Carney Lien, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1994

Carney Lien,
Respondent,

vs.

Casper Construction, Inc., et al.,
Defendants,
Veit & Company, Inc.,
Appellant.

Filed January 14, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-15-1957

Eric J. Magnuson, Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Robins Kaplan, L.L .P., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Cortney S. LeNeave, Thomas W. F uller, Richard L. Carlson, Huneg s, LeNeave & Kvas,
P.A., Wayzata, Minnesota (for respondent)

Thomas H. Boyd, Tucker A. Chambers, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Mark A. Solheim, Angela Beranek Brandt, John M. Bjorkman, Larso n • King, L.L.P.,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, J udge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Following a jury trial, appella nt Veit & Company Inc. (Veit) challenges the district
court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and motion for a new
trial. Respondent/cross-appellant Carney Lien (Lien) argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
On August 28, 2014, Lien drove home from work on a state highwa y in Itasca
County. As he drove, a rock broke through the windshield of his car and struck him in the
head, causing serious injuries. T hese included a skull fractur e, facial lacerations, partial
blindness, and a severe traumatic brain injury, which have all permanently impacted his
everyday life.
At the time, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) had re tained Veit to
supply pit run material for the construction of an expansion at BNSF’s Gunn Yard site.
Veit contracted with Hawkinson Sand and Gravel (Hawkinson) to supply and haul material
from their pit to the construction site. Hawkinson hired truck ing companies, including
Casper Construction, Inc. (Casper), to transport the material. Veit was responsible for
excavating the material from the Hawkinson pit and loading it i nto the trucks. Lien sued
Veit, Hawkinson, and Casper, alleging that the rock that caused his injuries fell out of a
truck owned by Casper and driven by Casper’s employee.

3
Prior to trial, Lien settled with Casper and Hawkinson. Lien also made a motion to
amend the complaint to add punitive damages, which was denied. The district court held
a jury trial in April 2017 on Lien’s remaining negligence claim against Veit.
At trial, Veit presented its theory of the case that this was nothing more than a tragic,
“freak accident,” which occurred when a rock became lodged in the dual tires of the Casper
dump truck and kicked up onto the road, ricocheting into Lien’s windshield. Veit provided
testimony from an excavator who maintained that, on the day of the accident, they were
p r o p e r l y l o a d i n g t h e t r u c k s o n t h e s i t e . V e i t a l s o p r o d u c e d a n accident-reconstruction
expert who testified that, based on the evidence, engineering p hysics, and his own
reconstructions, the rock was likely ejected from the dual tire s and did not come from the
truck bed.
In contrast, Lien argued that Veit was filling the dump trucks dangerously full with
the pit run material, such that on the day of the accident, rocks were falling off the top and
over the sides of the truck involved in the accident. Lien pro duced witnesses who were
present at the scene of the accident, who testified as such. L ien also produced three truck
drivers who were working on this project, who testified that Ve it was consistently
overloading the trucks with material at the Hawkinson excavation site.
After two weeks of trial, the jury found all three companies causally negligent, and
allocated 38% of the fault to Veit.
The district court denied Veit’s motion for JMOL and motion for a new trial. The
district court affirmed the jury verdict, adjusted the award fo r collateral sources, and
entered judgment against Veit in the amount of $4,754,973.67. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in denying Veit’s motion for JMOL because
sufficient evidence supported the verdict.

Veit argues that the district court erred by failing to enter JMOL in its favor for two
reasons: (1) Lien failed to establish a standard of care and (2) Lien failed to offer admissible
evidence supporting a breach of any standard of care by Veit.
If a party moves for JMOL after a jury returns a verdict, the d istrict court may
“(1) allow the judgment to stand, (2) order a new trial, or (3) direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.02(a). Appellate courts r eview the district court’s
decision to deny a motion for JMOL de novo. Christie v. Estate of Christie, 911 N.W.2d
833, 838 n.5 (Minn. 2018). “[W]e construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party and as k whether there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for the prevailing party.” Karl v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 835 N.W.2d
14, 17 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). An appellate court will set aside a jury’s verdict
“only if it is perverse and palp ably contrary to the evidence, or where the evidence is so
clear as to leave no room for differences among reasonable pers ons.” Moorhead Econ.
Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 888 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
A. Lien presented sufficient evi dence at trial to establish the standard of
care.

