Bradley Yde, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0030

Bradley Yde,
Appellant,

vs.

Viking Coca-Cola Bottling Company,
Respondent.

Filed July 2, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-16-1021

Arlo H. Vande Vegte, Arlo H. Vande Vegte, P.A., Long Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Holly M. Robbins, Alice D. Kirkland, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Bradley Yde appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to respondent Viking Coca-Cola Bottling Company and dism issing appellant’s
retaliatory-discharge claim. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant worked as a delivery driver for respondent from April 11, 2012 to
May 13, 2015. Appellant received and signed a copy of respondent’s Vehicle Safety Policy
as part of his training for this position, and agreed to abide by its guidelines. The Vehicle
Safety Policy provides for a Driver Safety Committee to “review incidents and accidents
regarding any company-owned mo torized vehicle.” This commi ttee assigns “points” to
drivers for accidents or driving infractions. In the event of an accident, the Vehicle Safety
Policy requires drivers to comple te an accident report form and report the accident to the
company within 12 hours. Failure to report an accident “may result in further disciplinary
action up to and including termination,” and an y points charged to the driver for the
accident are doubled for failure to timely report. When a driver accumulates eight or more
points within a three-year period, the driver is deemed an unaccepta ble risk and will no
longer be employed as a driver.
Appellant’s Driving History
Appellant was involved in multiple acciden ts with his company vehicle during his
employment with respondent. The Vehicle Sa fety Committee sent appellant a letter on
January 24, 2013, after reviewing reports of accidents on September 14, 2012,
December 11, 2012, and Decembe r 19, 2012. The committee determined that the two
December incidents were preventable. A ppellant was assigned four points for those
accidents. The letter also re minded appellant that if he received eight points or was
involved in more accidents in the next three years, hi s ability to drive a company vehicle
would be jeopardized. Appellant signed this letter. The Vehicle Safety Committee sent

3
appellant another letter on September 25, 2013, assigning him three points for an accident
in which he was involved on September 7, 2013. The letter again reminded appellant that
if he received eight points or was involved in more accidents in the next three years, his
ability to operate a company vehicle would be jeopardized. Appellant signed this letter to
acknowledge receipt. The committee also sent appellant another letter that same day
stating that appellant had acquired a total of seven points. Appellant also signed this letter
to acknowledge receipt.
Appellant’s On-the-Job Injuries
Appellant notified respondent of on-duty injuries on five separate occasions.
Appellant filed a first-report-of-injury form1 on August 3, 2012, after a pallet-jack handle
hit him in the leg. Appellant reported anothe r injury on November 24, 2012, after falling
while walking to his truck in the parking lot. He reported a third injury on August 20,
2013, when a loaded product cart ran over his foot. Appellant reported a fourth injury on
November 8, 2013, after his left knee painfully popped when he stood up at work. He
pursued and settled a workers’ compensation claim for this fourth injury.
Appellant’s fifth injury report involved an injury to his left arm. Appellant had
previously reported a nonwork-re lated left-arm injury to hi s supervisor, Dean Dufner.
Appellant reported that he injured his elbow on November 1, 2014 on his personal time,
not at work. He went to the emergency room promptly. Dufner forwarded the personal-

1 The first-report-of-injury form is one su bmitted by the injured employee to notify the
employer of a work-related injury for work ers’ compensation purposes. Minn. Stat.
§ 176.141 (2016).

4
injury report to human resources. Later, a ppellant reported to Dufner that he fell and
injured the same arm while wo rking on November 25, 2014. Appellant told Dufner on
December 3 that he was injured while trying to catch falling Coke products.
Appellant visited a doctor for his arm inju ry. On December 8, 2014, the doctor
wrote a note taking appellant of f of work until he completed further tests. The doctor
diagnosed appellant with a torn left bice ps tendon. On December 19, 2014, after
determining that the injury was nonwork related, based on evidence that appellant had
received ongoing medical treatment since injuring his arm at home, respondent’s insurance
company denied appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. On December 22,
2014, appellant’s doctor approved his return to work with some restrictions. Appellant had
a surgery to repair his biceps tendon on January 14, 2015. Appellant’s doctor approved his
return to work without restrictions on March 10, 2015. Appellant filed a claim petition for
workers’ compensation benefits for these injuries on March 26, 2015. 2
The April 25 Accident and Investigation
Employee Charles Booth told appellant’s supervisor, Dufner, that Booth saw
appellant back his trailer into another trailer on April 25, 2015. Appellant denied doing so.
Steve Wright, another employee, also told Dufner that he h eard two trailers rub together,
but did not see the accident occur. Dufner looked at the trailers and noticed what he
determined to be a fresh scratch along the left side of the trailer that appellant allegedly
backed into. He reported the incident to branch manager Dan Jacobs.

