be encourag ed despite the risk that the
statements might be defamatory.” Bol v. Cole , 561 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. 1997)
(quotation omitted). Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of la w, which we
review de novo. Id.
In determining whether a qualified priv ilege exists, we examine whether the
allegedly defamatory statements were ma de “upon a proper occasion, from a proper
motive, and based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Bauer v. State, 511 N.W.2d 447,
449 (Minn. 1994). Larson argues that the stat ements were not made within respondents’
scope of employment because respondents’ employment does not require generating false
reports. This argument appears to be directed at whether or not respondents’ statements
were properly motivated and made upon a proper occasion.
8
The evidence in the complaint establishes that respondents’ statements were made
upon a proper occasion and from a proper motive. The statements were made in routinely
generated reports, which is a proper occasion, and for the purpose of recording
respondents’ observations during the incidents in question, which is a proper motive. Cf.
Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 149 (concluding that the release of requested documents recording
firsthand communication was a proper occasi on, and concern for patient’s safety was
proper motive.). Next, we consider whether MSOP employees had reasonable grounds to
make the statements in the reports.
“Reasonable grounds can exist if a pers on has valid reasons for believing a
statement, even though the statement later proves to be false.” Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1995).
Here, respondents’ written statements were ma de based on their recollections of recent
events. This provided reasonable grounds for respondents to believe the statements were
accurate. See Keuchle v. Life’s Companion P.C.A., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. App.
2002) (noting a defendant “canno t simply rely on accusati ons . . . or on second-hand
hearsay with no identified source” as reasonable grounds), review dismissed (Minn. Jan.
21, 2003); Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler , 481 N.W.2d 120, 125-26 (Minn. App.
1992) (concluding reasonable grounds existe d when a company relied on evidence it
believed to be true), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992). Be cause the statements were
made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and upon reas onable grounds, we
conclude the statements were qualifiedly privileged.
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“To defeat this qualified privilege, the plai ntiff must prove actu al malice. Actual
malice means what it says: ill-will and improper motive or wishing wantonly and without
cause to injure the plaintiff.” Bauer, 511 N.W.2d at 449 . “Malice can be shown by
extrinsic evidence of personal spite, as well as by intrinsic evidence such as the exaggerated
language of the libel, the character of the language used, the mode and extent of the
publication, and other matters in excess of the privilege.” Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 150
(quotation omitted). Larson argu es that exaggerated language is evidence of malice, but
his complaint alleged no facts to support his malice allegation. In fact, as discussed in the
next section, what Larson alleges to be malic ious exaggeration is substantially similar to
what he claims he actually said.
Because the statements were made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive,
and based on reasonable gro unds, and because Larson prov ides no evidence of actual
malice, we discern no error in the district court’s dismissal of Larson’s defamation claim
based on qualified privilege.
C. Truth
Even if we were to reach the merits of Larson’s defamation claim, the claim would
be defeated by the fact that the complaint’s description of Larson’s actual statements are
substantially similar to those written in respondents’ reports. Truth is a complete defense
to a defamation action, and “true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.”
Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 255. If a statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of
expression or detail are immaterial. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,
517, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991); see also Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 11,
10
277 N.W. 264, 269 (1938) (c haracterizing the que stion of truth as “[w]hether the
publications were substantially true”). A stat ement is substantially true if it would have
the same effect on the mind of the reader or listener as that which the pleaded truth would
have produced. Masson, 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
Larson’s complaint alleged that on July 5, 2016, Larson said to MSOP employees
that they “better hope I never get out of here . You better go down to the Capitol and beg
them not to let Larson out, ’cuz if I get out, I’ll be to see you.” The complaint alleged that
an employee’s report “deliberately, sadistically, and maliciously, fabricated and misquoted
[his] statement into: ‘Y’all mo ther f----rs better hope I never get out of here, I’m coming
after all of you. Don’t let Hollis Larson out or it’s going to be a bloodbath.’”
Larson’s complaint alleged that on July 15, 2016, he told an employee of MSOP he
was “authorized by law and justified to use d eadly force in the de fense of, and against
violations of, his constitutional rights and that [the employee] and his family would suffer
consequences for such if and when [he] ever got out of th e MSOP and that the statement
was not a threat, but a blood oath.” The complaint alleged that the employee then wrote a
report that “deliberately, sadistically, and maliciously, fabricated and misquoted [his]
statement into: ‘I will use deadly force! I will kill you and your family! That’s not a threat!
That’s a blood oath!’”
Larson’s complaint alleged that on Novemb er 1, 2016, he “told [one respondent]
that if either [of two other respondents] ‘came onto the unit, bad things would happen to
them.’” The complaint alleged that two re spondents wrote reports indicating Larson had
11
said “I want everyone to know that those two f---ing c---s better not come on this unit or I
will kill them.”