Veit argues that Lien was required to establish with expert tes timony the standard
of care for excavating pit run material and loading it into trucks. We are not persuaded.
The district court has broad discretion in determining whether an expert opinion is
necessary to establish the standard of care to assist the jury. Seaton v. Scott County, 404

5
N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. App. 1987). The supreme court has stated that expert testimony
is not needed, “[w]here the acts or omissions complained of are w i t h i n t h e g e n e r a l
knowledge and experience of lay persons . . . even in cases of alleged medical malpractice.”
Atwater Creamery Co., v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985).
On the other hand, expert testim ony is necessary “if it would b e speculative for the
factfinder to decide the issue of negligence without [it].” Id.
Here, the district court referenced the trial testimony of thre e dump-truck drivers
working on the Gunn Yard project, who all agreed that, if dump trucks were overloaded,
material could spill out over the top or sides, creating hazard ous conditions. The district
court concluded that sufficient evidence was presented that could lead a jury to infer that a
reasonable loader would not load a dump truck with so much pit material that excess gravel
would spill from the sides. The district court deemed an exper t opinion not necessary
because loading a dump truck involves basic common sense.
We agree with the district court that loading dump trucks is no t so technical an
activity that average jurors could not understand that a reasonable loader would take care
in loading the truck properly because overloading could cause material to spill out over the
top or sides and cause injury. A layperson would not need to speculate on the standard of
care, because it is within the realm of common knowledge.
This conclusion is consistent with Minnesota caselaw, which has found expert
testimony necessary with highly technical or “professional” issues. Blatz v. Allina Health
System, 622 N.W.2d 376, 388 (Minn. App. 2001) (“When a claim is predicated on conduct
subject to a professional standard of care, expert evidence is generally required . . . .”),

6
review denied (Minn. May 16, 2001); Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 279 (finding expert
testimony necessary to establish standard of care for insurance agents); Seaton, 404
N.W.2d at 400 (concluding expert testimony required for standard of care for designing a
bridge). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding expert testimony
unnecessary to establish the standard of care.
B. Lien presented sufficient evidence at trial to establish tha t Veit breached
its standard of care.

Veit further argues that, even i f sufficient evidence establish ed a standard of care,
there was not sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Veit breached that
standard of care. We disagree.
The evidence introduced at trial, viewed in the light most favo rable to the verdict,
included evidence that Veit consistently overloaded the trucks leaving the Hawkinson pit
for the Gunn Yard site. It also included testimony from driver s on the road who saw the
rock that struck Lien “come off the top” of the Casper truck.
Three truck drivers testified that Veit overloaded trucks for this construction project.
The first truck driver, a gravel truck driver for 30 years, tes tified that he saw Veit
overloading trucks at the Hawkinson site on more than one occasion, “coned up into like a
V above the side boards and then the rest spilled off like wate r.” This driver knew that
Veit was overloading his truck because of the pressure gauge on his dashboard.
The second truck driver, an owner of a hauling company employed to haul material
at the Hawkinson site, has been working in the industry for 25 years. At trial, he testified
that Veit was “overloading my tr ucks and others . . . 75 to 90 percent of the time,” to the

