State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1984

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Michael Easter,
Appellant.

Filed November 19, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-16-1422

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David J. Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant David Michael Easter challenges his second-degree mur der conviction,
arguing that (1) the district court erred when it used the self-defense instruction concerning
the justifiable taking of life in stead of the general self-defe nse instruction, (2) the district

2
court abused its discretion when it sentenced appellant to a 306-month prison term, (3) the
district court improperly sentenced appellant for both carrying a pistol without a permit
and second-degree murder, and (4 ) the district court exceeded i ts authority when it
amended the restitution amount after sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 23, 2016, at approximately 9:19 p.m., appellant called 911 to report that
he had shot another person. Appella nt told the dispatcher, “Someone pulled up when we
were uh, gettin’ in my car, he stepped out with a bat and uh, I ’m a concealed-and-carry
person and under self-defense I shot him and he’s sitting, lyin g in his car.” Multiple law
enforcement officers responded to the park from which appellant had called, and found
S.B. dead in his car, with two gunshot wounds to his head. An autopsy later confirmed
that S.B. had died from the two bullet wounds—one to his left c heek and the other to his
left temple. The state charged appellant with second-degree intentional murder in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016), and with carrying-a -pistol without a permit in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2016).
Appellant testified at trial that he and his family were at the park having a picnic in
the park’s pavilion area. Appellant became concerned when a ca r pulled into the park’s
dark, empty parking lot. The car’s headlights were off and, after driving around, the driver
(later identified as S.B.) parked across from appellant’s truck. Appellant testified that S.B.
got out of his car and was shouting, which made appellant uneas y. Appellant described
that S.B. began walking toward the pavilion, then toward the woods, and again approached
appellant and shouted. Appellant testified that he instructed his wife to gather their infant

3
and move toward his truck so that they could leave. Appellant testified that S.B. went
behind a building and then reappeared. Appellant was “freaked out” by the pace at which
S.B. was walking. As appellant started to walk off the sidewal k toward his truck, S.B.
“kind of turned with [appellant] and was starting to walk with [him].” Once he noticed
this, appellant told S.B. that he was there with his family, and that they were getting ready
to leave. S.B. did not reply. Appellant described that the tw o were walking side-by-side,
and that S.B. said “I have something for you” and went toward h is car. This startled
appellant; he looked over at S.B. and then changed his directio n and began walking past
his truck and toward S.B.’s car . Appellant testified that he w alked toward S.B.’s car so
that he could “keep his eye on him” while his wife got their infant into their truck.
Appellant testified that S.B. got into the driver’s seat of his car, looked at appellant,
and told appellant, “Yes, a--hol e, I do have something for you. ” Appellant testified that
S.B. “reached over and closed the door.” Moments after, the tw o locked eyes, and
according to appellant, S.B. “re ached over to the passenger’s s ide, grasped a barrel of a
gun, and was bringing it up.” Appellant testified that he “dre w his [own] firearm and
decided to shoot” as S.B. was “motioning over to bring that barrel up.” Appellant testified
that he shot S.B. twice as he had been taught in firearms training.
Police found neither a firearm nor a baseball bat in or near S .B.’s car. At trial, S.B.’s
former girlfriend, L.G., testified that S.B. kept a golf club in his car to prop open the hood
and the back hatch of his car. L.G. also testified that S.B. frequently went to the state park,
where he had been shot, to relax after work.

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At trial, appellant requested the justifiable-taking-of-life s elf-defense jury
instruction. The district court gave the requested instruction . The jury found appellant
guilty of second-degre e intentional murder and carrying a pisto l without a permit. The
district court sentenced appella nt concurrently to 306 months i n prison for the second-
degree-murder offense and to 180 days in jail for the carrying- a-pistol-without-a-permit
offense. At appellant’s sentenci ng hearing, the district court ordered that appellant pay
restitution in the amount of $5,081.48. Appellant’s counsel asked the district court for 30
days to file a response to the restitution order. The district court later amended its
restitution order, requiring appell ant to also pa y $8,597.75 in restitution to the Crime
Victims Reparations Board (CVRB). Neither appellant nor his co unsel further contested
the restitution amount in the district court.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s error in not instructing the jury conce rning the general law
of self-defense under Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3), was harmless.

