State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1956

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Isiah Jones,
Appellant.

Filed November 26, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-2848

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi L. Proulx, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of felony violation of an order for protection
(OFP). He argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting overly

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prejudicial and cumulative relationship evidence and that the failure to provide a limiting
instruction on the proper use of relationship evidence during final jury instructions was
error. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 29, 2013, the district court issued an OFP against appellant Joshua Jones.
The OFP prohibited Jones from having contac t with his ex -girlfriend, A.S., including
contact by “telephone, mail, or electronic mail or messaging [or] through a third party.”
The OFP was extended for an additional ten years in 2015.
In March 2017, A.S. received phone calls from a number that she did not recognize.
After answering the phone, A.S. recognized the caller as Jones and contacted the police.
A few days later, A.S. received another phone call, during which the caller asked her why
she called the police. A.S. hung up. After receiving another phone call, A.S. contacted the
police. The state charged Jones with two felony counts of domestic abuse (violation of
OFP).
At trial, the district court allowed the prosecutor to introduce relationship evidence
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2016) and Minnesota caselaw over Jones’s objection .
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Jones contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to
introduce relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and Minnesota caselaw. See
State v. Horman n, 805 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Minnesota caselaw has

3
established a basis for the introduction of relationship evidence independent of Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 . . . .”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012) . The evidence included A.S.’s
testimony about her relationship with Jones and certified copies of Jones’s six prio r
convictions, all of which involved A.S.
We review the admission of relationship evidence for an abuse of discretion. State
v. McCoy , 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (reviewing admission of relationship
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20); Hormann, 805 N.W.2d at 888 (reviewing admission
of relationship evidence under Minnesota caselaw).
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 governs the admissibility of evidence of domestic conduct .
The statute provides:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Domestic conduct includes evidence of domestic abuse and violation
of an OFP. Id. Relationship evidence can also be admitted independently of Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d at 890. Evidence offered to “show the strained
relationship between the accused and the victim” is especially probative when it
contextualizes the charged incident . Id. (quotation omitted). Relationship evidence,
whether admitted under section 634.20 or caselaw, requires the district court to balance the
probative nature of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice. Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20; Hormann, 805 N.W.2d at 890.

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Jones contends that A.S.’s testimony about their rel ationship was unfairly
prejudicial because her testimony was not limited or tailored by the district court and
because it described acts of domestic violence such as “choking,” “smothering,” and
“kicking.”
A.S. testified about the history of her relationship with Jon es. A.S. described
instances of Jones’s behavior such as him coming to her house in violation of the OFP,
breaking windows, kicking down her door, choking her, putting a pillow over her face, and
threatening her over the phone. A.S.’s testimony was limited to the instances of conduct
that prompted her to seek orders for protection against Jones or to report his violations of
existing orders. Her testimony did not contain graphic detail or focus on any one incident
for an extensive period of time.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it persuades by illegitimate means and gives
one party an unfair advantage. State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006). The
district court acknowledged the potential for unfair prejudice, but stated that it would
instruct the jury not to use the evidence in an impermissible way . The district court gave
the jury a limiting instruction before A.S.’s testimony and before the admission of Jones’s
prior convictions, but did not include a limiting instru ction in the final jury instructions.
Jurors are presumed to have followed instructions. State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 151
(Minn. 2011).
The supreme court has held that relationship evidence is admissible when it helps
to contextualize the relationship between the accused and the victim. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d
at 159. Relationship evidence has “further probative value when it serves to place the

