State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0181

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eddie Bee Forrest,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-17-1013

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appella te Public Defender, Andrea Ba rts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Eddie Bee Forrest challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
based on the sexual abuse of C.F. and B.W. Forrest argues that the district court erred by

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allowing improper vouching testimony from two witnesses. Because any error in admitting
the police officer’s testimony did not affect Forrest’s substantial rights and because it was
not error for the district court to admit the testimony of the social worker, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Eddie Bee Forrest is 49 years old and moved to Minnes ota around the
spring of 2016. Although he orig inally lived with his brother, Forrest moved in with his
niece, the mother of B.W. (age 9 at the time) and C.F. (age 4 at the time), sometime in the
early summer of 2016. Forrest stayed in an upstairs bedroom, a nd B.W. and C.F. shared
the other upstairs bedroom next to Forrest’s room.
In February 2017, B.W. and C.F. were removed from their mother’s care and placed
with their aunt and uncle.1 A few months later, the children’s aunt discovered a video that
the children were in, showing them dancing inappropriately and pulling down their pants.
When their aunt questioned the children about the video, C.F. stated that Forrest made her
“suck his thing that he peed out of,” and B.W. stated that Forr est stuck his thing in her
“second hole.” The girls’ aunt alerted the police.
Police arranged for both girls to be interviewed by a social wo rker trained in the
Cornerhouse interviewing method.2 The girls were interviewed separately and did not talk
to one another between the interviews. During her interview, C.F. stated that she knew she
was there to talk about what Forrest did and asked the social worker if she was going to go

1 The children were removed from their mother’s care after she allowed C.F.’s father to be
around the children after he was released from prison for malicious punishment of C.F.
2 The Cornerhouse method is a forensic interviewing technique us ed to interview victims
of sexual abuse.

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to jail or die. After the social worker assured her she would not, C.F. disclosed that Forrest
told her to “suck his thing.” C.F. also told the social worker that she saw bumps on
Forrest’s thing, that she saw white stuff on his thing, and that the white stuff tasted weird.
C.F. said that everything happened in Forrest’s bedroom, that i t happened a lot, and that
she tried to tell her mom while she was sleeping. C.F. also to ld the social worker to ask
her sister what happened because she would remember. B.W. disc losed to the social
w o r k e r t h a t F o r r e s t a s k e d b o t h t h e g i r l s t o “ s u c k h i s t h i n g , ” and said that Forrest had
touched her butt and put his thing in her butt. B.W. told the social worker that they did
what Forrest told them to do because they did not want Forrest to kill them. B.W. said the
abuse happened in Forrest’s bedroom and that it happened more than once.3
Based on the girls’ statements, the police interviewed Forrest, who voluntarily went
to the police station with officers. Forrest denied all allega tions. During the interview,
Forrest appeared nervous and was shaking his leg. The officer questioned Forrest about
his leg-shaking, and Forrest said it was hereditary, but the of ficer said he did not believe
him. Forrest was taken into custody and charged with 12 counts of criminal sexual
conduct.4
Before the trial began, the district court determined that both girls were competent
to be called as witnesses. At trial, C.F., then age 5, testified first. She testified that Forrest

3 B.W. also disclosed that her co usins, Forrest’s children who t emporarily lived with the
family, sexually abused her as well. The cousins returned to Mississippi, and a report was
sent to the proper agency there.
4 Forrest was charged with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for each child, for a total of 12 counts.

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touched her on her private parts, that he touched his “wing-dingy” to her butt, and that he
p u t i t i n s i d e h e r b u t t . S h e s t a t e d t h a t t h i s h a p p e n e d i n F o r r es t ’ s b e d r o o m a n d t h a t i t
happened “a lot of times.” She testified that it made her feel weird and she did not like
what he was doing, and that she tried to tell her mom but her m om would not believe her.
When asked about more specific de tails, C.F. stated that Forres t unzipped his pants and
pulled his “wing-ding” out, but then C.F. said, “I don’t want to talk about it anymore. I’m
sort of about to cry.” C.F. also testified that her cousins sexually abused her.
B.W., then age 10, testified next. She testified that Forrest put his thing in her “coo-
coo” (her word for her vagina) and her butt, that it felt bad, and that she told him to stop.
B.W. also stated that she told her mom about the abuse but that her mom did not believe
her, and that Forrest told her nobody would believe her. B.W. also testified that the abuse
occurred in Forrest’s bedroom, and that both she and C.F. sucked Forrest’s thing. Similar
to C.F., B.W. testified that her cousins sexually abused her as well.
In addition to the girls’ testimony, the state presented several other witnesses. First,
the nurse practitioner who physic ally examined the girls testif ied that both exams were
normal, which was not unusual. The officer who interviewed For rest also testified,
including that he did not believe what Forrest was telling him during the interview. During
cross-examination, the officer further testified that he “absol utely” told Forrest that he
thought he was lying. Finally, the state presented the testimony of the social worker who
interviewed the girls. The social worker testified that she determined maltreatment of each
child had occurred and that the d emeanor of the children and th eir consistent statements
helped her reach this conclusion.

