Richard Willmar Rapatt, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2033

Richard Willmar Rapatt, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 4, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-15-606

Richard W. Rapatt, Menahga, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
relief. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Richard Willmar Rapatt with four counts of failure to
file a tax return and four counts of failure to pay state income tax. The case was tried to
the district court, and it found Rapatt guilty of six of the eight counts. The district court
entered judgment of conviction on three counts of failure to pay state income tax and stayed
a 13-month prison sentence for five years on the condition that Rapatt serve 90 days in jail.
Three days prior to sentencing , Rapatt filed a petition for a writ of m andamus with this
court. This court denied his petition and his subsequent request for reconsideration. Rapatt
petitioned for postconviction re lief, and the postconviction court summarily denied his
petition. Rapatt appeals.1
D E C I S I O N
Before we address Rapatt’s assignments of error, we note the principles that govern
our review. As an appellate court, our responsibility is to correct errors, not to retry the
case. Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House , 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n.2 (Minn. 1979). “[O]n
appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can

1 The state did not file a brief, and this court ordered the appeal to proceed under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if a respondent fails to file a brief, the case shall be
determined on the merits).

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be reversal. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Loth
v. Loth , 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949) (quotat ion omitted). “An
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by legal authority or
argument is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. ”2 Brooks v.
State, 897 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Minn. App. 2017) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 8, 2017). In
addition, issues not adequately briefed are waived. Id. at 819. “Any error that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 . Moreover, an
appellate court “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district
court.” Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Although some
accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, they are generally held to the same
standards as attorneys. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
The postconviction statute authorizes “a person convicted of a crime” to seek
postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s
rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2016). Upon filing a petition for postconviction relief, an evidentiary
hearing must be held “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd.

2 The postconviction court observed that Rapatt’s “briefing and other filings, while
voluminous, often contain no sustained argument, shed no greater light on the nature of his
claims for relief, and appear to contain frequent contradictions.” Thus, the postconviction
court noted that “it is within the C ourt’s discretion to summarily dismiss these claims.”
Nonetheless, the postconviction court carefully construed and thoroughly analyzed
Rapatt’s claims. We commend the district court for its patient approach and detailed
analysis.

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1 (2016). Appellate courts review a postconviction court’s summary denial of a petition
for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 416
(Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Brown v. State,
895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Rapatt seems to challenge the postconviction court’s rulings on the following issues:
(1) whether the state’s witnesses should have been required to testify regarding certain tax-
code definitions; (2) whether Rapatt’s 1099 federal tax forms were sufficient to establish
his guilt; (3) whether he was exempt from paying state income tax based on his citizenship
status; and (4) whether the guilty verdict s are invalid because the district co urt did not
obtain Rapatt’s not-guilty plea before trial. We address each argument in turn.
Tax-Code Definitions
Rapatt argues that he was denied his right to require the state’s witnesses to testify
regarding the definitions of certain terms in Minnesota ’s tax code. The admissibility of
such testimony is an evidentiary ruling that lies within the discretion of the district court.
State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016). The postconviction court concluded
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing the testimony because it
was irrelevant. Indeed, the state’s witnesses did not testify about the nuances of the tax
code. We discern no error in the postconviction court’s determination that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by disallowing the testimony.

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Federal Tax Form 1099
Rapatt next argues that his 1099s could not be used as evidence against him because
“[n]ot one witness testified with any firsthand knowledge of the veracity of the 1099s
numbers.” The postconviction court construed this argument as a cha llenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support Rapatt’s convictions.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court closely
reviews the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach its verdict. State
v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). “[T]he same standard of review [is used] in
both bench and jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Barshaw,
879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016) . An appellate court will not disturb the verdict if the
fact-finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
The postconviction court reasoned that the district court did not solely rely on the
1099s in finding Rapatt guilty. The district court received additional evidence in the form
of witness testimony and business records . The postconviction court determined that this
additional evidence, taken together, supported Rapatt’s convictions . Our review of the
record reveals no error in the postconviction court’s determination that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts. And because the district court’s finding of guilt
did not depend on the 1099s, any error related to their admission was harmless and does
not provide a basis for relief. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01.

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Citizenship Exemption
Rapatt asserts that because he is a “citizen of Minnesota” and not a “citizen of the
United States,” the district court denied his “political rights” by refusing to allow him to
provide evidence regarding his citizenship status and why that status allows him to legally
avoid paying state incom e tax. As we understand it, Rapatt argues that because the
completion of a Minnesota state tax return require s a taxpayer to file a federal tax return
and he was not required to file a federal tax return, he was not required to file a stat e tax
return. The underlying basis for his assertion that he was not required to file a federal
income tax return is that he did not consent to being taxed by any government entity.
The postconviction court concluded that Rapatt’s argument is flawed because
Minnesota only requires a taxpayer to fill out a federal tax return —as opposed to filing
one—and Rapatt provided no evidence to show that he was exempt f rom paying state
income tax. As the postconviction court reasoned, the power of taxation has nothing to do
with consent and everything to do with territorial sovereignty. See Reed v. Bjornson, 191
Minn. 254, 257, 253 N.W. 102, 104 (1934) (“It is elementary that the power of taxation is
inherent in sovereignty . . . .”). The postconviction court’s legal reasoning is sound.
Failure to Obtain Not-Guilty Plea
Rapatt asserts that the district court erred by failing to obtain his plea of not guilty
before his trial. Rapatt does not cite law establishing that the district court was required to
obtain his plea of not guilty before trial, and our review of the relevant rules does not reveal
such a requirement. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 8.02, subd. 1 (“The only plea a defendant may
enter at the Rule 8 hearing is a guilty plea.”); Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.08(a) (“The defendant

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may enter a plea to the charged offense . . . any time after the commencement of the
Omnibus Hearing.”); Minn. R. Crim. P. 12.06 (“The defendant may enter a guilty plea to
the charged offense . . . . ”). Regardless, as the postconviction court reasoned, because
Rapatt does not allege, much less establish, any prejudice resulting from the district court’s
failure to obtain a formal plea of not guilty , the alleged error is harmless and does not
provide a basis for relief. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01.
Other Arguments
We acknowledge Rapatt’s extensive argument regarding his suffrage rights. But
Rapatt does not adequately explain, and we fail to discern, how the alleged violation of his
right to vote compromises the validity of his convictions. We therefore do not address the
merits of this argument. See Brooks, 897 N.W.2d at 818-19. Nor do we address Rapatt’s
assertion that the State of Minnesota is running a “CON,” because it is not relevant to our
legal analysis of the issues that are properly before us.
In sum, we have thoroughly reviewed Rapatt’s arguments and the relevant portions
of the record, and we conclude that he did not establish a basis for postconviction relief.
The postconviction court therefore did not err by summarily denying his petition for relief.
Affirmed.