In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. I. Q., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1901

In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. I. Q., Child.

Filed July 9, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-6597

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth District Public Defender, David W. Merchant, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant A.I.Q.)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal and remand of the restitution ordered in a disposition order,
arguing that she did not directly cause the victim’s loss and that the district court failed to
make sufficient disposition findings. We affirm.

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FACTS
Victim B.W. accidentally dropped the car keys to her red PT Cruiser and
subsequently discovered that her car was missing. B.W. immediately reported to law
enforcement that her car had been stolen. The next day, a Minne sota Highway Patrol
Trooper observed a red PT Cruiser with an expired registration and learned that its owner
had reported it stolen. The trooper stopped the car and asked the driver to identify herself.
The driver, appellant A.I.Q., gave the trooper a false name. A.I.Q. subsequently provided
her true name at the Hennepin County Juvenile Supervision Center.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged A. I.Q., a juvenile, for falsely identifying
herself to a peace officer and tampering with a motor vehicle. B.W. claimed that her
recovered car was missing $2,000 worth of clothing.
At a pretrial hearing, the parties reached a plea agreement. A.I.Q. admitted to both
charges, and the state reduced the false-na me charge from a gross misdemeanor to a
misdemeanor and dismissed six other cases pending against her. A victim advocate for
B.W. read B.W.’s victim-imp act statement on the record. Th e juvenile court issued a
written order, adjudicating A.I.Q. delinquent as to both charges, dismissed the other cases
pending against her, placed her on probation, and ordered a restitution study.
B.W. subsequently submitted a restitution claim for $2, 129.68 that was comprised
of $200 for B.W.’s insurance deductible, $1,800 for missing clot hes not covered by
insurance, and $129.68 in lost wages. The district court modified A.I.Q.’s disposition to
include restitution to B.W. in the amount of $2,129.68. A .I.Q. requested a restitution
hearing, denying that she caused B.W. any lo ss, disputing the value of missing clothing,

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and claiming that she lacked the ability to pay th e restitution award. At the restitution
hearing, through counsel, A.I.Q. stipulated to the admission of the following documents:
(1) a memorandum of a meeting between the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office and
B.W.’s victim advocate; (2) a memorandum of a meeting between the Hennepin County
Attorney’s Office and B.W.; (3) a victim impact/restitution report prepared by the
Hennepin County Attorney’s Office; and (4) B.W.’s restitution claim form.
The district court determined that the record was insufficient as to A.I.Q.’s inability
to pay restitution, that restitution served “a rehabilitative purpose” for A.I.Q., and that,
based on the law favoring restitution and the fa ctual basis for the ch arges, the court had
properly ordered A.I.Q. to pay restitution of $2,129.68 to B.W. for her loss.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
“In juvenile-delinquency matters, restitu tion is governed by both the restitution
provision of the juvenile-delinquency statute . . . and the general restitution statute.” In re
Welfare of I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 28,
2017); see Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04, .045 (2016) (allo wing restitution if an offender is
“found delinquent”); Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subds. 1(5), 8 (2016) (allowing for restitution
in juvenile-delinquency cases). “The primary purpose of the [restitution] statute is to
restore crime victims to the same financia l position they were in before the crime.” State
v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. 2007). Part of a district court’s “duty to vindicate
a victim’s statutory right to restitution . . . is to award some amount of restitution when

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there is economic loss to a victim.” State v. Davis, 907 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Minn. App. 2018)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). In determining whether to order
restitution, the district court must consider “the amount of economic loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense” and the “income, resources, a nd obligations of the
defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.0 45, subd. 1(a). “The record must provide the [district]
court with a factual basis to award restitution.” State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn.
2014). “The burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim is on the
prosecution.” Id.; Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a).
“A district court has broad discretion to award restitution,” and its order “will not
be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913
(Minn. 2015). “The district court’s factual fi ndings will not be dist urbed unless they are
clearly erroneous.” Id.
A.I.Q. argues that we must reverse the di strict court’s restitution order because the
record lacks sufficient evidence to prove that her conduct directly caused B.W.’s clothing
loss. Indeed, “[r]estitution has limits”; a dist rict court should only order restitution for
“losses the defendant directly caused by the conduct that led to h[er] conviction.” State v.
Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 15, 2014); State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[A] loss
claimed as an item of restitution by a crime victim must have some factual relationship to
the crime committed—a compensa ble loss must be directly caused by the conduct for
which the defendant was convicted.” (quotation omitted)). A district court “may not order

