State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1981

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Devell Eshawn Warren,
Appellant.

Filed December 31, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-9746

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota, and

Lisa L. Beane, Special Assistant Public Defender, Robins Kaplan, LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decid ed by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of prohibited person in possession of a firearm,
arguing that the district court erred by (1) denying his suppression motion; (2) admitting
Spreigl evidence of his prior conviction of prohibited person in possession of a firearm;
and (3) prohibiting his trial counsel from inquiring about potential jurors’ biases against
individuals with mental illness. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2017, while parked at an intersection, Metro Transit Police Officer
Christopher Miles observed a Grand Marquis and a Dodge Durango drive by “at a high
rate of speed.” Officer Miles had stopped t he Durango earlier in the night because an
occupant was involved in an assault , and based on the manner in which the vehicle s were
traveling, Officer Miles believed that the Durango was pursuing the Marquis. Because the
Marquis “was obviously fleeing from the Durango for some reason,” Officer Miles decided
to follow the Marquis without his l ights or sirens on to “see if [the driver] was in any
danger.”
Officer Miles observed the Marquis turn into an alley and park. As Officer Miles
drove in the alley, he observed a male get out of the backseat of the Marquis with a shotgun
that was partially wrapped in a blanket. Officer Miles knew that under Minnesota law, a
shotgun being transferred in a vehicle must be in an enclosed case. The individual then got
into the front seat of the Marquis with the shotgun and proceeded to drive farther down the

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alley. When the Marquis reached the dead end of the alley, the Marquis pulled into a
parking spot and the driver “fled on foot” with the shotgun.
As the driver of the Marquis fled, Officer Miles exited his squad car and yelled for
the individual to stop. Officer Miles chased the individual on foot but lost sight of him
when he ran in front of a nearby house. After losing sight of the individual, Officer Miles
“heard the shotgun rack,” “[l]ike a round being loaded into it.” Officer Miles then stopped
at the backside of the house to avoid getting shot. There he observed the individual throw
the blanket and shotgun over a fence and “heard a clank of metal” when the shotgun hit the
ground. The individual then approached Officer Miles, who arrested him and identified
him as appellant Devell Warren. Officer Miles later retrieved a blanket and a loaded
Remington shotgun in the area where Warren discarded it . Officers searched the Marquis
and found several shotgun shells “of the same type and brand” as the shell found in the
shotgun that Warren discarded. Because the Marquis was blocking other vehicles in the
alley, officers inventoried and then towed it from the scene.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Warren with being a prohibited person in
possession of a firea rm. Warren moved to suppress all the evidence obtained by the
officers, claiming that the officers seized him without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. The district court denied the motion. Before trial, the state sought permission to
introduce evidence of Warren’s 2005 conviction for being an ineligible person i n
possession of a firearm. Over Warren’s objection, the district court granted the state’s
request. Warren then stipulated to the fact that he was ineligible to possess a firearm.

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During voir dire, Warren’s counsel attempted to question prospective jurors about
their biases pertaining to individuals with mental illness. The district court prohibited
counsel from doing so after concluding that Warren’s mental health would not be squarely
before the jury. A jury found Warren guilty of the charged offense , and the district court
sentenced Warren to 60 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Denial of Suppression Motion
Warren challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, arguing that
his seizure was unconstitutional, his arrest was not supported by probable cause, and the
warrantless search of his vehicle was unlawful. When considering the denial of s uch a
motion, we review “the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo.” State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018).
The United States and Min nesota Constitutions protect individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. 1, § 10. A search or seizure that is conducted without a warrant is presumptively
unreasonable. State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). Evidence seized in
violation of the United States or Minnesota Constitutions must be suppressed. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842
(Minn. 2011).

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Seizure
Warren argues that law enforcement improperly seized him when Officer Miles
“blocked his vehicle in the dead end of the alley.” We disagree. A seizure occurs only when
an “officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. at 1879 n.16. “[A] person has
been seized if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard t he police questions nor
free to terminate the encounter.” State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995).
Circumstances that might indicate a seizure include the threatening presence of several
officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, an officer’s ph ysical touching of the person, or
the officer’s use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be
compelled. In re Welfare of E.D.J. , 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993). And an officer’s
directive that an individual stop constitutes a seizure. Id. at 783.
“Not every interaction between the police and a citizen amounts to a seizure.” State
v. Klamar, 823 N.W2d 687, 692 (Minn. App. 2012). “Generally, no seizure occurs when
an officer merely walks up to and speaks with a driver sitting in an a lready-stopped
vehicle.” Illi v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 873 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. App. 2015). And a
seizure does not occur when “a person, due to some moral or instinctive pressure to
cooperate, complies with a request . . . because the other person to the encounter is a police
officer.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 99 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Here, Warren was retrieving the shotgun from the backseat of his already -stopped
vehicle when Officer Miles pulled into the alley. And, as the district c ourt found, Officer

