In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. E. M. and R. B. L., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2067

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. E. M. and R. B. L., Parents

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-JV-17-159

Carrie A. Doom, McKinnis & Doom, P.A., Cambridge, Minnesota (for appellant S.E.M.)

Ann Tessneer, Tessneer Law Office, Cambridge, Minnesota (for appellant R.B.L.)

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Timothy C. Nelson, Assistant County Attorney,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Laura Moore, Cambridge, Minnesota (Guardian ad Litem)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
On appea l from an order terminating their parental rights, appellant mother and
appellant father argue that the district court abused its discretion by terminating their

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), (4), and
(5) (2016). Appellants also argue that respondent county failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunify them with their child. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants S.E.M. and R.B.L. are the parents of W.R.M.S. (the child), who was
born in August 2015. From September 2015 to January 2017, several child protection and
law enforcement reports were filed raising concerns about S.E.M.’s and R.B.L.’s parenting
of the child. Isanti County Family Services (ICFS) became involved in May 2016 when
the agency did a multi-factor family assessment. An ICFS social worker kept contact with
the parents from July 2016 to October 2016 but failed to maintain this contact through the
remainder of that year.
In January 2017, law enforcement received a welfare call with concerns about the
child’s well -being. Law enforcement investigated the home, and due to unsafe living
conditions, placed a safety hold on the child. As a result, ICFS moved the child into foster
care and developed case plans for both S.E.M. and R.B.L. In March 2017, S.E.M. and
R.B.L. each agreed to their respective case plans.
Isanti County (the county) filed a permanency petition to terminate S.E.M.’s and
R.B.L.’s parental rights in August 2017. The county based its petition on three statutory
grounds: (1) that S.E.M. and R.B.L. refused or neglected to comply with the duties of the
parent-child relationship, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(2); (2) that they were
“palpably unfit” to parent the child, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(4); and (3) that
3
reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s removal from
the home, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(5).
The district court conducted a court trial in November 2017. The parties stipulated
to the district court’s receipt of 44 exhibits, many of which were child protection and law
enforcement reports regarding S.E.M., R.B.L., and the child’s welfare. The district court
filed an order terminating S.E.M.’s and R.B.L.’s parental rights in De cember 2017. The
district court dete rmined that the county produced clear and convincing evidence
supporting the three statutory grounds for termination and that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify S.E.M. and R.B.L. with the child. Both S.E.M. and R.B.L. appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I.
S.E.M. and R.B.L. challenge the district court’s decision to terminate their parental
rights. We review the district court’s findin gs for clear error and evaluate its decision to
terminate parental rights on a particular statutory ground for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). And while the district court in this case terminated S.E.M.’s and
R.B.L.’s parental rights on three separate statutory grounds, we will affirm the district
court’s decision so long as one of the statutory grounds is supported by clear and
convincing evidence. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.
2004). Though the district court may only terminate parental rights for “grave and
weighty” reasons, In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012)
(quotation omitted) , the district court ’s decision to terminate parental rights is given
4
“considerable deference,” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008).
The district court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child if “the parent has
substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). These duties include “providing the child with necessary food, clothing
shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or
emotional health and development.” Id. A parent’s failure to fulfill the requirements of a
court-ordered case plan provides evidence of the parent’s noncompliance with the duties
set forth in the statute. In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn.
App. 2012). The district court in this case concluded that due to the parents’ sporadic
efforts relating to their respective case plans and their persistent issues of domestic
violence, mental health, and chemical usage, S.E.M. and R.B.L. are not able to comply
with the duties of parenting the child.
S.E.M. argues that she was not the perpetrator of domestic violence and therefore
should not be punished for R.B. L.’s conduct. Her argument is unpersuasive given the
evidence in the record. In July 2016, S.E.M. an d R.B.L. got into an argument and when
she pushed R.B.L., she accidentally injured her eye and went to the hospital. And in
October 2016, S.E.M. responded to an argument about who would care for the child by
throwing a book and toy at R.B.L. When R.B.L. locked himself in a separate room, S.E.M.
pounded on the do or, bending its frame. R.B.L. informed law enforcement after this
incident that “this stuff happens a lot” and that “he was afraid for his safety.” While R.B.L.
5
has had his own difficulty in controlling his temper and has displayed aggressive conduct,
the evidence supports the district court’s finding that S.E.M. has also exhibited violent
behavior that is detrimental to fulfilling her role as a parent.
S.E.M. also disagrees with the dis trict court’s concerns about her mental health.
Within the year before trial, S.E.M. was hospitalized on three separate occasions due to
threats of self-harm and other mental -health related concerns. For instance, S.E.M. was
involuntarily admitted into t he behavioral health unit for five days in May 2017 because
she was unable to function and exhibited suicidal ideation. S.E.M. claims that she has
demonstrated recent progress with her new therapist. But the evidence supports the district
court’s assessm ent that her efforts to engage in therapy have been inconsistent at best.
S.E.M. attended some appointments with her initial therapist but was later discharged after
her sixth “no-show.” She also struggled to make progress with the services of her second
therapist and was ultimately discharged when she failed to schedule additional
appointments. And though S.E.M. testified that she was making improvements with a new
therapist, the guardian ad litem testified that she attempted to contact this therapist b ut
learned that the therapist was no longer associated with the health services agency. 1
R.B.L. points t o evidence in the record that observed interactions of him with the
child did not raise any serious concerns. But there is also evidence in the recor d of his
“explosive temper” and “unstable lifestyle.” For example, in May 2015, R.B.L. slammed