2 Appellant ultimately prevaile d on this claim petition. The outcome of that workers’
compensation dispute is not at issue in this appeal.

5
Lisa Zolin, the human-resources manager for respondent, investigated the April 25
accident after it was reported. She stated that she generally handwrites her interview notes
and then types summaries late r, filling in more detailed info rmation. Zolin and Jacobs
interviewed appellant about the incident and appellant denied causing the damage. Zolin
and Jacobs also interviewed Wrig ht and Booth. Wright told Zolin that he was inside the
building and on the phone with Booth when Booth said that appellant was going to hit the
trailer. Wright also told Zolin that he talk ed with appellant after the accident and took
pictures of the damage. Booth told Zolin that he saw appellant hit a trailer in the docking
area at the end of the day on Ap ril 25. Booth said that af ter he, Wright, and appellant
looked at the trailer, Wright to ld appellant to report it and appellant said “I can’t. I’m at
seven points and I will get fired.”
Zolin and Jacobs al so reviewed surveillance vide o from April 25, taken from two
different surveillance cameras. Zolin testified at her depos ition that they “watched the
driver, who [they] later determined to be [appellant] attempt to back in and out of the spot
several times unsuccessfully. At one point, yo u could see a trailer move as if there was
some activity.” Zolin stated that, after reviewing the footage multiple times, she and Jacobs
were able to see the trailer move or shake for a few seconds as if it had been hit before the
striking trailer was parked at the loading dock. From the video and review of drivers’ route
assignments, Zolin concluded that the striking tr ailer was assigned to appellant that day.

6
Zolin testified that it did not occur to her at the time that the video should have been
preserved.3
Zolin also testified in her deposition that she reports monthly to the CEO concerning
open workers’ compensation claims. She stated that the only concerns the CEO has ever
expressed concerning appellant were over th e number of appellant’s workplace accidents
and whether appellant can perform his job safe ly. Zolin testified th at she informed the
CEO that she did not believe there were any concerns about appellant’s ability to safely do
his job other than the safety c oncerns about his driving. Zolin expressed that she had her
own concerns about the validity of appellant’s November 2014 arm-injury claim, given its
temporal proximity and similarity to a reported nonwork injury.
Jacobs testified that a fleet manager notif ied him of the April 25 accident, stating
that appellant hit a trailer. Jacobs stated that he watched the su rveillance video and saw
appellant enter the premises and back his rig into a parked tr ailer. Jacobs saw the other
trailer move, and then watched appellant finish docking his trailer. Jacobs further testified
that he spoke to Wright, who told him that he had watched appellant b ack into a trailer.
Jacobs later submitted a written correction stating that Wright had told Jacobs that he heard
the trailers scrape together but did not see it firsthand. Jacobs testified that he was unaware
of appellant’s workers’ compensation claims; he knew only that appellant had some work
restrictions based on injuries. Jacobs stat ed that the decision to terminate appellant’s

3 Respondent’s technology manager testified in his deposition that he would have been able
to download the video if he had been requested to do so, but no su ch request was made.
The relevant recording was recorded over a few weeks after the accident, based on the
company’s retention schedule.

7
employment was based on the number of points on appellant’s driving record. Jacobs
explained that, under company policy, “it’s . . . pretty black and white. Once you’re over
a certain threshold . . . it’s not really up for debate at that point in time.”
In his deposition, appellant identified two former coworkers who he claimed would
say that he had not crashed into the trailer. He also identified a number of other people
who he said were not present at the April 25 incident, but who believed that appellant did
not crash into another trailer.4
Appellant testified that he knew that re spondent required its drivers to report
accidents. He also knew that he was respons ible for calling his supervisor and filling out
the initial paperwork. Appellant testified that, when he returned from taking his loads out
on April 25, 2015, he started trying to back his truck into the docks. Appellant stated that
he readjusted his trailer as he was backing up and, at some point, he could no longer see
the back end of his trailer. He also testified that another employee had left a trailer parked
crooked in the dock next to hi s spot. Appellant testified that he eventually got his trailer
docked and was talking with other employees while Booth was docking another trailer.
Wright came over and told appellant that appella nt had hit the adjacent trailer. Appellant
testified that Booth also said that he might ha ve seen the trailer move. They walked over
and looked at the trailer that appellant allegedly hit, which appellant testified had a number
of preexisting scratches. Wright identified a sc ratch as fresh, but appellant stated that he
did not think it looked new. Ap pellant said that Wright took pictures of the scratches.

