State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0102

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Michael Wolden,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-31959

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jillian M. Dease, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Joseph P. Tamburino, Hillary B. Parsons, Caplan & Tamburino Law Firm, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of criminal vehicular operation, arguing that
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress . Because the district court
correctly concluded that the emergency -aid exception justified law enforcement’s
warrantless entry into a residence where appellant was arrested, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shane Michael
Wolden with criminal vehicular operation : causing great bodily harm while under the
influence of alcohol. The charges stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident. Wolden moved
to suppress evidence supporting the charge. The district court held a hearing on Wolden’s
motion and heard testimony from Sergeant Buffie of the Golden Valley Police Department.
The district court also received photographs of the accident scene, as well as a squad video
depicting officers’ actions after the accident, as exhibits.
The evidence showed that on December 10, 2016, several police officers responded
to a motor-vehicle accident at 5900 Westbrook Road in Golden Valley. Upon arrival, the
officers observed a vehicle with extensive damage. Photographs of the accident scene
showed that the windshield of the vehicle was shattered and contained a large hole on the
driver’s side. Those photographs also showed debris strewn around the front end of the
vehicle, one of the vehicle’s wheels on the ground across the street from the vehicle, a light
pole sheared off from its base, the detached lamp from that light pole, and a downed street
sign. Blood was visible on both the driver’s and passenger’s sides of the vehicle, including
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on top of the vehicle’s sunroof. Sergeant Buffie testified that the caller who reported the
accident was at the scene and told the officers that the occupants of the vehicle “had left
on foot.” The officers determined that Wolden was a registered owner of the vehicle.
Officers were informed that there was a man with a severe head injury in front of a
different caller’s residence. Officers responded to that residence and spoke to the man,
who was identified as C.T. C.T. had been a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the
accident. C.T. had severe injuries. Sergeant Buffie testified that C.T.’s “eye was bulging
out of his head really bad, filled with blood,” that he had “numerous lacerations on his head
and was actively bleeding with blood running down his face,” and that he “looked horrific.”
Sergeant Buffie testified that he believed that the other occupant of the vehicle “most likely
looked like [C.T.] or potentially worse.” Officers called for an ambulance for C.T., and he
was eventually transported to a hospital.
At the accident scene, C.T. was initially uncooperative and claimed that he had been
alone in the vehicle. Officers told C.T. multiple times how important it was to find the
other occupant of the vehicle in case that person needed medical assistance. Sergeant
Buffie testified that he raised his voice and desperately pleaded with C.T. to tell him where
the other occupant of the vehicle was because the seriousness of C.T.’s injuries made him
concerned about the other occupant . C.T. eventually stated that his friend “Shane” had
been driving at the time of the accident.
Police dis patch informed the officers that Wolden had prior contact with law
enforcement at a residence at 5630 Kentley Avenue, which was less than a mile from the
accident scene. Officers went to that address and found, outside the garage of the residence,
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a man’s watch and what appeared to be a key fob for the same make and model as the
vehicle involved in the accident . Officers elected not to set up a perimeter around the
residence. Instead, officers entered the residence and announced their presence. Sergeant
Buffie testified that he entered the residence because he believed that the driver of the
vehicle, Wolden, was potentially in worse condition than C.T. and could have been
severely injured.
The officers encountered t hree people in the residence and were informed that
Wolden stayed in the basement. Sergeant Buffie testified that he told the first person that
he encountered that the officers were there because there was a “serious car accident down
the street.”
Officers went to the basement and saw Wolden lying on a bed, under the covers.
Wolden was not wearing a shirt and was wearing one shoe. Officers saw cuts and scrapes
on Wolden’s hands that contained both fresh and dried blood. The officers asked Wolden
if he was all right and whether he needed an ambulance. Wolden stated that he did not
need an ambulance. Wolden’s responses to the officers’ questions were delayed. The
officers removed Wolden’s blanket to check for concealed weapons and other injuries.
Officers observed that Wolden’s breathing and heartbeat were rapid. While Wolden
was talking to the officers, they detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed that his
speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Wolden told officers a second
time that he did not need an ambulance. Law enforcement administered field sobriety tests,
and Wolden performed poorly on the tests.
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Officers took Wolden into custody and transported him to the Golden Valley Police
Department, where law enforcement read him an implied-consent advisory and asked him
to submit to a breath test. Wolden agreed to take the test, which registered a 0.19 alcohol
concentration.
In support of his motion to suppress, Wolden argued that “the arresting officers
made a warrantless entry into [his] house without consent or exigent circumstances to
justify the entry.” The district court den ied Wolden’s motion to suppress, reasoning that
the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the officers’ warrantless
entry. In April 2017, the state amended the complaint to add a count of criminal vehicular
operation: causing great bodily harm and leaving the scene of the collision. Wolden
stipulated to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of the district court’s ruling on his
motion to suppress. The district court found him guilty as charged , entered judgments of
conviction on October 23, 2017 , and stayed imposition of sentence for two years . This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Wolden contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress ,
arguing that the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the
officers’ warrantless entry into the residence. When reviewing a district court’s pretrial
order on a motion to suppress evidence, this court r eviews the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496, 502 (Minn. 2008 ). A district court’s application of an exception to the warrant
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requirement is a legal determination. Ries v. State , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL
6332362, at *5 (Minn. Dec. 5, 2018).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable government
searches and seizures of “persons , houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v.
New York , 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980) (quotation omitted).
“Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law
enforcement officers . . . ‘may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’” State
v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787 -88 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart , 547
U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006)).
