A17-1995

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1993
A17-1995

State of Minnesota,
Appellant (A17-1993),
Respondent (A17-1995),

vs.

Deandre Martell Weaver,
Respondent (A17-1993),
Appellant (A17-1995).

Filed December 10, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Worke, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-15-3612

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Se nior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Lydia Mar ia Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Deandre Martell Weaver)

Considered and decided by Bratv old, Presiding Judge; Worke, Ju dge; and Jesson,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, Deandre Weaver challenges his c onviction of
promoting prostitution, arguing t hat the district court committ ed reversible error by
allowing expert testimony on the subject of the business of pro stitution. Meanwhile the
state contends that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a downward
durational sentencing departure. Because we conclude that the district court did not plainly
err by allowing the expert testimony and did not abuse its disc retion in sentencing, we
affirm Weaver’s conviction and sentence. But we remand for the district court to correct
the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
An undercover Rochester police officer exchanged texts with E.M., Weaver’s then
girlfriend, after viewing an escort-ad page on the internet. T he officer was directed to a
room in a hotel. Other surveilling officers, after discovering that the room was being rented
by Weaver, saw Weaver exit the hotel and talk on his phone. They also saw another male
drive up, talk on the phone, enter the hotel without bags, and leave ten minutes later. E.M.
exited the hotel and eventually d rove away with Weaver in his v ehicle; the surveilling
officers followed them to another hotel.
Meanwhile, the undercover officer had received a text message s tating, “don’t do
in-call if you don’t have the balls for it.” He testified that the term “in-call” means that the
buyer of sex goes to the person providing sex for money. He we nt to a different hotel to
try to do an “out-call,” meaning that the person selling sex would come to him. He called

3
the escort-ad number using a different undercover phone; when E .M. responded, he met
her in a hotel room, and they discussed “getting comfortable.”
When the officer said a code word, one of the other officers, w ho had followed
Weaver and E.M. to that hotel, en tered the room and placed E.M. under arrest. Weaver
was arrested in the parking lot and charged with second-degree promotion of prostitution.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(2) (2014).
Police recovered cell phones from both Weaver and E.M. E.M.’s phone contained
texts from a contact named “Daddy,” a term which an officer testified was frequently used
to identify a woman’s promoter. When that number was called, it rang to Weaver’s phone.
Weaver’s phone also contained p hotos from the escort website ad , and texts exchanged
between the phones including one that stated, “Y’all NEED to wa ke up and get this
money.” Weaver’s vehicle contained about $1,000 cash and some prepaid VISA gift cards,
which two officers testified are used in prostitution because they act as currency and cannot
be traced. Two of the gift cards were also found on Weaver’s p erson; when traced, their
history revealed payments to the escort website.
Without objection, the state called an expert, Ann Quinn, to testify about the general
mechanics of the business of pro stitution and sex trafficking i n Minnesota. Quinn is a
retired agent with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehensio n with expertise in
investigating prostitution and sex trafficking cases. She test ified that most prostitution is
now advertised on the internet on escort websites. Quinn described the process of placing
ads, using prepaid Visa cards and phones precharged with funds so the numbers cannot be
traced. She testified that the pictures in the ads are often not of the woman being advertised.

4
She also described additional te rminology used, including “dona tions” or “roses” for
money paid, “out-call” referring to a woman going to a customer’s location, and “in-call”
means that the customer goes to the woman.
According to Quinn, the promoter will help place ads, provide transportation to the
dates, and is frequently in a relationship with the woman he pr omotes, which helps
maintain dependency. She testifie d that almost all of the wome n have experienced some
kind of violence in their backgrounds, and their relationship w ith their promoters (whom
they often call “Daddy”) usually involves domestic violence. Quinn testified that although
it is possible for a man and a wo man to be involved in a joint enterprise, there is always
some manipulation, and Quinn had never seen a woman exit prosti tution and maintain a
relationship with her promoter.
E.M. testified for the defense. She explained that she dated Weaver for a few years
after a previous abusive relationship and that her children have a connection with him. She
testified that she placed an escort-website ad without discussi n g i t w i t h W e a v e r . S h e
contended that she met men for m assages but did not have sex wi th them for money and
did not share any of the money she received with Weaver. E.M. testified that Weaver never
physically or emotionally abused her or made her have sex for m oney. She stated that
when she entered the hotel, she told Weaver she was meeting a girlfriend.
Weaver testified that he took on the role of a substitute fathe r to E.M.’s children.
He stated that he and E.M. sometimes shared a phone, and he used prepaid gift cards from
E . M . t o b u y v i d e o g a m e s . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t E . M . d i d n o t t e l l him she was running

