Glen M. Palecek, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2038

Glen M. Palecek, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Rushford-Peterson, Independent School District No. 239,
defendant, third party plaintiff,
Respondent,

Moonyeen Claire Holle, individually and as trustee of the
Richard Allen Holle and Moonyeen Claire Holle Revocable Trust,
Third Party Defendant.

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-CV-15-840

Phillip R. Krass, Malkerson Gunn Martin LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Joseph J. Langel, Nathan B. Shepherd, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
In this easement dispute, appellant-landowners challenge the district court ’s
declaration that the ir easement permits private access rather than a public roadway over
school property and the denial of mandamus relief. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2008, Moonyeen Claire Holle (Holle) and her late husband, Richard Holle 1
(collectively, the Holles) , sold 16 acres of land to respondent Rushford -Peterson,
Independent School District No. 239 , for construction of a new school. The Holles sold
the land under a lease purchase agreement (LPA), with a term that ran from August 1, 2008,
to July 31, 2014. The Holles retained 52 acres bordering the east side of the school district
land, which had no access to a public road. As part of the LPA, the school district granted
the Holles a permanent easement —a 66-foot wide stretch along the east and south edges
of the district land—to provide access to the 52 acres. Before signing the LPA, the Holles
insisted that the “easement” be referred to as a “right -of-way.”2 The Holles believed that
by calling it a “right -of-way,” the easement would permit construction of a public road.
But they never explained to the school district that they intended to reserve the right to
build a public road or install utilities in the easement.

1Richard Holle died in 2011. Moonyeen Holle is a third-party defendant, both individually
and as trustee for a trust established for the benefit of the Holles.

2 The LPA states that the “right -of-way” is “described in Exhibit B ,” but Exhibit B was
never completed.

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Two years later, on March 18, 2010, the Holles sold the remaining 52 acres (the
property) to appellants Glen M. Palecek and Denise K. Palecek under a contract for deed.
The Paleceks did not investigate access issues, instead relying on the Holles’
representations. The contract for deed includes a legal description of the easement and
notes it is “for the purpose of ingress and egress .” But the document does not specify
whether the easement provides private or public access to the property.
In April 2011, the Paleceks offered to sell the property to the Minnesota Department
of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR asked the Paleceks to clarify the access issue. In
response, t he Palecek s drafted a nd had the Holles sign a “Right -Of-Way-Agreement,”
which grants the Paleceks “any and all rights we have to a sixty-six (66) foot right-of way”
as set forth in the LPA. The Holles expressly stated that the “intent of this right-of-way is
that it be set aside and dedicated for the purpose of constructing public and/or private roads
as well as the installment of public and/or private utilities.” This agreement was not put
into recordable form and thus not accepted for filing by the county recorder.
On July 7, the school district superintendent, Charles Ehler, received a letter from
the Paleceks explaining that the DNR wanted to buy their land but needed to clarify the
extent of the access easement. Ehler asked the school district’s attorney to draft a clarifying
“access easement.” This document, signed on July 27, granted the Holles, who still owned
the land subject to the Paleceks’ contract for deed, a private ingress/egress easement
consistent with the right of way described in the LPA. The school district filed the access
easement with the county recorder without consulting the Holles or the Paleceks. But both

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the Holles and the Paleceks received copies of the access easement and did not object to it.
The Paleceks forwarded a copy to the DNR, but the proposed sale never occurred.
The school district made its final payment under the LPA in August 2014 . Holle
refused to transfer the warranty deed, which was executed before Richard Holle’s death
and held by the Holles’ attorney, because of the ongoing concerns about access to the
Palecek property. Only after both the school district and the Paleceks sign ed documents
acknowledging their satisfaction with th e access agreement and releasing Holle from
liability, did Holle permit her attorney to transfer the deed. In 2015, after delivering the
warranty deed to the school district, Holle executed a document entitled “Right-of-Way for
Public and Private Ingress and Egress” at the Paleceks’ request. 3
In November 2015, th e Paleceks initiated this action seeking (1) a declaration that
they have an easement for private and public access over the school district land and (2) a
writ of mandamus ordering the school district to commence condemnation proceedings to
compensate the m for taking their property. Following a series of pretrial motions, the
district court concluded that the easement terms stated in the various documents were
ambiguous, requiring consideration of extrinsic evidence .4 The district court limited the
parties’ presentations to evidence related to the easement terms and ordered the parties to

3 The district court described this document as “self -serving” and stated that it had “no
validity for purposes of this Court’s decision” because Holle signed it after she had
transferred the property to the school district.

4 The Paleceks do not challenge the district court’s decision that extrinsic evidence was
needed to determine the extent of the easement.

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brief their legal arguments regarding the availability of mandamus relief. At trial, the court
excluded evidence of the school district’s alleged encroachments on the easement.
After a three -day trial, the district court determined that a 66 -foot perpetual and
nonexclusive easement for the purpose of unobstr ucted ingress and egress exists on the
school district’s land for the benefit of the Paleceks’ property. The court found that the
easement was not intended for the purpose of a public road, stating that “[i]f the Holles, in
fact, wanted to create a public street to their property, they would have had to and should
have retained ownership of the property in order to dedicate the land as a public street.”
After declaring the extent of the Paleceks’ easement, the district court concluded the
Paleceks do not have an inverse -condemnation claim because the school di strict did not
take their property and because they have an adequate legal remedy for any impairment of
the easement. The district court denied the Paleceks’ motions for amended findings or a
new trial, concluding that sufficient evidence supports its findings. The Paleceks appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the easement in favor of
the Paleceks is for private access only and not for a public right-of-way.