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incident . . . into proper context.” State v. Loving , 775 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. 2009)
(quotation omitted). Allowing the relationship evidence here was probative because, as
the district court determined, it provided the jury with context of the relationship between
Jones and A.S. The history of their relationship helped the jury understand why A.S. was
upset by the phone calls in 2017 and assisted the jury in assessing the credibility of her
testimony that the caller was Jones. Because the background evidence better enabled the
jury to properly evaluate how and why the phone calls made A.S. fearful, the district court
properly exercised its discretion by admitting A.S.’s testimony concerning the relationship.
Jones also contends that the admission of certified copies of his six prior domestic-
conduct convictions was unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. Whi le he concedes that
admission of two of the convictions was necessary for the state to prove an element of the
offense for which he was being tried, Jones asserts that the admission of the four additional
prior convictions did not provide necessary context. We disagree. The supreme court has
“recognized the inherent value of evidence of past acts of violence committed by the same
defendant against the same victim.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted) . In
addition, the supreme court has held that relationship evidence that assists the jury in
understanding the relationship between the parties and making credibility determinations
is relevant, probative, and admissible. Id.; State v. Barnslater , 786 N.W.2d 646, 65 2
(Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010). Jones could have stipulated to
the prior -convictions element of the offense s but chose not to. The admitted prior
convictions were all the result of offenses committed against A.S. and did serve to
contextualize the relationship be tween her and Jones. Accordingly, we conclude that the

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district court acted within its discretion by admitting the evidence of Jones’s prior
convictions.
II.
Jones argues that the district court committed reversible plain error by failing to
include a third limiting instruction in the final jury instructions. He did not object at trial.
For this court to review a claimed error that was not objected to, there must be “(1) error;
(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three prongs are
met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998) (footnote omitted).
In State v. Meldrum, we stated that when relationship evidence is admitted, “ [a]
cautionary instruction is strongly preferred.” 724 N.W.2d 15, 22 (Minn. App. 2006) ,
review denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007). We noted that “[u]pon the admittance of relationship
evidence . . . the district court should provide a cautionary instruction when the evidence
is admitted, and again during its final charge to the jury. ” Id. at 21. But we further stated
that, while a cautionary instruction concerning the proper use of relationship evidence is
preferred, the absence of such an instruction does not automatically constitute plain error.
Id. at 22.
Here, the district court gave the following instruction prior to A.S.’s testimony,
consistent with 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 2.07 (2017):
[T]he state is about to introduce evidence of conduct by Mr.
Jones. The evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship between

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Mr. Jones and [A.S.] . . . [i]n order to assist you in determining
whether or not the defendant committed the acts that he is being
charged with in this case [.] [T]he defendant is not being tried
for and may not be convicted of any behavior other than the
offenses that he is charged with in this case. To do so might
result in an unjust double punishment.

When certified copies of Jones’s convictions were offered through the officer, the
district court gave the jury a second cautionary instruction, which was substantially the
same as the first.
The supreme court has held that there was no plain error when the prosecutor
outlined permissible uses of relationship evidence, even when the district court did not
provide any cautionary instructions. State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 366 (Minn. 1999).
In Bauer, the supreme court noted that, “[i]mportantly, at no time did the state suggest that
the relationship evidence be used for an improper purpose.” Id. at 365. Rather, the state
“prefaced its summary of the relationship evidence” by pointing out a permissible use. Id.
at 365-66.
Here, in closing argument, the prosecutor similarly reminded the jury of the proper,
limited use of the relationship evidence, stating:
You heard a lot of evidence about the history, and as the
Court told you, you are not to consider that as it relates to the
defendant’s guilt in this case because it’s improper for you to
say, listen, he’s done all this bad stuff before, he must have
done this now, righ t? But these types of cases that come up
where there’s a court order for protection, there’s a relationship
involved, there’s context. And so that information was given
to you so you could understand how they got here, how did this
order get put in place, why was it put in place, why did a judge,
after hearing evidence, determine that [A.S.] was in need of
protection from the defendant, and why was he banned from
having . . . any contact with her.

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The district court gave the jury two clear cautionary instructions during trial, which
the jurors are presumed to have followed. And, as in Bauer, the prosecutor reminded the
jury of the proper use of the admitted relationship evidence during closing argument.
Because we conclude that the district court did not err by failing to give a third cautionary
instruction during its final jury instructions, we need not determine whether the error was
plain or whether it affected substantial rights. State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn.
2002). We discern no error.
Affirmed.