6
Miles pulled into the alley “without his lights, sirens, or horn indicating to [Warren] that
he was being seized.” Officer Miles did not display any outward show of authority while
he pulled into the alley . Although Officer Miles ’s squad car blocked Warren’s car, the
district court found that he did so “incidentally.” The blocking of a parked vehicle by police
does not automatically amount to a seizure. See Erickson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 415
N.W.2d 698, 701 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that “actions by the officers in parking their
vehicles, which may have incidentally blocked appellant’s vehicle, did not constitute a
seizure”). In fact, as the state points out, Warren “obviously felt free to leave because he
got back into his car and drove off.” Under the circumstances in this case, the district court
properly concluded that Officer Miles did not seize Warren when he pulled into the alley
behind Warren.
Warren also contends that even if Officer Miles did not s eize him when his sq uad
car blocked his vehicle in the alley, Officer Miles seized him when he identified himself as
a police officer and ordered Warren to stop. Warren argues that this stop was not supported
by the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion and that the district court therefore erred
by denying his suppression motion. Warren’s argument is without merit.
Law enforcement may “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884).
“[T]he reasonable suspicion showing is ‘not high.’” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927
(Minn. 2006) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin , 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422
(1997)). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the

7
officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the seized person of criminal act ivity.” State v. Morse , 878 N.W.2d 499, 502
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). “Police must be able to articulate more than an inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , 744
N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (qu otations omitted). We consider “the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether the police had justification for a Terry stop.” State
v. Hollins, 789 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2010).
Here, when Officer Miles exited his squad car and yelled for Warren to stop, he
seized Warren. See E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783 (stating that seizure occurs when police
direct individual to stop). The district court found that Officer Miles observed Warren
carrying an uncased shotgun. Under Minnesota law, carrying or transporting a shotgun in
a public place is a gross misdemeanor unless the shotgun is “unloaded and in a gun case
expressly made to contain a firearm, if the case fully encloses the firearm by being zipped,
snapped, buckled, tied, or otherwise fastened, and no portion of the firearm is exposed.”
Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subds. 1(b)(2), 2 (2016). Warren’s actions violated Minnesota law.
Moreover, the court found that based on his testimony, Officer Miles knew that the law
prohibited a person from carrying an uncased shotgun in a public place. These
circumstances provided Officer Miles with a reasonable basis to seize Warren. The court
did not err by concluding that Officer Miles’s seizure of Warren was constitutional.
Probable cause to arrest
Warren argues that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. “A warrantless
arrest is reasonable if supported by probable cause.” State v. Williams , 794 N.W.2d 867,

8
871 (Minn. 2011). “Probable cause exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence,
viewing the tot ality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d
334, 343 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The quantum of proof required for a finding
of probable cause is more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for
conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). “ The inquiry is objective, and the existence of
probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual case.” Williams, 794 N.W.2d
at 871.
As a general rule, an officer may make an arrest for most misdemeanors and gross
misdemeanors if the offense occurs within the presence of the police officer. See Minn.
Stat. § 629.34, subd. 1(c)(1) (2016) (stating that peace officer may make an arrest without
a warrant . . . when a public offense has been committed or attempted in the officer’s
presence”). Here, Warren committed two offenses in Officer Miles’s presence. First,
Officer Miles observed Warren carrying a shotgun under a blanket, and Officer Miles knew
that carrying an uncased shotgun in a public place was unlawful. See Minn. Stat.
§ 624.7181, subds. 1, 2. Second, Warren did not comply with Officer Miles’s order to stop,
instead fleeing the scene . Minnesota Statutes section 609.487, subd ivision 6 (2016)
provides that to attempt to evade or elude a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of
an official duty by any means other than fleeing in a motor vehicle is a misdemeanor. The
circumstances, assessed objectively, supported a strong suspicion to believe that Warren
committed two criminal offenses. The district court therefore did not err by concluding that
Officer Miles had probable cause to arrest Warren.