4 None of the witnesses or persons who appellant stated would testify that he did not back
into the trailer were deposed in this case.

8
There was no damage to appellant ’s trailer. Appellant stated that he was interviewed by
Jacobs and Zolin, and was then terminated two days later. He further testified that Zolin
told him that they had video proof that he hit the trailer, but refused to show him the
video(s) when he asked.
Appellant is not aware of anyone who re spondent has fired for being injured or
seeking workers’ compensation, but stated that Wright had once commented that appellant
was going to be fired after his biceps injury. Appellant was assigned to work with Wright
after returning from his biceps surgery. Zolin and Dufner pulled appellant aside after one
shift and told him that Wright had said that appellant’s work was “worthless.” Appellant
said that he told Zoli n and Dufner that he was “not quit e up to speed” since he was just
returning from being off. Appellant also testified that Zolin told him that he needed to go
back to see his doctor or would be replaced if he could not do his job. Appellant stated that
this interaction took place in March of 2015, between the 25t h and 28th. Appellant also
testified that he had told othe r employees that he thought he was being “set up” at work
and that some of the others, including Wright , were trying to get hi m fired. He claimed
that a number of drivers had b een asked to help find a way to get rid of him. The record
contains no depositions or affidavits from any such drivers. Additionally, appellant stated
that Zolin at one point told him that he needed to stop getting injured.
Respondent’s Vehicle Safety Committee reviewed the April 25 accident and
investigation. The committee sent appellant two letters on May 13 , 2015 informing him
that it assigned four points to his record as a result of the incident and informed appellant

9
that he would no longer be eligible to drive for respondent. Appellant testified that he was
aware that other employees had also been fired for having too many driving-record points.
Appellant produced evidence of two othe r employees who were discharged for
excessive driving points. One wa s terminated in July 2015, for “an accide nt or record of
accidents.” Another was terminated in January 2015, after a positive drug test and multiple
reported accidents in his driving record, with four points being assigned for the most
recent.5
Appellant sued respondent, alleging that respondent terminated his employment in
retaliation for his workers’ compensation claims. Respondent moved for and was granted
summary judgment dismissing appellant’s claims.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Respondent did not spoliate the surv eillance video evidence of the April 25
accident.

Appellant argues that respondent spoliate d the surveillance video of the loading
dock by not preserving it as evidence for this litigation. Appellant claims that, because
respondent knew appellant to be litigious from past work ers’ compensation litigation,
respondent should have known to save the video evidence of the April 25 incident.
Appellant provides no legal support for this argument.

5 The record reflects that this employee “quit in anticipation of termination due to driving
points/issues.”

10
Spoliation occurs when one party fails to preserve evidence for the other party’s use
as evidence in pending or future litigation. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn. 1990). “The task of determining what, if
any, sanction is to be imposed is implicated by the broad authority provided the trial court.”
Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995).
Appellant agreed at oral argument that, at the time the surveillance videos had been
erased pursuant to company polic ies unrelated to this case, he had not give n respondent
notice that he intended to sue for retaliato ry discharge. The re cord shows that the
surveillance cameras retained footage for two to six weeks before automatically erasing
old footage as new footage was recorded. Th e accident in question is alleged to have
occurred on April 25, 2015. In the ordinary course, the footage of the accident would have
been retained until early June 2015 at the latest. Appellant sued respondent in October
2015. Respondent could have saved the foot age, but respondent had no knowledge or
reason to know that appellant intended to sue at the time that the footage was overwritten.
The footage was erased in the ordinary course of business before litigation was commenced
or threatened. This is not a case of spoliation.
II. The district court did not err in gr anting summary judgment to respondent.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
respondent dismissing appellant’s claims.
Summary judgment is gran ted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as

