Paul King, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0041

Paul King, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

County of St. Louis,
Respondent,

Duluth Economic Development Authority,
Respondent.

Filed September 17, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-17-529

Elizabeth Royal, Paul Bosman, Elizabeth Royal & Associates, Mi nneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellants Paul King and Copasetic, Inc.)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Nick D. Companario , Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County)

Gunnar Johnson, Duluth City Attorney, Nathan N. LaCour siere, Assistant City Attorney,
Steven B. Hanke, De puty City Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (fo r respondent Duluth
Economic Development Authority)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellants Paul King and Copa setic Inc. appeal the district court’s dismissal of their
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Ap pellants argue that the district court erred
in concluding (1) that decisions of respondent County of St. Louis (the county) to place
King’s tax-forfeited property on the forfeited-lands list and ultimately sell it to respondent
Duluth Economic Development Authority (DEDA)—described in claims one through four
of appellants’ complaint—were quasi-judicial in nature and therefore subject only to
certiorari review and (2) that it was constitutio nal to apply the stat ute of limitations for
challenging tax forfeitures to dismiss appellan ts’ fifth claim. Because appellants had a
reasonable time to challenge the tax forfeiture, we affirm the dismissal of claim five. But,
because claims one through four challenge decisions that are not quasi-judicial, we
conclude that the district court has subject -matter jurisdiction over those claims, reverse
the dismissal of those claims, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
FACTS
This case arises out of the disposition of a piece of property in Duluth. From 1998
to 2005, appellants operated a bar and apartments in a building on the property. In 2005,
King suffered a stroke and became unable to continue managing the property. As a result,
in 2006, King sold the property to Temple Corp. Inc. on a contract for deed. While Temple
made payments to King under the contract for deed, Temple paid the real-estate taxes on
the property directly to the county from 2006 to 2010. In 2010, a fire damaged the property,

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forcing the closure of the building. From 2011 to 2015, no one paid the real-estate taxes
due on the property.
On November 24, 2015, a certificate of forfeiture was issued for the property for
nonpayment of taxes, and the certificate was recorded in the St. Louis County Recorder’s
Office one week later. Four months later, on March 8, 2016, the St. Louis County Board
of Commissioners adopted a resolution to add the property “to a list of tax forfeited lands
to be filed with the County Auditor to be withheld from re purchase for one year because
the County Board is of the opinion that th e property may be acquired by a municipal
subdivision for redevelopment purposes.” Four-and-a-half months after that resolution, on
July 26, the board adopted a resolution approvi ng the sale of the property to respondent
DEDA. On September 15, the state quitclaimed the property to DEDA.
Eight days later, appellants filed a petition fo r a writ of certiorari with this court,
challenging the sale of the property. In November, howe ver, appellants and the county
stipulated to dismissal of that petition, and the certiorari appeal was dismissed.
On March 8, 2017, appellants filed a comp laint in district court. Because the
complaint raised federal due-process claims, respondents removed the case to federal court.
Appellants then amended their complaint (re sulting in the amended complaint at issue
here), seeking relief only on state-law grounds. Claims one, two, and four of the amended
complaint challenged the decision of the county to sell the property to DEDA; claim three
challenged the decision of the county to lis t the property on the forfeited-lands list; and
claim five challenged the notice appellants re ceived regarding the tax forfeiture of the
property.

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The case was remanded to state court. Th e county filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, arguing that the first four claims in the
complaint challenged quasi-judicial decisions reviewable only by certiorari appeal to this
court and that the fifth claim was barred by the statute of limitations. With its motion, the
county included a number of documents, incl uding the county’s re solutions placing the
property on the forfeited-lands list and approving the sale of the property to DEDA. The
same day that the county filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings, DEDA filed a
motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 for substantially the same reasons.
Following these motions, appellants filed a motion to again amend their complaint.
The district court held a hearing on Augus t 14, 2017. Following the hearing, the
court issued an order grantin g “County and DEDA’s motion to dismiss this action with
prejudice on the pleadings.” The order al so denied appellants’ motion to amend the
complaint. The district court denied appellants’ request to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appellants appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I. Application of Procedural Rules
As a preliminary matter, we address appe llants’ challenge to the district court’s
procedural treatment of this case. Appellant s argue that the district court erred in not
converting the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary
judgment because the county submitted documents not in cluded within the pleadings in
support of their motion. Appellant asserts that Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, which governs
motions for judgment on the pleadings, require s conversion in such a situation because it