7
point that material was “coming over the top of the side board. ” This truck driver further
testified that he reported this overloading repeatedly to Veit’s supervisors on site.
The third truck driver, whose deposition testimony was read into the record at trial,
explained that if a truck is loaded properly the material will go in the middle of the truck,
“and you should be able to stand in the four corners with a hum an body.” But on this
project, he reported that the mat erial was improperly loaded fr om corner to corner, and
piled too high, sometimes several feet above the sideboards.
Lien also provided testimony from three eyewitnesses who were on the road at the
time of the accident. The first witness, who was driving a semi-truck about 100 feet directly
behind Lien and had a clear view above Lien’s small car, testif ied that he first saw some
small rocks falling off the dump t ruck coming towards them in t he other lane. Then, he
saw “a larger rock come off the top, bounce once on the highway, and up and through . . .
his windshield and the back window exploded. . . .”
This testimony was corroborated by a second witness on the road , driving directly
behind the dump truck who saw the truck pull onto the highway f rom the Hawkinson pit
and head toward Grand Rapids. When he got closer to the truck, he slowed down because
he “could see rocks coming off the truck” from the driver’s sid e and falling into the
oncoming lane of traffic. This witness saw the rock that hit L ien fall from the side of the
truck, bounce off the highway, and into Lien’s windshield. He further testified that the
rocks were not coming from the truck’s tires, and that the mud flaps were never disturbed.
A third witness driving his car behind the second witness testi fied that rocks were
coming out over the top of the Casper truck and falling over the sides, so he and the car in

8
front of him slowed down. He then stated that he saw the rock that hit Lien come “from
the top left of the truck.”
Taken together, the testimony from the truck drivers and the eyewitnesses supports
a reasonable inference that the C asper truck was overloaded on the day of the accident,
which ultimately caused the rock to come off the truck bed and into Lien’s windshield.
There was sufficient evidence fo r a jury to find that Veit brea ched its standard of care.
Given that this court may only set aside a jury verdict if it w as “perverse and palpably
contrary to the evidence,” Moorhead, 789 N.W.2d at 888 (quotation omitted), the district
court did not err in denying Veit’s motion for JMOL.
II. The district court did not ab use its discretion in denying Veit’s motion for a
new trial based on evidentiary rulings and allegations of attorney misconduct.

Veit next argues that the distric t court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion for a new trial for two reasons: (1) erroneous evidentiary rulings and (2) misconduct
throughout the trial by Lien’s attorneys.
A new trial may be granted to any party because of an “[i]rregu larity in the
proceedings of the court . . . or any order or abuse of discretion, whereby the moving party
was deprived of a fair trial,” or because of “[e]rrors of law occurring at the trial. . . .” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 59.01. “On appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial, an appell ate court
should not set aside a jury verdict unless it is manifestly and palpably contrary to the
evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Raze v. Mueller,
587 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1999) (quotations and footnote omitted).

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A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Veit argues that the district court made two primary evidentiary errors: (1) allowing
in evidence of previous overloading of other trucks and (2) exc luding statements of the
truck driver regarding the origin of the rock that injured respondent.
With regard to evidentiary rulings, the district court has disc retion to admit or
exclude evidence, and its rulings “will not be disturbed absent indications of an erroneous
legal view or abuse of discretion.” TMG Life Ins. Co. v. County of Goodhue, 540 N.W.2d
848, 851 (Minn. 1995). Even if an evidentiary ruling is errone ous, it will not be reversed
unless it results in prejudice. Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. , 567 N.W.2d 42, 46
(Minn. 1997). An evidentiary error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility that it
might have changed the result of the trial. Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720,
725 (Minn. 1983).
1. Previous overloading
Veit argues that the district court erroneously allowed into ev idence the testimony
from the three truck drivers concerning instances of Veit overl oading trucks at the
Hawkinson pit site, over Veit’s objections. Veit argues that this testimony: (1) is improper
character evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) should have been excluded under
Minn. R. Evid. 403; (3) does not constitute evidence of habit; and (4) was not relevant to
foreseeability. Veit’s arguments lack merit.
First, Veit argues that this testimony is improper character ev idence. Rule 404(b)
provides that evidence of prior bad acts “is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evi d. 404(b). But, it may be

