In re the Marriage of: Amy Marie Causton, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0192

In re the Marriage of: Amy Marie Causton, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul Ronald Causton,
Appellant.

Filed August 20, 2018
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-16-2637

Mark E. Mullen, Jensen, Mullen, McSweeney & Meyer, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for respondent)

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this marital dissolution dispute, appellant challenges the district court’s
imputation of income, division of marital debts and property , and characterization of
money received from appellant’s parents as gifts to both parties. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I. Imputed Income
The district court’s imputation of income is a finding of fact, which w e review for
clear error. Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). In doing so, we view the record in the light most favorable
to the district court’s findings and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn . App. 2000) . To conclude that
findings of fact are clearly erroneous we must be left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797
(Minn. 2013). “If there is reasonable evidence to support the [district] court’s findings of
fact, a reviewing court should not dis turb those findings. ” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer
Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (201 6), states
“if a parent is voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full -
time basis . . . child support must be calculated on a determination of potential income.”
Appellant Paul Ronald Causton does not challenge the district court’s decision to
impute income but contests the amount of income imputed. Appellant argues that the
district court did not properly consider his probable earnings based on his employment

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potential as required by statute. Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, su bd. 2 (2016), provides that a
“[d]etermination of potential income must be made according to one of three methods,”
the first of which is to consider “the parent’s probable earnings level based on employment
potential, recent work history, and occupational qualifications in light of prevailing job
opportunities and earnings levels in the community .” The district court used this method
to calculate appellant’s potential income.
The di strict court considered the fact that appellant “historically made between
$70,000 and $80,000 as an ordained minister ,” which was supported by testimony from
respondent Amy Marie Causton and by appellant’s W2 form indicating he made $67,100
in 2015. The district court noted that appellant has a bachelor’s degree, a medical degree
with a specialty in anesthesiology, and a master’s degree in divinity. Finally, the district
court relied on appellant’s testimony that there were approximately 100 to 200 churches in
Minnesota of appellant’s denomination.
Appellant asserts that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Appellant
argues that it is improbable tha t he will find a new job as a pastor, because his previous
positions w ere temporary , his divorce decreases his employment chances, and jobs are
available only when a church is in need of a pastor. Appellant contends that the district
court should have used his lower-paying work history as a spec ial-education
paraprofessional when imputing income rather than his income as a pastor.
The district court ’s determination of income is supported by record evidence and
based on the appropriate statutory factors. Because its decision on this point is not clearly
erroneous, we affirm.

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II. Orthodontics Debt
Appellant argues, “The district court abused its discretion in ordering [him] to pay
60% of [an] . . . orthodontics debt.” A district court has broad discretion in apportioning
marital property and debt. Antone v. Antone , 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 ( Minn. 2002);
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain , 615 N.W.2d 405, 414 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). We will affirm the district court’s division of property if it has an
acceptable basis in fact and principle even though we might have taken a different
approach. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100.
The district court divided the o rthodontics debt based on the parties’ incomes.
Appellant argues that this was unfair because he does not agree with the court’s imputation
of income. But because we affirm the district court’s determination of appellant’s imputed
income, the division of property and assignment of debt was not an abuse of discretion.
III. Division of Tax Refund
Appellant argues that he “is entitled to . . . an equal share of the 2016 tax return.”
Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding unequal shares of
the 2016 refund because “[t]he parties agreed generally that their assets were to be divided
equally.”
The district court is required to make “a just and equitable divis ion of the marital
property,” but not necessarily an equal distribution. Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 900
(Minn. App. 2005). T he district court stated its reason for dividing the returns: “Because
[appellant] had no income in 2016 and [respondent] was working two jobs, the Court finds

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that [respondent] should be awarded a larger interest in the refund.” Again, the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
IV. Marital Gifts and Homestead
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by characterizing money
received from his parents as marital gifts, not loans, and refusing to cre dit him with a
nonmarital interest in the homestead because he used the money from his parents to pay
the mortgage. Appellant did not raise a claim of nonmarital interest in district court. “A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the district court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Appellant’s argument
regarding his nonmarital interest in the homestead is not properly before this court.
We review the issue of whether property is marital or nonmarital de novo as a
question of law and the district court’s findings for clear error. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d
797, 800 (Minn. 1997) . All property acquired by either spouse during a marriage is
presumptively marital, but a spouse may defeat the presumption by showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the pr operty acquired is nonmarital. Antone, 645
N.W.2d at 100-01. “Nonmarital property” includes real or personal property acquired by
a spouse as a gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance made by a third party to one spouse but
not the other. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2016).
Appellant’s parents provided $69,500 during periods of appellant’s unemployment
and $22,000 in order to refinance the homestead. The district court found that respondent
“was unaware of the loan and had no information as to how the $22,000 was spent. [Sh e]

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stated credibly that she first learned of the loan during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings.” With respect to the $69,500, the district court stated that respondent “knew
that [appellant] was receiving money from his parents, but was never informed the money
would need to [be] repaid.” Appellant’s father testified that the money was to be used to
refinance the house and to supplement the parties’ income during appellant’s
unemployment. The record evidence indicates that the gifts were made to the parties, and
not exclusively to appellant. The district court did not err by determining that these
payments were marital gifts.
Affirmed.