State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1982

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gary Walter Granger,
Appellant.

Filed December 24, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-16-1783

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Evan W. Frazier, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ryan M. Schultz , Special Assistant Public Defender , Robins Kaplan, LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from convictions for receiving stolen property, possession of burglary
or theft tools, and fifth -degree controlled substance cr ime, appellant argues that he was
seized without reasonable suspicion when a police officer requested his identification as
he sat in a parked car. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 12: 14 a.m. on December 9, 2015, Officer Sannes , as part of his
routine duties, was conducting license-plate checks of parked cars in a hotel parking lot in
Eagan. Officer Sannes later testified that he had previous experience in that parking lot
“[f]inding vehicles with registered owners who have warrants or order for protections” and
checking “the registry to make sure they’re in the hotel to see if they’re violating an order
for protection or have unoccupied stolen vehicles in that parking lot.” As he was reviewing
the license plate of a car parked with its engine off approximately two car lengths away
from his squad car, Officer Sannes discovered that the car was registered to a female owner
who had an active warrant for her arrest.
Officer Sannes approached the car and saw appellant Gary Walter Granger, who is
obviously male, sitting in the driver’s seat with another man in the passenger seat. On that
night, he was dressed in his police uniform and carrying a firearm. Officer Sannes asked
appellant “about the registered owner of the vehicle” and “his associa tion with the
registered owner.” Appellant responded that he had just purchased the vehicle from the
registered owner and that she had been recently arrested. Appellant indicated that he and

3
his passenger were sitting in the car while contemplating whether they should get a room
at the hotel. At some point during this short exchange with appellant, Officer Sannes asked
appellant for his identification. Also, during this exchange, Officer Sannes noticed a
catalytic converter in plain view sitting on the back seat of the vehicle.
Subsequent to this conversation and the request for identification, Officer Sannes
determined that the driver’s licenses of both the driver and the passenger had been
suspended or cancelled , and upon further questioning , neither of the two was able to
explain how they obtained the catalytic converter. Other officers were called to the scene
and one of the officers observed in plain view a cordless, battery-operated Sawzall, wire
cutters, and red paint shavings on the passenger. Upon a search of the vehicl e, officers
discovered drugs, paraphernalia, and burglary tools. It was later reported that the catalytic
converter found in appellant’s possession was stolen.
Appellant was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property, possession of
burglary or theft tools, and fifth-degree controlled substance crime (possession). Appellant
filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his possession on the grounds that
Officer Sannes seized him without reasonable suspicion. At the omnibus hearing, in an
attempt to narrow the issue before the district court, appellant and the state agreed that
appellant was seized during what appellant’s attorney described as a “three-minute window
of time” at the point where the office r “asks for the identification.” The single issue
presented to the district court was whether Officer Sannes’s request for identification was
supported by particularized, reasonable, and articulable suspicion. Without mentioning the
agreement regarding the moment of seizure, the district court concluded that “[a] seizure

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does occur when an officer, lacking reasonable, articulable, suspicion that a person was
engaging in criminal activ ity, asks for identification.” The district court concluded that
Officer Sannes had a reasonable , articulable suspicion that a person was engaging in
criminal activity when he approached the parked car and requested appellant’s
identification. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant agreed to a
stipulated-facts court trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, and was convicted of all
charges. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota constitutions protect all individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. 1, § 10. A seizure occurs when a police officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen in some manner that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to termin ate the encounter. In re
E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 552, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1876 (1980); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999).
Minnesota has adopted the totality of the circumstances standard developed by the United
States Supreme Court in Mendenhall to determine whether a police encounter with a citizen
constitutes a seizure. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances
standard, some of th e circumstances that may be considered include the threatening
presence of several police officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching
of the citizen by an officer, and the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554,

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100 S. Ct. at 1877; Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98. Other acts that may constitute evidence of
physical force or authority include blocking a citizen’s car or using flashing lights. State
v. Sanger, 420 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Minn. App. 1988).
We will not reverse a district court’s findings regarding whether a seizure took place
unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Overvig v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 730 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007).
If the facts are not in dispute, a reviewing court must determine as a matter of law whether
there was a seizure and whether the seizure was unreasonable . Id. Not all encounters
between police officers and citizens constitute seizures. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553–54,
100 S. Ct. at 1877; Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98. A seizure does not result merely because a
citizen feels some moral or instinctive pressure to cooperate because the other person
involved in the encounter is a police officer. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98–99. In the absence
of evidence indicating that the police officer restrained the citizen by means of physical
force or authority, such an encounter, as a matter of law, does not constitute a seizure of
that person. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 –54, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; Harris, 590 N.W.2d at
98.
Whether There Was a Seizure
Appellant argues that he was seized at the point when Officer Sannes requested his
identification. At the district court and on appeal, the state con cedes appellant was seized
at this point. Acknowledging that not every request for identification is a seizure,
respondent appears to assert that it is bound by its stipulation about the moment of seizure
at the district court.

