State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0134

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Joseph Madrigal,
Appellant.

Filed November 13, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-10692

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second -degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it was
unintelligent and involuntary. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 1, 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant David Joseph
Madrigal with two counts of second -degree criminal sexual conduct. The complaint
alleged that Madrigal touched the upper inner thighs of a 12 -year-old student and a 10 -
year-old student at a Hopkins school where he was employed.
On June 14, 2017, Madrigal appeared before the district court, in custody, and
pleaded guilty to one count of second -degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to a plea
agreement. The state agreed to dism iss the remaining charge and to recommend a stay of
imposition of sentence with 90 days of local jail time. The state also agreed that Madrigal
could be conditionally released pending sentencing once he had served the equivalent of
90 days of jail time. At the plea hearing, Madrigal waived his right to trial, submitted a
petition to enter a plea of guilty, and provided a factual basis for his plea.
The plea petition included the following statements: “I . . . do not make the claim
that the fact I have been held in jail since my arrest and could not post bail caused me to
decide to plead guilty in order to get the thing over with rather than waiting for my turn at
trial” and “I now make no claim that I am innocent.” The plea petition also stated:

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My attorney has told me and I understand that if my plea
of guilty is accepted by the judge I have the right to appeal, but
that any appeal or other court action I may take claiming error
in the proceedings probably would be useless and a waste of
my time and the court’s.

At the plea hearing, Madrigal answered “[y]es” when the district court asked him
whether he had had “enough time to consider this matter” and “consult with [his] attorney.”
Madrigal’s attorney reviewed the plea petition with him and asked him whether he
understood that “your signature’s telling the judge that you understand what’s written on
the document.” Madrigal responded, “Yes.” Madrigal’s attorney reviewed the trial rights
that Madrigal would give up by pleading guilty. Madrigal stat ed that he understood and
expressly waived his trial rights. Madrigal’s attorney noted that the petition asked
questions regarding whether Madrigal had previously been treated by a psychiatrist or had
been on medication because “today you’re making an imp ortant decision about your life
and the Court wants to be sure that . . . you’re in a position to make important decisions.”
Madrigal did not raise the possibility of plea withdrawal or ask any questions regarding the
plea-withdrawal process during the plea hearing.
The district court deferred acceptance of Madrigal’s guilty plea pending completion
of a presentence investigation report and psychos exual evaluation. On June 26, Madrigal
was conditionally released from custody after serving the equivalent of his 90 -day jail
sentence, consistent with the plea agreement.
Prior to sentencing and represented by a new attorney, Madrigal moved to withdraw
his guilty plea, arguing that he did not commit the offense to which he pleaded guilty and
that he was pressured by his previous defense counsel into pleading the guilty. The district

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court held a hearing on Madrigal’s plea -withdrawal motion, at which Madrigal and his
previous attorney testified. Madrigal argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea because he felt that he had no choice but to plea d guilty for the following
reasons: (1) his previous attorney would not investigate “potentially exculpatory witnesses
or exculpatory evidence,” (2) he believed that he “would have a right to withdraw his plea”
when he entered it, and (3) he needed to plead guilty to address personal matters that he
could not address while in custody.
Madrigal testified as follows in support of his request for plea withdrawal: (1) his
previous attorney failed to interview a po tentially exculpatory witness, (2) he told his
attorney that after his release from jail, he was going to come back to court and claim he
was innocent, (3) his attorney failed to thoroughly explain the plea petition, and (4) his
attorney told him that pleading guilty under the plea agreement would be in his best
interests. Madrigal also testified that he “lied” under oath about being guilty to get out of
jail.
Madrigal’s previous attorney testified as follows: (1) he told Madrigal that he would
interview the potentially exculpatory witness as part of his trial preparation if he thought it
was appropriate, (2) he explained to Madrigal that contacting the witness would be difficult
because the witness was a child, (3) he explained the benefits and risks of the state’s offer
to Madrigal and told him that whether to accept it was ultimately his decision, (4) he
thoroughly explained the plea petition to Madrigal, and (5) Madrigal never said that he was
pleading guilty to get released from custody or that he intended to withdraw his guilty plea.

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The district court denied Madrigal’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, reasoning
that his “guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” and that “permitting
withdrawal would cause prejudice to the state” because “[t]he victims in this case were
children and they had a sense of finality upon . . . Madrigal’s resolution of the case.” The
district court stayed imposition of sentence for five years, placed Madriga l on probation,
and imposed a ten-year conditional-release term. Madrigal appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Madrigal contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because his plea was unintelligent and involuntary. “A defendant has n o
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d
90, 93 (Minn. 2010). However, withdrawal is permitted in two circumstances. Id. First,
“[a]t any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely
motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, “[i]n its discretion the court
may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just
to do so.” Id., subd. 2. Although Madrigal moved the district court for plea withdrawal
under both the manifest-injustice and fair-and-just standards, his arguments on appeal are
limited to the manifest-injustice standard.
A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is invalid. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). A defen dant has the
burden of showing that his guilty plea was invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Assessing