We review a district court’s findings of fact following a court trial for clear error.
In re Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees between Stowman Law Firm, P.A. , & Lori Peterson Law
Firm, 855 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Minn. App. 2014), aff’d, 870 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Oct. 28,
2015). A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict , and we may not “engage

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in fact -finding,” even when we “might find the facts to be different if [we] had the
factfinding function.” Id. (quotation omitted). But we review a district court’s legal
determinations de novo. Id. A party challenging posttrial decisions must demonstrate clear
abuse of discretion in denying amended findings , Zander v. State , 703 N .W.2d 845, 857
(Minn. App. 2005), or in denying a new trial, Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 811
N.W.2d 618, 625 (Minn. 2012).
The Paleceks challenge the district court’s denial of their posttrial motions. Their
primary argument is that the district court erred by crediting the school district’s testimony
over contrary testimony by the Paleceks and Holle . “[I]t is the district court’s exclusive
responsibility to reconcile conflicting evidence.” Am. Bank of St. Paul v. City of
Minneapolis, 802 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. App. 2011). A fact -finder may reject even
uncontradicted testimony, “if the surrounding facts and circumstances afford reasonable
grounds for doubting its credibility.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the record supports a
district court’s findings, we “may not reverse a trial court due to mere disagreement with
its findings.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1999).
The district court’s determination that the easement provides private access only is
supported by the record evidence. The LPA does not , by its terms, establish a public
easement. Rather, the LPA grants the Holles a “permane nt right-of-way” over a 66 -foot
wide portion of the school district land. Holle could not remember if she informed the
school district of her desire to create a public road. But the school district witnesses denied
discussing a public easement, stating that the school district would not have agreed to it in
any event. And the access agreement the school district prepared at the Paleceks’ request

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plainly describes the easement as private. Holle and the Paleceks received copies of the
access agreement at the time it was recorded and made no objections.
Because there is evidentiary support for the district court’s findings, we discern no
clear error. And in the absence of such error, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the Paleceks’ motions for amended findings or a new trial.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a writ of mandamus.

A writ of mandamus may be issued to compel a court, corporation, board, or person
to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law. Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (2016); Douglas
v. Stillwater Area Pub. Sch s., Indep. Sch. Dist. 834, 899 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Minn. App.
2017). Mandamus relief is not appropriate if “there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” Minn. Stat. § 586.02 (2016); see also Douglas, 899 N.W.2d
at 556 (same). We review a district court’s decision on a mandamus petition for an abuse
of discretion. Douglas, 899 N.W.2d at 556.
A government entity must compensate a property owner when it takes the owner’s
property; failure to do so creates a cause of action for inverse condemnation, which can be
litigated through a mandamus action. Nolan & Nolan v. City of Eagan , 673 N.W.2d 487,
494 (Minn. App. 2003 ), review denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 2004). Whether a taking has
occurred is a legal question. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623,
631 (Minn. 2007). To prevail on an inverse-condemnation claim, an aggrieved party must
show (1) a property interest, (2) government taking of the property, (3) taking for a public
use, and (4) nonpayment of just compensation. Hall v. State, 908 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Minn.
2018).

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The Paleceks argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their
mandamus request without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree for two reasons. First, the
Paleceks have not suffered a taking by a government entity. The district court declared
that they retain what the school district originally granted to the Holles—a 66-foot,
unobstructed, access easement over the school district land. The fact that the district court
found the easement authorizes private access rather than a public road, as the Paleceks
advocated, does not change the fact that they have an easement. Their reliance on Nolan
does not persuade us otherwise . In Nolan, this court reversed dismissal on the pleadings
of an allegation that the Minnesota Department of Transportation’s construction of a storm
sewer system caused “frequent, regular, and permanent” flooding on the Nolan
partnership’s property that was so extensive that it amounted to a taking. 673 N.W.2d at
491. We concluded that the partnership adequately pleaded its claim because recurrent
flooding could rise to the level of a taking. Id. at 492-93. And we observed that legal
remedies for negligence, trespass, and nuisance would be inadequate if a taking occurred.
Id. at 493 -94. In contrast, the Paleceks have an access easement that the school district
must honor under contract law. See Lindberg v. Fasching, 667 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Minn.
App. 2003) (stating that an “express grant creating the easement is a contract”) , review
denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). There has been no taking because the district court declared
the Paleceks’ easement right.
Second, the Paleceks have an adequate legal remedy. As noted above, based on the
evidence adduced at trial, the district court defined the nature of the Paleceks’ easement.
To the extent the school district has obstructed the Paleceks’ use of the easement, or does

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so in the future, the Paleceks may pursue co ntract remedies, including money damages or
a court order to remove any obstructions. Because the Paleceks have a “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law ,” they are not entitled to mandamus relief .
Douglas, 899 N.W.2d at 556 (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.