State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1968

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jennifer Ann Culver,
Appellant.

Filed December 31, 2018
Reversed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-5774

Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assista nt County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina Schu lz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, J udge; and Reyes,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that her conviction must be reversed because insufficient evidence
supported her conviction of dep rivation of parental rights and, in the alternative, that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting relationship evidence at trial. We reverse.
FACTS
The underlying facts of this case stem from a family court matter between appellant
Jennifer Culver and D.E. After appellant and D.E. were in a br ief relationship, appellant
became pregnant with D.E.’s child , L. The relationship ended b efore L. was born in
September 2012, and D.E. did not know that appellant was pregna nt or had given birth to
L. until approximately June 2013. D.E. eventually obtained court-ordered visitation rights.
In August 2016, the state charged appellant with one count of deprivation of parental
rights during the time period of July 25 through August 8, 2016, under Minn. Stat. § 609.26,
subd. 1(3) (2016). After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the state failed to prove two elements of the offense: her intent
and that her conduct amounted to “substantial” deprivation unde r the statute. Appellant
contends the circumstances prove d would lead the jury to reason ably infer an alternative
hypothesis inconsistent with guilt.1 We agree.

1 Appellant filed a supplemental pro se brief, which we construe as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Because we address the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge
raised in appellant’s principal brief in the body of this opini on, we need not separately
address appellant’s pro se argument.

3
Under Minnesota Statutes, whoever intentionally “takes, obtains, retains, or fails to
return a minor child from or to the parent in violation of a co urt order, where the action
manifests an intent to substantia l l y d e p r i v e t h e p a r e n t o f r i g hts to parenting time or
custody,” may be charged with and convicted of a felony. Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3).
When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim involves the question of whether a
defendant’s conduct meets the statutory definition of an offens e, an appellate court is
presented with a question of sta tutory interpretation that is r eviewed de novo. State v.
Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013). The first step in a statut ory interpretation
analysis is to determine whether the statute’s language is ambi guous. State v. Peck, 773
N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). I f it is unambiguous, we interpr et the statute’s text
according to its plain language. State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284-85 (Minn. 2015).
Where the statute does not provide a definition of a word, we l ook to the plain meaning.
State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). To identify the plain meaning of a
particular word used in a statute, it is appropriate to refer to the common usage of the word.
State v. Fitman , 811 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. App . 2012). The common definition of
“substantial” is “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent.” The
American Heritage Dictionary 1213 (2d ed. 1985).
Intent is a product of the mind, based on inference, and is gen erally proven by
circumstantial evidence. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Therefore,
the circumstantial-evidence analysis is appropriate here in det ermining whether the state
proved the element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. When r eviewing a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence , this court applies a two-step analysis. State v. Harris,

4
895 N.W.2d 592, 600-601 (Minn. 2017). The first step is to ide ntify the circumstances
proved “by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,” in deference to the
jury’s credibility determinations. Id. at 600. Second, this court independently considers
the “reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. at 601.
“To sustain the conviction, the circumstances proved, when view ed as a whole, must be
consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
The state proved the following circumstances at trial. Appella nt denied D.E.
parenting time on seven occasions: July 25, July 26, July 29, A ugust 1, August 2, August
6, and August 8. On one of these occasions, she was home but s till prevented D.E. from
seeing L. The family court ordered that D.E.’s parenting time on Mondays, Tuesdays, and
Saturdays was to begin on July 25 unless the parties reached a mutual agreement otherwise,
despite appellant’s family wedding. Appellant and D.E. did not reach a mutual agreement.
Appellant sent D.E. a message on July 25, approximately four ho urs before his scheduled
parenting time, stating that L. would be unavailable for a week and a half due to the family
wedding. D.E. responded that h e may have been willing to work with appellant had she
informed him of the conflict earlier. On August 5, appellant stated that she needed to leave
town immediately due to a death in the family, the services wer e August 8 and August 9,
and L. would not be available until after the services on Tuesday, August 9. Investigation
showed that appellant’s son-in-law’s father died on July 27 and a funeral service was being
held on Monday, August 8, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

5
Based on the circumstances proved, there is a reasonable hypoth esis that appellant
intended to substantially deprive D.E. of parenting time. However, we also conclude that
there is a reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt, which is that appellant did not
intend to substantially deprive D.E. of his parenting time, based on the plain meaning of
the word. The circumstances do not indicate that appellant att empted to conceal L.’s
whereabouts, she did not leave the state, the time period of th e charged conduct was
relatively short, and she let D. E. know why he could not pick u p L. Moreover, the
undisputed evidence presented by D.E. shows that appellant main tained regular
communication with him. On multiple occasions, appellant indic ated to D.E. that she
would like to meet to reschedule the visits, and when D.E. did not acknowledge her
willingness to reschedule visits, she suggested specific dates when he could begin makeup
visits. He eventually agreed to meet to discuss makeup visits. Further, while the record
shows a lack of tran sparency and complete candor on appellant’s part, the family events
did in fact occur, and the record does not indicate that appell ant intended to keep L. from
D.E. after these events were over. We do not condone appellant ’s behavior, but we
conclude that the circumstances pr o ve d s h o w t ha t t he r e i s a r easonable hypothesis that
appellant did not intend substantial deprivation.
A review of similar cases supports our conclusion that there is an alternative
hypothesis inconsistent with guilt that can be inferred. Other cases involving Minn. Stat.
§ 609.26 indicate that substantial deprivation generally involves circumstances including a
longer duration, concealing the child’s whereabouts, a lack of communication, or leaving
the state with the child. For example, in State v. Andow, a mother picked up her child from

6
the child’s father for a two-hour visit and never returned, taking the child to North Dakota,
and telling her sister to remove her belongings from her apartment and collect the security
deposit, indicating that she had no plans to return. 386 N.W.2 d 230, 231 (Minn. 1986).
She was arrested 12 days later on a felony warrant. Id. I n State v. Niska , the child’s
maternal grandparents moved with the child to Arizona without giving contact information
to the father, preventing him from exercising parenting time. 514 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.
1994). The child remained in Ari zona, away from the father, fo r nearly five-and-a-half
years. Id. In State v. Smith, a mother took the children out of the area and did not surrender
to police for over a month, after the children had been reported missing. 656 N.W.2d 420,
421 (Minn. App. 2003). The circu mstances of these cases establ ish an intent to
substantially deprive a person of their rights to parenting tim e or custody. Such
circumstances are lacking here.
Because we reverse based on insu fficient evidence, we decline t o address
appellant’s alternative arguments regarding the admission of relationship evidence.
Reversed.