5
escort-website ads, but told him she was meeting a girlfriend in the hotel that evening. He
denied that he was making her work as a prostitute.
The jury found Weaver guilty of promoting prostitution. At sentencing, the defense
moved for downward dispositional and durational de partures, contending that Weaver’s
crime was less serious than a typical crime of promoting prosti tution and that, as Quinn
testified, promoters are usually violent towards their prostitu tes and manipulate them for
money, while Weaver was a loving boyfriend who acted as a carin g adult to E.M.’s
children. The state argued in opposition that despite E.M.’s a nd Weaver’s relationship,
there was always some degree of coercion and manipulation in prostitution.
The sentencing guidelines for Weaver’s offense provide for an executed 117-month
sentence with a presumptive range of 100-140 months for someone with his
criminal-history score of four. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B. The district court declined
to depart dispositionally, but issu ed a downward durational dep arture, finding that
Weaver’s offense was significantly less serious than the typical offense. The district court
stated that based on the evidence, Weaver’s testimony on his lack of involvement was not
credible, but
I’m also convinced that the defendant was not the type of
classic, ruthlessly predatory, violent, and exploitative pimp
that we do see in these cases, the kind of character for whom a
guideline prison sentence of between 100 and 140 months
makes . . . sense. One looks at the sentencing guidelines that
apply to this offense and others on the same guideline grid, and
one notes that one can do various types of fourth-, third-, and
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, with four criminal
history points, and be looking at a guideline sentence much less
than Mr. Weaver is looking at here. In other words, one can
do really horrible sexual things to people and still not be

6
looking at the guidelines sentence that applies in Mr. Weaver’s
situation. What that tells me is that in Minnesota what we
consider to be the typical offense must be one in which the
brutal kind of manipulation and victimization of the prostitute
is what we have in mind, a kind of serial sexual assault being
committed against her time and time again for the monetary
g a i n o f t h e p i m p . T h a t ’ s a t l e a s t w h a t I s e e a s t h e t y p i c a l
offense.

Now, I understand what [the prosecutor is] saying,
Judge, look at the elements of the offense, doesn’t require that.
Yeah, I get that, but I’m say ing that I think what these
guidelines tell me is the typical offense is thought to be that
kind of brutal victimization.

. . . .

There’s no indication that the defendant was ever
violent toward [E.M.] or threatening or intimidating in any
manner. He assisted in this enterprise, and that is all he did in
this enterprise.

The district court therefore imposed a sentence of 48 months, a greater-than-double
downward durational departure.
1 This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The admission of expert testimony did not constitute plain erro r affecting
substantial rights.

Weaver challenges the district court’s admission of expert evidence from Quinn on
the subject of prostitution. Because Weaver did not object to this expert testimony at trial,
we review its admission for plain error. See State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn.
2010). Under that standard, the defendant has the burden to pr ove error that is plain and

1 This offense is classified as a level C offense on the sex-off ender grid, and 48 months is
the middle of the range of the presumptive sentence length for an offender with no criminal
history points. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2014).

7
that affects substantial rights. Id.; see State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious,” which generally occurs if it contravenes a rule,
caselaw, or standard of conduct. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d at 872 ( quotation omitted). An
error affects substantial rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that it had a significant
effect on the jury’s verdict. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. “To determine whether the error
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, we review the strength of the State’s case, the
pervasiveness of the error, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to respond to the
testimony.” Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d at 873.
The decision to admit expert testimony rests within the distric t court’s discretion.
State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987). A person may be qualified as an expert
by education, knowledge, skill, or experience, and expert testi mony may be admitted if it
helps the jury to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue. Minn. R. Evid. 702.
“The basic requirement of Rule 702 is the helpfulness requirement.” State v. Helterbridle,
301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). Proposed expert testimony do es not meet the
helpfulness test if its subject lies within the knowledge and experience of lay jurors and it
will not add precision or depth to their ability to reach conclusions about the subject within
their experience. Id. Additionally, a district court may exclude expert testimony if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury, confusing
the issues, or creating unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d
227, 235 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Evid. 403).
Here, the admission of Quinn’s testimony did not constitute pla in error. The
testimony was helpful to the jury because the terminology and d etails of the business of