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states, “[I]f, on such motion, matters outsi de the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
a motion by Rule 56.”
The county responds that conversion to a summary-judgment motion was not
required because the basis for its motion was a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not
failure to state a claim. The county analogizes to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, which may be based on documents outside
the pleadings without requiring conversion to a motion for summary judgment. See Turner
v. Comm’r of Revenue, 840 N.W.2d 205, 208 n.1 (Minn. 2 013) (explaining that, if a rule
12.02 motion to dismiss is base d on a ground other than failure to state a claim, matters
outside the pleadings may be considered without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment).
We need not resolve this dispute. Even if rule 12.03 were to require conversion to
a summary-judgment motion when a motion alleging lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
relies on matters outside the pl eadings, this case can be resolved based solely on the
pleadings and on the two resolutions that ar e specifically refere nced in the amended
complaint. Cf. Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. , 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 n.7 (Minn.
2000) (holding that, under rule 12.02, matte rs “referenced in th e complaint” may be
considered without conversion to a motion for summary judgment); Marchant Inv. &
Mgmt. Co. v. St. Anthon y W. Neighborhood Org., 694 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2005)
(applying Martens to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 motion), overruled on other grounds by

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Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minneapolis, 848 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 2014). Thus,
conversion to a motion for summary judgment was not required. We, therefore, turn from
arguments regarding procedure to the substantive bases for the district court’s rulings.
II. Subject-Matter Jurisdicti on in the District Court

Appellants argue that the district court e rred in concluding that it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over appellants’ claims challenging the decisions to place the property
on the forfeited-lands list and to sell the prop erty to DEDA because those decisions were
legislative and not quasi-judici al. We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo. See Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mut. Ins. Co., 909 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Minn. 2018).
“[C]ertain decisions of local governmen t entities are subject to review only by
certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01, which gran ts exclusive jurisdiction to the court of
appeals over petitions for a writ of certiorari. . . . District courts do not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims that must be resolved in a certiorari appeal.” Zweber v. Credit
River Tp., 882 N.W.2d 605, 608-09 (Minn. 2016).
Decisions of local government entities are either legislative or quasi-judicial. Id. at
609. Legislative decisions are subject to review in the district court and are not subject to
direct certiorari appeal. Id. Legislative decisions “have broad applicability and ‘affect the
rights of the public generally.’” Id. (quoting County of Washington v. City of Oak Park
Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 549 (Minn. 2012)).
Quasi-judicial decisions, on the other hand, are not subject to district court review
but rather may be reviewed only by certiorari appeal. Id. “In general, quasi-judicial
decisions ‘affect the rights of a few individuals analogous to the way they are affected by

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court proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2000)). There are th ree indicia necessary for a decision to be
quasi-judicial: “(1) investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts;
(2) application of those facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding
the disputed claim.” Minn. Ctr. For Envtl. Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838,
842 (Minn. 1999) (MCEA). “Failure to meet any of the three . . . indicia is fatal to [a] claim
that . . . proceedings were quasi-judicial.” Id. at 844.
A. Placement of the Property on the Forfeited-Lands List

