Sujata Sangwan, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0171

Sujata Sangwan,
Relator,

vs.

Department of Employment and
Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 4, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Department of Employment and
Economic Development
File No. 35919814-3

Sujata Sangwan, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Soon after relator Sujata Sangwan was informed by her school district that she
would not be offered a teaching contract for the following year, she went to the office of
respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) to ask when
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she should apply for unemployment benefits. Sangwan alleges that she received inaccurate
information from a DEED employee regarding when she should apply and, as a result,
missed three months of benefits payments . DEED found her ineligible for these months,
and the unemployment law judge (ULJ) affirmed DEED’s determination. Because the ULJ
failed to determine whether Sangwan actually received inaccurate information from a
DEED employee, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Relator Sujata Sangwan was employed as a teacher with a school district for the
2016-2017 school year. But in March 2017, she received a letter stating that her contract
would not be renewed for the following school year. Her last day at the district would be
June 9, 2017. Sangwan went to the DEED office to inquire about unemployment benefits
on May 8, 2017, approximately one month before her last day. Sangwan testified that she
showed a DEED e mployee the letter she received, asked whe n she should apply for
benefits, and was told not to do so until the end of summer since all teachers are
unemployed for the three-month summer break.
Sangwan returned to the DEED office on September 8, 2017 and filed for
unemployment benefits. After reviewing her application, DEED determined Sangwan was
eligible for benefits. But DEED only backdated those benefits one week because benefits
can be backdated no more than one week unless DEED prevented the ap plicant from
completing an application, which it determined was not the case. Sangwan returned to the
DEED office on September 28, 2017, and asked that the benefits be backdated to June 11,
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two days after her last day of employment. DEED denied the request. Sangwan challenged
the denial, and a ULJ heard the case.
Sangwan represented herself at the hearing with the ULJ and provided the only
testimony. She testified that she received inaccurate advice from a DEED employee not to
file for benefits earlier, even after she showed the employee the letter from the district
telling her she would not be employed the following school year.
The ULJ issued an order determining that, because the “department did not prevent
her from filing an earlier applicatio n for benefits ,” DEED’s determination that Sangwan
was not eligible for unemployment benefits dating back to June 11, 2017 was proper. The
ULJ stated Sangwan was not credible because:
[Sangwan] says she showed the March 2017 letter she received
from her employer to the department employee, and that letter
stated her contract would not be renewed for the following
school year. Thus, the employer’s March 2017 [letter] directly
contradicted whatever it was the department’s employees may
have told her.
(Emphasis added.) Sangwan requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed his earlier
decision.
Sangwan appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Sangwan argues that she failed to file for unemployment benefits earlier because
she was misinformed by a DEED employee that she w as not eligible until the end of the
summer break. And, because she was misinformed by a DEED employee, Sangwan argues
DEED should backdate her benefits to June 11, 2017 in accordance with the prevented -
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from-filing exception. This court reviews a ULJ’s d ecision that an applicant is ineligible
for unemployment benefits de novo. Fay v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev. , 860 N.W.2d
385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015). And it views the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
favorable to the decision, while giving deference to the credibility determinations made by
the ULJ. Peterson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008) (citations
omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). To address this issue, we first examine the
prevented-from-filing exception statute and accompanying caselaw , and then determine
whether the ULJ erred in determining that the exception did not apply.
Minnesota Statutes section 268.07, subdivision 3b (2016)—which contains the
prevented-from-filing exception—states that “[a]n application for unemployment benefits
may be backdated one calendar week before the Sunday of the week the application was
actually filed if the applicant requests the backdating within seven calendar days of the date
the application is filed.” But there is an exception to this one-week rule. “If an individual
attempted to file an application for unemployment benefits, but was prevented from filing
an application by the department , the application is effective the Sunday of the calendar
week the individual first attempted to file an application. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3b
(emphasis added).
In Morales, this court addressed the prevented-from-filing exception under
circumstances similar to the facts before us today. See Morales v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ.
Dev., 713 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. App. 2006). There the ULJ found that the applicant sought
advice from DEED on when he should apply for unemployment benefits, was misinformed
by a DEED employee, applied based on the misinformation, and was denied the ability to
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backdate the unemployment benefits to the date when he should have applied. Id. at 883.
Nonetheless the ULJ determined the prevented-from-filing exception did not apply, and
affirmed DEED’s decision not to backdate. Id. Based on the ULJ’ s findings, this court
reversed because the appl icant made a bona fide attempt to apply for benefits but was
prevented from doing so by DEED (1) giving misinformation and (2) not having any
written materials advising him to the contrary. Id. at 884.
Here Sa ngwan testified that she was given misinformation from DEED and this
testimony was not contradicted at the hearing. But in the ULJ’s order, no findings were
made regarding whether DEED misinformed Sangwan. Instead, the ULJ found Sangwan
not credible, in part because of a letter not in the record. Under the prevented-from-filing
exception statutory language and Morales, we determine that a reversal and remand is
appropriate because: (1) the ULJ made insufficient findings regard ing whether Sangwan
received misinformation from DEED; (2) there were no written materials in the record
advising Sangwan to the contrary; and (3) the ULJ’s determination that Sangwan was not
credible lacked sufficient reasoning.
First, the ULJ’s factual findings regarding whether Sangwan received
misinformation are insufficient. Under Morales, if Sangwan attempted to apply for
unemployment benefits, but was prevented from doing so by virtue of being given
misinformation by DEED, then the prevented-from-filing exception must apply as a matter
of law. See Morales, 713 N.W.2d at 884 (“Under Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 3b(a), relator
attempted to apply for benefits and was prevented from doing so by the department as a
matter of law.”). However, here the ULJ failed to make a factual determination as to
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whether Sangwan re ceived misinformation from DEED, and thus the factual findings do
not substantially support a determination that the prevented-from-filing exception did not
apply. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions for the ULJ to make this finding
in order to determine whether the exception applies . See Friend v. Gopher Co. , 771
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[W]e conclude that the findings are insufficient to
permit effe ctive appellate review and we remand for the district court to make further
findings.”).1
Second, there are no written materials in the record that contradicted the
misinformation Sangwan testified she received. In Morales, we determined that the
applicant was prevented by DEED from applying not only because of misinformation, but
also because there were no written materials advising the applicant to the contrary. See
Morales, 713 N.W.2d at 884. Here, the ULJ found that a letter contradicted any
misinformation Sangwan could have received, but this letter is not in the record.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the letter included anything
about Sangwan’s eligibility for unemployment benefits. Therefore, on remand, the ULJ
must determine whether there were written materials that advised Sangwan correctly when

