In re: Estate of Sandra Sandland, Deceased.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2016

In re: Estate of Sandra Sandland, Deceased.

Filed December 10, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-PR-17-891

Patrick W. Ledray, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (for appellant Dennis Sandland)

John A. Wehrly, Foster Brever We hrly, PLLC, St. Anthony, Minnesota (for special
administrator Kristy Sandland)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant was arrested and charged with murdering his wife. A special
administrator was appointed to represent the decedent’s estate. Appellant and the special
administrator challenge the district court’s order. Appellant argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to allow his attorney -in-fact to access the marital home to

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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investigate the premises and obtain appellant’s personal b elongings. The special
administrator argues that appellant did not have standing to seek access to the property .
Because appellant’s attorney -in-fact is an “interested person” under Minn. Stat. § 524.1-
201(33) (2018), w e affirm the district court’s order on standing. Because appellant’s
attorney-in-fact had an equal right to possession of the marital home, a tenancy in common,
we reverse and remand the district court’s order denying access.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellant is an “interested person” under Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(33).
The special administrator argues that the district court erred in interpreting the
definition of “interested person” to include appellant as the decedent’s spouse. The special
administrator argues that appellant lost his title as “spouse” for purposes of determining
“interested persons” by feloniously and intentionally killing his wife, and therefore, does
not have standing to challenge the district court’s decision.
We apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issue of interpreting statutes. In
re Estate of Butler , 803 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 2011). We interpret statutes by
ascertaining and effectuating the intent of the legislature. Christianson v. Henke , 831
N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013). The first step “is to determine whether the statute’s
language, on its face, is ambiguous.” Id. In doing so, we give the words and phrases their
plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
Minnesota Statutes section 524.1-201(33) defines an “interested person” as “heirs,
devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a property right
or claim against the estate of a decedent.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(33). We give the word

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“spouse” its plain and ordinary meaning, which is a “marriage partner; a husband or wife.”
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1694 (5th ed. 2011) (defining
spouse). We also give the phrase “any others having a property right” its plain and ordinary
meaning, which is a person who owns or has an interest in possessions, real estate, tangible
items, or intangible items . See id. at 1412 (defining property). Thus, the statute is
unambiguous and we apply its language to this case.
Here, appellant is both a spouse and a person with a property right affected by the
estate. Although appellant may have lost his status as an heir by “feloniously and
intentionally” killing his wife, see Minn. Stat. § 524.2-803(a), (f) (2018), appellant is not
precluded from bringing a claim in district court. Thus, appellant is an “interested person”
with standing to file his claim in district court.
II. The district court erred in denying appellant’s motion to allow his attorney-in-
fact to enter the house to investigate the premises and collect appellant’s
personal belongings.

Appellant argues that his attorney -in-fact should be permitted to inspect the
premises and obtain appellant’s personal items . The special administrator disagrees and
argues that she may exclude any third party from the house because she serves in the
decedent’s position as a tenant in common with appellant.
“Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby
effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes
as the decedent’s property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.” Minn. Stat.
§ 524.2-803(b) (201 8). A joint tenant whose interest is severed becomes a tenant in
common. Johnson v. Gray, 533 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Minn. App. 1995) (citing Gau v. Hyland,

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41 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. 1950)). A tenancy in common is a “tenancy by two or more
persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess
the whole property but no right of survivorship.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1695 (10th ed.
2014) (defining tenancy in common) . A tenant in common shares a common right to
possess the entire interest of the property. See Adams v. Johnson, 136 N.W.2d 78, 81
(Minn. 1965). But a tenant in common may not exclude a cotenant. Petraborg v. Zontelli,
15 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 1944).
We recognize that “[a] special administrator is a personal representative of a
decedent,” Jones v. Minn. Transfer Ry. Co. , 121 N.W. 606, 607 (Minn. 1909), appointed
“to preserve the estate or to secure its proper administration,” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-614 (2)
(2018). A special administrator appointed by the court “has the power of a general personal
representative.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-617 (2018). “Until termination of the appointment a
personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an
absolute owner would have.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-711 (2018).
Likewise, an agent who is given power of attorney has t he authority to act for the
principal. In re Will of Kipke, 645 N.W.2d 727, 732-33 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 2002); see also Minn. Stat. § 523.23, subd. 1 (2018) (short form power of
attorney). By issuing a valid short form power o f attorney, the principal authorizes the
attorney-in-fact “to use in any way . . . any real property in which the principal has, or
claims to have, any estate or interest,” and

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to do any act of management or of conservation, with respect
to any tangible personal property or to any interest in any
tangible personal property owned, or claimed to be owned, by
the principal, including by way of illustration, but not of
restriction, power to . . . obtain or regain possession, or protect
the tangible personal property or interest in any tangible
personal property, by action, proceeding, or otherwise.

Minn. Stat. § 523.24, subds. 1(5), 2(4) (2018).
Here, the special administrator was appointed as the legal representative of the
decedent and appellant’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to serve as the legal representative
of appellant. Both legal representatives act on behalf of the tenants in common. Neither
tenant in common may exclude the other from the property because they share an equal
right to possess and use it. The district court erred in concluding that the special
administrator could exclude appellant’s attorney-in-fact from the house.
We reverse and remand to the district court for an order authorizing appellant’s
attorney-in-fact access to the house to obtain appellant’s personal property, limited by
whatever terms and conditions are appropriate.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.