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Warrantless search of vehicle
Warren further argues that the warrantless search of his vehicle was unlawful and
that the district court erred by not suppressing the ammunition discovered in the vehicle as
a result of the search. A search conducted without a warrant is generally unreasonable.
Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 517. But well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement exist,
and a search which qualifies for one of these exceptions is not unreasonable. See State v.
Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). “One such exc eption is the automobile
exception, under which the police may search a car without a warrant, including closed
containers in that car, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in a
discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016)
(quotations omitted). And another exception is an inventory search. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
at 502.
The district court found that the officers had probable cause to search Warren’s
vehicle based on Warren’s “decision to abandon the vehicle and the shotgun,” and because
people who carry weapons often carry ammunition. The court also found that the vehicle
was “not parked in a legal location” and that the vehicle was impounded by Metro Transit
Police and inventoried under “standard procedure.” The court determined that the search
of the vehicle was a valid search under both the automobile exception and the inventory-
search exception, and that t he ammunition found in the vehicle therefore need not be
suppressed. Warren argues that neither the automobile exception nor the inventory-search
exception is applicable. We disagree.

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A law-enforcement officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, impound
a vehicle and perform an inventory search of the vehicle without obtaining a warrant.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987) ; State v. Rohde, 852
N.W.2d 260, 263 –64 (Minn. 2014). In determining the reasonableness of an inventory
search, the threshold inquiry is whether the officers “had any authority or purpose that
justified the impoundment.” Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 264. For an impoundment to be
appropriate, the govern ment “must have an interest in impoundment that outweighs the
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Id. (quotation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has stated that in the interests of
public safety, police have the authority to “remove from the streets vehicles impeding
traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 369, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097 (1976). And impoundment of a motor vehicle must be
“conducted pursuant to standardized criteria.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 503.
Here, Warren’s challenge to the inventory search is limited to his claim that the
search was invalid because Officer Miles lacked probable cause to arrest Warren. But as
addressed above, Officer Miles’s observations of Warren’s unlawful conduct provided the
officer with probable cause to arrest Warren. Moreover, Officer Miles had a reasonable
basis to impound the Marquis because it was blocking other cars from exiting a driveway
off the alley and was parked in an illegal location. And the district court credited Officer
Miles’s testimony that the inventory search of the vehicle was conducted under standard
procedure of the Metro Transit Police. The court therefore properly determined that the
ammunition need not be suppressed because it was discovered as the result of a valid

11
inventory search. And because the inventory search was valid, we need not address whether
the search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception.
Admission of Spreigl evidence
Prior to trial, Warren stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. But over
Warren’s objection , the district court allow ed police to testify that as part of their
investigation, they discovered that in 2005, Warren was convict ed of ineligible person in
possession of a firearm. Warren challenges the admission of this testimony.
This court reviews the district court’s decision to admit “evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Welle , 870 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn.
2015). We will affirm the district court unless Warren meets his burden to “show that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence and that the erroneous
admission was prejudicial.” State v. Rossberg , 851 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2014) . An
erroneous admission is prejudicial when there is “a reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Fardan , 773
N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove bad character
or a propensity to commit the charged crime. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn.
2006). But such evidence, also referred to as Spreigl evidence, may be admissible for other,
limited purposes. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 315–16 (discussing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d
167, 171 (Minn. 1965)) . These purposes include evidence offered as “proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id. at 316 (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)). As our supreme court has stated:

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“We believe that generally in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a weapon the
defendant should be permitted to remove the issue of whether he is a conv icted felon by
stipulating to that fact,” but “the door should be left open so that in appropriate cases where
the probative value of the evidence outweighs is potential for unfair prejudice, the evidence
may be admitted.” State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1984).
In determining the admissibility of Spreigl evidence, the district court must ensure
that (1) the state has given notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state has clearly
indicated what the evidence will be offered to prove; ( 3) there exists clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the evidence is relevant and
material to the state’s case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also Ness,
707 N.W.2d at 685–86. Warren challenges only the last two requirements.
Relevance and materiality
Warren argues that the prior conviction was neither relevant nor material to the
current offense because he stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm and the
previous conviction had no bearing on his defense presented at trial. We disagree. To
determine the relevance and materiality of Spreigl evidence, courts consider “the issues in
the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close
relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in time, place or modus
operandi.” State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Here,
Warren made various statements to police suggesting that he believed that his possession
of the shotgun was legal. Warren also testified at trial that he “Googled” whether or not he

