State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1997

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Aaron Wozna, III,
Appellant.

Filed December 10, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Traverse County District Court
File No. 78-CR-15-139

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matthew P. Franzese, Traverse County Attorney, Wheaton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Bradford Colbert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of first -degree burglary, appellant argues that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during an

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investigatory stop and abused its discretion in instructing the jury. Wozna also makes
claims for relief in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 22, 2015, S.G. was a t home with her two daughters. At
approximately 1:00 p.m., she heard a knock at the back door. When she went to answer
the door, she saw a man pointing a handgun at her. The man was wearing a red bandana
across his face and a black sweatshirt. A second man opened the door before S.G. was able
to lock it. The second man was wearing a skull face ma sk and gray sweatshirt. S.G. told
her daughters to run and hide . After the two men entered the home, the man in the skull
mask demanded to know where S. G. kept her safe. S.G. told them the safe was in her
bedroom. The man in the skull mask went to retrieve the safe while the other man
continued to point the handgun at S.G . After the man in the skull mask returned with the
safe, the two men fled, and S.G.’s daughter called 911.
Chief Deputy Greg Forcier of the Traverse County Sheriff’s Office and Chief James
Minion of the Wheaton Police Department responded to the 911 call. Chief Deputy Forcier
interviewed S.G. She gave descriptions of the men’s clothing and physical appearance and
provided an inventory of the items in the safe. Deputy Joshua Gareis of the Traverse
County Sheriff’s Office later returned to the home to ask follow-up questions. S.G.
repeated her descriptions and stated that she did not recognize their voices. Her husband,
J.G., told Deputy Gareis that he was not home at the time of the burglary and did not have
any idea who either man could be.

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On September 24, J.G. contacted Deputy Gareis and asked to meet with him. When
the two met, J.G. identified appellant William Aaron Wozna and Stephen Shawno skey as
suspects. J.G. explained that he had learned that Wozna and Shawnoskey were attempting
to pawn one of the items from the stolen safe. J.G. then sent Wo zna a message on
Facebook, asking him to return certain items from the safe. In exchange, J.G. said he would
not contact law enforcement. Wozna responded t hat he would leave the items behind a
power box near an intersection in Roberts County, South Dakota. Deputy Gareis conveyed
the information to law enforcement in Rober ts County, and an officer retrieved a plas tic
bag containing the stolen items from the location provided by Wozna.
The following day , J.B. contacted the Watert own Police Department. J.B. is an
assistant manager at the Dakota Sioux Casino in Watertown, South Dakota. She reported
that two men wanted for the burglary in Browns Valley were in the casino and had loaded
weapons. When the men left the casino, J.B. provided dispatch with a description of their
vehicle, including the license plate number and the direction and street on whi ch the men
were traveling.
Officers located the vehicle and conducted an i nvestigatory stop. When asked for
identification, Wozna told the officers that his identification was in a suitcase in the
backseat of the vehicle. He gave the officers permission to open the suitcase to find his
identification. While retrieving the identification, the officers noticed the suitcase
contained various items associa ted with the burg lary, including the skull mask. After
contacting the Traverse County Sheriff’s Office, the officers detained Wozna and obtained
a warrant to search the vehicle. Through the search, the officers discovered items from the

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stolen safe, including a $100 bill from 1934, jewelry, and savings bonds in the names o f
S.G.’s children.
The state charged Wozna with two counts of first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.582, subd. 1(a), (b) (2014). Wozna moved to suppress the evidence discovered
during the investigatory stop, arguing that the officers did not have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to support the stop. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, S.G. identified Shawnoskey as the i ndividual wearing the bandana and
holding the handgun dur ing the burglary. The prosecutor argued that Wozna was the
individual wearing the skull mask who took the safe. While discussing proposed jury
instructions, the parties disagreed how the jury shoul d be instructed with respect to Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b). The prosecutor argued that Wozna could be convicted under
the statute based on an accomplice’s p ossession of a dangerous weapon during the
burglary. Wozna disagreed and argued that the statute required that he be the one to
physically possess the weapon to be convicted. The district court ultimately instructed the
jury that Wozna could be convicted if “[Wozna] or an accomplice possessed a dangerous
weapon” during the burglary. The jury found Wozna guilt y of both counts. The district
court sentenced Wozna to 58 months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Investigatory Stop
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations
de novo. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 49 6, 502 (Minn. 2008). We review reasonable

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suspicion to justify a stop de novo. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a stop is justified.
State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if an officer has “specific and articulable
facts establishing reaso nable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.”
State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) ( quotation omitted). The
reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted). But suspicion must be based on more than a “mere hunch.”
State v. Battleson , 567 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Minn. App. 1997) . The reasonable -suspicion
standard can be established based on information provided to law enforcement by a reliable
informant. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).
Wozna argues that the information provided by J.B. was insufficient to satisfy the
reasonable-suspicion standard because “there was no indication that [J.B.] was reliable,
other than her identificatio n.” But we “presume that tips from private citizen informants
are reliable.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). This is particularly true
“when informants give information about their identity so that the police can locate them
if necessary.” Id. at 183. J.B. provided identifying information that would allow the police
to locate her if necessary. Accordingly, we presume that her tip was reliable. And her tip
provided the officers with sufficient information to satisfy the reasonable -suspicion
standard. J.B. indicated that she recognized the men as suspects in the burglary, identified
the location in which the burglary occurred, and reported that the men were dangerous and
had loaded weapons. She also provided a detailed and accurate description of their vehicle.

