Matthew Frie, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0056

Matthew Frie,
Relator,

vs.

Kroll Ontrack, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 20, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 35844205-3

Matthew Frie, Monticello, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Kroll Ontrack, LLC, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Relator chal lenges the decision of an unemployment law judge (ULJ) that he is

2
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment and does not meet a
statutory exception to ineligibility for an employee who quits employment. Relator argues
that he quit because of a medical necessity and for a good reason caused by his employer.
We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Matthew Frie is an attorney who began working full -time at respondent -
employer Kroll Ontrack, LLC, as a document review attorney on November 30, 2015. The
Kroll facility was open from 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., and employees were allowed to
keep flexible hours so long as they worked 40 hours a week. Frie suffers from anxiety, and
the flexible work hours and lower stress environment Kroll offered were the main reasons
that he accepted the position.
At the beginning of 2017, Kroll announced that it had merged with another business,
and Frie felt that the company culture had changed as a result. He testified that professional
standards were not being enforced, and that “[t] here’s been lots of people taking a lot of
time off and people being rewarded for tardy and insufficient work .” Frie was worried
about the future of the company, and, in June of 2017, he met with his direct supervisor to
discuss his concerns. Frie testified that his direct supervisor took his criticisms “personally
and began a campaign” to criticize his work and make an issue of Frie’s “taking advantage
of the flexible hours.”
On Monday July 17, 2017, at 2:02 p.m., Frie’s direct supervisor sent him the
following email:
Hi Matthew,

3
We have not seen you at the office yet today, and I wanted to
check in to make sure everything is okay. I am not able to find
an email from you tha t you were planning to be out today,
though let me know if I am just missing it.

Thanks,
[Direct Supervisor]
Frie responded that he was
Taking advantage of extended hours. Spent most of the
morning discussing future career plans with other interested
parties. Putting in 6 hours today (2-8). Still planning to put in
40 this week. In Fargo right now. Let me know if you would
like to discuss further, in private.

Sincerely,

Matthew D. Frie
His direct supervisor replied, saying “[t]hanks for the heads up. That’s what I figured. I’m
glad the extended hours give you the time to do that. Thanks! [Direct supervisor].”
Then on Monday July 31, 2017, at 12:04 p.m., Frie’s direct supervisor emailed him
another question about his hours. It reads, “Hi M atthew, We haven’t seen you yet today,
and I can’t find a record that you expected to be out today. Please let us know if you are
okay and whether you expect to be in today. Thanks, [Direct supervisor].” After both
emails, Frie had a personal meeting wi th his direct supervisor and was told that his
supervisor “wanted to know where [Frie] was if [he] didn’t arrive by a particular time on a
particular day.” Being questioned about his schedule caused Frie to experience worsened
anxiety. Frie gave two weeks’ notice of his intent to quit on July 31, with an intended last
day of August 11.

4
On August 3, at a meeting with Frie and other employees, Frie’s direct supervisor
announced that Kroll would be discontinuing its bonus pay and holiday pay. Following
the announcement, the supervisor directed Frie into the hallway with him and told Frie that
he was terminated for smirking during the announcement and for his reduced productivity.
The supervisor advised Frie that had he not quit, he would have been fired anyway.
After holding a hearing, the ULJ issued a decision determining that Frie quit his
employment effective August 11, making him ineligible for unemployment benefits, and
that no exception to ineligibility applied. Because Frie was discharged for r easons other
than employment misconduct prior to his intended quit date, the ULJ determined that “[i]f
all other eligibility requirements are met, Frie is eligible for unemployment benefits. . . .
for the period from July 30, 2017, to August 11, 2017.” But the ULJ held that he was not
eligible for unemployment benefits after August 11, 2017.
At the hearing before the ULJ, Frie argued that two exceptions to ineligibility for
quitting employment apply to his case: that a serious medical condition made it medically
necessary to quit and that he quit because of a good reason caused by his employer. The
ULJ determined that the exception for a serious medical condition did not apply to Frie
because he did not request an accommodation. And the ULJ rejected Frie’s argument that
he quit for a good reason caused by his employer because the reasons Frie gave for quitting
“would not compel the average, reasonable worker to quit the employment and become
unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.”
Frie requested reconsideration by the ULJ, and claimed that he “recently discovered
that I forwarded to myself e -mails dated January 23, 2017 and February 14, 2017 where I