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But while the court is bound by parties’ stipulations to the facts, stipulations of law
are not binding on the court. Hoene v. Jamieson, 182 N.W.2d 834, 837–38 (Minn. 1970);
State v. Litzau, 377 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Minn. App. 1985). “[L]egal determinations, such as
whether there was a seizure and, if so, whether that seizure was unreasonable, are reviewed
de novo.” State v. Eichers, 853 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn. 2014). “[I]t is the responsibility
of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to
be ‘diluted by counsel’ s oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite
relevant authorities.’” State v. Hannuksela , 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Min n. 1990).
Therefore, neither the district court nor this court is bound by the agreement between the
state and appellant that a seizure took place when Officer Sannes requested identification
from appellant.
It is well settled that, “T he law differentia tes between a n investigatory stop of a
moving vehicle and an investigation of an already stopped vehicle.” State v. McKenzie ,
392 N.W.2d 345, 346 ( Minn. App. 1986). L aw enforcement officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonabl e seizures merely by approaching
individuals in public places or in a parked car and asking questions. See United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 , 200, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002); Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 98;
Overvig, 730 N.W.2d at 792; McKenzie, 392 N.W.2d at 346–47; s ee also State v.
Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14,
1995) (holding that a single request for identification of the owner of a parked motorcycle,
without more, did not constitute a sei zure); Blank v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 358 N.W.2d
441, 442 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding that there was no seizure when an officer who

7
observed a car parked on the roadway with the engine running and the lights on pulled up
behind the car and asked to see the driver’s license).
Appellant essentially argues that we adopt a bright -line rule that any request for
identification by a police officer is a seizure. But, in previously rejecting this bright -line
rule, we stated that the Mendenhall totality of the circumstances test is “not conducive to
such line-drawing,” recognizing that “[n]ot every request for identification rises to the level
of intrusiveness that Mendenhall requires.” Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d at 588.
And the district court erred as a matter of law when it effectively adopted a bright-
line rule that a seizure occurs when an officer asks for identification without reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person was engaging in criminal activity. Although the district
court cited State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. App. 2002) in support of its holding,
that case does not support such a bright -line rule and is factually distinguishable from the
instant case. In Johnson, this court clearly stated that “a person has been seized if in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the
encounter.” Id. at 509 (citing State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995))
(emphasis added). The Johnson court then noted the circumstances in that case:
The record shows that the officers pulled the vehicle over with
flashing lights, parked the squad car behind the vehicle , and
remained behind appellant’ s vehicle during the entire
encounter. A ppellant was seated in the back seat of the car
[that police had pulled over] , two policemen approached the
vehicle and positioned themselves on each side of the vehicle,
and the driver of the vehicle was specifically told by the officer
not to go anywhere.

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Id. at 510. The court held that under those circumstances police asking for Johnson’s
identification to run a warrant check constituted a seizure. Id. at 507, 510.
Appellant does not claim that he was seize d when Officer Sannes walked up to his
car and spoke with him briefly regarding his association with the female in whose name
the car was registered, but only that he was seized the moment Officer Sannes requested
his identification. But, u nlike Johnson, here there is no evidence that Officer Sannes, by
means of physical force or show of authority, restrained appellant’s liberty. The undisputed
testimony from Officer Sannes in this case was that appellant’s car was already parked
with the engine off when he arrived at the lot in his squad car. There is no evidence that
Officer Sannes’s squad car was blocking appellant’s car . His undisputed testimony was
that he had parked his squad car two car lengths behind appellant’s car. Although Officer
Sannes was in uniform and had a firearm, there is no evidence that he drew his firearm,
turned on his emergency lights, ordered appellant to get out of his car and go to his squad
car, or told appellant that he was not free to go. At s ome point during his very brief
conversation with appellant, Officer Sannes either asked for appellant’s identification or
appellant “alr eady had it in his hand.” Officer Sannes explained during the omnibus
hearing that he needed to get appellant’s name s o that he could include it in his report of
the incident. Either way, none of th ese actions/events represent a physical force or show
of authority by Officer Sannes that would make a reasonable person believe that they were
not free to leave such that the circumstances would constitute a seizure at the moment
Officer Sannes asked for identification. Applying the totality of the circumstances test to

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the undisputed facts in this case, we conclude that appellant was not seized at the moment
that Officer Sannes requested his identification.
We also note that while Officer Sannes had not seized appellant at the time he
obtained appellant’s identification, he could have lawfully done so under the totality of
circumstances in this case. See State v. Setinich, 822 N.W.2d 9, 12–13 (Minn. App. 2012)
(holding state trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient
to perform an investigatory stop of vehicle after license -plate check revealed outstanding
arrest warrant for registered owner); see also State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn.
2014) (“We evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists . . . from the
perspective of a trained police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411,
418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)); State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2011) (noting
that the court is to determine reasonable, articulable suspicion based on the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the seizure, the rational inferences from those facts, from the
perspective of a reasonable police office) ; State v. Davis , 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn.
2007) (noting that the reasonable suspicion standard is not high) (quotation omitted) .
Appellant was in a stopped car , in a hotel parking lot, near midnight, and the registered
owner of that car had a warrant out for her arrest. And even individually innocent factors
can create reasonable suspicion when considered together. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d
846, 852 (Minn. 1998).
Affirmed.