Mike Sanchez, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0204

Mike Sanchez, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 22, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-13-2330

Mike Sanchez, Red Wing, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding J udge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that he is eligible for a reduced sentence under the Drug
Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA). We affirm.
FACTS
On July 23, 2013, appellant Mike Sanchez was arrested while in possession of 991
grams of cocaine. A later search of Sanchez’s residence uncovered 2,655.28 additional
grams of cocaine, 1,341.97 grams of methamphetamine , and 31.12 grams of marijuana.
On September 9, 2013, Sanchez ple aded guilty to first -degree controlled-substance
possession under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012). That same day, the district
court entered judgment of conviction and imposed a presumptive guidelines sentence of 98
months in prison. Sanchez did not file a direct appeal.
In 2017, Sanchez petitioned for postconviction relief, requesting resentencing
under the DSRA. Sanchez argued that his sentence would be much shorter under the
DSRA, that people convicted of first -degree controlled-substance crimes after passage of
the DSRA receive shorter sentences than he did, and that principles of uniformity,
proportionality, and predictability support resentencing . The postconviction court
summarily denied San chez’s petition on the merits, concluding that the DSRA does not
apply because Sanche z’s conviction was fi nal before the effective date of the DSRA .
Sanchez appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
“[A] person convicted of a c rime, who claims that: . . . [his] sentence . . . violated
[his] rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state” may file a
petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2016). “[A] petitioner
is entitled to a hearing on the petition ‘[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.’” Riley v. State,
819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Min n. 2012) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2010)). “A
postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if
true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d
501, 505 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
This court reviews “a denial of a petit ion for postconviction relief, as well as a
request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 167.
A postconviction court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Factual determinations by the postconviction court are reviewed for clear error, and this
court does “not reverse those determinations unless they are not factually supported by the
record.” Id. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531,
535 (Minn. 2007).
Sanchez argues that he is eligible for resentencing under the DSRA. Section 18 of
the DSRA modified certain provisions of the sentencing guidelines. 2016 Minn. Laws ch.
160, § 18(b), at 591. As a result, many drug -related crimes, including first -degree
controlled-substance crimes, are now classified less seve rely and have lower presumptive

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sentencing ranges. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016) (drug offender guidelines
grid), with Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012) (standard guidelines grid) . Sanchez’s
sentence of 98 months in prison is higher than the new sentencing range for first -degree
controlled-substance crimes.1
Sanchez is entitled to relief only if the changes mandated by section 18 apply to his
conviction and sentence. This determination turns on when his conviction became final.
In general, section 18 applies to crimes committed on or after its effective date of May 23,
2016. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18, at 591 (“This section is effective the day
following final enactment.”); 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, at 592 (stating that governor
signed DSRA into law on May 22, 2016). The supreme court has held that section 18 also
applies retroactively to crimes committed before May 23, 2016, if three requirements are
met: “(1) the Legislature made no statement that clearly establishes the Legislature’s intent
to abrogate the amelioration doctrine; (2) the a mendment mitigated punishment; and
(3) final judgment had not been entered as of the date the amendment took effect.” State
v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2017). In Kirby, the supreme court held that no
statement by the legislature clearly demonstr ates an intent to abrogate the amelioration

1 When Sanchez committed the offense in July 2013, the presumptive sentencing range for
first-degree controlled-substance possession for a person with a cr iminal-history score of
1 was 84 to 117 months in prison. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012). After enactment of
the DSRA in Ma y 2016, the presumptive sentencing range is 64 to 90 months in prison.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.C (2016).

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doctrine and that the DSRA mitigates punishment. Id. at 496. Thus, the sole issue before
this court is whether final judgment was entered in Sanchez’s case before May 23, 2016. 2
The supreme court recently explained that, if a defendant does not file a direct
appeal, his conviction “[becomes] final when the time for filing a direct appeal expire[s].”
Johnson v. State , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 3999734, at *4 n.4 (Minn. Aug. 22,
2018). Here, the district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Sanchez on
September 9, 2013. Sanchez had 90 days after that date in which to appeal. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 4(3)(a). Because Sanchez did not file a direct appeal, his conviction
“became fi nal when the time for filing a direct appeal expired.” Johnson, 2018 WL
3999734, at *4 n.4. Thus, Sanchez’s conviction became final 90 days after September 9,
2013, well before the DSRA’s effective date of May 23, 2016, and he is not entitled to
resentencing under the DSRA-amended guidelines.
This court recently denied relief in a similar case. The defendant in Luna-Pliego v.
State was sentenced to 74 months in prison for a first-degree controlled-substance crime in

2 The state argues that Sanchez’s pet ition is untimely because it was filed more than two
years after entry of judgment of conviction and sentence, and no exception to a two-year
statutory time bar applies. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) -(c) (2016) (stating that
petitions for postconviction relief may not be filed more than two years after “the entry of
judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed,” unless certain exceptions
apply). However, the state did not challenge the timeliness of Sanchez’s petition in the
postconviction court. We therefore will not consider that challenge for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Morse , 878 N.W.2 d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016) (noting that reviewing
courts consider only the issues that were presented and considered by the district court );
see also Carlton v. State , 816 N.W.2d 590, 606 (Minn. 2012) (“[T]he State’s failure to
assert that [ the defendant’s] petition was untimely under the 2 -year statute of limitations
[in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c)] waived this defense .”). Because the postconviction
court denied Sanchez’s petition for postconviction relief on the merits, without considering
the timeliness of his petition, we review the denial on the merits.

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June 2015. 904 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Minn. App. 2017). He did not file a direct appeal. Id.
After enactment of the DSRA, Luna-Pliego petitioned for postconviction relief, requesting
resentencing under the DSRA-amended guidelines. Id. at 918. This court applied Kirby,
held that the defendant’s judgment was final prior to May 23, 2016, and affirmed the
postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief. Id. at 918-20. The relevant facts of
this case are indistinguishable from those in Luna-Pliego.
Nonetheless, Sanchez advances two arguments in support of resentencing under the
DSRA, both of which are unavailing. First, Sanchez cites State v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d
110, 112 (Minn. 1983), for the proposition that the supreme court “has discretion in
individual cases to modify the sentence of an appealing defendant if that appears to be in
the interests of fairness and uniformi ty. . . . [Fairness in sentencing ] . . . involves
comparing the sentence of the defendant with those of other offenders.” However, that
discretion belongs to the supreme court, and not to this court . Moreover, Vazquez was a
direct sentencing appeal in which the supreme court compared the sentences of similarly
situated defendants under the same sentencing law. 330 N.W.2d at 111-13. Here, Sanchez
compares his sentence to the sentences of offenders who were sentenced under a law that
does not apply to Sanchez’s case. Defendants similarly situated to Sanchez are those who
were sentenced under the pre-DSRA-amended guidelines and whose convictions were final
before May 23, 2016. Sanchez does not assert that his sentence is not fairly comparable to
the sentences of those defendants.

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Second, Sanchez relies on Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 3 (2016), which allows
“resentencing under [a] subsequently enacted law.” However, that statute applies only to
crimes committed before May 1, 1980. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 3.
In sum, b ecause Sanchez’s conviction was final before the effective date of the
DSRA, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying his
petition for postconviction relief on the merits.
Affirmed.