Appellants challenge the county’s decision, reflected in its first resolution, to place
the tax-forfeited property on the forfeited-lands list. Placement on the forfeited-lands list
precludes the former property owner from repurchasing the property while the property is
on the list. Minn. Stat. § 282.322 (2016). A county board may decide to place property on
the forfeited-lands list so long as the “board is of the opinion that such lands may be
acquired by the state or any municipal subdivision of the state for public purposes.” Id.
We begin with the second indicium of a quasi-judicial decision—that the decision
involves application of a prescribed standard. The supreme court’s decision in Handicraft
Block Ltd. P’ship v. City of Minneapolis gives guidance for resolv ing this issue. 611
N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 2000). In Handicraft, the supreme court decided that a governmental
decision to designate a building as subject to heritage pres ervation was a quasi-judicial
decision. Id. at 23. In analyzing whether the decision involved a prescribed standard, the
court contrasted the heritage-preservation decision with the legislative decision in MCEA
regarding whether a project was “consistent with [a] long-range plan.” Id. at 21. The court

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noted that the guidelines for heritage-preservation status “provide[d] [a] framework for the
facts . . . investigate[d] and findings . . . [made] regarding the property.” Id. at 23. That
framework consists of “specific criteria th at curtail the discretion of the City.” Id. at 22.
The court observed that, in MCEA, in contrast, the federal st atutory requirement that a
transportation improvement plan be “consistent with” a long -range plan was “flexible,”
and the requirement that government only “consider” a number of “non-specific” goals did
not amount to prescribed standard. Id. at 21-22.
The putative standard in this case—that the county board is “of the opinion” that the
property “may be” acquired by a municipal subdivision for a public purpose—is closer to
the nonspecific and flexible considerations in MCEA than the specific and mandatory
criteria in Handicraft. Whether the board is “of the opinion” that there may be a municipal
buyer is not a standard to be applied to a set of evidentiary facts to arrive at a decision as
to whether the board is or is not of a certain opinion; rather, the board’s “opinion” is the
decision itself. Moreover, that a municipal subdivision may acquire the property merely
expresses a possibility that it might happen—or not. See Funk & Wagnalls New Standard
Dictionary of the English Language 1531 (1945) (giving the first two definitions of “may”
as “[t]o have permission; be allowed; have the physical or moral opportunity” and “[t]o be
contingently possible”). Again, that language does not provide a specific standard that can
be applied to evidentiary facts to arrive at a conclusion.
To be quasi-judicial, the county’s decision must also meet the first indicium—that
it involves investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts. Again,
we find guidance in Handicraft. The supreme court in Handicraft explained why the

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heritage-preservation-designation proceedings in that case were “more typical of judicial
proceedings than legislative proceedings.” 61 1 N.W.2d at 20. The court noted that the
property owner was a formally identified party to the pro ceedings; the property owner
received notice of possible designation; the property owner was invited to present evidence
and was given a list of the factors that w ould govern the decision; oral testimony and
written evidence was submitted; and the city weighed evidence, found facts, and arrived at
a legal conclusion. 611 N.W.2d at 22-23. He re, in contrast, no written notice to the
previous owner of tax-forfeited property is re quired before a county board can place the
property on the forfeited-lands list. See Minn. Stat. § 282.322. Rather, as the county
acknowledged at oral argument, only general notice of the meeting to the public at large is
required. There are no factual findings to be made and no legal conclusions to be drawn.
The process for deciding to place property on a forfeited-lands list is more typical of a
legislative proceeding than a judicial proceeding.
In urging a different conclusion, the county points out that the decision is limited to
a single parcel of tax-forfeite d property and “had no direct legal impact on anyone other
than DEDA, Copasetic, and perhaps a few othe r persons.” Placement of property on the
forfeited-lands list does have a consequence th at is specific to the former owner—the
owner cannot repurchase the property while the property is listed. Minn. Stat. § 282.322.
And, as noted above, “[i]n general, quasi-j udicial decisions affect the rights of a few
individuals analogous to the way they are affected by court proceedings.” Zweber, 882
N.W.2d at 609 (quotation omitted ). But that is a general rule , and all indicia of a quasi-
judicial decision must still be met before the matter is subject to this court’s exclusive