In applying the emergency -aid exception to the warrant requirement, “two
principles must be kept in mind: first, that the burden is on the state to demonstrate that
police conduct was justified under the exception; and second, that an objective standard
should be applied to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that there was an
emergency.” Id. at 788. The Minnesota Supreme Court uses a two -part test to determine
whether a search was reasonable under the emergency -aid exception. Ries, 2018 WL
6332362, at *9 (citing Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788). First, t he police must have
“reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need
for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” Id. (quoting Lemieux, 726
N.W.2d at 788). And second, “ [t]here must be some reasonable basis, approximating
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probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. ” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788). “Under the emergency-aid
exception, it does not matter if officers have reason to believe some criminal activity is
afoot as long as they are objectively motivated by the need to give aid.” Id. (citing Brigham
City, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S. Ct. at 1948).
Wolden argues that “Officer Buffie did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
there was an emergency and that [Wolden ] needed immediate assistance.” However, the
district court found that the vehicle “had extensive damage in multiple areas” and that
“there was blood visible on both the driver’s side and passenger’s side of the vehicle.” This
finding is unchallenged, and the photographs of the vehicle and accident scene support it.
The district court also found that when officers encountered C.T. he had “severe injuries
including numerous lacerations, and blood running down his face and head.” That finding
is suppor ted by the record, particularly, Sergeant Buffie’s testimony regarding C.T.’s
“horrific” appearance. The totality of these circumstances provided the officers objectively
reasonable grounds to suspect that Wolden might be seriously injured and need immediate
aid.
Wolden argues that “a witness saw two men running away from the damaged
vehicle, militating against a conclusion that they were both severely injured.” The record
refutes this argument. Sergeant Buffie testified that the caller who reported the accident
was at the scene and told law enforcement that the occupants of the vehicle “had left on
foot,” and not that they had run from the vehicle.
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Wolden also argues that “Sergeant Buffie talked to the passenger involved in the
accident and [Buffie] did not show any concern whatsoever about [Wolden’s] well-being.”
The record refutes this argument. Sergeant Buffie testified that he desperately pleaded with
C.T. to tell him where the other occupant of the vehicle was and that he raised his voice to
convey how urgent it was to find that person, given the possibility that the other occupant
was seriously injured.
Wolden further argues that C.T. informed Sergeant Buffie that “he was much more
injured than hi s friend ” and that “[t]hat statement should have reasonably assuaged
Sergeant Buffie’s concerns that [Wolden’s] life was in immediate danger.” Although C.T.
told Sergeant Buffie that he was in worse condition than the other occupant of the vehicle,
it was reasonable for the officers to doubt C.T.’s statement because C.T. had just been in a
serious accident and was injured, C.T. initially was not cooperative with law enforcement,
and the extensive vehicle damage indicated that the driver may have been significantly
injured. Given the condition of the veh icle and C.T.’s injuries, it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to believe that Wolden, the reported driver of the vehicle, was
seriously injured and might need aid.
Lastly, Wolden argues that because “ the officers did not call for an ambulance” o r
“back-up medical personnel” before arriving at the residence, there were not reasonable
grounds to believe that he was seriously injured. But as noted above, the accident scene
and C.T.’s condition provided reasonable grounds to suspect that Wolden migh t be
seriously injured and need aid . The fact that the officers did not call for an ambulance or
medical personnel before locating and observing Wolden does not negate that suspicion.
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In sum, Wolden’s arguments regarding the first part of the emergency -aid test are
not persuasive. The circumstances of this case show that the officers had objectively
reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and that Wolden needed
immediate medical assistance.
We turn to the second part of the emergency-aid test: whether there was some
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched . Probable cause “exists where the facts and c ircumstances within
the officer’ s knowledge and of whi ch he has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable man of reasonable caution in [a] belief.”
State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1979). “The probable-cause standard is
an objective one that conside rs the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Johnson , 689
N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20,
2005).
Here, police dispatch informed the officers that Wolden had prior contact with law
enforcement at the residence to be searched, which was less than a mile from the accident
scene. Officers found , outside the garage of the residence, a man’s watch and what
appeared to be a key fob for the same make and model as the vehicle involved in the
accident. Based on the information from police dispatch connecting Wolden to the
residence, the proximity of the residence and accident scene, and the discovery of a key
fob, outside of the garage of the residence, for a vehicle with the same make and model as
the accident vehicle, there was a reasonable basis approximating probable cause to believe
Wolden was at the residence and to associate the emergency with the residence.
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Wolden’s arguments to this court heavily emphasize the officers’ subjective intent.
Specifically, Wolden argues that “[t]he search of [his] home was primarily motivated by
Sergeant Buffie’s intent to arrest and seize evidence.” We do not address such arguments
because the off icers’ subjective intent is irrelevant. See Ries, 2018 WL 6332362, at *8
(“Consistent with established Fourth Amendment case law, . . . ‘[t]he officer’s subjective
motivation is irrelevant.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404,
126 S. Ct. at 1948)); id. at *9 n.6 (rejecting consideration of officers’ subjective
motivations as a component of the emergency -aid test). The record establishes that the
officers were objectively motivated by the need to render aid, which is sufficient to justify
the warrantless entry. Nonetheless, we observe that Sergeant Buffie’s statements to C.T.
expressing concern regarding Wolden’s condition, as well as the officers’ questions of
Wolden regarding his medical condition and need for an ambulance , show that the
warrantless entry was primarily motivated by an intent to provide immediate medical
assistance.
Based on our de novo application of the two-part emergency-aid test, we conclude
that the emergency-aid exception justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the residence.
Indeed, it is arguable that “the officers would have been derelict in their duty if they had
acted otherwise.” Id. at *10 (quotation omitted). The district court therefore did not err by
denying Wolden’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.