11
a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “On appeal from summary judgment, we must
review the record to determin e whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Dahlin v. Kroening , 796
N.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Minn. 2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. 1993). “The party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere
averments,” but rather must iden tify specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial.
DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). Summary judgment is not appropriate
“when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.”
Id. at 69.
Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1 (2016) provides a cause of action for employees who
are discharged or threatened with discharge for se eking workers’ compensation benefits.
“The statute proscribes three forms of c onduct: discharging an employee for seeking
workers’ compensation benefits; threateni ng to discharge an employee for seeking
benefits; and intentionally obstructing an employee seeking benefits.” Schmitz v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 831 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. App. 2013), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2014).
Minnesota courts evaluate retaliatory-di scharge claims using the burden-shifting
formula articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 1824-25 (1973). Randall v. N. Milk Prods. Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App.
1994). First, an employee claiming retaliatory discharge must establish a prima facie case.
Schmitz, 831 N.W.2d at 670. Once the employee has established a prima facie case, “[t]he
burden then shifts to the employer to artic ulate legitimate reasons for the discharge.”

12
Randall, 519 N.W.2d at 459. “Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason for the
discharge, the employee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge
was for an impermissible reason.” Id.
A. Appellant met his burden of establis hing a prima facie case of retaliatory
discharge under step one of the McDonnell Douglas test.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that he failed to establish
a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.
An employee establishes a prima facie ca se of retaliatory discharge by showing
“(1) statutorily protected conduct by the employee[,] (2) adverse employment action by the
employer, and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Schmitz, 831 N.W.2d at 670.
The parties agree that appellant engaged in statutorily protected conduct by filing a
workers’ compensation claim. Appellant’s conduct is indeed statutorily protected by Minn.
Stat. § 176.82. The parties also agree that respondent took an adverse employment action
against appellant by discharging him. The on ly element of the prima facie case at issue
here is whether appellant has made a prima fa cie showing that his discharge is causally
related to his workers’ compensation claim.
We are “mindful that retaliatory motive is difficult to prove by direct evidence and
that an employee may demonstrate a causal connection by circumst antial evidence that
justifies an inference of retaliatory motive.” Cokley v. City of Otsego , 623 N.W.2d 625,
632 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2011). Speculation by the
employee is not circumstantial evidence; rather, “[a] fact is proved by circumstantial

13
evidence when its existence can reasonably be inferred from other facts proved in the
case.” Id. at 633.
A causal connection between an employee’s statutorily protected conduct and
discharge “may be demonstrated indirectly by evidence of ci rcumstances that justify an
inference of retaliatory motive, such as a showing that the employer has actual or imputed
knowledge of the protected activity and the [discharge] follows closely in time.” Hubbard
v. United Press Intern., Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 445 (Minn. 1983). “A short interval between
protected conduct and an adverse employment action ‘may occasionally raise an inference
of causation,’ but, ‘in general, more than a temporal connection is required.’” Otto v. City
of Victoria, 834 F.Supp.2d 912, 919 (D. Minn. 2011) (quoting Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n,
467 F.3d 695, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2006)). “[T]he presence of intervening events undermines
any causal inference that a reasonable person might otherwise have drawn from temporal
proximity.” Freeman, 467 F.3d at 698.
In Randall, an employee was fired immediatel y after meeting with the company
owner who told him that the company needed to “control the amount of money spent on
workers’ compensation costs.” 519 N.W.2d at 460. The immediate firing was sufficient
to establish that the employe e’s termination was causally related to his workers’
compensation claim. Id. In Hubbard, an employee was fired two days after he filed a
complaint, which the c ourt found sufficiently close in tim e to establish causation. 330
N.W.2d at 445. In contrast, federal courts have held that longer gaps are insufficient to
establish causation. The Eighth Circuit has stated that an “interval of two months between
the [protected conduct] and [the employee’s] termination so dilutes any inference of

14
causation.” Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002).
That court has also stated that without ot her evidence, “a one-month or two-month lag is
too long.” Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 925 (8th Cir. 2014).6
There was some confusion at oral ar gument concerning which event—the first
report of injury or the filing of the claim petition—is the appropriate measuring point from
which to consider temporal proximity. Filing a first report of injury with the employer is
not generally considered a formal clai m for workers’ compensation benefits. See
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Minn. 2002) (stating that the purpose
of the reporting requirement is to enable the employer to fu rnish immediate attention and
to investigate the claim soon after the injury). Notice of injury to an employer is required
by statute. Minn. Stat. § 176.141 (2016). Employees must report injuries to the employer
to allow the employer to determine wh ether the injury is compensable. Schmidgall, 644
N.W.2d at 805. Denial of compensation afte r a report of injury does not mean that the
employee will pursue a claim. Therefore, an employee’s submission of a first report of
injury does not provide the employer with any reason to retaliate. In our view, the correct
measuring point from which to determine wh ether causation can be inferred is the
employee’s filing of a claim petition.

