State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1889

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathan Christopher Braun,
Appellant.

Filed September 4, 2018
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-16-1323

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Philip K. Miller, Benton County Attorney, Kathleen L. Reuter, Assistant County Attorney,
Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Kirk, Judge; an d Smith, Tracy M.,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this appeal from a conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court committed plain error by
admitting irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In March of 2016, City of Foley police officers received a rep ort that appellant
Nathan Christopher Braun engaged in sexual conduct with H.E., a m i n o r f e m a l e , f r o m
October of 2015 through February of 2016. Appellant was arrested and charged with one
count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct shortly thereafter. A one-day jury trial was
held in July of 2017 in Benton County.
At trial, H.E. testified that she and appellant met through a friend and that appellant
informed her, when they first met, that he was 17 years old. At the time, H.E. was 14 years
old and appellant was 24 years old. H.E. testified that appellant pressured her into a sexual
relationship soon after the two began dating. Their sexual relationship involved oral sex,
digital penetration, and eventually sexual intercourse. H.E. t estified that appellant would
pressure her into performing sexual acts any time they were together.
During her testimony, H.E. described two instances that her sis ter, P.E., observed
H.E. and appellant shortly after they engaged in sexual contact. Each time P.E. walked in,
she observed H.E. or appellant without clothing. Eventually, H .E. and members of her
family discovered that appellant was living at an adult group h ome in St. Cloud and
confronted appellant about his age. At that time, appellant informed the family that he was

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19 years old. Appellant and H.E.’s relationship ended in February 2016. Shortly thereafter,
H.E. was admitted to a mental-health facility and began receivi ng mental-health
counseling. H.E. contacted law enforcement in March of 2016 an d reported her sexual
relationship with appellant. On cross-examination, H.E. admitted that she had previously
denied that she and appellant had sexual intercourse due to her shame and the presence of
her family members at the time sh e was asked, but she testified that she began telling the
truth when she made a formal statement to police.
P.E. also testified about H.E. a nd appellant’s relationship. S he stated that the two
spent a great deal of time together and described the two insta nces she observed H.E. and
appellant in various stages of undress. After one of these ins tances, P.E. asked appellant
how old he was, and in response appellant sent her an altered p hoto of a driver’s license
that showed him to be 17 years old. In that same conversation, she recalled that appellant
stated that he was “sorry that [P.E.] had to walk in on that” in reference to the second time
she observed the two without clothing.
The state presented additional testimony from two police offic ers and two of H.E.’s
friends, A.K. and J.C. Chief McMillin of the Foley Police Depa rtment detailed her
involvement in the investigation and explained that H.E. and he r mother came to report
appellant’s conduct. She stated that they also turned over a hard drive that appellant left at
their home when the relationshi p ended. Chief McMillin intervi ewed H.E. and H.E.
described her relationship w ith appellant, initially denying th e two had sex, but later
providing a full description of t he nature of their relationshi p. Chief McMillin also
reviewed the files on the hard drive and discovered photographs of appellant and H.E. and

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slideshows titled “Just For [H.E.]” that included photographs of appellant and H.E. and a
photograph of appellant naked with a rooster covering his genitals.
The state called Officer Triplett, the officer who arrested app ellant and took his
statement. During Officer Triplett’s testimony, a transcript o f appellant’s post-arrest
statement was distributed to the jury and the jury listened to an audio recording of the
statement. During his statement, appellant admitted that he an d H.E. were dating for a
period of five months. He claimed, however, that he informed H.E. of his real age and that
H.E. manipulated him into the relationship. Appellant admitted that the two kissed, but
stated that the two never went further and explained that the i nstances where they were
observed without clothing were a result of H.E.’s advances. Appellant also stated that H.E.
sent him naked photos on approximately 20 occasions.
Appellant’s statement also extended to a discussion about A.K. In his statement,
appellant acknowledged knowing A. K. and denied ever requesting naked photographs
from her. When asked if he had any illicit photos on his lapto p, appellant discussed his
current relationship with another woman and stated they had made the pornographic video
found on his hard drive. Appella nt also discussed two additional relationships with other
women over the age of 18.
In addition, the state called A.K. to testify about appellant’s relationship with H.E.
A.K. testified that she was a friend of H.E. and that at the ti me the offense occurred she
was 16 years old. She explained that appellant told her he was 17 years old and that
appellant discussed his sexual relationship with H.E. with her. She also testified that
appellant sent her sexually explicit text messages using variou s messaging applications,

