Nathan C. McGuire, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0167

Nathan C. McGuire,
Appellant,

vs.

Julie A. Bowlin,
Respondent,

Thomas M. Bowlin,
Defendant,

Joy M. Szondy,
Respondent,

Chelon L. Danielson,
Respondent,

Cheryl Hewitt,
Respondent.

Filed December 3, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-15-6030

Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Sharon L. Van Dyck, Andrew T. James, Fafinski Mark &
Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellant)

Julie A. Bowlin, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Andrew T. Shern, Andrew T. Shern Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent Joy M. Szondy)

2

Chelon L. Danielson, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Garth J. Unke, Kirsten J. Hansen, Stich, Angell, Kreidler & Unke, PA, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Cheryl Hewitt)

Jenneane Jansen, Kris Palmer, Jansen & Palmer, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amici
curiae Minnesota State High School Coaches Association and National High School
Basketball Coaches Association)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant-basketball coach challenges summary judgment dismissing his claims of
defamation, civil conspiracy, and false report of child maltreatment against respondent -
parents of student athletes. Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that
(1) he is a public official required to prove actual malice to recover for defamation, (2) the
record contains no evidence of actual malice, and (3) the record contains no evidence that
maltreatment reports made by two respondents were knowingly or recklessly false. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Nathan McGuire is a kindergarten teacher and basketball coach. He was
the head girls’ basketball coach at the Academy of Holy Angels (AHA) from 2010 unti l
2012, during which time he coached the daughter of respondent Julie Bowlin. From 2012
until 2014, McGuire led the girls’ basketball program at Woodbury High School . During
that time, the daughters of respondent Joy Szondy, respondent Chelon Danielson, and

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respondent Cheryl Hewitt participated in the Woodbury basketball program, as did
Bowlin’s daughter, who transferred from AHA to play for McGuire.
The Woodbury program consisted of four teams —a varsity team, a junior varsity
(JV) team, a sophomore (or “B”) team, and a freshman team —and six coaches, including
McGuire. McGuire supervised the assistant coaches, coached the varsity team, determined
practice schedules, and frequently reassigned players between the four teams.
During McGuire’s first season (2012-2013), Szondy’s daughter and Danielson’s
daughter were juniors and played on the JV team . Szondy and Danielson had concer ns
about the basketball program. Danielson was concerned, based primarily on her daughter’s
reports, that McGuire yelled at, singled out, and ridiculed the players; threw basketballs in
anger; and physically handled the players by grabbin g their jerseys and moving them .
Szondy was troubled by the hours-long daily practices and unsuccessfully challenged
McGuire’s late-season decision to remove her daughter from the roster based on behavioral
issues. Neither Szondy’s daughter nor Danielson’s daughter played basketball the
following year.
During the 2013-14 season, Hewitt’s daughter was a freshman originally assi gned
to the B team and later reassigned to the JV/varsity team s, and Bowlin’s daughter was a
freshman assigned to the varsity team. Hewitt and Bowlin also had concerns about the
basketball program . Hewitt did not believe players should be penalized for m issing
practices during holidays or school breaks and thought that practices ran too long and
interfered with academics. She was also concerned, based on her daughter’s statements,
that McGuire swore around and yelled at players, physically moved players by the ir