Appellant argues that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on his self-
defense claim concerning the seco nd-degree-murder charge. Spec ifically, he argues that
the district court should have gi ven the general self-defense j ury instruction and not the
justifiable-taking-of-life jury instruction because appellant d enied that he intended to kill
S.B.
A district court has “broad discretion” to craft jury instructi ons, and it abuses that
discretion if the instructions given “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State

5
v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Appellant did not object
to the jury instruction at trial, and requested the instruction that was given, but raised the
issue in a postverdict motion for a new trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(4)(f).
A motion for a new trial adequately preserves an issue for appe al. See State v. Glowacki,
630 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. 2001) ( “[D]espite a defendant’s fail ure to object to a jury
instruction at trial, if the instruction contains an error of fundamental law or a controlling
principle, a motion for a new trial adequately preserves the is sue for appeal.” (quotation
omitted)). Since appellant adequat ely preserved the issue, we review the claimed jury-
instruction error to determine whether the instruction was erro neous and, if so, whether it
was harmless. State v. Larson , 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010). An erroneous jury
instruction does not merit a new trial if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 683 (Minn. 2007).
Minnesota law recognizes two different forms of self-defense. The general law of
self-defense is that reasonable force may be used upon another without the other’s consent
“when used by any person in resis ting or aiding another to resi st an offense against the
person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2016). A claim of self-defense arising under
section 609.06, subdivision 1(3), is reflected in the jury inst ruction in CRIMJIG 7.06,
“Self-Defense—Death Not the Result.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.06 (Supp.
2017).
A person may intentionally take a life when it is “necessary in resisting or preventing
an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily
harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2016). This statutory section corresponds with the

6
jury instruction in CRIMJIG 7.0 5, titled “Self-Defense—Justifiable Taking of Life.” 10
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.05 (Supp. 2017).
At the time of appellant’s trial, the general self-defense jury instruction was
embodied in CRIMJIG 7.05, 10 Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 7.05 (2015) and the
justifiable-taking-of-life self-d efense instruction was in CRIM JIG 7.06. 10 Minnesota
Practice, CRIMJIG 7.06 (2015). Before appellant’s trial, the Minnesota appellate courts
had repeatedly held that a distr ict court errs if it fails to p rovide the general self-defense
i n s t r u c t i o n w h e n a d e f e n d a n t a s s erts self-defense, but claims t hat death was not the
intended result. State v. Pollard , 900 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. App. 2017) (collecting
cases); see also State v. Dolbeare , 511 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Mi nn. 1994) (“[E]ven where
death has resulted from a defendant’s action, the judge should use [the general instruction]
if the defendant’s theory does not include a concession that there was an intent to kill.”).
At trial, the district court gave the justifiable-taking-of-lif e self-defense jury
instruction, as appellant requested and the state agreed.1

1 The justifiable taking-of-life self-defense instruction, now in CRIMJIG 7.05, is as follows:

No crime is committed when a person takes the life of
another, even intentionally, if the person’s action was taken in
resisting or preventing an offense the person reasonably
believed exposed him or another to death or great bodily harm.

I n o r d e r f o r t h e t a k i n g o f l i fe to be justified for this
reason, four conditions must be met. First, the defendant’s act
must have been done in a belief that it was necessary to avert
death or great bodily harm. S econd, the judgement of the
defendant as to the gravity of th e peril to which he or another
was exposed must have been reasonable under the
circumstances. Third, the defendant’s election to defend must

7
The district court denied appellant’s new-trial motion. It rea soned that, based on
the jury’s verdict, the death of S.B. was not accidental or uni ntentional. The jury had
necessarily concluded that appellant intended to kill S.B., because it found him guilty of a
crime requiring proof that he acted “with intent to effect the death of” S.B. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1). As such, the district court concluded th at the justifiable-taking-of-
life jury instruction given was applicable to appellant’s self-defense claim.
Appellant argues on appeal that, because the numbering of the jury instruction guide
(JIG) changed and the corresponding comments did not, the trial court and appellant’s trial
counsel mistakenly relied on the JIG commentary, resulting in t he wrong jury instruction
being given. See Pollard, 900 N.W.2d at 180 (noting that although the 2015 version of the
criminal jury instruction guide renumbered the justifiable-taki ng-of-life instruction as
CRIMJIG 7.06, it continued to i nclude the same footnote and cas e descriptions
recommending its use in cases where the defendant claims the death was unintended, which
was contrary to Minnesota Supreme Court precedent). Appellant argues that, because he

have been such as a reasonabl e person would have made in
light of the danger perceived and the existence of any
alternative way of avoiding the peril. Fourth, there was no
reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger. All fou r
conditions must be met.