10
admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.” Id. Veit relies on Ray v. Miller Meester Advert., Inc., 664
N.W.2d 355 (Minn. App. 2003). I n that case, an employee introd uced evidence that her
former employer did not respond to harassment complaints in the past. Ray, 664 N.W.2d
at 363. This court explained that for character evidence to be admissible, it must be “proved
by a preponderance of the evidence, relevant to a material issu e, more probative than
prejudicial, and close in time a nd similar in kind to the condu ct at issue.” Id. at 364.
(quotation omitted). This court held that the prior bad-act allegations did not meet those
requirements. Id. The previous allegations of harassment occurred as long as seven years
prior, and all but one of the people who perpetrated those earl ier instances of harassment
were no longer with the company. Id.
Here, the potential systematic overloading of other trucks at this same excavation
site, in the same time frame as the accident, is extremely prob ative. Unlike in Ray, the
conduct at issue here is much closer in time and similar in kind to the conduct in that case.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitte d evidence of overloading
under rule 404(b).
Second, Veit argues that this evidence of overloading was impr operly admitted
under rule 403, which states tha t “evidence may b e excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con fusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury. . . .” Mi nn. R. Evid. 403. As noted abov e, the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial. Vei t also argues that this evidenc e confused and misled the
jury, because it concerned other trucks on other days, and was not about the Casper truck

11
involved in the accident. The district court weighed these arg uments, and found that the
evidence regarding the loading practices at the excavation site was relevant to the issues of
foreseeability of risk and scope of duty and outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice
or jury confusion. The district court properly exercised its discretion.
Third, Veit argues that the district court erroneously allowed in the testimony about
overloading as evidence of habit under rule 406. That rule states:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of
an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of
the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the
conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.

Minn. R. Evid. 406. “Whether the response is sufficiently regular and whether the specific
situation has been repeated enough to constitute habit are questions for the [district] court.”
Minn. R. Evid. 406 1989 comm. cmt. “The [district court] should make a searching inquiry
to assure that a true habit exists.” Id.
Here, the district court held that, by introducing testimony from multiple employees
that Veit was overloading trucks at the excavation site, “it te nds to establish habit, within
the meaning of Rule 406, more de finitively.” Three truck drive rs testified as to Veit’s
practice of overloading trucks at the Hawkinson site. One driver specifically testified that
he witnessed Veit overloading trucks up to 90 percent of the ti me on this project. Given
that determining whether the response is sufficiently regular is a discretionary question for
the district court, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Finally, Veit argues that evidence of overloading was not admi ssible based on
relevance to foreseeability. The district court held that if o verloading occurred, the jury

12
could find that Veit owed a dut y to institute greater safety precautions and that “the issue
of foreseeability in this case is a close call, to be submitted to the jury.” We agree. “In
close cases, the question of f oreseeability is for the jury.” Whiteford by Whiteford v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998). Admitting the evidence
of overloading gave the jury the opportunity to determine wheth er Lien’s injury was a
foreseeable result of overloading the trucks with pit run material.
2. Statement by the truck driver
Veit argues that the district court erred in excluding a statement by the driver of the
truck involved in the accident in his guilty plea to a misdemeanor traffic offense. We are
not persuaded.
The district court excluded the statement based on Minn. Stat. § 169.94, subd.1
(2018), which states that “[n]o record of the conviction of any person for any violation of
this chapter shall be admissible as evidence in any court in an y civil action.” In the
statement, the truck driver states that the rock was kicked up by the tires. Veit asserts that
this would only have been used as a prior inconsistent statemen t to impeach the driver’s
trial testimony, that he did not know where the rock came from, and it would not have
required any disclosure of his guilty plea.
However, even if it could have b een admitted under the statute, the district court
also found that, pursuant to rule 403, any probative value woul d be outweighed by
substantial prejudice. The distr ict court found that the dange r of unfair prejudice arose
“because if [the truck driver’s] written statement had been int roduced into evidence-it
would have been impossible to question him regarding the context of his statement, or his

13
reasons for making that statement, without impermissibly refere ncing his guilty plea to a
misdemeanor failure to secure a load,” in violation of the statute. The district court found
that the statement made during his plea deal would be too confu sing, and “any probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury.” Because the district court properly a pplied Rule 403, it did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the statement by the truck driver.
B. The district court did not ab use its discretion by refusing to grant a new
trial based on attorney misconduct.