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shoulders and hips, and entered the girls’ locker room. Bowlin was concerned about her
daughter’s role on the team and playing time and troubled by her daughter’s report that
McGuire pushed her during a drill. Bowlin also heard from her daughter and other players
and parents that McGuire yelled at and singled out players, swore in front of players, threw
basketballs in anger, and was inconsiderate of players’ academic and other obligations.
In November or early December 2013, Bowlin met with the athletics director, the
coaching staff, and the school principal. She also approached other basketball parents,
suggesting that they should complain to the athletics director because McGuire was “let
go” from AHA after parents had done so there. Bowlin’s daughter transferred to another
school on or around December 11.
Hewitt learned of the transfer and called Bowlin. She told Bowlin that she shared
her concerns based on reports from players during the previous season about McGuire
yelling and swearing, giving back rubs, and throwing balls.
On December 29, Hewitt, Bowlin, and three former players (the daughters of
Szondy, Danielson, and Bowlin) met at Hewitt’s residence to prepare for an upcoming
meeting with the school district superinte ndent. The group, led primarily by Bowlin and
the former players, discussed various aspects of McGuire’s conduct. Bowlin told the group
that McGuire was asked to resign from AHA in lieu of being fired after parents complained
to the p rincipal and athletics director. Hewitt took notes during the meeting , which she
subsequently distributed to the other attendees.

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In early January 2014, Bowlin, Danielson, Szondy’s daughter, and another parent
filed complaints with the Minnesota Department of Education, allegi ng that McGuire had
engaged in maltreatment of at least four players.
Around the same time , school administrators met with players and parents,
including Hewitt, Szondy, and Bowlin, to address complaints related to McGuire’s
performance as the girls’ head basketball coach. The school district subsequently placed
McGuire on paid administrative leave and hired a law firm to investigate the allegations
against him. The investigation yielded a report that largely rejected claims of physical
improprieties such as pushing or massaging players, but found several of the complaints
were substantiated, including that McGuire failed to consider the emotional well -being of
his players, yelled and swore in front of players, and ran a demanding and uncompromising
practice schedule. On March 14, the school district notified McGuire that it would not
renew his coaching contract.
Approximately one year later, the department of education concluded its
investigation of the maltreatment reports, determining that none of the players had been
maltreated.
McGuire initiated this action against Bowlin, Szondy, Danielson, and Hewitt,
alleging defamation and civil conspiracy , and that Bowlin and Danielson knowingly or
recklessly filed false child-maltreatment reports.1 After two rounds of summary-judgment

1 McGuire also asserted all three claims against Thomas Bowlin . The district court
dismissed the claims, and McGuire does not challenge the dismissal in this appeal.
Accordingly, all references to Bowlin herein are to Julie Bowlin.

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motions, the district court dismissed all claims, reasoning that McGuire was a public
official and the record lacks evidence of false statements made with actual malice or
knowingly or recklessly false maltreatment reports. McGuire appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. McGuire was a public official.

A plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must prove the defendant made (1) a false
statement about the plaintiff, (2) in “unprivileged publication to a third party,” (3) that
harmed the plaintiff’s reputation in the community , and (4) “fault, at least negligence.”
Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991). If the plaintiff is a “public official”
who alleges defamation in a statement concerning his official conduct, the consti tution
demands even more—proof that the statement was made with “actual malice.” New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964). “The public or private
status of the plaintiff in a defamation action is a question of law” that we review de novo.
Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 520.
The Supreme Court has declined to specify categories of individuals who would or
would not be included in the ranks of public officials. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85,
86 S. Ct. 669, 675 (1966). Instead, it outlined a general approach for determining whether
a particular public employee is a public official:
[T]he “public official” designation applies at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility
for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs . . . [and
to an employee whose ] position in government has such
apparent importance that the public has an independent interest
in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds

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it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all government employees.

Id. at 85-86, 86 S. Ct. at 676. Minnesota follows the Rosenblatt approach but focuses
particularly on “whether th[e] employee is able to assert the authority of the government
while performing his duties.” Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 521, 523.
Whether a public high school coach falls within these parameters is a question that
neither the Supreme Court nor Minnesota’s ap pellate courts have addressed, a nd other
states have split on the issue. 2 But we have considered a similar public employee —a
teacher. Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270 , 533 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. App. 1995),
review denied (Minn. July 27, 1995). In Elstrom, w e identified several factors that
persuaded us that public school teachers are public officials for defamation purposes. Id.
We noted that Minnesota strongly emphasizes education and places teachers in a position
of special trust and authority, creating in the public a “greater than normal interest” in being
able to debate and freely criticize teachers’ conduct. Id. Teachers “act with the authority
of the government.” Id. And teachers who abuse their positions “may affect many lives.”
Id.