The legal excuse of self-def ense is available only to
those who act honestly and in good faith. This includes the
duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.

The State has the burd en of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.

8
did not admit that he intentionally killed S.B., the district c ourt should have given the
general self-defense instruction instead of the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction.
Under Pollard and other cases to like effect , appellant was entitled to the g eneral
self-defense instruction. He denied an intention to kill S.B. Despite appellant not having
raised the issue until the posttrial motion, the law was well-s ettled that a defendant is
entitled to that instruction in this circumstance. The district court erred by not instructing
the jury concerning the general law of self-defense.
I n t h i s c a s e , t h e e r r o r d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e v e r d i c t . T h e s t a t e presented powerful
circumstantial evidence that appellant did intend to kill S.B. It is undisputed that appellant
fired two bullets into S.B.’s head from point-blank range. The district court could properly
give the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction in light of tha t powerful circumstantial
evidence. We see no basis for concluding that the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction was
erroneous. Appellant had actually requested that instruction a t trial. The district court
should have given at least the general self-defense instruction , but could have properly
given both instructions, leaving it to the jury to determine wh ether appellant intended to
kill S.B.
By its verdict concluding that the state proved second-degree m urder beyond a
reasonable doubt, the jury nece ssarily concluded that appellant , despite his testimony to
the contrary, intentionally killed S.B. That being so, the jur y was provided with the self-
defense instruction applicable to the facts as it found them—th e justifiable-taking-of-life
instruction in section 609.065. Therefore, the district court’ s error in not instructing the
jury concerning the general law o f self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

9
That law, applicable to situations where the actor does not intend to cause death would
have no application to the facts as the jury found them. We th erefore affirm the district
court’s denial of appellant’s new-trial motion.
We also observe that, on this record, the district court’s Pollard error was harmless
f o r a t l e a s t t w o o t h e r r e a s o n s . U n d e r e i t h e r t h e g e n e r a l s e l f -defense instruction or the
justifiable-taking-of-life instruction, the actor must act reas onably. State v. Richardson ,
670 N.W.2d 267, 277-78 (Minn. 2003). And, under either instruction, the actor has a duty
to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible. See CRIMJIGS 7.05, .06 (“The legal
excuse of self-defense is available only to those who act hones tly and in good faith. This
includes the duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.”).
Other than S.B.’s alleged shouting, the record does not show that S.B. posed a threat
to appellant or his family. The record shows the opposite—duri ng appellant’s jury trial,
the jury saw text messages from S.B. that were sent minutes bef ore his death. In one of
those messages, S.B. said, “I’m happier than I’ve been in a lon g time.” Here, the record
also conclusively shows that appellant did not retreat—he walked toward S.B.’s car when
he had the opportunity to leave the park. The record also shows that appellant did not use
reasonable force because there was no firearm found in S.B.’s car.
While appellant did not admit that he intentionally killed S.B., appellant testified at
trial that he fired his gun almo st immediately after he thought h e s a w S . B . r a i s e w h a t
appellant thought was the barrel of a gun inside S.B.’s car. Appellant admitted that he was
“not firing randomly” but was “ firing at a target.” Appellant also admitted that he shot
S.B. twice in the head. One of the bullets was fired from between two inches and two feet

10
away from S.B.’s head. Instead of walking away from S.B.’s car, appellant put two bullets
in S.B.’s head.
The jury’s guilty verdict refle cts, and the record supports, th at the state proved
appellant did not act reasonably and failed to avail himself of a ready avenue of retreat.
For these reasons also, the district court’s error was harmless.
II. The district court did not ab use its discretion when it sentenced appellant to a
presumptive guidelines sentence.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him
to a 306-month guidelines sentence because it exaggerates his c ulpability, and that,
although Minnesota does not recognize imperfect self-defense, t he district court should
have considered it as a mitigating factor.
We address the latter argument first. Minnesota does not recog nize the defense of
imperfect self-defense. State v. Thompson , 544 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. 1996). A district
court may order a downward departure from the presumptive guide lines if “substantial
grounds exist that tend to excus e or mitigate the offender’s cu lpability,” even if those
grounds do not amount to a defense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a(5) (2016). The record
confirms that the district court did consider all relevant fact ors, including appellant’s
unsuccessful self-defense claim.
Appellate courts afford a district court great discretion in sentencing and will reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014). Rarely will we interfere with a decision to impose the presumptive