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certiorari review. Because the first and second indicia are not met, we conclude that the
decision to place the property on the forfeited-lands list was not quasi-judicial. The district
court therefore has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims relating to that decision.
B. Sale of the Property to DEDA

Appellants also challenge the county’s deci sion, reflected in its second resolution,
to sell the property to DEDA. Once prop erty has been forfeited, a county board may
approve the sale of the property to a govern mental subdivision for less than market value
if “a reduced price is necessary to provide an ince ntive to correct the blighted conditions
that make the lands undesirable in the open market” and the governmental subdivision “has
documented its specific plans for correcting the blighted conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 282.01,
subd. 1a(d) (2016).
We begin with the first indicium of a quasi-judicial decision—that it involves
“investigation into a disputed claim a nd weighing of evidentiary facts.” MCEA, 587
N.W.2d at 842. With respect to the decision to sell to DE DA, appellants had no disputed
claim to be investigated. At the time the county decided to sell, appellants had no particular
interest in the property above and beyond that held by the general public. Although King
was the owner of the property before its forfeiture, at the time of the second resolution he
had no special interest in it. The property had been forfeite d to the state, and the only
potentially distinguishing right he had wa s the repurchase right under Minn. Stat.
§ 282.241, subd. 1 (2016). That statute pe rmits a property owner to repurchase forfeited
property during the six months following forf eiture if the county board of commissioners
determines that, by permitting repurchase, “undue hardship or injustice” resulting from the

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forfeiture will be avoided. But, due to the county’s prior act of placing the property on the
forfeited-lands list, King did not have the right to repurchase. As a result, the decision to
sell the property to DEDA did not affect “the rights of a few individuals,” see Zweber, 882
N.W.2d at 609, but rather was akin to a coun ty board’s decision to sell any other piece of
property belonging to the county. The conclusion that appellants had no specific disputed
claim is also reflected in th e fact that, as with the county’s forfe ited-lands decision,
Minnesota law does not require any notice other than the general notice given to the public
at large of the county board meeting prior to the board’s decision to sell the property.
The county cites to MacCharles v. State Dep’t of Revenue , 584 N.W.2d 795, 799
(Minn. App. 1998) to argue that this decision was quasi-judicial. We are unpersuaded. In
MacCharles, the decision at issue was the refusa l of the county board to accept the
respondents’ repurchase application after fo rfeiture had occurred. 584 N.W.2d at 797.
MacCharles did not involve property withheld from repurchase because the property was
on a forfeited-lands list. The respondents in MacCharles were thus uniquely situated in
contrast to the public as a whole: only they had the right to repurchase the property; only
they had applied to repurchase the property; and only their application was refused.
In this case, on the other hand, appellants (as discussed above) did not possess any
right that distinguished them from the public generally. Unlike in MacCharles, appellants
do not base their claims on any alleged denial by the county of a repurchase application by
them. Rather, appellants claim that the co unty failed to satisfy statutory standards
regarding the sale of tax-forfeited property to a governmental en tity when it sold the
property to DEDA. The absence of a claim based on an alleged denial of a repurchase

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application is the key difference between MacCharles (where jurisdiction was exclusively
in the court of appeals on certiorari review) and this case. MacCharles is thus inapposite,
and, because the decision to se ll to DEDA did not involve in vestigation into a disputed
claim with appellants, we conclude that the decision to sell the property to DEDA was not
a quasi-judicial decision.1
III. Statute of Limitations

The district court dismissed appellants’ cl aim challenging the ta x forfeiture of the
property because the claim was brought after the limita tions period had expired.
Appellants do not contend that they met the st atute of limitations but instead argue that
applying the statute of limitations violated their procedural-due-process rights under the
Minnesota Constitution. “Whether procedural due process has been violated is a question
of law that we review de novo.” Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 618 (Minn. 2016).
“A statute is presumed constitutional,” and “[a] party who challenges a Minnesota statute
as unconstitutional bears the burden of estab lishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
statute violates some constitutional provision.” Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. , 432
N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988).
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.” Minn. Const. art. I § 7. If a party is “barred by the statute of limitations from having