8
promoting prostitution are not s ubjects within the experience o f a lay jury. See
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d at 547. It assisted the jury by adding depth to their understanding
of how the business of prostitutio n is run with the aid of tech nology and also illuminated
the typical relationship between a prostitute and the promoter.
Weaver argues that Quinn’s testimony confused the jury by conflating the crimes of
sex trafficking and promoting prostitution, two separate offenses. Conviction of promoting
prostitution requires that a person, among other acts, “solicit s or procures patrons for a
prostitute” or “transports an i ndividual from one point . . . t o another point . . . to aid the
prostitution of the individual.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.321, subd. 7(1), (6), .322 , subd. 1a(2)
(2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.32 1, subd. 9 (2014) (de fining prostitution). S e x
trafficking, a different offense, is “receiving, recruiting, ha rboring, providing, or
obtaining . . . an individual to aid in . . . prostitution.” M inn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 7a(1)
(2014).
Quinn testified that although p romoting prostitution and sex tr afficking are
analogous, in prostitution, a person works for him or herself, while in sex trafficking,
another person is in control and arranges ads, provides transportation, and provides a sense
of security for the person being trafficked. This definition w as legally imprecise. But
Quinn’s testimony was unlikely to have confused the jury because Weaver was not charged
with sex trafficking, and the ev idence presented on the process of placing and paying for
ads on escort websites and the use of untraceable cell phones a nd credit cards is also
relevant to Weaver’s crime of promoting prostitution. See Minn. R. Evid. 402 (stating that
relevant evidence is generally admissible).

9
Weaver also argues that Quinn’s testimony was not helpful becau se it duplicated
police testimony, and because jurors were not required to under stand the mechanics of a
complex sex-trafficking operation in order to determine whether he promoted prostitution.
See, e.g., State v. DeShay, 669 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that gang-expert
testimony in a noncomplex drug case was duplicative of other ev idence and did not assist
the jury in evaluating the evidence). But the jury was unlikel y to have experience and
knowledge about how the busine ss of promoting prostitution is c onducted with current
technology. The police did testify as to some of the same term inology that Quinn used.
But other parts of her testimony, including the typical relatio nship of a prostitute and a
promoter, were not presented to the jury by other means. The admission of expert opinion
on these topics did not constitute plain error.
Further, we conclude that even if an error did occur in admitting the evidence, it did
not affect Weaver’s substantial rights. See Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d at 873 (reciting relevant
factors of the strength of the s tate’s case, the pervasiveness of the error, and whether the
defendant had an opportunity for response). Here, the state’s case was strong and included
evidence of Weaver’s payment for the escort ads on his phone; h is text to E.M. that she
“need[ed] to . . . get this money”; and his presence in the par king lot while she was in the
hotel with the police officer. In addition, Quinn’s testimony was not pervasive, and the
district court instructed the jury that expert testimony was entitled to “neither more nor less
consideration . . . than any other evidence.” Finally, Weaver had the opportunity to respond
to Quinn’s testimony when he and E.M. both testified that their relationship was not

10
consistent with his promoting he r as a prostitute. Therefore, the testimony did not affect
Weaver’s substantial rights.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a d ownward
durational departure.

The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a downward
durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence for Weaver’s offense. We
review the district court’s decision to depart from sentencing guidelines for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court abuses
its discretion when “i ts reasons for de parture are legally impe rmissible and insufficient
evidence in the record justifies the departure.” Id. If the district court states its reasons for
departure in the record, this court examines the record to dete rmine whether the reasons
given justify the departure. Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985). Even
if the reasons given are improper or inadequate, when sufficien t evidence of record exists
to justify the departure, we will affirm. Id.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide that a district court must impose the
presumptive sentence unless “substantial and compelling circums tances” exist for
departure. Minn. Sent. Guideline s 2.D.1.c (2014). “Substantia l and compelling
circumstances are those demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct . . . was significantly
more or less serious than that typically involved in the commis sion of the crime in
question.” State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
In departing from the presumptive sentence, the district court concluded that
Weaver’s conduct was significantly less serious than typical. The district court explained

