In re the Marriage of: Scott Douglas Wiggins, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1990

In re the Marriage of: Scott Douglas Wiggins, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Marjarie Marie Renteria Wiggins,
Appellant.

Filed October 15, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-15-4850

Scott Wiggins, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Brandon M. Schwartz, Michael D. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Firm, Oakdale, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s ruling that the stipu lated judgment and
decree (the Decree) is silent on how gains and losses from the parties’ retirement accounts
are to be divided. Appellant argues that the district court’s decision violated the parties’
agreement, altered the parties’ substantive rights, and resulted in an unjust and inequitable

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division of marital property because the parties agreed that gains and losses on any amount
awarded to the parties from the accounts would be each parties’ non-marital property. We
affirm.
FACTS
The parties married in December 1999 , and respondent-husband filed a petition to
dissolve the marriage on October 12, 2015. A court trial was scheduled for October 25,
2016, and on the morning of trial , the parties came to a stipulated agreement on all issues
and made a record of that agreement with the district court . Relevant to this appeal, the
parties agreed that “their pretax retirement assets, which includes VOYA Financial
account, a Minnesota State Retirement Account, a deferred comp account, a Fidelity IRA
account, and an Equity Trus t IRA account will be equalized” and that “[t] he two largest
accounts will need to be divided pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.” They
also agreed that respondent “has a Health Savings Account, and that account will also be
equally divided bet ween the parties.” There was no discussion of gains and losses from
those accounts on the record. At issue in this appeal is the VOYA account, the Minnesota
State Retirement Account, and the Health Savings Account.
After the parties negotiated the ter ms of the Decree and signed it, the district court
signed the Decree on December 16, and judgment was entered on December 19. In the
Decree, the parties agreed to a valuation date of September 30, 2015, and listed the balances
of each of the three retirement accounts at issue in this appeal. The Decree further states:
11. Property Division. The parties’ marital property
shall be divided as set forth in the spreadsheet attached hereto
as Appendix C as soon as reasonably possible. . . . “Marital

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personal p roperty” means personal property acquired by the
parties prior to September 30, 2015, and does not include “non-
marital property” as defined by Minnesota Statute 518.003.
The division of retirement accounts as provided in
Appendix C shall be effected by m eans of a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order, which shall be prepared by attorney
[D.B.] and each party shall pay one -half of [D.B.]’s fee. The
parties shall contact [D.B.] and pay their one-half share of his
fee within thirty (30) days of entry of this J udgment and
Decree.
Appendix C lists the relevant property division as follows: Voya Financial, title is in
respondent’s name, value of $101,923 , $39,067 awarded to respondent, $62,856 awarded
to appellant , divide by Qualified Domestic Relations Order ( QDRO); MN State
Retirement, title is in respond ent’s name, value of $117,153 , $58,576.50 awarded to
respondent, $58,577.50 awarded to appellant, divide by QDRO; Health Care Savings, title
is in respondent’s name, value of $38,717, $19,358.50 awarded to respondent, $19,358.50
awarded to appellant, transfer from respondent to appellant.
There was significant communication between the parties’ attorneys related to
drafting the QDROs. When appellant’s attorney received the draft of the QDROs , she
disagreed that appellant should not receive gains or losses from the accounts. The parties
continued to discuss the issue of gains and losses, and appellant’s attorney scheduled a
hearing with the district court to address the issues she had with the QDROs. On July 7 ,
2017, respondent filed a motion for, among other issues that are not part of this appeal, an
order requiring appellant to execute the QDROs that were drafted by D.B. The district
court issued an order concluding “that the Judgment and Decree is silent o n capital gains
and losses regarding the QDROs. Accordingly, the QDROs as [D.B.] drafted each shall

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be signed by the parties without further delay.” Appellant now appeals this part of the
district court’s order.
D E C I S I O N
“Except in cases of fraud or mistake, property divisions are final and not subject to
modification.” Graff v. Graff , 472 N.W.2d 882, 883 (Minn. App. 1991) , review denied
(Minn. Sept. 13, 1991) . But, a district court “may issue orders to implement, enforc e, or
clarify the provisions of a decree, so long as it does not change the parties’ substantive
rights.” Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“An order implementing or enforcing a dissolution dec ree does not affec t the parties’
substantive rights when it does not increase or decrease the original division of marital
property.” Id. District courts can “consider terms implied in the judgment, as well as those
actually expressed.” Thompson v. Thompson , 385 N.W.2d 2 0, 22 (Minn. App. 1986).
“Whether a provision in a dissolution judgment and decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal
question” which we review de novo. Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 339 (Minn. App.
2014). If a provision in a judgment and decree is amb iguous, the district court’s
determination of its meaning is a fact question which we review for clear error. Id. And
if the same judge enters the judgment and decree and then later determines its meaning,
that judge’s “reading of the provision is entitled to great weight.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We hold that the Decree is not ambiguous. The Decree is silent on the issue of gains
and losses from the three accounts at dispute in this case. Neither the word gain, the word
loss, nor any similar langu age appears anywhere in the Decree in relation to the accounts
at issue. But this particular silence does not make the Decree ambiguous because , when

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read in its entirety, its meaning is clear. The Decree states : the value of the accounts on
the valuation date ; that marital property shall be divided as set f orth in an attached
spreadsheet; that QDRO’s drafted by D.B. shall be used to divide the retirement accounts;
that title to all three accounts is in respondent’s name ; and the amount from each account
awarded to each party. The fact that the three accounts are in respondent’s name and that
the Decree awards appellant a specific dollar amount of each of these accounts, as opposed
to a percentage of the total balance or an amount plus or minus gains and losses, makes the
Decree’s meaning unambiguous. We hold that it is clear from the Decree that each party
bears the risk of losses and will reap the reward of gains on accounts titled in their name
or on property they were awarded title to by the Decree.
But even if we were to hold that the Decree was ambiguous, the outcome would not
change. Appellant argues that the part of the Decree which states that “‘[m]arital personal
property’ means personal property acquired by the parties prior to September 30, 2015, and
does not include ‘non-marital property’ as defined by Minnesota Statute 518.003,” should
be read to mean that the parties agreed that the gains and losses on the respective accounts
was each party’s non-marital property. But even i f we were to agree with appellant’s
argument and hold that the gains and losses from each account is non-marital property, the
Decree is still silent on the issue of whose non -marital property the gains and losses are.
So, for the same reasons t hat we held that the Decree is not ambiguous, we would be
compelled to determine that the gains and losses are respondent’s non -marital property.
Accordingly, even if the Decree were ambiguous, we would hold that the district court did

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not clearly err in its determination of the meaning of the Decree, especially in light of the
“great weight” that we accord to its reading of the Decree.
Moreover, while in isolation this p ortion of the property division may appear
unequal, it is not. The fairness of a global settlement cannot be evaluated by looking solely
at individual pieces of the settlement. See Carlson v. Carlson, 390 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn.
App. 1986) (noting that the fairness of a property division depends on many factors),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). O ne party may benefit more in one aspect of the
settlement, while the other benefit s more in another aspect of the settlement. Here,
respondent argues that he accepted a smaller p ortion of the equity in their marital home
because he knew there would be market gains on his retirement accounts from the valuation
date until the date judgment was entered. And by virtue of being awarded the marital home,
appellant was able to benefit from the increase in value of the home in addition to receiving
a more favorable portion of the equity in the home.
We hold that, in light of the fact that the three accounts were in respondent’s name
and the Decree awarded appellant a specific dollar amount from each account, the Decree
was not ambiguous.
Affirmed.