5
informed another manager . . . that I was taking advantage of the company’s advertised
flexible hours to deal with a medical condition.” But Frie did not submit these emails to
the ULJ, and the ULJ affirmed its prior determination.
D E C I S I O N
An individual who quits employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless
that individual meets one of nine exceptions under the statute. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd.
1 (Supp. 2017). When reviewing a ULJ’s eligibility determination, we may affirm or
remand for further proceedings, or reverse or modify if the petitioner’s substanti al rights
might have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision was:
“(1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the department; (3) made upon unlawful procedure ; (4) affected by other
error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted; or (6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2017).
“Whether a claimant is properly disqualified from the receipt of unemployment
benefits is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” Hayes v. K-Mart Corp.,
665 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. App. 2003). We view “the ULJ’s factual findings in the light
most favorable to the decision ,” giving “deference to the credibility determinations made
by the ULJ.” Peterson v. Nw. Airlines Inc. , 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). If the evidence substantially sustains the ULJ’s
findings, we will not disturb them. Minn. St at. § 268.105, subd. 7(d); Peterson, 753
N.W.2d at 774.

6
One of the exceptions to ineligibility for employment benefits based on quitting is
if the employee quit “because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1). A good reason caused by the employer is one: “(1) that is directly
related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to
the worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become
unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Id. at subd. 3(a) (Supp. 2017).
Frie argues that he quit because his direct supervisor “created a work environment
that was so hostile that a reasonable person with [his] medical condition would quit.” But
Frie misinterprets the standard. The standard of reasonableness is “applied to the average
man or woman, and not to the supersensitive. Thus, like the standard of the ‘reasonable
person’ in negligence and anti-discrimination laws, the standard here is an objective one.”
Werner v. Med. Professionals LLC , 782 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation
and citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). Frie was not denied the ability
to work flexible hours, nor does the evidence support that his direct supervisor created a
hostile work environment that would cause a reasonable person to quit employment.
Rather, Frie’s supervisor requested that Frie inform him of the hours that he intended to
work. Frie’s reason for quitting would not “compel an average, reasonable worker to quit
and become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 3(a).
Another exception is that the employee quit because his “illness or injury made it
medically necessary.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(7). But “[t]his exception only applies

7
if the applicant informs the employer of the medical problem and requests accommodation
and no reasonable accommodation is made available.” Id.
The ULJ found, and the evidence sup ports, that Frie did not request an
accommodation from his employer, and thus this exception does not apply to Frie. On
appeal, Frie argues that the ULJ should have granted him a new hearing because in his
request for reconsideration he informed the ULJ t hat he had two emails from January and
February of 2017 where he informed another manager at Kroll that he was taking advantage
of Kroll’s flexible hours to deal with a medical condition.
On a motion for reconsideration, the ULJ can only consider eviden ce that was not
submitted at the hearing for the purpose of deciding whether to order a new hearing. Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 2017). The ULJ must order a new hearing if “evidence
which was not submitted at the hearing: (1) would likely change the outcome . . . and there
was good cause for not having previously submitted that evidence; or (2) would show that
the evidence . . . at the hearing was likely false and . . . had an effect on the outcome of the
decision.” Id. But Frie did not sub mit the emails to the ULJ for reconsideration, and
without the emails , it would be speculative for the ULJ or this court to decide that the
emails would likely have changed the outcome of the hearing or would have shown that
evidence submitted at the heari ng was likely false and affected the outcome. See id.
Moreover, Frie does not explain why he had good cause for not submitting the emails at
the hearing. According to Frie, he had forwarded the emails to himself, which means they
were in his possession at the time of the hearing. Frie’s failure to discover evidence in his
own possession is not “good cause” under the statute, and the ULJ did not err by denying

8
his request for a new hearing. Id. (“‘Good cause’ for purposes of this paragraph is a reason
that would have prevented a reasonable person acting with due diligence from submitting
the evidence.”).
Affirmed.