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and that the communications included sexually explicit photos o f himself. A.K. also
described one incident where appellant attempted to sleep in a bed with her and attempted
to kiss her in her sleep.
J.C. also offered testimony about H.E. and appellant’s relatio nship. J.C. was a
friend of H.E. and was a minor at the time the offense occurred . She stated that appellant
told her that he was 17 years old and informed her that he and H.E. were sexually active.
In addition, J.C. testified that appellant sent her three sexua lly explicit photos—the same
photos sent to A.K. and found on appellant’s hard drive.
The state rested and appellant d id not present any evidence. Through cross-
examination, defense counsel arg ued to the jury that the charge s against appellant were
false and stemmed from a bad brea k-up with a mentally unstable H.E. The jury found
appellant guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. The district court imposed
a sentence of 91 months. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court admitted
irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence. Appellant poin ts to three specific pieces
of inadmissible evidence: (1) testimony about sexually explici t text messages with A.K.
and J.C.; (2) testimony about appellant’s conduct at a sleepove r with A.K and J.C.; and
(3) evidence that appellant made a pornographic video with anot her woman. Because
appellant did not object to the evidence at trial, we review th e admission of that evidence
for plain error. See State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (reviewing an
unobjected-to-issue for plain e rror). To establish plain error , appellant must show that

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there was: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that the e rror affected substantial rights.
Id.
A plain error is one that is “clear” or “obvious,” and “contrav enes case law, a rule,
or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006) (quotation
marks omitted). An appellant “generally bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the
third factor.” State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007). And if an appellant “fails
to establish that the claimed error affected his substantial rights, we need not consider the
other factors.” Id. But if an appellant “satisfies the first three prongs of the pl ain-error
doctrine, we may correct the error only if it seriously affect[ s] the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.
2014) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Appellant argues that the district court
plainly erred in allowing testimony about each of the three cha llenged pieces of evidence
because they were irrelevant and improper character evidence.
I. Relevance
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence
is defined as “evidence having a ny tendency to make the existen ce of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more [or less] p robable.” Minn. R. Evid.
401. The rules of evidence do not allow relevant evidence to b e admitted if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice to the accused.
Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Here, appellant’s conduct towards H.E.’s friends, including the photographs he sent
them and his conduct at the sleepover, was relevant to establis h appellant’s ownership of

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the photographs on the hard drive and to support H.E.’s testimo ny regarding appellant’s
conduct towards her and the other underage girls at the time of their relationship. The
district court did not commit plain error in allowing the testimony on relevance grounds.
However, statements regarding the pornographic video that appel lant created with
another woman were not relevant evidence. Even though that evi dence may have been
irrelevant, appellant has failed to establish that its admissio n was plain error. The
references to the video came before the jury when a recording o f appellant’s statement to
police was played during Officer Triplett’s testimony. Appella nt did not object to any
portion of the statement prior t o trial. Appellant contends th at it was plain error for the
district court to play the full statement, withou t sua sponte r edacting portions of the
statement that were inadmissible. Only in rare circumstances h ave appellate courts
imposed such a duty on district courts. See State v. Pearson , 775 N.W.2d 155, 161-62
(Minn. 2009) (concluding that a district court plainly erred by not removing references to
a defendant’s right to counsel fro m a recorded police interview ); State v. Winter , 668
N.W.2d 222, 226 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that a district c ourt plainly erred by not
redacting references to a polygra ph test from a recording and t ranscript of a police
interview).
The substance of the statement c omplained of here is not akin t o the categorically
inadmissible information at issue in Pearson and Winter. References to the pornographic
video did not run afoul of a ppellant’s constitutionally protected rights and were confined
to one sentence in his statement. Accordingly, the admission of his full recorded statement
was not plain error. Because no rule or caselaw clearly imposes a duty on the district court

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to sua sponte redact any and all inadmissible portions of an otherwise admissible recorded
statement, the district court did not plainly err by allowing appellant’s full statement to be
presented to the jury.
II. Character Evidence
Appellant argues that the three challenged pieces of evidence q ualify as
inadmissible character evidence un der Minnesota Rule of Evidenc e 404(a). In general,
“[e]vidence of a person’s character . . . is not admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a par ticular occasion.” Minn. R. Ev id. 404(a). Character
evidence is generally prohibited to ensure that the jury does n ot return a conviction to
penalize a defendant for “past m isdeeds or simply because [the defendant] is an
undesireable person.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981).
As contemplated by rule 404(a), character evidence “is consider ed to be a
generalized description of one’s disposition, or of one’s dispo sition in respect to a
generalized trait.” Minn. R. Ev id. 406 cmt. (quotation omitted ); see State v. Yang , 644
N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 2002) (an alyzing “gang affiliation” as a form of character
evidence); State v. Williams , 525 N.W.2d 538, 547-48 (Minn. 1994) (evaluating “drug
courier profile evidence” as character evidence).
The challenged pieces of evidence here are not generalized desc riptions of
appellant’s character or traits but involved testimony surrounding distinct events. Unlike
evidence of gang affiliation, pro file evidence, or opinion test imony regarding personality
traits, the distinct events described here do not constitute character evidence.