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the validity of a plea presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Id.
However, where “credibility determinations are crucial,” this court gives “deference to the
primary observations and trustworthiness assessments made by the district court” in
determining the factual circumstances of a defendant’s guilty plea. State v. Aviles-Alvarez,
561 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997).
Intelligence Requirement
“The purpose of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to [ensure] that the
defendant understands the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty,
and understands the consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). If the record shows that a defendant “had full opportunity to consult with his
counsel before entering his plea,” courts may “safely presume” that a defendant was
adequately informed of his rights. State v. Propotnik, 216 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Minn. 1974);
Hernandez v. State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 1987).
Madrigal contends that his “guilty plea was not intelligently entered because he
believed that he had the unqualified right to withdraw his guilty plea.” Madrigal argues
that he “told defense counsel of his plan to withdraw his guilty plea at a later date, and
prove his innocence” and that he “relied upon this belief and was not corrected by his
attorney, nor was he warned by the district court that he would not be allowed to withdraw
his plea.”
The record does not support Madrigal’s claim that his plea was unintelligent.
Madrigal’s attorney testified that Madrigal never mentioned his plan to come back into
court, claim innocence, and withdraw his plea. The district court app ears to have deemed

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the attorney’s testimony credible: it found that Madrigal “understood at the time of the
entry of his plea that he would not necessarily have the right to withdraw his plea.” We
defer to that credibility determination. See Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d at 527.
Moreover, Madrigal’s plea petition in no way suggests that plea withdrawal would
be allowed. Thus, Madrigal’s plea -hearing testimony that he understood the plea petition
undercuts his claim that he believed that he had an unqualified right to withdraw his guilty
plea. It also refutes any suggestion that he did not understand that a consequence of his
guilty plea would be a finding of guilt.
Madrigal’s claim that his plea was unintelligent also fails as a matter of law. The
intelligence requirement ensures a defendant understands the rights he is giving up.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96; Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. But a defendant does not have an
absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea, Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93, and therefore d oes
not give up such a right by pleading guilty. Madrigal does not cite authority suggesting
that the intelligence requirement requires the court or defense counsel to dispel
misperceptions a defendant may have about rights he does not have, especially wh en the
record does not show that the defendant communicated his misperceptions to the court or
counsel. The circumstances would be different if the record established that Madrigal had
disclosed his alleged erroneous belief regarding plea withdrawal to the district court or
defense counsel and it was ignored, but those are not the circumstances here. In sum,
because a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea, Madrigal’s
purported erroneous, undisclosed belief that he had an un qualified right to do so did not
make his plea unintelligent.

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Voluntariness Requirement
“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. “[T]he normal trauma
associated with being incarcerated following an arrest is not, by itself, a basis to claim
coercion.” Sykes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn.
July 16, 1998). Improper pressure or coercion generally comes from an external source,
such as a threat or promise made to induce a defendant to plead guilty. See, e.g., Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) (“[A]gents of the State may
not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the will of the defendant.”); Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (noting
the fact that a defendant denied that he had been “subjected to threats or promises” was
further evidence that his plea was voluntary); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.
2000) (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises . . . .”).
The voluntariness of a plea is determined by considering all of the relevant surrounding
circumstances. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
Madrigal contends that his “guilty plea was not voluntarily entered because defense
counsel delayed the interview of a potentially exculpatory witness and [he] believed he had
no other choice than to get out of jail and inte rview his exculpatory witness himself.”
Madrigal does not argue that his previous counsel’s representation “was deficient, but
rather that defense counsel’s delay of interviewing a potentially exculpatory witness placed
undue pressure on [him] to investig ate his case himself, when presented with that
opportunity.”

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Madrigal’s claim that his plea was involuntary fails as a matter of law. Madrigal
does not argue that anyone threatened him or induced him to plead guilty. Instead,
Madrigal argues that he believed that he had to plead guilty to get out of jail and investigate
his case, because he disagreed with his attorney’s investigation strategy. Madrigal does
not cite authority supporting his contention that a defendant’s disagreement with defense
counsel’s investigation strategy results in improper pressure sufficient to invalidate a guilty
plea. Madrigal’s belief that a defense witness should be interviewed immediately may
have been a legitimate concern to him, but it is not the type of improper external coercion
that renders a guilty plea involuntary.
Conclusion
Madrigal has not met his burden to show that his plea was unintelligent or
involuntary and therefore invalid. Neither the record nor the law supports his request for
plea withdrawal. Moreover, his request for plea withdrawal is inconsistent with public
policy favoring the finality of pleas.
[O]nce the plea is accepted and a jud gment of conviction is
entered upon it, the general policy favoring the finality of
judgments applies to some extent, at least, in crimi nal as well
as in civil cases. The tender and acceptance of a plea of guilty
is and must be a most solemn commitment. While the state has
no reason to imprison a man for a crime which he did not
commit, we are not disposed to encourage accused persons to
play games with the courts at the expense of already
overburdened calendars and the rights of other accused persons
awaiting trial by setting aside judgments of conviction based
upon pleas made with deliberation and accepted by the court
with caution.

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Chapman v. State , 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1968) ( footnote and quotation
omitted).
Underlying the [fair -and-just plea -withdrawal] rule is the
notion that giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a
plea before sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-
taking process. If a guilty plea can be withdrawn for any
reason or without good reason at any time before sentence is
imposed, then the process of accepting guilty pleas would
simply be a means of continuing the trial to some indefinite
date in the future when the defendant might see fit to come in
and make a motion to withdraw his plea.

Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989) (quotation and citation omitted).
Madrigal essentially ask s to withdraw his guilty plea because he lied under oath
when he pleaded guilty and had no intent to be bound by his plea. Th at is precisely the
type of game playing that undermines the integrity of the plea-taking process. We will not
allow it.
Affirmed.