1 DEED argues that the plain language of the statute governing when school employees
should apply for unemployment benefits —Minnesota Statutes section 268.085,
subdivision 7 (2016)—is clear, and Sangwan should have been aware of the requirements
through this statute. We are not persuaded. This subdivision is not a model of clarity.
With subdivision 7’s eleven different components, and references to terms such as “wage
credits” and “reasonable assurance” that are rarely used outside of the legal context, w e
cannot determine that an applicant should be aware of her obligations in the face of
misinformation from DEED.
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to file for unemployment benefits. If so, t hese materials must be in the record to enable
sufficient appellate review.
Finally, the ULJ’s determination that Sangwan was not credible in her testimony is
insufficient on its own to support affirming the decision because the credibility assessment
is not explained. “When the credibility of a witness testifying in a hearing has a significant
effect on the outcome of a decision, the unemployment law judge must set out the reason
for crediting or discrediting that testimony. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2016).
Here, the credibility determination has a significant impact because whether Sangwan
received misinformation is instrumental in determining if the prevented -from-filing
exception applies.
In its order, the ULJ referenced Sangwan’s credibility twice. The firs t instance is
when the ULJ noted that Sangwan was not credible because the letter she received from
her employer contradicted “whatever” misinformation DEED gave her. But as we
explained earlier, this finding is not substantially supported by the record a s the letter is
not in the record. The second instance is when the ULJ stated that “Sangwan ’s overall
credibility was also negatively affected because of her attempt to shift responsibility from
herself to the department.” However, this reasoning does no t help determine Sangwan’s
credibility as to whether or not DEED provided misinformation. Since the ULJ’s
credibility determination is not sufficiently reasoned, it is insufficient on its own to support
affirming the ULJ’s decision. If the ULJ determines that Sangwan is not credible on
remand, the reasoning must be explained.
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In sum, the statute governing when teachers may apply for unemployment
compensation is complicated and can be difficult for individuals to understand. And when
Sangwan was confused as to when she should apply, she did what applicants often do when
they need answers. She asked DEED. Whether Sangwan received misinformation from
DEED in the absence of any written materials advising her correctly is dispositive of
whether the prevented-from-filing exception applies. We therefore reverse and remand for
the ULJ to make the necessary findings.
Reversed and remanded.