State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2043

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Micah Lee Ward,
Appellant.

Filed December 3, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-16-1147

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Rick Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Abby Wikelius, Assistant County Attorney, Marshall,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of domestic assault and fifth -degree
controlled-substance sale, arguing that the district court plainly erred in its jury instructions
and that his conviction of fifth -degree controlled -substance sale is not supported by
sufficient evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2016, while appellant Micah Ward was involved i n a romantic
relationship with A.H. and at her home, he hit her with a closed fist, bruising her left arm
and back, and hit her with a fan that he had broken, injuring her face near her left eye. Ward
told A.H. that if the police came, he would kill her. When A.H. tried to leave her home,
Ward prevented her departure by blocking the door and then pulling out a gun. Eventually,
A.H. called 911, and Ward ran from A.H.’s apartment and she saw him get into a taxi.
Police arrived quickly, and A.H. directed them to a taxi, where Ward was sitting in
the front passenger seat. A police officer stopped the taxi and noticed that Ward was
“making movements like he was moving his hands toward the back seat of the [taxi] and
after he got out [the officer] observed he didn’t have anything in his hands.” The officer
searched the taxi and found a “package of green leafy substance ” behind the front
passenger’s seat. Based on his experience and training, the officer identified the substance
as marijuana. The substance in the package consisted of 15 individually wrapped baggies
that were identical in size and were later determined to weigh one gram, including the

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weight of the baggie. The officer arrested Ward and transported him to a law-enforcement
center for questioning.
Before questioning Ward, the police officer p atted him down and found additional
small baggies and one larger bag of marijuana on his person . Ward admitted that the
marijuana belonged to him . Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ward with various
offenses, and the following offenses were tried to a jury: threats of violence in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016); domestic assau lt-fear in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016); domestic assault -bodily harm in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4; two counts of domestic assault-prior convictions in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.224, subd. 4(b) (2016); fifth -degree controlled-substance sale in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1) (2016); and second -degree assault with a dangerous
weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016).
Multiple officers testified at trial about the packaging and presentation of the
marijuana. One officer stated that “when people carry baggies like that where they’re all
individually packaged, identical in size, identical in shape and weight, that to [him] is
indicative . . . that they have them fo r sale, not for p ersonal use.” An officer also testified
that the larger bag of marijuana was ground up, indicating that it was for Ward’s personal
use, while the smaller bags contained buds, indicating they were intended for sale.
At the close of the trial, the district court instructed the jury about each charge, but
the court misstated the jury instruction for domestic assault-bodily harm. Before the jury
began deliberating, the court acknowledged the mistake and again instructed the jury on

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domestic assault -bodily harm. The jury found Ward guilty of felony domestic assault -
bodily harm and fifth-degree sale of marijuana.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Jury Instructions
Appellate courts review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Peltier , 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). Jury instructions must “fairly and
adequately explain the law of the case and not materially misstate the law.” Id. Ward did
not object to the jury instructions at trial. When a defendant fails to object a t trial, the
forfeiture doctrine generally precludes appellate relief. State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275,
278–79 (Minn. 2015). But under Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02, an appellate court may consider
a forfeited error when an appellant shows “(1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected
substantial rights.” State v. Lillenthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017). If an appellate
court concludes that any of the requirements of the plain -error doctrine is not satisfied, it
need not consider the others. State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn. 2017). If an
appellant establishes all three requirements, an appellate court “may correct the error only
if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error
contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. at 787 (quotations omitted). A
district court “abuses its discretion . . . when its jury instructions materially misstates the
law when read as a whole.” State v. Schoenrock, 899 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Minn. 2017).

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Here, the district court instructed the jury on felony domestic assault in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4, in relevant part, as follows:
Under Min nesota law, whoever intentionally inflicts or
attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another is guilty of a crime
if the personal assaulted is a fa – is a member of the defendant’s
family or household.

Domestic Assault Intent to Inflict Bodily Harm Elements. The
elements of domestic assault are, f irst the defendant assaulted
[A.H.]. The term assault as used in this charge is the intentional
infliction of bodily harm upon another. Bodily harm means
physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of a person’s
physical condition. It is not necessary for the State to prove
that the defendant intended to inflict bodily harm or death but
only that the defendant acted with intent that [A.H.] would -- it
is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant
intended to inflict bodily harm or death. Intentionally means
that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the
result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor,
if successful, will cause the result. In addition the actor mu st
have knowledge of those facts that are necessary to make the
actor’s conduct criminal and that are set forth after the word
intentionally. To have knowledge requires only that the actor
believes that the specified fact exists. Second, [A.H.] was a
member of the defendant’s family . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Ward argues that the italicized language above constituted “instructional error” and
means the jury, to convict, did not have to find that [Ward] had
even committed the physical act necessary to inflict bodily
harm. This is because a reasonable lay jury could not
reasonably have understood the instruction “it is not necessary
for the State to prove that the defendant intended to inflict
bodily harm or death” to mean the State had no burden to prove
that Ward specifically intended the bodily harm he allegedly
caused.