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restitution for conduct that is only tangentially related to the criminal act that caused the
loss.” Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477.
A.I.Q. argues that she never admitted to ta king the clothes and that the district
court’s findings do not support re stitution for the lost clothes. She states that “[n]othing
other than sheer speculation co nnects [her] to the missing clot hes.” But the district court
ordered restitution based on facts stipulated to and therefore admitted by A.I.Q., including
that B.W.’s car contained clothes prior to it going missing, A.I.Q. had been in B.W.’s car
without B.W.’s permission, and when B.W. r ecovered her car, her clothes were missing.
The district court concluded that a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that
A.I.Q.’s conduct caused the loss of B.W.’s cl othes, and that “enough of a nexus” existed
to award restitution for B.W.’s lost clothes.
A district court decides the proper am ount or type of restitution based on a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Willis, 898 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 2017). The
preponderance of the evidence standard “requires that to establish a fact, it must be more
probable that the fact exists th an that the contrary exists. If evidence of a fact or issue is
equally balanced, then that fact or issue has not been established by a preponderance of the
evidence.” In re Source Code Evidentiary Hear ings in Implied Consent Matters , 816
N.W.2d 525, 538–39 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). Allowing the district
court to factually resolve restitution disputes frees the crime victim “from the burden of
instituting a civil action based upon the same conduct.” State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280,
283 (Minn. 1996).

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Here, at the plea hearing, a victim’s advocate read B.W.’s victim-impact statement
on the record, which included B. W.’s statement that “[w]or st of all was the loss of
irreplaceable items I had in my car that I was in the process of moving to storage. Several
were boxes of clothing.”1 The following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: [A.I.Q.], when you heard that statement from
the victim, how did that make you feel?
A.I.Q.: Not very good. Sad.

The district court then informed A.I.Q. that she would “have to pay any restitution back for
any of the victim’s costs,” and asked A.I.Q. if she understood that, and she replied yes. At
no point did A.I.Q. or her counsel deny that she had taken the clothes or object to restitution
for the missing clothes. Moreover, prior to the restitution hearing, the state filed exhibits
that included an itemized list of losses, including the missing clothes. And, at the hearing,
A.I.Q. stipulated to the admission of the exhibits without qualification.
In State v. Gaiovnik , the supreme court concluded that the record contained
sufficient evidence to award restitution, stating that th e offender “was on notice prior to
and during trial” of the requested restitution and that both he and th e district court “were
aware of [the victim’s] loss, and [the offender] has never contested the amount of the loss.”
794 N.W.2d 643, 652 (Minn. 2011). Here, A.I.Q . offered no evidence to the contrary or
disputed the district court’s implications that she had caused B.W.’s loss. Based on the
record, we conclude that the district court properly found that a preponderance of the
evidence supported a finding that A.I.Q.’s cond uct caused the loss of B.W.’s clothes. See