2 See Basarich v . Rodeghero, 321 N .E.2d 739 , 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (high school
“athletic coaches” were public officials); Milkovich v. News -Herald, 473 N .E.2d 1191 ,
1196 (Ohio 1984) (high school head wrestling coach was not a public official), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 953 (1985), overruled on other grounds, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986); Johnston
v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978) (grade school wrestling
coach was a public official); Johnson v Sw. Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex.
App. 1993) (high school athletic director and head football coach was a public official );
O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah 2007) (high school basketball coach
was not a public official).

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McGuire argues that Elstrom is inapposite because a coach is not analogous to a
teacher. We disagree. High school sports play a formative role in the lives of student
athletes and a significant role in their families and in the community that watches from the
bleachers and pays the school levies. The coaches who direct young athletes enjoy
positions of trust and authority , the abuse of which may affect many lives. Accordingly,
as with teachers, the public has an interes t in coaches’ qualifications and conduct. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 122A.15, subd. 2 (subjecting “athletic coaches” to teacher licensure
requirements), .33 (establishing licensure exemption for otherwise qualified head coach)
(2016); see also Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Minn. App.
2010) (comparing school board’s non-renewal of a coach’s contract to a teacher’ s non-
renewal), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). For these reasons, states that have
considered both types of public employees consistently treat teachers and coaches the same
in the context of defamation actions. Basarich, 321 N.E.2d at 742; Johnston, 583 P.2d at
1103; see also O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1220 (holding that neither teachers nor coaches are
public officials).
Although we need not decide here whether all public high school coaches are public
officials, the undisputed facts persuade us that McGuire was a public official. Like a
teacher, he had extensive contact with his student athletes during hours-long daily practices
and had a substantial impact on their lives, as demonstrated by the very complaints at issue
in this litigation. As head of the high school basketball program, h e had a significant
supervisory and administrative role. Five coaches worked under him in the program, three

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of whom he hired. 3 And he established the structure and priorities of the program with
respect to team rosters, practice schedules , and policies regarding miss ed practices and
player discipline.
We appreciate the challenges that coaches face in addressing parents’ criticisms,
both fair and unfair . In this, too, coaches are like teachers. Coaches like McGuire, who
lead sports programs, regularly field both collective and individual complaints on topics
ranging from the program’s competitive success, to coaching methods and style, to a
particular child’s playing time. But these challenges do not outweigh the public interest in
freely debating and criticizing the conduct of persons in positions of authority ( both
teachers and coaches) who play a prominent role in the lives of students. We conclude that
McGuire was a public figure for purposes of his defamation claims.4
II. The record contains no evidence that respondents made false statements about
McGuire with actual malice.

We review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact , viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014) . In a defamation case, “the test is whether
the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding that the plaintiff has

3 McGuire testified during his deposition that he independently hired thre e assistant
coaches.

4 The district court rejected McGuire’s argument that any public-official status would not
apply to allegedly defamatory statements made after he was removed from his coaching
position. McGuire does not assert this argument on appeal.

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shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.” McDevitt v. Tilson, 453 N.W.2d
53, 57 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. May 23, 1990).
“Actual malice” is a term of art, not a reference to ill will or spite. Chafoulias v.
Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003). A statement is made with “actual malice”
when it is made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S. Ct. at 726. Reckless disregard
means the defendant had “serious doubts” about the truth of the statement. Elstrom, 533
N.W.2d at 56. “Errors in judgment do not establish actual malice; nor does failure to
investigate.” Id. And neither does a mere “slanted perspective.” Chafoulias, 668 N.W.2d
at 655.
It is within this context that w e address McGuire’s allegations against each of the
respondents except Szondy ,5 focusing princip ally, as McGuire does, on those against
Bowlin.
Danielson
McGuire alleges that Danielson defamed him by stating at the December 29, 2013
parent-player meeting that she saw McGuire give players back rubs. McGuire denies doing
so. These differing accounts demonstrate a fact question regarding McGuire’s conduct .
But McGuire’s denial is not evidence that Danielson made her statement about witnessing
back rubs knowing it was false or recklessly disregarding its veracity . In the absence of
any such evidence, McGuire’s defamation claim against Danielson fails as a matter of law.