1 The district court explici tly stated that the guardian ad litem offered a credible account,
and we defer to the district court on credibility determinations. In re Welfare of M.D.O. ,
462 N.W.2d 370, 374–75 (Minn. 1990).
6
a door ––breaking the door’s window ––when the child was only five feet away. More
recently, S.E.M. notified law enforcement that during an argument in January 2017, R.B.L.
threw her to the ground and began to punch and slap her.
And while there is evidence that R.B.L. behaved properly during some supervised
visits with the child, his struggles with chemical substance abuse demonstrate that he is
unable to resume the role of the child’s parent. R.B.L. completed a chemical use
assessment in February 2017, but despite its recommendations for outpatient treatment, he
never entered treatment and believed that his drug use was not an issue. Four of his drug
screening tests returned positive for cannabinoid. In fact, instead of prioritizing his visits
with the child, R.B.L. traveled to California in April 2017 to participate in an event called
the “Cannabis Cup.” More importantly, R.B.L., who was prohibited from havi ng contact
with the child or S.E.M. after the filing of an order for protection in May 2017, did not
have any significant contact with the child from March 2017 to December 2017.
Both S.E.M. and R.B.L. argue that ICFS failed to provide resources and guidan ce
to specifically address issues of domestic violence in their home. But both case plans,
which primarily focused on visitation, therapy, and chemical assessments, included general
guidelines with respect to domestic violence services. The evidence in t he record is clear
that neither S.E.M. (mental health therapy) nor R.B.L. (chemical use testing) adhered to
the essential elements of their respective case plans.
We also emphasize that the child was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
and an unspecified neurodevelopmental disorder. The district court found that the child
has experienced significant delays in development and will benefit most from a predictable
7
and structured environment. There are multiple reports from multiple reporters in the
record that indicate S.E.M. and R.B.L. neglected to care for the child and would be unable
to provide a stable living environment. In February 2016, they left the child unsupervised
in a hotel while they were at the hotel’s bar. In May 2016, medical staff reported that the
child was receiving ina dequate food and supervision. Around that same time p eriod,
residents and staff at a homeless shelter told law enforcement that the child was often left
unattended and neglected. In June 2016, S.E.M. left th e child unattended l ying on his
stomach in a kiddie pool. It was also reported that S.E.M. and R.B.L. did not understand
the contagious nature of the child’s skin infection and lost his prescribed medication after
using it only once.
Based on both parents’ conduct and their failure to comply with their individual case
plans, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that both
parties refused or neglected to comply with the duties of the parent and child relationship ,
as articulated in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) . Because the district court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating their parental rights on this statutory ground , we need
not address the two remaining statutory grounds for termination. See R.W., 678 N.W.2d at
55.
II.
S.E.M. and R.B.L. argue that the district court erred by concluding that the county
made reasonable efforts towards reunification, as required by Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 8(1) (2016). We will affirm the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights
if the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the parent with the child. In re Children
8
of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). The statute requires the district court to
make “specific findings,” as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016), “that reasonable
efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1). The district court’s findings must includ e
“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id.
The district court must determine whether the county’s services were: “(1) relevant
to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and
family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely;
and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). Instead of being mere
matters of form, these services must provide real and genuine assistance. In re Welfare of
Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). “Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires consideration
of the length of the time the county was involved and the quality of the effort given.” In
re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn . App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July
6, 1990).
In this case, the district court determined that the county met its burden of providing
reasonable efforts. The district court found that ICFS began coordinating visits with the
family in July 2016 and connected the parents with public health services that provide
resources to families. The district court noted that it was troubled by the fact that ICFS did
not maintain contact with the family during the last couple months of 2016. Nevertheless,
9
the district court determined that ICFS made reasonable efforts towards reunification after
the child was removed from the home in January 2017.
S.E.M. argues that ICFS never permitted her to demonstrate her parenting skills
because she was only allowed limited supervised visits. But the district court’s findings
illustrate that ICFS offered S.E.M. many services that were designed toward furthering her
relationship with the child. These services included coordinating supervised visitation for
the parents and the child, offering S.E.M. visitation schedules, and providing the child with
transportation services. And when the family moved to Redwood County, ICFS continued
to assist in conducting supervised visitations by making payments for the parents’
transportation and providing S.E.M. with gas cards. S.E.M. does not make a persuasive
argument that contact with a child during a supervised visit cannot be meaningful or offer
an opportunity to display parenting abilities.
R.B.L. claims that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with
the child after his arrest in May 2017. Citing In re Children of Wildey, R.B.L. argues that
his incarceration did not relieve the county of its duty to continue making reasonable efforts
in providing him resources for his case plan. See 669 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. App. 2003),
aff’d as modified , 678 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2004) . The district court found that prior to
R.B.L.’s incarceration, the county made significant and ongoing efforts to ensure contact
between the parents and the child.
“[I]t is well established that incarceration alone does not necessarily preclude a
person from acting in a parental role.” In re Welfare of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 899
(Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted). But what constitutes re asonable efforts depends
10
on the problem presented, In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn.
2008), and a parent’s incarceration may change what qualifies as “reasonable” in working
towards reunification. A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 899. The social worker testified at trial that
she was unaware of R.B.L.’s whereabouts since his release from custody and that she had
not spoken to him since April 2017. When asked about her efforts to reunify R.B.L. with
the child since April 2017, the social worker explained:
There’ve been limited efforts. I haven’t known ––you
know, he’s been in jail at times and so that’s been happening
and then I didn’t know where he was when he was not in jail.
And I can’t provide those efforts if he’s not in touch with m e
and letting me [k]now where I can reach him.