11
that the typical offense of pro moting prostitution involved “br utal . . . manipulation and
victimization of the prostitute,” for the promoter’s monetary gain. While one of Weaver’s
text messages effectively urged E.M. to “get busy” and evidence d a “degree of
manipulation,” the court observed that Weaver never used violen ce. Nor did he directly
threaten or intimidate E.M. His arrangement with E.M., the cou rt stated, appeared to be
assisting in a joint business enterprise, as opposed to “brutal . . . victimization.”
This reason for the sentencing d eparture—less serious conduct i n promoting
prostitution—is supported by evidence in the record. The relat ionship between prostitute
and promoter is integral to prostitution operations. As the state explained in its brief, that
is why, in part, the state called Quinn as an expert witness—to help the jury “understand
the nature of these crimes, the relationships of the various actors , and the specific
terminology used in the trade.” (Emphasis added.) And in desc ribing the relationship
between a prostitute and a promoter, Quinn likened it to a domestic-violence relationship,
with dependency and physical and emotional abuse. She testified:
And I’ve never seen a healthy relationship between a pimp and
his girls. It’s violent . A n d w e a l l k n o w p e o p l e w h o a r e
involved in relationships, and we think why the heck don’t they
get out. This is very much the same way. They’re dependent
on their pimps; the pimps know their secrets; they know their
heart; they love them. Very much like a very bad relationship
that people get into.

(Emphasis added.) In response to the prosecutor’s question about whether it is possible to
have a relationship that was more of “a joint enterprise” as op posed to one “that involves
violence and possibly verbal abuse and that sort of thing,” Qui nn acknowledged “You

12
know, it happens,” but she further e x p l a i n e d t h e r e w a s a l w a y s “some type of
manipulation.”
One reading of Quinn’s expert testimony is that while most prom oter-prostitute
relationships are violent, it was possible to have one operated as a “joint enterprise,” but
even then some degree of manipulation is involved. Given this expert testimony about the
typical relationship between prostitutes and their promoters and the contrast between that
and the nonviolent relationship between E.M. and Weaver, the di strict court’s reason for
determining that Weaver’s conduct was less serious than that in volved in the typical
promotion-of-prostitution offense is supported by evidence in t he record. See Williams,
361 N.W.2d at 844. Accordingly, the district court did not abu se its discretion by
concluding that Weaver’s conduct was less serious than conduct typically involved in
promotion-of-prostitution cases. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a(5) (permitting a
departure based on “substantial grounds [that] exist that tend to excuse or mitigate the
offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense”).
The state argues that the district court’s comments comparing t he presumptive
sentence for Weaver’s offense with sentences for certain criminal-sexual-conduct offenses
show that the district court considered irrelevant information and suggest that the court
disagreed with the presumptive sentence for Weaver’s offense, which is not a valid ground
for departure. See State v. Carter, 424 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. App. 1988) (stating that
“[m]ere disagreement with the guidelines does not justify a dep arture from them”). We
agree. The district court’s reference to sentences for other crimes, taken by itself, does not
articulate a valid ground for departure.

13
But even when some of the district court’s given reasons are im proper, we will
affirm if the record contains s ufficient evidence to justify th e departure. Williams,
361 N.W.2d at 844. We note that here, the state failed to pres ent evidence by which the
jury could infer that Weaver and E.M. had a violent relationshi p, such as any allegations
of domestic abuse. And as discussed above, on this record the district court did not abuse
its discretion by determining that the amount of abuse and control in Weaver’s relationship
with E.M. made his conduct less serious than that involved in t he typical
promotion-of-prostitution offense.
The state further contends that the district court gave legally improper reasons for
its downward durational departure because a lack of violence is already contemplated in
the guidelines sentencing for Weaver’s offense.2 If Weaver had inflicted bodily harm on
E.M., the state argues, he would have been sentenced instead un der a penalty which
establishes a higher statutory maximum sentence when aggravating factors are present. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(b) (2014) (providing that a pers on convicted of promoting
prostitution or sex trafficking may be sentenced to up to 25 years in prison, a fine of up to
$60,000, or both, if certain aggr avating factors are present); see also Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.G.9 (2014 ) (establishing a higher presumptive sent ence for offenders
sentenced under subdivision 1(b)). But the possibility of an increased sentence based on
aggravated conduct does not compe l a conclusion that the distri ct court gave improper

2 The penalty provision for Weaver’s offense of promoting prosti tution provides a
maximum penalty of imprisonment for not more than 15 years or payment of a fine of not
more than $40,000 or both. See Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a.