5 McGuire acknowledged in his summary-judgment memorandum that there is no record
evidence that Szondy made defamatory statements.

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Hewitt
McGuire asserts that Hewitt defamed him by (1) telling Bowlin during a December
2013 phone call that he inappropriately touched players and gave play ers back rubs,
(2) stating at the December 29 meeting that he “singles out players in front of everyone ”
for criticism or punishment , (3) drafting notes from that meeting without independently
investigating the truth of the statements she recorded, and (4) stating in an August 23, 2014
email to Bowlin, “I heard from someone not involved in [basketball] at all that they heard
he was just put in jail? Is there any truth to that?” When read in context, t he record
demonstrates all of Hewitt’s claimed defama tory statements reflect information she
received from others —players’ descriptions of t heir interactions with McGuire, other
parents’ descriptions of their daughters’ experiences, and an unknown person’s report that
McGuire was “put in jail,” the truth of which she expressly questioned. There is no
evidence that—at the time Hewitt made the statements—she knew they were false, or made
them recklessly, without considering their veracity. Accordingly, McGuire’s defamation
claim against Hewitt fails as a matter of law.
Bowlin
McGuire contends that Bowlin made defamatory statements about him with actual
malice on three separate occasions. First, McGuire contends that Bowlin acted with actual
malice when she stated in a December 2013 email to other Woodbury basketball parents
that McGuire was “let go” from his coaching position at AHA. He argues Bowlin knew
this statement was false because she and other parents received an email from AHA’s
athletics director in February 2012 indicatin g that McGuire “decided to resign.” This

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argument is unavailing. Bowlin’s email itself reflects information she had recently
received showing that McGuire left AHA because of parents’ concerns: “All girls from
Varsity but [Bowlin’s daughter] went to see the [athletics director] at AHA…I was just
told this last night. This is what AHA did and that is how he was let go because of his
behavior.” This is consistent with her statement to other parents and players later in
December 2013 that “McGuire was aske d to resign or he would have been fired.” And
Bowlin’s statements are consistent with the AHA athletics director’s statements that he
received emails from concerned parents and told McGuire that he was not sure the school
was a good place for him, and McGuire’s own acknowledgment that the “climate” at AHA
led him to resign. Overall, this record reflects that Bowlin did not knowingly or recklessly
disseminate false information about the nature of McGuire’s separation from AHA but
relied on information she received from others to form and communicate an opinion that
parental complaints were the impetus for his departure.
Second, McGuire argues that Bowlin acted with actual malice by telling a friend in
two August 2014 emails, that she “heard” McGuire “was re cently put in jail” but would
“find out the truth and call the state today and find out,” then later the same day that he
“may lose his teaching job and do jail time.” He contends that Bowlin “had no basis, good
faith or otherwise, for fabricating the inf ormation that McGuire had been in jail or could
be jailed.” The record reflects otherwise. Bowlin accurately communicated to her friend
that she “heard” (from Hewitt) that McGuire may have been jailed . Her emails indicate
that she understood the jail consequences related to the maltreatment report she filed with

