State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1987

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chris Becerra,
Appellant.

Filed December 17, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Schellhas, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-16-96

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Rudolph P. Dambeck, Assistant County
Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Cleary , Chief Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree controlled-substance sale,
arguing that the district court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress; (2) erred by
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denying his request to represent himself; (3) abused its discretion by prohibiting him from
presenting evidence that the controlled substance belonged to someone else; and (4) erred
by entering judgment of convictions on both second-degree controlled-substance offenses.
Appellant also raised several issues in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm the district
court’s denial of appellant’s suppression motion but reverse the denial of his request to
represent himself and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
In February 2016, Deputy Matt Seifkes received information that appellant Chris
Becerra was at the VFW bar in Redwood Falls. Two days earlier, an armed robbery had
occurred at the bar, and police suspected that Becerra was involved in the robbery. Deputy
Seifkes went to the bar to assist several other local law-enforcement officers and deputies
in investigating the robbery. Deputy Seifkes found Becerra sitting at the bar with another
male and assisted in his arrest and escort from the building. A s Becerra was led out of the
VFW, Deputy Seifkes grabbed Becerra’s jacket from the back of his chair. While another
officer placed Becerra in the back of a squad car, Deputy Seifkes placed Becerra’s jacket
on the hood of the car . Becerra caught Deputy Seifkes’ attention and told him that his ID
card was in his jacket. While locating the ID card in the inside pocket of the jacket, Deputy
Seifkes felt a small black bag and believed that the contents felt like powder. Upon further
investigation, Deputy Seifkes discovered a white powdery substance that was later
identified as approximately 8.5 grams of metha mphetamine. Deputy Seifkes also
discovered a “large amount of cash” in one of the other jacket pockets.
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Respondent State of Minnesota charged Becerra with one count of second-degree
controlled-substance possession. Becerra moved to suppress the methamphetamine as fruit
of an unlawful search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the warrantless
search of Becerra’s jacket did not violate Becerra’s Fourth Amendment rights because the
search was performed incident to a lawful arrest.
At a hearing on June 21, 2017, after the district court denied his suppression motion,
Becerra informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. The court told Becerra “to
think about” his desire to represent himself and scheduled another hearing. The state then
amended the complaint to include a charge of second-degree controlled-substance sale. At
a pretrial hearing on July 11, the court presented Becerra with three choices: (1) proceed
with his present attorney; (2) represent himself; or (3) hire a private attorney. Although
Becerra again expressed that he wanted to represent himself, the court again told him to
“think about it,” and that the issue would be revisited the next morning.
On July 12, 2017, Becerra told the district court that “nothing has changed from
yesterday,” and that he still wanted to represent himself because “that’s the only best option
I got.” The court then questioned Becerra on the record, found that Becerra’s waiver was
not “a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver to the right to an attorney,” and denied
Becerra’s request to represent himself.
Prior to trial, J.U. informed Becerra’s trial counsel and an investigator that the
methamphetamine discovered in Becerra’s jacket was hers. Becerra moved in limine for
the admission of J.U.’s statement under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district court denied
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the motion. A jury found Becerra guilty of the charged offenses, and the district court
sentenced Becerra to 78 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Suppression motion
Becerra challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. When
considering the denial of a pretrial suppression motion, this court reviews the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Molnau,
904 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn. 2017). “The State bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged evidence was obtained in accordance with the constitution.” State v. Edstrom,
916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 19, 2018).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Evidence seized in violation
of the United States or Minnesota Constitutions must be suppressed. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12–13, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn.
2011). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d
476, 486 (Minn. 2016). A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within an
exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 2015).
“A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn.
2015), aff’d sub. nom.; Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). An arrest is
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lawful if an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime. In
re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997). The arresting officer may then
search (1) the arrestee’s person, and (2) the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175.
Becerra argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion
because at the time his coat was searched (1) it was not within the area of his immediate
control, and (2) his coat was not immediately associated with his person when Deputy
Seifkes searched it incident to his arrest. We agree that Becerra’s coat was not within his
immediate control at the time that it was searched. A search of the area within the arrestee’s
immediate control is limited to “the area into which [the] arrestee might reach” in order to
gain possession of a weapon or destr oy evidence. Id. at 2182 (quotation omitted). An
officer’s authority to search that area terminates “[o]nce law enforcement officers have
reduced . . . personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee
to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2485 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
Here, a search of Becerra’s jacket at the time of his arrest may have been warranted
since Becerra was a suspect in a previous robbery involving a gun, and Becerra’s jacket,
which was on the back of his chair, was within the area of his immediate control. But those
are not the circumstances here. Instead, when Deputy Seifkes searched Becerra’s jacket, it
was lying on the hood of the squad car and Becerra was handcuffed in the back of the squad
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car. Because the record clearly reflects that Becerra had no access to the contents of his
jacket at the time of the search, the search cannot be validated as a search of his immediate
area.
Becerra also contends that his jacket was not immediately associated with his person
when Deputy Seifkes searched it incident to his arrest. We disagree. The United States
Supreme Court has indicted that the search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest is
fundamentally different from a search of the area within an arrestee’s immediate control.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2175–76. A search of an arrestee’s person does not depend on the
probability that weapons or evidence may be found. Id. at 2176. Rather, “the mere fact of
the lawful arrest justifies a full search of the person.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other
words, an officer’s authority to search the arrestee’s person incident to a lawful arrest is
absolute and requires no additional justification. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483–
84 (2014); State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. App. 2018).
A search of an arrestee’s person includes “personal property . . . immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (quotation omitted).