6 Appellant cites to Tretter v. Liquipak Intern., Inc. , 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn. App.
1984), stating that a three-month gap between the employee reporting sexual harassment
and her demotion followed by an additional six-month gap between the demotion and her
being laid off (for a total of nine months) is sufficient to show causation. However, it
appears that in Tretter this court also considered the fa ct that the employee was the only
person with her level of seniority terminated and that the company made no attempt to
rehire her when it needed an employee in her former department as significant in inferring
causation. Tretter, 356 N.W.2d at 715.

15
Appellant filed a claim petition challenging the denial of wo rkers’ compensation
benefits on March 26, 2015. He was discharged on May 13, 2015. The seven-week gap
between appellant’s protected conduct and his discharge could reasonably support an
inference that respondent terminated appella nt because he filed a workers’ compensation
claim.
The alleged April 25, 2015 accident involving appellant is an intervening event
which might undermine the causal inference. Freeman, 467 F.3d at 698. But the record
also shows that respondent was both aware of appellant’s potential workers’ compensation
claim and suspicious of its validity. Unde r Minnesota law, a discharge closely following
an employee’s protected activity of which th e employer has knowledge can establish a
causal connection be tween the two. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 445. Given the short
temporal gap between appellant ’s claim-petition filing and hi s termination, along with
respondent’s knowledge and candid skeptic ism of appellant’s workers’ compensation
claim, appellant fairly met the requirements of the first McDonnell Douglas step of making
a prima-facie showing of retaliation.
B. Respondent met its burden of pro ducing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for appellant’s termination.

After the employee establishes a prima faci e case of retaliatory discharge, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating the employee. Randall, 519 N.W.2d at 459. The employer’s burden to
establish a legitimate reason for the term ination is a burden of production. Schmitz, 831
N.W.2d at 670-71. The empl oyer need only provi de a legitimate reason; it “need not

16
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 ( 1981). For this step
to be met, the court need only find that th e record contains “evid ence presented by the
employer that its actions were related to some legitimate business purpose.” Sigurdson v.
Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986).
Respondent claims that it terminated appellant’s employment because he
accumulated 11 points on his driving record, exceeding th e point limit allowed for
remaining eligible to drive for the company. Once an employee accumulates eight or more
points within three years, the employee is term inated. Appellant had 11 points after the
April 25 accident. Respondent sufficiently articulated a legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating appellant’s employment.
C. Appellant failed to es tablish a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether respondent’s reason for his termination was pretextual.

Appellant argues that his claim that the Ap ril 25 accident was fabricated raises a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether respondent’s proffered reason for terminating
his employment was pretextual.
Once the employer has produced a legitimate reason for the discharge, the employee
must “show that the reason or justification stated by the employer is actually a pretext for
discrimination.” Id. The employee “may meet the bur den of showing pretext either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employe r’s proffered explana tion is unworthy of
credence.” Meads v. Best Oil Co. , 725 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Mi nn. App. 2006) (quotation

17
omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 20, 2007). The employee does not sufficiently
establish pretext by showing th at the termination was “ill-a dvised or unwise, but rather
must show that the employer ha s offered a phony excuse.” Id. at 542-43 (quotation
omitted). The employee can also prevail if a discriminatory reason “more likely than not”
motivated the termination, ev en when the employer has pres ented a legitimate reason.
McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., F.S.B. , 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (M inn. 1993). The pretext
inquiry looks to “whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior” in light
of the employee’s arguments. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur , 47 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir.
1995).
Appellant claims that respondent’s i nvestigation of the April 25 accident was
fraught with issues, such as a lack of eyew itnesses, Zolin’s typed summaries being more
detailed than her handwritten notes, and respondent’s failure to preserve the April 25 video
recording of the loading dock. Appellant e ssentially argues that th e poor quality of the
investigation raises a genuine issue of mate rial fact concerning whether an accident
qualifying him for termination even occurred. But, in context, the employer is not required
to prove that the April 25 accident occurred. Rather, the question is whether there is an
issue of material fact concerning whether respondent believed in good faith that appellant
was involved in an accident on April 25.
The record shows that respondent investigated the report of the April 25 accident in
which appellant was alleged to have been involved. Zolin interviewed Booth, Wright, and
appellant about the alleged accident, reviewed surveillance video fro m that day, and had
the branch and fleet managers check the trailers for damage. On this record, it is evident