14
reasons when it issued a lesser sentence based on mitigating factors. We reject the state’s
argument based on these penalty provisions.
Finally, the state, citing cases involving aggravated sentencin g, contends that the
district court abused its discretion in the length of the departure ordered because Weaver’s
offense did not involve “severe mitigating factors.” See, e.g., State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d
85, 89 (Minn. 1999) (noting proportionality in sentencing and holding that the district court
abused its discretion in sentencing when aggravating factors di d not justify a triple
durational sentencing departure). But the sentencing guideline s recognize that “[a]
departure is . . . an exercise of judicial discretion.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1. And we
note that in this case, if Weaver had had zero, rather than four, criminal-history points, the
presumptive guidelines sentence for his offense would have been 48 months, the sentence
that he received. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B. The sentence actually imposed therefore
falls within the range generally contemplated for such an offense. We conclude that in this
case, the downward durational departure ordered is not an abuse of the district court’s broad
discretion.
III. The warrant of commitment requires correction.
Weaver was charged by amended co mplaint with violating Minn. S tat. § 609.322,
subd. 1a(2), promotion of prostitution of an individual, and th e jury found Weaver guilty
of that offense. The warrant of commitment, however, states th at Weaver was convicted
of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(a) (2014), which re fers to promotion of
prostitution with respect to a person under 18 years of age. B oth parties agree that the
warrant incorrectly states the offense of which Weaver was conv icted. Therefore, we

15
reverse and remand to the district court for correction of the warrant of commitment to
accurately reflect Weaver’s conviction offense. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10
(stating that clerical mistakes in a judgment or order based on omission or oversight “may
be corrected by the court at any time”); id., subd. 9 (allowing the court “at any time [to]
correct a sentence not authorized by law”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

C/D-1
WORKE, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I agree with the majority that the admission of Ann Quinn’s tes timony did not
constitute plain error affecting Weaver’s substantial rights an d that the warrant of
commitment should be corrected. I respectfully dissent from th e majority’s decision on
sentencing, however, and would c onclude that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a downward durational departure.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide that the district c ourt must impose
the presumptive sentence unless “substantial and compelling” reasons for departure exist.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1.c ( 2014). “Substantial and compel ling circumstances are
those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.”
Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). The district court
reasoned in part that its downward departure was justified beca use Weaver “was not the
type of classic, ruthlessly predatory violent, and exploitative pimp that [the district court]
usually see[s] in these cases.” But this description of Weaver is based largely on his
character, not his actions in committing the offense. The district court may consider only
offense-related factors, not o ffender-related factors, when add ressing a downward
durational departure. State v. Peter , 825 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Minn. App. 2012), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2013). Therefore, consideration of Weaver’s p ersonal
characteristics was not appropriate in determining whether his crime was typical of the
offense of promoting prostitution. See Taylor, 670 N.W.2d at 587.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelin es are designed to “maintain u niformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5

C/D-2
(2014). As the majority notes, in making its decision to depar t, the district court also
compared the presumptive senten ce for Weaver’s offense to those f o r c e r t a i n
criminal-sexual-conduct offenses. But the district court’s reference to sentences for other
crimes was not relevant when it imposed Weaver’s sentence on hi s offense of promoting
prostitution. The district court’s belief that Weaver’s offens e s h o u l d c a r r y a s h o r t e r
sentence based on this comparison does not justify a downward d eparture. See
State v.Weaver, 796 N.W.2d 561, 576 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that general
disagreement with the sentencing guidelines or the policy on wh ich they are based does
not justify a departure).
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the rec ord supports a
determination that Weaver’s conduct was less serious than that involved in a typical
promotion-of-prostitution case. W hen addressing a motion for a downward durational
departure, the district court must “whether the offense was sig nificantly less serious that
the typical conduct involved in that offense.” State v. Solberg, 869 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn.
App. 2015), aff’d, 882 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2016). Although E.M. testified that Weav er
did not physically or emotionally abuse her, Quinn testified th a t t h e r e i s a l w a y s s o m e
manipulation in the prostitute-promoter relationship. E.M.’s testimony to support Weaver
does not mean that no manipulation occurred in their relationsh ip. Further, the evidence
shows that Weaver’s phone contained a text pressuring E.M. to “get the money.” I would
conclude that under these circumstances, the record does not support a downward departure
on the basis that Weaver’s crime was significantly less serious than the typical offense of
promoting prostitution. See id.

C/D-3
Because I believe that the district court based its departure on improper reasons, and
t h a t i t s s t a t e d r e a s o n s f o r d e p a r t u r e a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d i n t h e record, State v. Williams ,
361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985), I would reverse the district court’s sentencing order
and remand for re-sentencing.