11
sentence. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
July 20, 2010).
When considering a downward dura tional departure, as appellant requested in this
case, a district court is limited to consideration of offense-r elated factors. State v. Peter,
825 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2013). Substantial
and compelling circumstances for a durational departure “demonstrate that the defendant’s
conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typica lly involved in the
commission of the crime in question.” State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Minn. 2004)
(quotation omitted). But, even if factors are present to support a downward departure, the
district court is not required to depart. State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn.
App. 2011).
The district court determined that there were no substantial or compelling reasons
to depart from the guidelines. The record supports that the district court, having presided
over the jury trial, properly considered the offense committed and the circumstances of that
offense. In response to appellant’s argument that the case was less serious than most
murder cases, the district court noted, that “at first blush . . . you can make an argument
that this case is less serious . . . you have to look closely a t the facts of the case.” The
district court concluded that, although appellant raised the defense of self-defense, “it [was]
clear to the court that the jury rejected the self-defense argument.” Ultimately, the district
court did not depart. It explained that it could not find that “this situation or murder was
less onerous than the typical case of second-degree murder.” T he district court found no

12
substantial and compelling reason to depart and sentenced appellant to 306 months, which
was within the presumptive guidelines range.
We can discern no failure of the district court to consider the severity of appellant’s
offense and any mitigating fact ors. Instead, the district cour t listened to and considered
appellant’s arguments concerning both a durational and dispositional departure and acted
within its discretion when it sentenced appellant.
III. The second-degree murder and carrying-a-pistol-without-a-permit convictions
were separate behavioral incidents, and the district court corr ectly sentenced
appellant.

Appellant argues that the distric t court erred by sentencing hi m for both second-
degree murder and carrying a pistol without a permit because th e offenses arose from a
single behavioral incident. Appellant also argues that carrying a pistol without a permit is
not a typical crime of possession because possession becomes un lawful only when
possession or carrying is in certain places or certain ways.
“Whether an offense is subject to multiple sentences under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 is
a question of law, which [appella te courts] review de novo.” State v. Ferguson , 808
N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012).
Whether a defendant’s offenses occurred as part of a single
course of conduct is a mixed question of law and fact. We
review the district court’s findings of historical fact under t he
clearly erroneous standard, but we review the district court’s
application of the law to those facts de novo.

State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014).
With limited exceptions, a court may only sentence a defendant once for a single
behavioral incident, even if the incident results in multiple crimes. Minn. Stat. § 609.035,

13
subd. 1 (2016); State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. 2000). The supreme court
has prescribed two tests for det ermining whether multiple offen ses arise from a singular
behavioral incident. Which test applies depends on the intent element of the crimes. When
one offense includes an intent element and the other does not, the proper inquiry is whether
the offenses “[arose] out of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting
an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” State v. Gibson, 478 N.W.2d
496, 497 (Minn. 1991) (quotation omitted).
Second-degree murder is an intentional crime for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.035
(2016). A conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1, requires proof that the defendant
“causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another,
but without premeditation.” In contrast, carrying a pistol wit hout a permit requires only
that the defendant know that he possessed the pistol. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1(a).
A crime of possession is a continuing offense that is complete when the offender
takes possession of the prohibited item. State v. Bakken , 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn.
2016). The unlawful possession of a firearm is such a continuing offense. State v. Banks,
331 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1983). Because the unlawful possess ion of a firearm is a
continuing offense, it can be proved without reference to another offense involving a one-
time action. Id.
The district court concluded that the second-degree murder offense and the carrying-
a-pistol-without-a-permit offenses were not committed as part o f a single behavioral
incident. The district court th erefore imposed two concurrent sentences, and appellant