18
that respondent reasonably and honestly believed that appellant had been involved in such
an accident.7 Appellant asserted that numerous other people were willing to testify that he
was not involved in the April 25 accident. But appellant did not depose or otherwise obtain
admissible evidence from any of these other people. Appellant also agreed that he was not
aware of any similarly situated person—an employee who had been injured on the job—
being terminated because of an injury or workers’ compensation claim. While appellant
submitted evidence of two other employees who were fired fo r excessive driving-record
points around the same time as he was, neither of those employees was pursuing workers’
compensation benefits. That evidence supports respondent’s position that any driver who
receives excessive points is terminated without exception.
Appellant relies on Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc. , 897 N.W.2d 267 (Minn.
2017), to support his position that pretext can be inferred when an employee is terminated
in the midst of workers’ compensation litigation. In Sanchez, the employer hired an

7 Even if respondent’s inve stigation of the alleged accide nt was not completed to the
highest standards, we have routinely stated in unpublished opinions that it is not the courts’
role to question an employe r’s investigation methods. See McKee v. St. Paul Eye Clinic,
P.A., No. A14-0681, 2015 WL 1757833, at *5 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2015) (“It is not [the
court’s] province to determine whether the em ployer’s investigation of alleged employee
misconduct reached the correct result, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff’s
termination.” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015); Shirwa v. N. Star,
Inc., No. A12-1467, 2013 WL 1092416, at *6 (Minn. App. Mar. 18, 2013) (“[C]ourts have
no authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the
business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve
intentional discrimination.” (quotation omitted)); Suneson v. N. Tool & Equipment Co. ,
No. A06-1844, 2007 WL 30769 92, *3 (Minn. App. Oct. 23, 2007) (concluding that
“although the documentation of respondent’s investigation . . . could have been clearer, the
record does not indicate that the investig ation and the decision to terminate appellant
resulted from anything other than” the proffered legitimate reason).

19
undocumented immigrant who f iled a workers’ compensation claim eight years after his
initial hiring. 897 N.W.2d at 270-71. The employer placed that employee on an indefinite
unpaid leave of absence within a day or two of his deposition in the workers’ compensation
litigation, citing the employee’s undocumented status as its reason. Id. at 271. The record
in Sanchez contained evidence that the employer knew of the employee’s undocumented
status well before the employ ee was injured on the job. Id. at 270. The supreme court
concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained co ncerning the employer’s true
motivation for placing the employee on unpaid leave. Id. at 275. In doing so, the supreme
court relied on the employer’s apparent willingness to employ the undocumented
individual with knowledge of his immigration status right up until he filed a workers’
compensation claim. Id. Here, in contrast, the reason given by respondent for terminating
appellant’s employment followed after the disqualifying event—accumulating eight points
for driving mishaps—and only existed after th e at-fault accident of April 25. Appellant
did not pass the eight-point threshold until a month after he filed his workers’ compensation
claim. Therefore, Sanchez is not controlling.
Finally, we recognize that the suprem e court has recently employed language
suggesting that it is possible that the supposition of what facts might be proved at trial may
be sufficient to survive a summary-judgment motion. Buskey v. Am. Legion Post #270 ,
910 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Minn. 2018) (stating that courts might infer knowledge of possible
claims and potential claimants when a letter suggests that a party might be making a claim).
But in order to avoid summary judgment here, appellant must identify and supply evidence
from which to make the inferences for which he argues. Appellant did not provide a record

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sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that respondent’s reason for
terminating appellant was pretextual. Therefor e, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to respondent and dismissing appellant’s retaliatory-discharge claim.
Affirmed.