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Alternatively, appellant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
introducing these three pieces o f evidence without providing pr oper notice. When an
appellant fails to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we review the claim under a
modified plain-error standard. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. Under this modified standard,
“when the [appellant] demonstrates that the prosecutor’s conduct constitutes an error that
is plain, the burden would then shift to the state to demonstra te lack of prejudice; that is,
the misconduct did not affect substantial rights.” Id. To demonstrate that the misconduct
did not affect substantial rights, the state must show that tha t there is “no reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant
effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The first issue is whether the a lleged misconduct qualifies as “plain or obvious
error” or “conduct the prosecutor should know is improper.” Id. at 300. Rule 404(b)
provides that “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is no t admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, [or] intent.” Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). Bad-acts
evidence, or Spreigl evidence, is admissible only if:
(1) [N]otice is given that the state intends to use the evidence;
(2) the state clearly indicates what the evidence is being
offered to prove; (3) the evidence is clear and convincing that
the defendant participated in the other [bad act]; (4) the Spreigl
evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case; and (5) the
probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice.

State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998).

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Here, the three challenged pieces of evidence constitute prior bad acts and therefore
qualify as Spreigl evidence, requiring notice.1 The state failed to provide formal Spreigl
notice prior to the trial and the district court did not have t he opportunity to evaluate
whether the evidence was relevant and material nor whether its probative value outweighed
the potential for unfair prejudice. The failure to provide for mal notice was plain and
obvious error.
In assessing whether there is a reasonable likelihood that prov iding formal Spreigl
notice would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdic t, we consider “the strength
of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and
whether the defendant had an op portunity to (or made efforts to ) rebut the improper
suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007).
The evidence against appellant was substantial. H.E.’s testimony strongly supports
appellant’s guilt, standing alon e. She testified at length tha t appellant lied about his age
and pressured her into engaging in sexual activity. She furthe r revealed that the two
engaged in oral sex and vaginal sex on numerous occasions while she was underage. P.E.’s
testimony about observing H.E. and appellant without clothing o n two occasions,
combined with H.E.’s and appellan t’s acknowledgment of those ev ents further support a
conclusion that appellant and H.E. engaged in sexual activity. In addition, A.K.’s and

1 The state does not argue, and therefore we do not address, whe ther the evidence related
to appellant’s conduct towards A.K. and J.C. may have been admitted under the immediate-
episode exception to rule 404(b). See State v. Riddley , 776 N.W.2d 419, 424-27 (Minn.
2009); State v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 117-18, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962).

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J.C.’s testimony about appellant’s age and appellant’s admission to them that he and H.E.
engaged in sexual activity support the jury’s verdict.
Moreover, when A.K. and J.C. testified about the text messages and appellant’s
conduct at a sleepover, and when the recording of appellant’s statement was played at trial,
appellant had the opportunity t o rebut any improper suggestions by objecting to portions
of the recording, cross-examining the witnesses, or requesting a curative instruction.
Appellant’s counsel cross-examined both A.K. and J.C. about their own credibility and that
of H.E. but appellant did not object to the recording at any point during or before trial. In
fact, defense counsel reference d appellant’s conversation with A.K. as a means of
explaining why H.E. pursued charges against him and suggested that the fact that H.E. was
not involved in the pornographic video was evidence that she wa s fabricating her story.
And while the prosecutor refere nced appellant’s sexual advances towards A.K. and his
“naughty” messages to A.K. and J.C., those references did not p ervade or dominate her
closing statement.
Even if appellant was provided with Spreigl notice related to the challenged pieces
of evidence, and the district court had excluded the statements , the testimony of the other
witnesses would have been suffici ent to corroborate H.E.’s test imony about the sexual
conduct. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that i t is not reasonably likely
that the absence of the testimony concerning appellant’s pornographic video with another
woman, his text messages to H.E.’s friends, and his conduct at the sleepover, would have
changed the jury’s evaluation of H.E.’s credibility and appella nt’s credibility. Based on
the nature of the three pieces o f challenged evidence and a rev iew of the evidence as a

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whole, we conclude that the stat e established that there is no reasonable likelihood that
providing formal Spreigl notice would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.
III. Appellant’s Pro Se Arguments
Appellant raises four additional claims in his supplemental bri ef and argues that:
(1) his attorney failed to disclose the state’s evidence to him directly and failed to subpoena
appellant’s mother and another woman to testify on his behalf; (2) the state failed to prove
that his statement to police was false; (3) his statements to P.E. were taken out of context;
and (4) the hard drive was provided to the police by a biased party and therefore lacked the
proper chain of custody.
Appellant’s arguments are without merit or support. And “[w]e will not consider
pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either argument s or citations to legal
authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008); State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d
713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (determining arguments in an appellant’s pro se supplemental brief
waived because the “brief contain[ed] no argument or citation to legal authority in support
of the allegations.”). Because appellant failed to support these arguments with citations to
relevant facts before this court or legal authority, we deem them waived.
Affirmed.