Veit argues that its motion for a new trial should have been granted on the basis of
misconduct by Lien’s counsel. We disagree.
T h e d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t a n e w t r i a l based on claimed attorney mis conduct “is not
governed by fixed rules, but instead rests wholly within the di scretion of the trial court.”
Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 600 (Minn. 1994). This is because the
district court judge, being present during the entirety of the trial, is best positioned to
determine whether an attorney’s misconduct is egregious enough to affect a jury’s verdict.
Id. at 601. The question on appeal therefore, is whether the dis trict court abused its
discretion, with the focus being on whether any misconduct resulted in prejudice. Id.
Veit primarily takes issue with Lien’s “golden rule” statement made during closing
arguments, and asserts that “th e prejudice caused by this golde n-rule argument was
compounded and exacerbated by the cumulative prejudicial effect of the other pervasive
misconduct throughout the trial,” including numerous orders, su stained objections, and
court admonishments.

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A “golden rule” argument is one t hat improperly asks the jury t o put themselves
directly in the shoes of a party. See Bisbee v. Ruppert, 235 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. 1970)
(concluding that asking jurors to consider what damages they wo uld seek in plaintiff’s
position improper). During closing arguments, Lien’s counsel m ade the following
remarks:
Lien’s counsel: So what should Veit have to pay him to
have this new job, a job they assigned him to, he didn’t contract
or volunteer for, and that they needlessly and carelessly forced
upon him? If we put a job posting out, person wanted who will
take rock to head, suffer the following conditions, and mirror
Mr. Lien’s condition, what would Veit have to pay somebody
to take that job?

Veit’s counsel: Objectio n. Improper argument.

The court: Overruled.

Lien’s counsel: They’d have to p ay him at least what their
CEO is making each year.

Veit’s counsel: Objection. Improper argument.

The court: Sustained.

Lien’s counsel: For rest of his life he’s got that job. Half
a million dollars a year to a million, no one would take it, none
of us.

Veit’s counsel: Objection. Improper argument.

The court: Sustained. Disregard.

The district court held that:

The argument of [Lien’s] counsel asked the jury to determine
what amount of compensation was fair for a person
experiencing the same deficits as [Lien]. Evidence of such
objective deficits were properly admitted into evidence. This

15
argument straddles the line between a permissible argument
based on objective evidence, and an impermissible argument
based on a plaintiff’s subjective experience. Because the
admissibility of such an argument is a close call, the Court
concludes that this argument does not represent misconduct of
the type warranting a new trial.

The district ultimately, and reas onably, found that any miscond uct was not egregious
enough to have impacted the verdict.
Even if we were to assume misconduct, Veit must demonstrate prejudice. When an
objection is made to improper argument, and the district court gives a curative instruction,
a new trial should not be granted on appeal unless the miscondu ct was prejudicial. Hake
v. Soo Line Ry. Co., 258 N.W.2d 576, 582 (Minn. 1977).
Here, the district court overru led the first objection to the a rgument, but then
sustained the next two, ultimately instructing the jury to “disregard” the statement that “no
one” would take that job. The district court also gave the sta ndard jury instruction that
“nothing the attorneys say during the trial, including opening statements and closing
arguments, is evidence.” See Omlid v. Lee, 391 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. App 1986) (new
trial not warranted because appellant’s counsel immediately obj ected, district court
sustained objection, and gave a curative instruction to jury). There is nothing to suggest
that this argument significantly prejudiced the jury such that it impacted the verdict.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretio n in denying Veit’s
motion for a new trial based on its evidentiary rulings and all egations of attorney
misconduct.