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the department of education, which was pending at the time.6 In her second email, Bowlin
stated that she “spoke to the State today and they are interviewing the 4 kids that turned
the claim in” and referred by name to t he investigator, who interviewed Bowlin and her
daughter less than two weeks later. That Bowlin would contemplate, or even hope, that
McGuire would be jailed for maltreatment may suggest her subjective ill will toward
McGuire but does not establish actual malice to support a defamation claim.
Third, McGuire asserts that Bowlin acted with actual malice by sending a text
message to a friend in December 2014 with a photo of a local newspaper story about a
Woodbury man who was sentenced to jail for stealing funds, some of which he used to pay
a Woodbury basketball coach, and the statement: “[T]his was part of the Woodbury stuff
with Mcguire that was going on. This guy too got busted.” McGuire insists that Bowlin’s
statements are “false and defamatory” because she “knew he was not involved in the events
described in the article.” But it is apparent from the article itself and undispute d that the
Woodbury man in question was a man whose daughter played basketball with Bowlin’s
daughter, and that McGuire was not the affected coach. Thus, while it is unclear precisely
why Bowlin referenced McGuire in sharing the article, nothing in the ar ticle or her vague
statement suggests that McGuire had anything to do with stealing funds or receiving stolen
funds. See McKee v. Laurion , 825 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing that
whether a statement conveys a defamatory meaning depends on how an ordinary person

6 Bowlin’s reference to possible criminal consequences or revocation of McGuire’s license
is consistent with the potential consequences in cases of substantiated child maltreatment.
See Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(e) (2016).

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would understand the statement in the light of surrounding circumstances ). Because the
record lacks evidence that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly made false statements about
McGuire, his defamation claim against her fails as a matter of law.7
III. The record contains n o evidence that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly filed a
false maltreatment report.

A person who knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being neglected
or physically or sexually abused in a school environment may rep ort to the local welfare
agency, department of education, or law enforcement. Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subds. 3(b),
3b (2016). But any person who “knowingly or recklessly makes a false report” can be held
liable in a civil suit. Id., subd. 5 (2016). As noted above, we review de novo whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Larson, 855 N.W.2d at 299.
McGuire challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim that Bowlin
knowingly or recklessly filed a false report alleging that he maltreated her daughter. He
contends that there are fact questions regarding whether Bowlin “filed her report out of
spite and with an ulterior motive intended to cause McGuire to lose h is teaching and
coaching positions.” But any such fact questions are not material as they do not bear on
the statutory elements of a false -report claim—whether Bowlin’s report was false, and if
so whether she knew it was false or recklessly disregarded the risk it was false.

7 Because McGuire’s defamation claims fail as a matter of law, his derivative civil-
conspiracy claims likewise fail.

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Two documents establish the allegations Bowlin reported. First, Bowlin’s reporting
form alleges physical abuse, noting “pushing in drill ,” and unspecified emotional abuse.
Second, the investigator’s report details the written and oral statements of Bowlin and her
daughter that McGuire “pushed” Bowlin’s daughter while participating with players in a
drill and “verbally abused” her by singling her out and yelling at her, causing her loss of
sleep, emotional disturbance, and decline in academic performance.
The investigator found a factual basis for Bowlin’s report, determining that evidence
supports the allegation that McGuire “used a loud voice which could be perceived as
yelling during practices” and that “physical contact with athlete s occurred during practice
drills and games.” But the investigator determined that these circumstances do not amount
to maltreatment because McGuire’s use of a loud voice did not specifically target Bowlin’s
daughter and his physical contact with her “occ urred during practice drills and games for
the purpose of direction and teaching,” was not targeted, and was not “inappropriate for
athletic situations.”
In short, the record evidence establishes that Bowlin’s report was not “false” ; its
supported allega tions simply did not meet the legal definition of maltreatment.
Consequently, Bowlin is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.8
Affirmed.

8 McGuire does not challenge summary judgment on his false-maltreatment-report claim
against Danielson. As with the claim against Bowlin, the record reflects that Danielson’s
complaint of neglect and emotional abuse allege conduct that Danielson and her daughter
perceived as punitive and targeted, but the investigator found was equally “intense” toward
all players and within legal parameters.