1 Part of the clothing included items that had belonged to B.W.’s deceased child.

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id. (concluding that record supported award of restitution when offender was on notice of
loss and did not provide contrary evidence that he caused the loss).
The record supports the district court’s findings that B.W. had $2,000 worth of
clothes in her car prior to it being stolen, that the clothes were missing when B.W. retrieved
her car, and that A.I.Q. admitted to being in B.W.’s car without permission in the
intervening time. And A.I.G. did not deny at the restitution hearing that she caused the loss
of B.W.’s clothes, i.e., that the clothes we re not in B.W.’s car when she came into
possession of it without B.W.’s permission. Further, prior to the restitution hearing, A.I.Q.
knew about B.W.’s missing clothes and was on notice that B.W. was seeking restitution
for them.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering A.I.Q. to
pay restitution for B.W.’s missing clothes because evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that she directly caused B.W.’s loss. See Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667 (affirming
restitution for expenses incurred by victim’s children attending court proceedings because
“the claimed loss [was not] too attenuated from the criminal act.”); Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d
at 283–84 (affirming award of restitution where preponderance of the evidence supported
award even though state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the offense of theft); In
re Welfare of J.A.D. , 603 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. App. 1999) (affirming restitution
compensating mother of minor victim for driv ing expenses incurred taking victim to an
interview); but see State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. App. 1999) (concluding
that the district court abused its discre tion in awarding restitution for murder where
offender convicted of accessory after the fact denied participating in the murder).

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II.
A.I.Q. argues that we must reverse the restitution order and remand to the district
court because it failed to make the requisite statutory findings. A.I.Q. argues that the district
court failed to make findings about her best interests, benefit to public safety, and
alternative dispositions.
Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinque ncy Procedure 15.05 , subdivision 2(A),
provides that a dispositional order made by the district court
shall contain written findings of fact to support the disposition
ordered and shall set forth in writing the following information:
(1) why public safety and the best interests of the child
are served by the disposition ordered; [and]
(2) what alternative dispositions were recommended to
the court and why such recommendations were not ordered.
“Written findings are required in juvenile-delinquency cases to show that the district court
considered vital standards and to enable the parties to unde rstand the court’s decision.”
I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d at 642 (quotation omitted). A court’s failure to issue adequate findings
in a juvenile-disposition order constitutes reversible error. Id.
Here, the district court considered A .I.Q.’s proposal of pa ying only $250 in
restitution and found that “ordering restitution in the full amount in this case does serve a
rehabilitative purpose — [A.I.Q.]’s payments to the victim will provide a monthly reminder
of the losses endured by this victim and may deter [A.I.Q.] from committing similar crimes
in the future.”
A.I.Q. argues that the district court’s di sposition order should be reversed because
of its similarity to the order reviewed in I.N.A. At age 14, I.N.A. vandalized public park

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property, and the state charged him with criminal damage to property. I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d
at 638. The district court continued the case without adjudication, conditioned in part on
I.N.A. paying restitution in the amount of $12,529.90. Id. At a contested restitution hearing,
I.N.A.’s mother testified that I.N.A. had atte ntion deficit hyperactivity disorder, dyslexia,
had missed developmental milestones, and received special education in school. Id. at 638–
39. She also testified that I.N.A.’s disabilities would prevent him from finding a job to pay
the restitution and that her family only could afford to pay “maybe” $50 per week. Id. at
639. When ordering the $12,529.90 in restitution, the district court stated that the restitution
“serves to rehabilitate I.N.A. by demonstra ting the amount of time and money that goes
into maintaining our citie s’ public park systems.” Id. at 642. This court reversed and
remanded the restitution order, c oncluding that the district court’s finding was “not an
explicit written finding addressing the statutory factors” in Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05
and that the court did not “explicitly discuss” alternative dispositions and why the court
had not ordered them. Id.
The case before us is distinguishable from I.N.A. In this case, A.I.Q. was 16 at the
time that she engaged in the delinquent conduct and age 17 when the district court issued
its disposition order that included restitution. A.I.Q. offered no testimony or other evidence
to support an argument that she was unable to pay restituti on. And the district court
“explicitly discuss[ed]” the a lternative disposition of lowe ring the amount of restitution
owed by A.I.Q. See id. (concluding that district court fa iled to discuss any alternative
disposition). We conclude that under the ci rcumstances in this case, the court made
sufficient findings under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05.

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Because the district court made adequate findings, and because the record supports
the restitution awarded, we conclude that th e court did not abuse its discretion, and we
affirm.
Affirmed.