State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2083

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jose Acaceo Inamagua,
Appellant.

Filed September 4, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-8841

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Eva Rodelius Buer, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of engaging in, hiring, or agreeing to hire a
minor between the ages of 13 and 16 to engage in prostitution, arguing that the district
court erred by rejecting his entrapment defense. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jose Acaceo Inamagua with
engaging in, hiring, or agreeing to hire a minor between the ages of 13 and 16 to engage in
prostitution. Inamagua moved to dismiss, asserting an entrapment defense, and he elected
to have his defense heard and decided by the district court, instead of a jury. The parties
agreed that the district court would decide the entrapment issue based on written
submissions. The relevant facts are as follows.
On September 27, 2016, law enforcement posted the following advertisement in the
“escort” section of Backpage.com:
Bella wants to Ride!!! Golfer specials! -18 I’m only here for
the big golf game and then gone soon. I love guys who know
[how] to use a big stick;) I love generous men who know how
to love a lady. come for some latina fun with a young, wild
girl from south of the [border].

The advertisement included a video and photograph of a woman, as well as a contact phone
number.
At approximately 3:10 p.m. on September 27, Inamagua responded to the
advertisement via text message and asked, “Hey are available now.” A law -enforcement
officer responded to the message , quoting rates for an hour and a half hour. Inamagua

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responded that he wanted a “Qv” and asked the price for 15 minutes.1 The officer answered
that it would cost “$60 cash” and asked Inamagua, “u like young?” Inamagua replied, “Ok
can I get your address.” The officer answered, “as long as u r ok w/ 15 yr old I will giv
it….the last guy was pist when i didn’t s ay my age. dont want truble.” Inamagua
responded, “Tha you mean how old are you.” The officer replied, “yes. A hot tight f—k.
15 going on an experienced 25 y/o. just being real. Some r ok w/it.” Inamagua responded,
“Ok send me your address.” Inama gua and the officer agre ed to meet at an address in
St. Paul at 4:00 p.m. Inamagua asked whether the person with whom he was exchanging
text messages was the person “in the pictures.” The officer replied, “yes .” Law
enforcement arrested Inamagua at the designated location. Inamagua had a cell phone and
$60 in cash in his possession at the time of arrest.
Law enforcement interviewed Inamagua and he admitted that the p hone number in
the text-message exchange with law enforcement was his number and that he was looking
for a quick 15 -minute visit for paid sexual activity . Inamagua also admitted that he had
been informed that the person with whom he exchang ed text messages was 15, but he
claimed that he thought there would be another person at the designated meeting spot who
was 18.
The district court rejected Inamagua’s entrapment defense, reasoning that Inamagua
had “not shown that the undercover officer improperly induced him to commit the crime
by improper persuasion, badgering, or pressure.” The district court reasoned that the state

1 “QV” is an abbreviation used in the commercial sex industry meaning “quick visit.”

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“was simply providing the opportunity for . . . Inamagua to commit the crime of
prostitution” and that Inamagua “quickly agreed without any delay or equivocation to set
up the sexual encounter with a person that he knew was 15 years old.” The district court
also found that the text -message exchange, “pro ves beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Inamagua] was predisposed to commit the crime.” After a bench trial, the district court
found Inamagua guilty of engaging in, hiring, or agreeing to hire a minor between the ages
of 13 and 16 to engage in prostitution. The district court stayed imposition of a sentence
and placed Inamagua on probation for three years. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Inamagua contends that the district court erred by rejecting his entrapment defense.
The process for determining the merits of an entrapment defense was set forth by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Grilli as follows:
[A]t a time prior to the commencement of trial, a defendant
shall elect whether to have his claim of entrapment presented
in the traditional manner as a defense to the jury, or to have it
heard and decided by the court as a matter of law. He shall
give notice of such election to the court and prosecution . . . .
Such a matter can be heard at a pretrial evidentiary hearing
similar to that held for suppression of evidence . . . . The
[district] court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law on the record. If the court decides that [the] defendant was
entrapped into the commission of the crime charged, this will
be a bar to further prosecution for that charge. . . . If the court
holds that there was no entrapment, the issue is closed and
defendant may not present the defense to the jury.

. . . .

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In the alternative, defendant may elect to have his claim
presented as a defense to be decided by the jury.2

304 Minn. 80, 95-96, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (1975). “ Whether the decision is to be made
by the court or jury, the evidence presented should focus on two questions: (1) Did the
criminal conduct initiate with the police rather than with t he defendant? (2) Did the
defendant have a predisposition to commit the crime? ” Id. at 96, 230 N.W.2d at 455 -56
(footnote omitted).
The defendant has the burden to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that law enforcement induced his actions. State v. Johnson, 511 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn.
App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 1994). To establish inducement, a defendant
must show that “the state did something more than merely solicit the commission of a
crime.” State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 1980). “[S]omething in the nature of
persuasion, badgering, or pressure by the state must occur before the inducement element
is satisfied.” Id. Only if the defendant establishes inducement does the burden shift to the
state to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime charged.” Grilli, 304 Minn. at 96, 230 N.W.2d at 456.
Inamagua argues that he “demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence” that he
was “induced to commit the crime by the bait and switch conducted by the government.”
Inamagua notes that he “respond[ed] to an advertisement which he believed to have been
posted by someone at least 18 years of age,” that “[o]nly after communicating with
someone he reasonably believed to be 18 or older was [he] informed that the person with

2 The Grilli procedure is incorporated in Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1(6).

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whom he was texting was 15,” and that he “re sponded by questioning the significance of
the information.” Inamagua maintains that he “did not seek out an individual between the
ages of 13-16 and had no intention of committing the crime with which he was charged.”
The record refutes Inamagua’s argument that he was induced to commit the crime.
The text-message exchange between the officer and Inamagua establishe d that the officer
twice told Inamagua that the person with whom he was exchanging text messages regarding
a paid sexual encounter was 15 years old. And the officer’s mention of another person
being upset because the purported 15 year old did not previously reveal her age, as well as
the statement that she did not want trouble, suggested that in the context of solicitation to
engage in prost itution, solicitation of a 15 -year-old child is worse than solicitation of an
adult. After the officer confirmed that the person with whom Inamagua was exchanging
text messages was 15, Inamagua responded, “Ok send me your address” and discussed the
details of the visit, including what type of condoms would be used. Although Inamagua
may not have sought out an individual between the ages of 13 and 16 for a sexual encounter,
he did not retreat from his sexual solicitation once he was told that the object of his
solicitation was only 15 years old.
In sum, the text-message exchange establishes that the officer twice told Inamagua
that the person with whom he was exchanging text messages was 15 years old and that
Inamagua nonetheless made arrangements to pay the purported 15 year old to engage in
sexual activity. There is no evidence of “something in the nature of persuasion, badgering,
or pressure by the state ,” which is required to establish inducement. See Olkon, 299
N.W.2d at 107. Instead, the record s uggests law enforcement attempted to dissuade

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Inamagua from going forward with the encounter by emphasizing that the object of his
solicitation was only 15 years old. Thus, the district court did not err by determining that
Inamagua failed to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement
induced him to commit the offense in this case.
Because Inamagua failed to establish that law enforcement induced him to commit
the offense of engaging in, hiring, or agreeing to hire a minor bet ween the ages of 13 and
16 to engage in prostitution, his entrapment defense fails as a matter of law.
Affirmed.