The social worker attempted to justify her explanation by stating that she needed to
prioritize other cases during those months. The social worker gave a similar explanation
for not maintaining contact with the parents in late 2016, stating that she had to put the case
“on my back burner” as she focused on other placement cases.
The assessment of whether the agency’s efforts at reunification were reasonable is
further complicated by the fact that R.B.L. w as prohibited from having any contact with
the child after an order for protection was filed in May 2017. And, as the district court
noted in its order, there is some evidence in the record that R.B.L. was hostile towards
those involved with the child’s c are. For instance, ICFS received a child welfare report
from an anonymous individual in January 2017. The reporter chose to remain anonymous
due to fears that R.B.L. and S.E.M. would retaliate. The reporter also mentioned that the
parents threatened the reporter about reporting to child protection and that R.B.L. would
comment that he fantasized about murdering the reporter.
11
Unlike in A.R.B., in which the county failed to create a case plan for the incarcerated
parent, ICFS did develop a case plan specific to R.B.L. See A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 899.
And even though R.B.L. did not agree to the case plan until late March 2017, ICFS began
providing services to the family as early as May 2016. ICFS undertook several
rehabilitative measures to help R.B.L. with his chemical dependency issues. And, as stated
previously, when the family moved to Redwood County in March 2017, ICFS arranged
transportation for the parents to visit with the child. Despite these arrangements, R.B.L.
chose not to attend the first visit in April 2017 and instead flew to California to participate
in the “Cannabis Cup” event. Therefore, based on these circumstances, including R.B.L.’s
inability and unwillingness to visit with the child, we conclude that the record supports the
district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate R.B.L.
In light of the array of services provided to S.E.M. and R.B.L., we conclude that the
district court was within its discretion in deciding that the county made reasonable efforts
towards reunification. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387 (affirming termination of parental
rights after concluding that reunification efforts were reasonable when county provided
variety of different services).
Affirmed.