For example, “a shoulder purse is so closely associated with the person that it is identified
with and included within the concept of one’s person.” State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218,
220 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted). In recognizing the rationale for such a search, the
Supreme Court stated that the search of a personal item on an arrestee’s person, such as a
wallet or a purse, “works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest
itself.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
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Because the justification for a search of an arrestee’s person arises from the lack of
“substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself,” id. at 2489, a search
of everything that constitutes the arrestee’s person can occur without a warrant either
during or after the arrest. Applying this standard, the search of Becerra’s jacket can be
justified because the jacket was part of Becerra’s person. The record reflects that Deputy
Seifkes knew or had reason to know that the jacket was immediately associated with
Becerra because it was on the back of Becerra’s chair at the time of his arrest. Under these
circumstances, Becerra’s jacket remained immediately associated with his person while he
was seated in the squad car and it was subject to a search incident to his lawful arrest by
the deputy who knew or had reason to know that Becerra had possessed the jacket when
he was arrested. See Bradley, 908 N.W.2d at 371 (holding that purse in suspected
shoplifter’s possession when detained was immediately associated with suspect’s person,
and responding officer could search purse along with suspect incident to lawful arrest when
officer knew or had reason to know that suspect possessed purse when detained). The
district court therefore did not err by denying Becerra’s suppression motion because the
search of his jacket was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.
Self-representation request
Becerra challenges the district court’s denial of his request to represent himself. A
criminal defendant is guaranteed the constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend.
VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A criminal defendant also has a constitutional right to represent
himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975); State v.
Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012). The right to self -representation “embodies
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such bedrock concepts of individualism and personal autonomy that its deprivation is not
amenable to harmless error analysis.” State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.
1990). “‘Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right does not require a showing of
prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s
free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.’” Id.
(quoting Flanagan v. California, 465 U.S. 259, 268, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1056 (1984)).
But the right of self -representation is not absolute; a district court may refuse a
request for self-representation under some circumstances. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578,
613 (Minn. 2004). When a defendant requests to represent himself, the district court “must
determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel.” Richards, 456 N.W.2d
at 263 (footnote omitted).
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a self -representation motion for clear
error. State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 2003). “A finding is clearly
erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Rhoads, 813
N.W.2d at 885. When the facts are undisputed, however, we review de novo whether a
waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. Id.
Becerra argues that his request to represent himself was timely and unequivocal. We
agree. The record reflects that Becerra’s request was made several weeks before the
scheduled trial date, and nothing in the record indicates that Becerra’s request was an
attempt to delay the trial. Moreover, th e record reflects that Becerra communicated his
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desire to represent himself at two successive pretrial hearings, on June 21, 2017, and July
11, 2017. A t both hearings, the district court told Becerra “to think about” his decision.
And at a third successive hearing on July 12, Becerra informed the district court that he
still wanted to represent himself. In fact, Becerra clearly stated on the record several times
at the July 12 hearing that he wanted to represent himself. Although Becerra stated that he
was “going to have to” represent himself because he was not happy with his privately
retained attorney and because he did not qualify for a public defender, the “case law is clear
that a request to proceed pro se is not equivocal merely because it is an alternative position,
advanced as a fallback to a primary request for different counsel.” Richards, 456 N.W.2d
at 264 (quotation omitted). The record reflects that Becerra clearly, unequivocally, and
timely asserted his right to self-representation.
And contrary to the district court’s finding, the record reflects that Becerra’s self -
representation request was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. “A waiver is an intentional
relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends, in each case, upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine if a
defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is voluntary and intelligent, a district court should
“comprehensively examine the defendant regarding the defendant’s comprehension of the
charges, the possible punishments, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant
to the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of the waiver.” State v. Camacho ,
561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn. 1997). The inquiry should focus on whether the defendant is
“aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self -representation, so that the record will
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establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 (quotation omitted). “I t is not necessary that defendant
possesses the skills and knowledge of a lawyer to waive the right to counsel and proceed
pro se; these attributes are irrelevant to a determination of a knowing and intelligent
waiver.” Richards, 456 N.W.2d at 264.
Here, the record reflects the district court’s examination of Becerra about his
familiarity with the criminal process, the disadvantages of proceeding without an attorney,
and his understanding of the charges against him. Becerra acknowledged that the maximum
sentence he could receive was 40 years in prison. He agreed that there were “certain
advantages and disadvantages to . . . representing [him]self ,” stating that one of the
“disadvantages” to self-representation was that he would “be expected to make an opening
statement, . . . ask questions of all witnesses, [and] make closing statements.” And Becerra
acknowledged that “the rules of evidence” and “the rules of court procedure” were
applicable to his case even if he represented himself. Although a more extensive
examination by the court of Becerra’s waiver of his right to representation by counsel
would have been appropriate, the record reflects that Becerra made his self-representation
decision with “his eyes wide open”; the record does not support the district court’s finding
that Becerra’s decision was not knowing and voluntary. See id. at 265 (stating that “[w]hile
the [district] court did not make as extensive an inquiry into the waiver issue as might have
been done, the record more than adequately shows defendant made an informed decision”).
Because Becerra’s self -representation request was knowing and voluntary, we
conclude that the district court erre d by denying his request. We therefore reverse and
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remand to allow Becerra to represent himself in a new trial. See id. at 263 (stating that
obtaining a reversal for violation of the right to represent oneself “does not require a
showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the
defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceedings”). Because we reverse and remand for a new trial, we need not address the
remaining issues raised by Becerra, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.