State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0011

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse Romeo Singh,
Appellant.

Filed December 24, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-17-1810

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, As sistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H . Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schel lhas, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant Jesse Romeo Singh appeals his conviction of possessio n of a firearm or
ammunition by an ineligible pers on, in violation of Minnesota S tatutes section 609.165,

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subdivision 1b(a) (2016). Singh argues that a 911 call used as evidence against him at trial
was hearsay, and the district court erred by admitting it witho ut considering whether a
hearsay exception applied. Singh also contends that his Miranda waiver was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary due to the impact of his bipolar symptoms. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2017, police responded to a 911 call in which a woman, N.B., stated that
her boyfriend, Jesse Singh, had threatened her with a gun. N.B. further stated that she had
escaped Singh’s home and was hiding nearby because she feared Singh would come after
her with the gun. Police arrived within two minutes. One officer observed a man walking
nearby who he recognized as Singh from previous interactions. The responding officers
initiated a pat search and discovered a loaded handgun magazine in the left outside pocket
of Singh’s jacket. Another officer removed a black metal handgun from Singh’s left inside
jacket pocket. The officer fam iliar with Singh knew he was ine ligible to possess
ammunition or a firearm, so he arrested Singh.
At the police station, two detec tives interviewed Singh. One detective read Singh a
Miranda warning, and, in response to each question in the warning, Sing h answered
affirmatively that he understood . Singh then gave a statement in which he admitted to
possessing the gun and disclosed his bipolar condition.
The state charged Singh with possession of a firearm by an ine ligible person and
second-degree assault. At a contested omnibus hearing, Singh challenged the initial stop,
his arrest, and the validity of his Miranda waiver. The district court denied all of Singh’s
motions.

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A jury trial was held in August 2017. Outside the presence of the jury, Singh
challenged the admissibility of th e 911 tape as a violation of the Confrontation Clause
because N.B. was “unavailable.” The trial began after the district court found that the 911
call was admissible as nontestimonial and that there was “no he arsay issue.” The state
presented witness testimony from the four responding police off icers and a 911 dispatch
supervisor. After the state rested, Singh moved for acquittal on the second-degree assault
charge, and the district court granted the motion. Singh calle d his mother to testify in his
defense. The jury found Singh guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
Singh appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not plainly err by admitting N.B.’s 9 11 call into evidence.
Under Minnesota law, “to properly preserve a claim that evidenc e should be
excluded under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, a defendant must timely object and state
the specific ground of objection.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 n.2 (Minn. 2014)
(quotations and emphasis omitted). “Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and [appellate courts] will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary
ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Minn.
1997). However, “[i]n the absence of an objection, [an appella te court] may review the
admission of evidence for plain error.” State v. Manthey , 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.
2006) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02).

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Here, Singh argues that the hears ay issue was properly preserve d through his
objection to the admission of N.B.’s 911 call under the Confron tation Clause. 1 S i n g h
contends that he mentioned the h earsay nature of the call by re ference to the state’s
argument that N.B. was unavailable. Based on this reference an d the district court’s later
statement that there was “no hearsay issue,” Singh argues that the district court was clearly
aware of the hearsay concerns, and therefore the issue must be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion under State v. Guzman . 892 N.W.2d 801, 812 (Mi nn. 2017). Alternatively,
Singh argues that, if the issue was not properly preserved, we should review for plain error
under State v. Griller. 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
In analyzing the record, Singh did not object on hearsay grounds at trial, but rather
used the word “unavailable” in reference to his Confrontation C lause objection, without
any further discussion of hearsay. Therefore, Singh did not properly preserve the hearsay
issue, and we review for plain error. See Mosley, 853 N.W.2d at 797; see also State v.
Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010 ) (applying plain-error review to confrontation-
clause issue where appellant only objected on hearsay grounds).
The three-prong plain-error sta ndard requires the defendant to show (1) error;
(2) that was plain; and (3) that affected the defendant’s subst antial rights. Manthey, 711
N.W.2d at 504; see also Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. In order to satisfy the third prong, “a
defendant must show prejudice that forms the basis for a reason able likelihood the error

1 On appeal, Singh does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the 911 call was
non-testimonial or that playing the recording at trial did not violate his rights under the
Confrontation Clause.