Finally, Larson’s complaint a lleged that on November 2, 2016, he “in a fit of rage
and in protest of yet anothe r deliberately false accusation . . . jumped through a half-
door . . . and pounded on the staff office door and made statements regarding the repeated
lying and fabrication of MSOP employees in their incident re ports.” It alleged that one
respondent falsely wrote in a report that Larson said he was “going to kill everyone,” and
“come and get me motherf----rs, I will kill you. ” The complaint doe s not specify what
Larson claims he actually said in his fit of rage.
“As a general rule, the truth or falsity of a statement is a ques tion for the jury.”
McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. 2013). However, in McKee the supreme
court analyzed whether or not si x statements presented genuine issues of material fact on
the issue of falsity, even assuming they were said exactly as plaintiff alleged. Id. at 730-
31. The supreme court concluded that, ev en though there may have been minor
discrepancies between the statements publishe d by defendant and the statements plaintiff
alleged were said, those differe nces were not substantial e nough to constitute falsity. Id.
We similarly conclude that, even assuming each of Larson’s statements was as he alleged
in his complaint, the reports were substantially similar to Larson’s alleged statements and
were therefore not false.
The reports reflect respond ents’ recollections of thre atening behavior, which the
complaint admits occurred. Th e statements in the reports w ould have the same effect on
the mind of the listener as the statements the complaint claims as true. In sum, because
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Larson’s complaint did not allege sufficient falsity to support a defamation claim, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal.
D. Dismissal of Slander Claims
Larson contends that it was error for the di strict court to interpret his disparate
claims as libel claims, because he alleged mu ltiple claims of slande r in his complaint.
Slander involves spoken defama tion, whereas libel refers to published written words.
Larson v. R.B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 29, 235 N.W.2d 393, 394 (1931). Larson points
to numerous separate instances in his complaint that he claims alleged slander. However,
each instance is merely a conclusory statemen t unsupported by a factual allegation. “A
conclusory, unsupported assertion is neither a well-pleaded fact nor is it evidence and,
therefore, it cannot make out a prima facie case.” DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875
N.W.2d 263, 276 n.5 (Minn. 20 16). Because slander requires verbal statements, Larson
was required to allege spoken defamation to sup port this allegation. He did not do so. It
was therefore proper for the district court to not consider these conclusory claims.
We do not discern any error by the district court. Furthermore, because respondents
are immune from Larson’s defamation claims and because respondents’ statements were
substantially true, any error would be immaterial.1

1 Larson also contends that th e district court erred when it ruled the reports in his MSOP
file were not sufficiently communicated to third parties so as to constitute defamation. The
district court did not reach the merits of Larson’s defamation claims because it concluded
respondents were immune. However, it did note that Larson’s statements were not
defamatory because the reports in his MSOP file did “not constitute statements made to a
member of the public or third party.” Because we agree that respondents are immune from
Larson’s defamation claim, and because Larson did not allege falsity adequate to support
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II. Emotional Distress
Larson contends that the district court erred by finding that he did not allege enough
facts to sustain his claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. To
sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Larson must show that
(1) the complained-of conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct was intentional
and reckless; (3) the conduct caused him emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress
was severe. Stead-Bowers v. Langley, 636 N.W.2d 334, 342 (Minn. App. 2001), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002). Intentional inf liction of emotional distress applies when
conduct is so “extreme and outrageous, so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency
and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community. Id. at 342 (quotation omitted). Larson
argues that the complaint established a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
by alleging that respondents maliciously fabricated statements that could lead to criminal
charges against him. Larson argues that this is reckless conduct that caused severe
depression, contemplation of suicide, an eating disorder, and other physical injuries.
Although Larson did allege th at respondents’ conduct was intentional and reckless,
he did not support this allegation with any f acts. As with his argument regarding actual
malice above, the absence of facts to support a conclusion of reck lessness is fatal to
Larson’s claim. See DeCook , 875 N.W.2d at 276 n.5. (“A conclusory, unsupported
assertion is neither a well-pleaded fact nor is it evidence and, therefore, it cannot make out
a prima facie case.”); see also Connelly v. Nw. Publ’ns, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn.

his defamation claim, we decline to consid er whether the reports were adequately
communicated so as to constitute defamation.
14
App. 1989) (applying a standard for actual malice based on recklessness), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 21, 1990).
Also, Larson’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish severe
emotional distress. “The standard is high. If a reasonable person could be expected to
endure the distress, the la w does not intervene.” Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 57; see also
Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co. , 411 N.W.2d 902, 9 08 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Even if severe
emotional distress exists, the defendant may es cape liability if the di stress is exaggerated
in comparison to what a reasonable person would expe rience under the
circumstances . . . .”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). In Elstrom, this court noted
that a plaintiff’s claim that she suffered insomnia, crying spells, fear, and depression did
not state a valid claim. 533 N.W.2d at 57.
Finally, because the statements Larson a lleges as defamatory are substantially
similar to the statements Larson admitted to in his complaint, we cannot conclude the
alleged defamation was unendurable. Because a reasonable person would not be subjected
to severe emotional distress by the exagge ration alleged as defamatory, Larson’s claim
fails. See Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. App. 1985)
(“If the claimed distress is of the type that people commonly encounter and endure in their
lives, then the claim should not even be submitted to the jury.”).
To sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Larson must show
that he “(1) was within a zone of danger of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for [his]
own safety; and (3) suffered severe emo tional distress with attendant physical
manifestations.” Stead-Bowers, 636 N.W.2d at 343 (Minn. App. 2001). “The zone of
15
danger requirement may be replaced by an intentional tort such as defamation . . . .” Oslin
v. State, 543 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. App. 1996) review denied (Minn. Apr. 1, 1996). A
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim fails when the defamation claim it is based
on fails. See id. (dismissing claim based on defamation because defamation claims failed);
see also Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 57 (“Elstrom’s neg ligent infliction of emotional distress
action fails along with the defamation claim.”).
Larson argues that he has established a cl aim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because his complaint alleged he was within a zone of danger of physical impact.
He further argues that he received the physical injury of arrhythmia and an eating disorder.
He argues that this shows he created a genuine issue of fact regarding whether he suffered
a physical injury or threat of physical injury. Alternatively, he argues that mental anguish
is a physical injury because mental anguish relates to the nervous system, which is part of
his person.
Emotional distress alone is not suffici ent to show a physical injury. See Leaon v.
Washington Cty. , 397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986 ) (Concluding that weight loss,
depression, anger, fear, and bitterness were insufficient to show physical injury). Larson’s
complaint alleged no facts that, if true, would support a finding that he was in a zone of
danger of physical impact as the result of the alleged defamation. Because Larson’s
underlying defamation claim fails , and because Larson has not alleged sufficient facts to
support his claims of intentio nal and negligent infliction of emotional distress, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of those claims.

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III. Negligence
Larson contends that the district court erred when it concluded there was no private
right of action under Minn. Stat. § 144.651. Section 144.651, subdivisions 5 and 6 provide:
“Patients and residents have the right to be treated with courtesy and respect for their
individuality by employees of or persons providing service in a health care facility” and
that “[p]atients and residents shall have the right to appropriate medical and personal care
based on individual needs.” However, “Minnesota Statutes section 144.651 does not create
a private cause of action.” Favors v. Kneisel , 902 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. App. 2017)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of a co mplaint because there was no private right of
action to sue DHS employees under Minn. Stat. § 144.651). Larson argues that the citation
in his complaint to Minn. Stat. § 144.651 was meant to inform the district court of certain
statutory obligations and to illu strate respondents’ level of negligence, but should not be
construed as making a claim based on Minn. Stat. § 144.651. To the extent that Larson’s
claim citing Minn. Stat. § 144.651 is not based on statute, we interpret it as realleging his
claims for emotional distress, which were properly dismissed.
IV. Negligent Hiri ng and Retention
Larson’s complaint alleged that res pondents MSOP and DHS were guilty of
negligent hiring and retention because indivi dual employees were unfit to serve in their
positions based on their negligent conduct. The district court dismissed Larson’s claim for
negligent hiring and retention, concluding “[a]lthough [Larson] does not sufficiently allege
actual physical injury as required to sustain a negligent hiring or retention claim, this is of
no moment, as [respondents] DHS and MSOP are again entitled to immunity from such
17
claims,” relying on the Minnesota Tort Claims Act. Respondents contend that Larson did
not adequately appeal this conclusion.
Larson’s reply brief argues that he adequately appealed the district court’s dismissal
of his negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim, citing portions of his initial brief
discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress. Between paragraphs discussing
Larson’s emotional-distress claim is the isolat ed sentence: “The district court erred as a
matter of law and fact and abused its disc retion when ruling that [Larson] ‘does not
sufficiently allege actual physical injury’ to sustain his neg ligent hiring and retention
claims and that ‘DHS and MSOP are again entitled to [statutory] immunity from such
claims.’” Larson makes no furt her mention of the negligent hiring and retention claim.
“An assignment of error based on mere asse rtion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived an d will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d at
772 (quotation omitted). Lars on’s single sentence asserting error did not serve to
adequately appeal the district court’s dismissal of his negligent hiring and retention claims.
V. Dismissal with Prejudice
Larson contends that the district court e rred when it dismissed his complaint with
prejudice. We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint with prejudice for
an abuse of discretion. Mercer v. Andersen , 715 N.W.2d 114, 120 (Minn. App. 2006).
“Where a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for purposes of
Rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal with prejudice and on
18
the merits is appropriate.” Martens v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 735
(Minn. 2000).
Larson argues that the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, combined with the
fact that two judges recused themselves from his case, indicates bias against him as a pro
se appellant. He does not support this contention with facts, but rather speculates that this
is due to some agreement be tween MSOP, the county, and th e public defender’s office.
Again, Larson makes mere assertions of erro r without supporting facts, authorities, or
arguments. His assignment of error is ther efore forfeited, and we discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court. See Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d at 772 (an
argument based on mere assertion of error is forfeited on appeal).
Affirmed.