13
could lawfully possess the shotgun. Evidence of Warren’s prior conviction of prohibited
person in possession of a firearm was relevant and material to Warren’s knowledge that he
was prohibited from possessing firearms, and to rebut his claim that he made a mistake.
Risk of unfair prejudice
Warren contends that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence was outweighed
by its risk of unfair prejudice. But unfair prejudice “is not merely damaging evidence, even
severely damagi ng evidence; rather unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Schulz , 691 N.W.2d
474, 478 (Minn. 2005). Although the evidence of Warren’s prior conviction for prohibited
person in pos session of a firearm may have been particularly damaging in light of the
similarity to the current offense, nothing in the record indicates that the evidence persuaded
by illegitimate means. Moreover, the prosecutor mentioned the prior conviction only
briefly. And the district court mitigated any potential for improper use of the evidence by
providing two cautionary instructions to the jury , one before the state introduced the
evidence, and one before the court submitted the case to the jury. See State v. DeWald, 464
N.W.2d 500, 505 (Minn. 1991) (stating that “the potential for prejudicial impact from the
Spreigl evidence [is] arguably lessened by the [district] court’s . . . cautionary instructions
to the jury”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice,
and in admitting evidence of Warren’s prior conviction of ineligible pers on in possession
of a firearm.

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Prejudice
Finally, even if Warren were able to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting the Spreigl evidence, he is unable to demonstrate that there is “a
reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.” Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 320 (quotation omitted). Officer Miles testified at trial
that (1) he observed Warren carrying the shotgun underneath the blanket; (2) after he lost
sight of Warren during his chase of Warren, he heard the shotgun “rack,” as if a round was
“being loaded into it”; and (3) he subsequently spotted Warren as he was climbing over a
fence, and heard the “shotgun hit the ground” when Warren threw it and the blanket over
the fence. The state also presented evidence that police recovered a shotgun at the location
where Warren climbed the fence and that the shotgun had Warren’s fingerprints on it.
Moreover, Officer Andrew Carlson testified that Warren admitted to him that the shotgun
was his, and police discovered ammunition matching the type of shotgun at issue in this
case in Warren’s vehicle . And the district court provided the jury with two cautionary
instructions, one before the state introduced the evidence, and one before the court
submitted the case to the jury, which reduced the risk that the jury misused the evidence as
propensity evidence. See Welle, 870 N.W.2d at 366 (explaining that appellate courts
“presume that the jury followed these cautionary instructions”). Although Warren contends
that the court’s cautionary instruction lacked “any explanation . . . of the purpose for which
the jury could consider the evidence of Warren’s 2005 conviction,” the record indicates
that Warren did not request any specific language. Nor does Warren cite any caselaw to

15
support a proposition that the lack of any explanatory language in a cautionary instruction
is prejudicial. We conclude that Warren is not entitled to a new trial.
Juror inquiry
Warren challenges the district court’s ruling that prohibited him from inquiring
about potential jurors’ biases against individuals with mental illness. “[District] court
decisions relating to the conduct of voir dire will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. 2001).
The United States and Minnesota Constitution s guarantee the right to a trial by an
impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “This right includes the
ability to conduct an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors,” Greer, 635 N.W.2d
at 87 (quotation omitted), the purpose of which is “to discover grounds for challenges for
cause and to assist in the exercise of peremptory challenges,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02,
subd. 4(1). But district courts may restrict or prohibit repetitious, irrelevant, o r improper
questions during voir dire. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 87.
The district court disallowed Warren’s voir dire pertaining to mental illness after
finding that the questioning “moved well beyond any bias and was moving over into
sympathy, something the ju ry will be instructed they are not to apply in their decisions.”
Warren concedes that he did not raise a mental-illness defense at trial. Because Warren did
not raise a mental -illness defense, questions during voir dire regarding biases against
people with mental illness could suggest that Warren had diminished culpability for his
actions, a defense not recognized in Minnesota. State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Minn.
1997) (stating that “Minnesota does not recogn ize the defense of diminished

16
responsibility”). Moreover, Warren provides no specific argument in his principal brief
explaining why the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing Warren’s voir dire inquiry
about mental illness.
Affirmed.