1 We recognize that appellants’ amended comp laint alleges that King made two offers to
purchase the property and that the county ignored offers to repurchase. But appellants’
claims—as explained in the relevant counts in their amended complaint—challenge only
the county’s decisions to plac e the property on the forfeite d-lands list pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 282.322 and to sell the property to DEDA at below market value pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 282.01, subd. 1a(d). Those two decisions were not quasi-judicial.

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a reasonable time” to bring a claim, then the statute of limitations violates the due process
requirements of our constitution. See Calder v. City of Crystal , 318 N.W.2d 838, 844
(Minn. 1982).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not ex plicitly specified what amount of time
constitutes a reasonable time, instead noting that “[w]hat may be a reasonable time depends
upon the sound discretion of the legislature[,] . . . [and] . . . courts will not inquire into the
wisdom of the exercise of this discretion . . . unless the time allowed is manifestly so short
as to amount to a practical denial of justice.” Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 806
(Minn. 1957). The court ha s found both 6-month and 14- month time periods to be
constitutional. See Bulau v. Hector Plumbing & Heating Co., 402 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Minn.
1987) (“[Respondent] had almost six months, . . . during which to bring its contribution
action against [appellant]. [Respondent] failed to do so. It was, therefore, [respondent’s]
own inaction and not a procedural statute of limitations, making the remedy impossible to
achieve, that prevented [resp ondent] from seeking contribu tion.”) (internal citation
omitted); Calder, 318 N.W.2d at 844 (“We are not re quired, in deciding this case, to
indicate what such a reasonable time limitation should be . . . . [T]he city was aware of the
injury long before it was sued. It had 14 months after being sued in which to join these
third parties.”).
The statute of limitations in this case provi des that any claim “adverse to the state,
or its successors in interest, . . . respecting any lands claimed to have been forfeited to the
state for taxes” must be comme nced within one year after th e filing of the certificate of
forfeiture. Minn. Stat. § 284.28 , subd. 2 (2016). The statute applies to suits brought by

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individuals under a disability, who, instead of having the statute tolled, can recover
damages out of the general fund once their disability is removed. Id. subd. 4 (2016).
Appellants commenced this action on March 8, 2017. They first argue that (1) King
is disabled due to his stroke; (2) therefore, he could not bring a claim within the statute of
limitations’ timeframe; and (3) because the statute of limitations is not tolled for individuals
under a disability, it resulted in a taking of his property without due process. But, contrary
to appellants’ argument, King not only could bring a claim within the statutory time period,
he did bring a claim within the statutory time period. The certificate of forfeiture was filed
on December 1, 2015. Ten months later, a ppellants petitioned this court for a writ of
certiorari, seeking review of th e decisions discussed above. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, King v. County of St. Louis, No. A16-1530 (Minn. App. Sept. 23, 2016). King
thereafter voluntarily dismissed his certiorari appeal. Because King was capable of
bringing a claim within the statute of limitation’s timeframe, we need not consider whether
section 284.28’s treatment of claims by indivi duals under a disability impacts appellants’
due process rights.
Appellants next argue that the statute mu st provide additional time to bring a claim
in order to pass constitutional muster. We are unpersuaded. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has indicated that time periods as short as six months meet the requirements of procedural
due process. See Bulau, 402 N.W.2d at 531. Here, the statute gave appellants one year
from the filing of the certificate of forfeiture to bring their claim, and appellants concede
they had notice of that filing no later than one month after it occurred. Even if the statute
of limitations was tolled by this one-month delay in notice, appellants still would have been

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required to file their claim by January 2017. They did not do so, and the district court did
not err in concluding that the statute of li mitations therefore barred their tax-forfeiture
claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.