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III. The district court improperly weighed the evidence when co nsidering if Lien
had established a prima facie case for punitive damages.

Lien cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in de nying his motion for
leave to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages because V eit “deliberately
disregarded the rights and safety of Minnesota motorists by ign oring repeated complaints
of overloading,” such that Lien established a prima facie claim for punitive damages. We
agree.
The parties dispute whether the proper standard of review is de novo or abuse of
discretion. In cases involving posttrial appeals, we have revi ewed the denial of a motion
to add a claim for punitive damages for an abuse of discretion. Hogenson v. Hogenson, 852
N.W.2d 266, 277 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that “[t]he district court’s decision to deny a
motion to add a claim for punitive damages is reviewed for an a buse of discretion.”); Bjerke
v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 196 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).
The district court’s decision to deny Lien’s motion here will t herefore be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.
Under Minn. Stat. § 549.191 (20 18), a party to a civil action m ay move to amend
the complaint to add a claim fo r punitive damages. In support of a punitive-damages
motion, the moving party must offer prima facie evidence that c learly and convincingly
shows the defendant’s “deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.” Minn. Stat.
§§ 549.191-.20, subd. 1(a) (2018). A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the
rights or safety of others if:
the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally
disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to th e

17
rights or safety of others and: (1) deliberately proceeds to ac t
in conscious or intentional disregard of the high degree of
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others; or
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.

Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1(b) (2018).
If the district court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion, it “shall”
grant the motion to amend the co mplaint. Minn. Stat. § 549.191 . A prima facie case is
established when evidence is presented, which, if unrebutted, sustains a fact or supports a
judgment. McKenzie v. N. States Power Co ., 440 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Minn. App. 1989).
“[P]rima facie does not refer to a quantum of evidence, but to a procedure for screening
out unmeritorious claims for punitive damages.” Swanlund v. Shimano Indus. Corp. LTD.,
459 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Minn. App . 1990) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct.
5, 1990). Clear and convincing ev idence refers to a quantum of evidence that is “more
than a preponderance of the evi dence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978).
Lien argues that the unrebutted evidence shows that before Lien’s injury, Veit’s on-
site project supervisor and Veit’s loaders “all knew that Veit was overloading trucks with
sand and rock at the Hawkinson pit.” In support of its motion for punitive damages, Lien
submitted affidavits from five truck drivers working on the project, who reported that Veit
systematically overloaded trucks at this job site. In addition to the three truck drivers who
testified at trial, Lien included affidavits from an additional two drivers.
One of these truck drivers worked the Gunn Yard project around the time of the
accident. He stated in his affidavit that his truck was damaged due to Veit overloading it.

18
This truck driver reported that “almost every time” his truck was loaded, Veit filled it “all
the way to the edge of the truck, which was unsafe.” He also noted that he complained to
Veit’s loader and foreman “many times about overloading” and th at Veit continued to
overload despite his complaints.
Considering the totality of these drivers’ statements, the dist rict court found the
evidence, if proven, “may support a claim for ordinary negligen ce” but that “neither a
showing of negligence nor gross negligence by [Veit] is sufficient to satisfy the deliberate-
disregard standard for punitive damage claims.” The district court’s only stated reason for
denying the motion was the fact that the drivers acknowledged t hey have a responsibility
to check their trucks. However, this does not detract from Vei t’s actions, and the district
court therefore abused its discretion by improperly weighing ev idence. We therefore
reverse and remand for reconsider ation by the district court as to whether Lien has
established a prima facie case for punitive damages. Because w e reverse and remand on
this issue, there is no need to address Veit’s counter-arguments.
Additionally, because the district’s court’s analysis ended there, it did not consider
whether Veit’s on-site supervisors were acting in a managerial capacity such that Veit can
be held liable for punitive damages under Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 2 (2018). We also
remand to the district court for consideration of this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.