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This provided law enforcement with more than a “mere hunch” that Wozna may be
involved in criminal activity, specifically the burglary in Browns Valley. Because the
investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, the district court did
not err by denying Wozna’s motion to suppress.
II. Jury Instructions
We review a district court’s jury instruct ions for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). District courts are afforded “considerable
latitude” in the selection of language for jury instructions. State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 105,
113 (Minn. 2002). The instructio ns must be viewed in their entirety to determine if they
fairly and adequately state the law. State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988).
An instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d
552, 556 (Minn. 2001). Wozna argues that the district court abused its discretion in
instructing the jury because the instru ction given misstates the law. The district court
instructed the jury that Wozna could be found guilty under the statute if he “or an
accomplice possessed a d angerous weapon.” Wozna argues that the statute requires that
he be the one to physically possess the dangerous weapon to support a conviction.
Minn. Stat. § 609.582 (2014) sets out four degrees of burglary. Each degree
establishes that a burglary occurs when an individual enters a building without consent and
intends to commit a crime or commits a crime while inside , “either directly or as an
accomplice.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subds. 1 -4. Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) -(c)
defines three situations that constitute first -degree burglary. Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd.
1(b) provides:

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[w]hoever enters a building without consent and with intent to
commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and
commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an
accomplice, commits burglary in the first degree . . . if:
. . . .
(b) the burglar possesses, when entering or at any time
while in th e building, any of the following: a dangerous
weapon, any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the
victim to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, or an
explosive[.]

Wozna argues that because Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b) , requires that “the burglar
possesses . . . a dangerous weapon” and does not include the language “either directly or
as an accomplice,” he cannot be held liable for first -degree burglary based on his
accomplice’s possession of a dangerous weapon.
In State v. Bates, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the evidence required to
sustain a conviction for burglary. 183 N.W.2d 287, 289 -90 (Minn. 1971). In Bates, a
lumberyard was burglarized on a snowy night. Id. at 288. The police discovered two sets
of fresh footprints in the snow near a broken window and followed the footprints until they
found Bates and his accomplice hiding in a field. Id. Their shoeprints matched those
leading away from the broken window, and Bates’s accomplice had the stolen items in his
pocket. Id. at 289. Following a jury trial, Bates was convicted of burglary. Id. at 288.
Bates appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to su stain
his conviction. Id. The relevant statute provided that “[w]hoever enters a building without
the consent of the person in lawful possession, with intent to commit a crime therein,
commits burglary.” Id. Bates argued that the state failed to present evidence establishing
that he actually entered the building, and therefore he could not be held liable for burglary.

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Id. at 289. The supreme court rejected his argument. The supreme court noted that the
state did not present direct evidence that Bates entered the building, but determined that
“there is enough evidence that [Bates] was present and joined in the criminal activities.”
Id. The supreme court explained that “[t]here is no distinction between principals and
accessories. All participants concerned in the commission of the offense of burglary are
deemed principals and are charged and punished accordingly.” Id. at 289-90.
This court has since applied this principle in unpublished opinions addressing
liability for first-degree burglary. In State v. Zenzius, we rejected the argument now made
by Wozna. No. A13-2257, 2015 WL 133821 (Minn. App. Jan. 12, 2015), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 25, 2015). In Zenzius, this court considered whether the plain language of
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b), contemplated liability for first -degree burglary when
another individual possessed a dangerous weapon during the commission of a burglary. Id.
at *2. Zenzius argued that because the term “accomplice” was used in the general
definition of burglary, but not in the aggravating -element subdivision, the statute did not
allow for liability based on another person’s possession of a dangerous weapon. Id.
In rejecting that argument, this court first noted that Zenzius’s argument overlooked
the fact that the aggravating factor was a subsection of the general crime of burglary, which
contemplates liability when an individual commits the crime “either directly or as an
accomplice.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1. We then reasoned that “[o]nce a burglary is
established, it follows that both the ‘direct’ individual or the ‘accomplice’ individual is the
burglar.” Id. Based on this, this court concluded that the term “burglar” was broad enough
to include both the “direct burglar” and “accomplice burglar,” and therefore the subdivision

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contemplated lia bility for first -degree burglary when another individual possessed a
dangerous weapon during the burglary. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Trambell , this court rejected the argument that an individual
could not be held liable for first -degree burglary bas ed on an assault committed by an
accomplice. No. A03-1768, 2004 WL 2340059 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2004). Under Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c), an individual is liable for first -degree burglary if “the burglar
assaults a person within the building.” Tra mbell argued that the district court erred in
instructing the jury that he could be found guilty based on an assault committed by another
person. Id. at *3. We rejected the argument, reasoning that the statute does not “draw a
distinction between an assa ult committed by a burglar and an assault committed by a
burglar’s accomplice.” Id.
Although Zenzius and Trambell are unpublished and therefore not precedential, we
find their reasoning persuasive. See State v. Omwega , 769 N.W.2d 291, 294 n.2 (Minn.
App. 2009) (stating that unpublished opinions “may be considered for their persuasive
value”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2009). The cases are consistent with the principle
established in Bates that there is no distinc tion between principals and accessories in a
burglary, and that all participants “are deemed principals and are charged and punished
accordingly.” Bates, 183 N.W.2d at 288 -89. Based on this principle, it was not a
misstatement of the law for the district court to instruct the jury that Wozna could be
convicted of first -degree burglary based on his accomplice’s possession of a dangerous
weapon. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury.

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III. Pro Se Arguments
In a one-page pro se supplemental brief, Wozna asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, that his due-process rights were violated, that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct du ring clo sing
arguments. Wozna does not cite to any legal authority or provide analysis to support his
claims. “We will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either
arguments or citations to legal authority if no prejudicial error is obviou s on mere
inspection.” State v. Anderson , 763 N.W.2d 9, 17 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Because Wozna’s arguments lack analysis and citations to legal support and no prejudicial
error is obvious on mere inspection, Wozna’s pro se claims are waived.
Affirmed.