State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0004

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Elwin Louis Klimek,
Appellant.

Filed August 20, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-17-707

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, F. Richard Gallo, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presid ing Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fl eeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle,
arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was invalid.
We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2017, respondent State of Minn esota charged appellant Elwin Klimek with
fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle af ter he drove away from a St. Louis County
deputy sheriff during a traffic stop. Appearing pro se, Klimek pleaded guilty to the charged
offense. The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Klimek to one year and one day,
stayed for three years.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant must be permitted to withdraw his or her guilty plea at any time if
“withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be valid, a guilty plea mu st be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). The validity of a guilty
plea is a question of law th at is reviewed de novo. Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858
(Minn. 2016).
Klimek challenges the accuracy of his gu ilty plea to fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle. “The accuracy requirement exists to protect a defendant from pleading

3
guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of if he were to go to trial.”
Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). For a guilty plea to
be accurate, a proper factual ba sis must be established. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712,
716 (Minn. 1994). “The factual-basis requireme nt is satisfied if the record contains a
showing that there is credible evidence available which woul d support a jury verdict that
defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty.” Nelson, 880
N.W.2d at 859 (quotation omitted). A defendant may challenge the lack of a factual basis
to support a guilty plea for the first time on appeal. See State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346,
350 (Minn. 2003) (stating that “by pleadi ng guilty, a defendan t does not waive the
argument that the factual basis of his guilt was not established”).
Under Minnesota law, “[w]hoever by means of a motor vehicle flees or attempts to
flee a peace officer who is acting in the lawf ul discharge of an official duty, and the
perpetrator knows or should reasonably know the same to be a peace officer, is guilty of a
felony.” Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2016).1 “[T]he term ‘flee’ means to increase speed,
extinguish motor vehicle headlight s or taillights, refuse to stop the vehicle, or use other
means with intent to attempt to elude a peace officer following a signal given by any peace
officer to the driver of a motor vehicle.” Id., subd. 1 (2016).
Klimek argues that his plea lacked a pr oper factual basis because “there is no
evidence to support the notion that he intende d or attempted to elude the peace officers.”
We disagree. The term “elude” is defined as “[t]o evade or escape from, as by daring

1 A deputy sheriff is a peace officer under the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 2
(2016).

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cleverness, or skill: The suspect continues to elude the police .” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 582 (4th ed. 2006). And the Supreme Court has
articulated that a valid traffic stop does not end until “the police have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.” Arizona v.
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (emphasis added).
Here, Klimek admitted at the plea hearing th at during a traffic stop he “just left,”
and “shouldn’t have.” By “just le[aving]” th e scene of the traffic stop, Klimek was
“eluding” the deputy following his signal to stop his motor vehicle. And by admitting that
he “shouldn’t have” left the scene, Klimek acknowledged that he knew that he was not free
to leave. Although a more thorough examin ation of Klimek’s actions may have been
appropriate, Klimek’s admissions at the plea hearing establish a sufficient factual basis that
he committed the offense of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.487, subd. 3 (codifying elements of motor-vehicle fleeing offense).
Moreover, “a defendant may not withdraw his plea simply because the court failed
to elicit proper responses if the record contains suffici ent evidence to support the
conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Thus, a “p lea petition and colloquy may be
supplemented by other evidence to establish the factual basis for a plea.” Lussier v. State,
821 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Minn. 2012). Other evidence incl udes the complaint since a
defendant “by his plea of guilty, in effect judi cially admit[s] the al legations contained in
the complaint.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983).
The complaint here supports the factual basis of Klimek’s plea. The complaint
alleges that while the deputy contacted the probation office during a stop of Klimek’s

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vehicle, Klimek decided to leave becaus e “he was done with the traffic stop.” The
complaint also alleges that when the deputy “noticed the brake lights on Klimek’s vehicle
illuminate and the engine start,” he “got out of his squad car with his emergency lights still
on and told Klimek that they were not finished yet and [that] he was not able to leave.” See
Johnson, 129 S. Ct at 788, 555 U.S. at 333 (stating that a traffic stop normally ends when
the police inform the driv er that he or she is free to le ave). The complaint further alleges
that despite the deputy’s instructions, Klimek drove away. The allegations in the complaint
that Klimek drove away from the deputy during a valid traffic stop, in conjunction with
Klimek’s admission at the plea hearing that he left the stop and “shouldn’t have,” establish
an adequate factual basis that Klimek intend ed to elude the deputy. Klimek’s guilty plea
therefore was valid, and he is not entitled to withdraw his plea.
Affirmed.