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Forrest testified on his own behalf. He stated that he spent most of his time working
and that he did not have much time to spend with the girls. He explained that he never did
anything inappropriate to the girls, never told them to suck hi s penis, never put his penis
inside either child, and that he loved C.F. and B.W. like his own children.
The jury found Forrest guilty of all 12 counts of criminal sexu al conduct. The
district court adjudicated Forrest guilty of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
for each child.5 The district court sentenced Forrest to 144 months in prison for each count,
to be served consecutively. Forrest appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Forrest argues that the district court erred by allowing two in stances of improper
vouching testimony.6 First, Forrest contends that the district court erred by allo wing the
police officer to testify that he did not believe what Forrest told him during his initial
interview. Second, Forrest maintains that the social worker im properly vouched for the
credibility of C.F. and B.W. Forrest alleges that these errors and their cumulative effect
affected his substantial rights and require a new trial.
Forrest did not object to the testimony of the officer or the s ocial worker at trial.
We review claims of unobjected-to error under the plain error standard of review. State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under this standard, there must be “(1) error;

5 The district court did not adjudicate the remaining ten counts because they were included
offenses.
6 Although allegations of improper vouching are typically raised as allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, Forrest raises them as plain error and we address his arguments
as such.

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(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” Id. If each of these three
prongs is met, this court then d etermines whether to address th e error to “ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. Because Forrest alleges two instances
of error, we review each one in turn.
I. Even if the district court e rred by allowing the police officer’s testimony,
any error did not affect Forrest’s substantial rights.

Forrest argues that it was error for the district court to allo w the police officer’s
testimony that during his interview with Forrest, he did not believe what Forrest was telling
him. At trial, the officer recounted his interview with Forrest as follows:
Q. And what, if anything, did you learn from Mr. Forrest
during the interview? What kind of information did he share?

A. He denied it. He denied all allegations.
Q. Specific to what the girls had said?
A. Yep.
. . . .
Q. And so you said you’ve had this time with Mr. Forrest. Did
you make any observations, I gu ess, about his person during
the interview, even though h e said he didn’t—what was
significant to you?

A. He—from the beginning, he would not make eye contact
with me in any way. He would not look at me. He would look
at the floor, the walls, door, and he just—and he was very, very
overly nervous.

Q. And how do you describe that? Tell us more.
A. His leg was bouncing up and down. Like, you know, some
people, when they sit there, if you put your leg in the right
position, it will bounce a little bit, but it was so much where on

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the audio you can hear it just constantly shaking hardcore. And
he even brought it up that “I’m not nervous; it’s a hereditary
thing.”

Q. Did you confront him about that?
A. I confronted him. I said—you know, because I told him I
didn’t believe what he was telling me. (Emphasis added.)

Q. And what did you say in reg ard to the shaking and those
things?

A. “You’re shaking like that,” and then I said, “You won’t even
look at me. You won’t even make eye contact with me.” And
then he would look up at me for a short period of time, but then
he’d turn away again. And then he brought up saying he’s not
nervous; it’s a hereditary thing.

Q. And so anything else significa nt about the interview other
than the things—did he share anything else about the girls and
the home or anything like that?

A. No, not really.
Forrest contends that the officer’s statement that “[he] didn’t believe what [Forrest]
was telling [him]” was impermissible because it commented on the credibility of Forrest’s
version of events. When reviewi ng an alleged error under the p lain-error rule, “[i]f a
defendant fails to establish that the claimed error affected hi s substantial rights, we need
not consider the other factors.” State v. Goelz , 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007).
Therefore, assuming without deciding that it was plain error for the district court to admit
the police officer’s testimony, we consider whether the error affected Forrest’s substantial
rights. An error affects substantial rights if “there is a rea sonable likelihood that the
absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 20 16) (quotation omitted). When eva luating whether

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the error significantly affected the verdict, we review “the strength of the [s]tate’s case, the
pervasiveness of the error, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to respond to the
testimony.” State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2010).
Here, the police officer’s testimony did not affect Forrest’s substantial rights. The
state presented significant evid ence against Forrest, including the testimony of C.F. and
B.W., the forensic interviews the social worker conducted with the girls, and testimony
from the social worker who interviewed them. Although C.F. and B.W. were somewhat
inconsistent in describing what happened to them, they never wa vered in stating that
F o r r e s t s e x u a l l y a b u s e d t h e m i n s o m e m a n n e r i n h i s b e d r o o m , a n d their testimonies
corroborated each other.
Further, the alleged error in the police officer’s testimony was a brief, one-sentence
response to a question about Forrest’s demeanor during his init ial interview with police.
The state did not dwell on or em phasize the officer’s statement and did not reference that
testimony in its closing argument. Further, Forrest had the op portunity to cross-examine
the police officer and respond to his testimony. Because of the strength of the state’s case
and the brevity of and lack of emphasis on the officer’s statem ent, the officer’s testimony
did not have a significant impact on the jury’s verdict.
But Forrest contends that the state’s case against him was not overwhelming and
argues that the jury may have relied on the officer’s statement that he did not believe what
Forrest was telling him to find F o r r e s t g u i l t y . B u t i f t h e j u ry relied on the officer’s
testimony about not believing Forrest, it was probably not the officer’s single statement on
direct examination—in the context o f w h y F o r r e s t w a s s h a k i n g h is leg during the