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We disagree. “[T]he mens rea element of assault -harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the
general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826,
831 (Minn. 2016) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (holding that
assault-harm is general-intent crime)). “[I]n proving the mens rea element of general-intent
crimes, the State need not show that the defendant meant to or knew that she would violate
the law or cause a particular result.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Moreover, here, before the jury began deliberating, the district court stated, “I want
to correct any possible error and that is the instruction on Domestic Assault Intent to – to
inflict bodily harm elements.” The court then provided full , correct, and agreed -upon
instructions to the jury . Additionally, the court provided written instructions to the jury.
See State v. Swain , 269 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Minn. 1978) (“[W] ritten instructions are to be
encouraged as an aid to juries unversed in the law and that fairness may be better insured
by giving written instructions.”). We conclude that the district court did not commit plain
error in its instructions to the jury on assault-harm.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ward argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of fifth-degree
controlled-substance sale because the circumstances proved create a reasonable inference
that is inconsistent with guilt and instead show possession for personal use. In assessing
the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court views “the evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict to determine whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.

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Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted). “We will not disturb the
jury’s verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for
the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Here, the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that Ward intended to sell
the marijuana that he possessed. “Intent to sell or distribute is usually proved
circumstantially.” State v. White, 332 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1983).
When assessing the sufficiency of circumstant ial
evidence, our review warrants closer scrutiny. When reviewing
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we first identify the
circumstances proved. Consistent with our standard of review,
we defer to the jury ’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances as well as to the jury ’s rejection of evidence in
the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the
State. We recognize that juries are generally in the best position
to weigh the credibility of the evidence and thus determine
which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their
testimony.

Our second step is to examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a
hypothesis other than guilt. In contrast to the deference given
when identifying the circumstances proved, we give no
deference to the fact finder ’s choice between reasonable
inferences. Circumstantial evidence must form a complete
chain that, as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt. Therefore, in assessing
the inferences drawn from the circumstances proved, the
inquiry is not simply whether the inferences leading to guilt are
reasonable. Although that must be true in order to convict, it
must also be true that there are no other reasonable, rational
inferences that are inconsistent with guilt . This is because if

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any one or more circumstances found proved are inconsistent
with guilt, or consistent with innocence, then a reasonable
doubt as to guilt arises. But we will not overturn a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere
conjecture. The State does not have the burden of removing all
doubt, but it must remove all reasonable doubt.

Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 622 (quotations and citations omitted).
To prove Ward guilty of fifth -degree controlled-substance sale, the state had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ward possessed marijuana with the intent to sell. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1) (listing elements of offense); Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd.
15a(3) (2016) (including intent to sell within definition of sell). “Evidence tending to show
such intent includes evidence as to the large quantity of drugs possessed, evidence as to the
manner of packaging, and other evidence.” White, 332 N.W.2d at 912.
Here, the circumstances proved are that: (1) after Ward was apprehended by police
when he lef t the scene where the assaults occurred, police searched the taxi in which he
was riding and found 15 small bags of marijuana; (2) the small bags of marijuana were
identical in shape and weight; (3) after Ward’s arrest, police searched him and found ten
additional small bags and one larger bag of marijuana; and (4) the large bag of marijuana
contained ground marijuana while the small bags contained buds. Experienced o fficers
testified that the identical shape and weight of the small bags indicated that the bags were
intended for sale, not for personal use. The officers also testified that the fact that the small
bags contained unground marijuana, unlike the large bag, showed that the small bags were
intended for sale and the large bag was intended for personal use.

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The next step is to evaluate “independently the reasonableness of all inferences that
might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 622 (quotation
omitted). Ward argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with other hypotheses
besides guilt because u nlike other intent -to-sell cases, police did not find Ward with
significant amounts of cash, log lists, scales, or weapons. But although “the circumstances
proved include circumstances from which, when viewed in isolation,” one might infer that
Ward possessed the marijuana for personal use, “there are also circumstances proved from
which the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that the [marijuana] was possessed for
purposes of sale.” Id. at 623. The packaging and pr eparation of the marijuana found in
Ward’s possession are overarching circumstances that proved that the only reasonable
inference was that he possessed the marijuana with the intent to sell it. The jury was in the
best position to evaluate the circumstant ial evidence, and its verdict is entitled to due
deference. See State v. Fairbanks , 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014) (“A jury is in the
best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is entitled to due
deference.”)
Affirmed.