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substantially affected the verdict.” Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 504. If the three-prong test is
met, this court determines whether it is necessary to address the error to ensure the fairness
and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id.; see also Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
Here, Singh argues that the distr ict court plainly erred by rea ching the conclusion
that there was “no hearsay issue” without any analysis. Howeve r, the district court was
under no obligation to provide reasoning on hearsay, because th ere was no hearsay
objection to analyze. See, e.g., Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 505 (noting that courts are not
advised to make affirmative intrusions into proceedings and concluding that plain error did
not occur); State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 205 (Minn. 2005) (disagreeing with the
proposition that the district court must or should interfere with potential trial strategies by
acting sua sponte because it would risk highlighting or enforcing rights the defendant chose
to waive). Singh further urges this court to review the hearsa y exceptions to determine if
the 911 call fits within any of them, but provides no authority to support such an exercise.
Singh claims that the state, as the proponent of the statement of N.B. who was
unavailable, failed to meet its burden to provide evidence that any of the hearsay exceptions
were satisfied. This argument fails because there was no clear objection made by Singh on
hearsay grounds. There are num erous exceptions to the hearsay rule in Minnesota,
therefore the law requires objection to potential hearsay at trial in order to create “a record
of the district court’s decision-making process in either admit ting or excluding a given
statement.” See State v. Smith , 825 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Mi nn. App. 2012) (quotation
omitted) (concluding th at the district court did not commit pla in error by admitting
potential hearsay statements becau se counsel failed to object a t trial and, as a result, the

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prosecutor did not have the oppor tunity to argue for the admiss ibility of the statements
under several hearsay exceptions), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013). It is the
responsibility of counsel to objec t to potential hearsay eviden ce, because absent such an
objection, the state does not have the opportunity to argue for the admissibility of the
statement under hearsay exceptions. See State v. Banks, 875 N.W.2d 338, 346 (Minn. App.
2016) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2016). Under Minn. R. Evid.
803(2), a statement is not excluded as hearsay if it relates “to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement cau sed by the event or
condition.” Minn. R. Evid. 803(2); see also State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn.
1992). Had Singh objected to the 911 call on hearsay grounds, the district court could have
heard arguments from both parties and analyzed the nature of th e call against the hearsay
exceptions, including the excited utterance exception. Given t he facts in the record and
Singh’s lack of a clear hearsay objection, the district court w as not required to apply any
exception and did not commit plain error by admitting N.B.’s 911 call or failing to provide
analysis regarding potential hearsay issues.
II. The district court did not er r in admitting Singh’s confess ion into evidence
because his Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

We review findings of fact surrounding a claimed Miranda waiver for clear error,
and legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227,
233 (Minn. 2010). Singh argues that his bipolar illness substa ntially interfered with his
ability to validly waive his rights under Miranda.

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Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), prior to custodial
interrogation police must warn individuals of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
and to have counsel present during such an interrogation. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d
160, 168 (Minn. 1997). However, individuals may waive those ri ghts as long as they do
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Minn.
2005). The state has the burden to prove that the defendant’s waiver was valid. State v.
Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2015). The state usually carries this burden by showing
that police gave the Miranda warning, the defendant said that he understood the warning,
and the defendant gave a statement. Id. “When an appellant contends that credible
evidence supports a finding that his Miranda waiver was ineffective, an appellate court
will make a subjective factual inquiry to determine whether und er the totality of the
circumstances the waiver was valid. Despite this inquiry, the standard of review remains
whether the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous.” Burrell, 697 N.W.2d at 591
(quotation omitted).
Here, Singh responded affirmatively when asked if he understood e a c h s p e c i f i c
Miranda right. Singh never asked any questions about his rights or req uested an attorney
before making a statement to police.
Singh argues that his confused and unresponsive answers, coupled with his bipolar
illness, indicate that his Miranda waiver was involuntary. However, the interrogation
transcript shows that while Singh ’s answers were evasive and wa ndering, they were
consistently responsive, especially during the Miranda warning in which Singh repeatedly
answered “ya” and “yep” when ask ed whether or not he understood his rights. When a

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detective asked Singh if he was willing to talk, he responded, “Ya I’m willing to talk, but
I would like to at least know like you know what is going on.” The detective sought to
verify Singh’s answer by asking, “So you’re willing to talk is that right?” to which Singh
replied, “I mean to a point because of the fact . . . .”
The district court noted that any hesitation on Singh’s part in answering questions
appeared to stem from his attempts to figure out what the detec tives knew. This analysis
is supported by the record. On numerous occasions, Singh tried to get detectives to tell
him what N.B. had already told them regarding the events in question. At one point, Singh
remarked that the detectives were trying to trick him through their questioning, a sign that
he was aware of the adversarial nature of the interrogation. S ingh also said that he was
“just trying to figure out a way not to go to jail.” This stat ement indicates that Singh was
aware of the consequences of providing an incriminating stateme nt, but simply trying to
navigate the detectives’ questions in a way that would protect h i m . B a s e d o n t h e s e
conclusions, drawn from the record, the district court did not commit clear error in finding
that Singh validly waived his Miranda rights.
Affirmed.