14
received 186 days of credit for time served (which credit was m ore than the 180-day
sentence on the firearm-possession charge).
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the ca rrying-a-pistol-
without-a-permit offense was not part of a single behavioral in cident with the second-
degree-murder offense. Appellant testified that he had been ca rrying a pistol in the state
of Minnesota for years, and that he carried the pistol on his person in a holster wherever he
went. Appellant began carrying a pistol starting in 2011, when he obtained a permit to
carry in Nebraska. Despite living in Minnesota since 2012, appellant did not have a valid
Minnesota permit to carry. Appellant testified that, on the day of the shooting, he and his
family went to the store to buy food and picnic supplies before going to the park,
approximately three hours before the shooting. Appellant’s off ense of carrying-a pistol-
without-a-permit was a continuing offense. The carrying-a-pist ol-without-a-permit
offense was complete before the act of murder, and appellant was not motivated to obtain
a single criminal objective in committing the two offenses.2
Appellant argues that, because t he state previously argued for joinder of the
offenses, and because that standard uses the same single-behavioral-incident analysis, the
state should be estopped from arguing that the offenses are not part of the same behavioral
incident. Appellant also asserts that judicial estoppel bars the state from now arguing that

2 Had the criminal objective of carrying a pistol without a permit been to effectuate S.B.’s
death, appellant would have been guilty of first-degree murder . See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(1) (2016) (defining a killing “with premeditation and the intent to effect the
death” as murder in the first de gree). Nothing in the record s uggests that appellant’s
objective in bringing the pistol to the park was to kill S.B. or anyone else.

15
the incidents are not part of the same behavioral incident. Mi nnesota does not recognize
judicial estoppel, and we decline to apply it here. See State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500,
507 (Minn. 2005) (declining to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel).
Pretrial joinder of offenses, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.03, uses an analysis similar
to that concerning sentencing un der Minn. Stat. § 609.035. “We have traditionally
analyzed joinder using the same restrictive test we developed i n applying Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035.” State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 458 (Minn. 1999). Generally, two related
offenses should be joined before trial where a defendant’s behavior falls under more than
one criminal offense and each offense should be joined into one case as separate counts.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 1. Minn. Stat. § 609.035 guides sentencing procedure and
is intended to prevent serial prosecution and double punishments that might create double
jeopardy problems. State v. Ross, 732 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Minn. 2007).
Before appellant’s trial, the di strict court joined the offense s. The district court
found as a fact that the offenses were part of a single behavio ral incident, and therefore
should be joined for one trial. While pretrial joinder of offenses follows the same analysis
as posttrial sentencing under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, pretrial j oinder does not limit the
district court’s analysis during sentencing. At sentencing, th e district court properly
analyzed the offenses under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, and sentence d appellant for two
separate offenses. The district court acted within its discretion when it sentenced appellant
for both offenses.

16
IV. The district court acted within its authority when it amend ed appellant’s
restitution order.

Finally, appellant argues that t he district court improperly am ended its restitution
order because the extent of the CVRB’s loss was known at senten cing. Appellant did not
raise this objection to the district court, but asserts that we should address the issue on
appeal because the district court’s amended restitution order was an unauthorized sentence
that can be corrected at any time.
“A district court has broad di scretion to award restitution, an d the district court’s
order will not be reversed absen t an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Anderson , 871
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). The district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. But, questions concerning the authority of the district
court to order restitution are questions of law subject to de novo review. Id.
At appellant’s sentencing hearin g, the issue of restitution was t h e l a s t i s s u e t h e
district court addressed during an hours-long sentencing hearin g. At the hearing, the
district court ordered appellant to pay restitution in the amou nt of $5,081.48. The state
later moved to amend the restitution order because the district court had not included the
amounts paid by the CVRB. Following the state’s motion, the di strict court ordered
appellant to pay an additional $8 ,597.75 in restitution to the CVRB. Appellant did not
challenge that amended order within 30 days, as required by Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.
3(b) (2016).
We view the district court’s additional order amending the rest itution amount as a
correction to a clerical mistake. “Clerical mistakes in a judgement, order, or in the record

17
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time, or after notice
if ordered by the court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10. Based on the record, it appears
that the district court’s failure to address the restitution ow ed to CVRB at appellant’s
sentencing hearing was an oversight. The district court correc ted the order, as it is
authorized to do.
In sum, the district court’s error in not instructing the jury with the general self-
defense instruction was harmless because the justifiable-taking-of-life jury instruction was
applicable to the facts as found by the jury. The district cou rt acted within its discretion
by sentencing appellant to a presumptive sentence under the sen tencing guidelines. The
district court did not err when it determined that appellant’s offenses were two separate
incidents because the unlawful-ca rrying-of-a-pistol-without-a-permit offense was
complete before the s econd-degree murder offense. Finally, the district court did not err
when it corrected its clerical error by amending the restitution order.
Affirmed.