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interview—that he did not believe what Forrest was telling him. Rather, it would have
been the more extensive additional testimony from the officer—d eveloped on
cross-examination—that he did not believe Forrest in the initia l interview and thought he
was lying. Under the invited-error doctrine, Forrest cannot assert as a basis for his appeal
an error “that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” State v.
Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 20 12). This invited error through
cross-examination, in addition to the significant evidence against Forrest, makes it unlikely
that the officer’s statement significantly impacted the jury’s verdict.
Because the state presented significant evidence of Forrest’s g uilt and because the
alleged error was brief and not e mphasized by the state, the al leged error did not affect
Forrest’s substantial rights. Acc ordingly, Forrest has failed to meet his burden under the
plain-error standard of review. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.
II. The district court did not err by admitting the social worker’s testimony.

Forrest also contends that the district court plainly erred by allowing testimony from
the social worker who interviewed C.F. and B.W. Forrest contends that the social worker’s
testimony that she determined th at maltreatment occurred constituted improper vouching
for the credibility of C.F. and B.W. The same standard of review and analysis used for the
police officer’s statement applies here.
The social worker testified about the methodology of a forensic interview of a child
who may have been sexually abused and about the factors that go into a determination of
whether maltreatment occurred. A video recording of her interv iews with C.F. and B.W.
was played for the jury. After the video, the social worker testified about her observations

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that led her to determine that m altreatment occurred in each ca se. For C.F., the social
worker noted that her statements were consistent that Forrest asked her to “suck his thing”
a n d t h a t i t w a s F o r r e s t w h o a b u s e d h e r . T h e s o c i a l w o r k e r a l s o testified that C.F.’s
demeanor—like not wanting to tal k and believing she might go to jail—aided in the
determination that maltreatmen t occurred. For B.W., the social worker noted that her
description of what happened, her demonstration of the abuse with dolls, her embarrassed
demeanor, and the fact that her statements were consistent led to the determination that she
was maltreated. Additionally, the social worker noted that wha t B.W. said corroborated
C.F.’s statements. The social wo rker testified that these fact ors led her to determine that
maltreatment occurred, but she did not testify that she determined Forrest abused the girls.
Witness credibility is an issue for the jury to decide. State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d
625, 630 (Minn. 1995). Accordin gly, “one witness cannot vouch for or against the
credibility of another witness.” State v. Ferguson , 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).
Vouching “occurs when the government implies a guarantee of a w itness’s truthfulness,
refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a personal opi nion as to a witness’s
credibility.” State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Here, the social worker’s testi mony did not constitute vouching . The Minnesota
Supreme Court has noted that while testimony about who sexually a b u s e d a c h i l d i s
objectionable, expert testimony about whether a child was sexually abused is proper. State
v. Dana, 422 N.W.2d 246, 250–51 (Minn. 1988); see also State v. Hollander, 590 N.W.2d
341, 349 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that a licensed social worke r and child interview
specialist was qualified to opine whether the child’s allegatio ns supported a finding of

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sexual abuse). Additionally, the supreme court has stated that while in most cases, the
jury’s common experience is a sufficient basis to assess a witness’s credibility, the nature
of child sexual abuse cases places jurors at a disadvantage and their common experience
may not be adequate to assess the credibility of a child who alleges sexual abuse. State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609–10 (Minn. 1984).
In this case, the social worker explained how she conducts inte rviews with child
sexual abuse victims and explaine d what factors she considers w hen determining if
maltreatment occurred. The social worker then described the sp ecific factors that led her
to conclude that maltreatment of both C.F. and B.W. occurred. The social worker testified
that she recommended that the girls have no contact with Forres t, but she did not testify
that she believed that Forrest sexually abused the girls. Nor did she express a personal
opinion that she believed the girls were telling the truth. Th e social worker’s testimony
was consistent with what caselaw permits and was not improper vouching.7 Accordingly,
because the social worker’s testimony did not constitute vouching, it was not error for the
district court to admit her testimony.

7 Although Forrest argues that the social worker’s testimony was improper vouching, the
cases he cites are distinguishable from the case here. Forrest cites Van Buren v. State, 556
N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Minn. 1996), a case in which the supreme court found that testimony
that family members believed a 14-year-old girl’s accusations of sexual assault constituted
improper vouching and warranted a new trial. But here, the soc ial worker did not testify
that she personally believed that the girls were sexually abused. Forrest also cites State v.
Myrland, 681 N.W.2d 415, 421 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2004),
a case in which this court determined that allowing testimony t hat an employee was fired
for possessing pornography at school was improper because it co uld have influenced the
jury to believe that the school district thought the employee was guilty of the charged crime.
But again, here, the social worker did not testify that she tho ught Forrest sexually abused
the girls or even that she personally believed the girls were sexually abused.

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Because any error in admitting the police officer’s testimony did not affect Forrest’s
substantial rights and because it was not error for the distric t court to admit the social
worker’s testimony, we affirm Forrest’s convictions.
Affirmed.