In re the Matter of:

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-0223

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

In re the Matter of:

Matthew Lawson Thornton,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: October 2, 2019
Office of Appellate Courts
Jessica Ortiz Bosquez,

Respondent.

________________________

Rodd A. Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Robert J. Lawton, Rogosheske Lawton, PC, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary Catherine Lauhead, Law Offices of Mary Catherine Lauhead, Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for respondent.

Christopher W. Bowman, Yaeger & Jungbauer Barristers, PLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael P. Boulette, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae Minnesota State Bar Association.

Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Rana S. Alexander, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Standpoint.

Kristine Lizdas, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Battered Women’s Justice
Project.
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Elizabeth J. Richards, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Coalition for
Battered Women.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The statutory rebuttable presumption against an award of joint custody when
domestic violence has occurred between the parents, found in Minnesota Statutes
section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(9) (2018), applies only against a joint physical or joint
legal custodial arrangement, and not against a particular party.
2. The district court’s custody award was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This appeal concerns a dispute over the custody of a 4-year-old girl and the proper
application of a statutory rebuttable presumption against an award of joint custody in cases
when domestic abuse has occurred between the parents. Soon after the child’s first birthday
in November 2015, appellant Matthew Lawson Thornton (“Thornton”), the child’s father,
sued the child’s mother, respondent Jessica Bosquez (“Bosquez”), for sole physical and
legal custody. After a two-day trial, the family court referee found that Bosquez had
committed domestic abuse against Thornton but that the child’s best interests required that
the parents be awarded joint physical custody and equal parenting time. The referee further
found that the statutory pres umption against joint legal custody was not rebutted and
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awarded sole legal custody to Bosquez. The district court agreed and the court of appeals
affirmed.
Thornton now asks us to reverse the district court’s order and award him sole legal
and physical custody. He contends that the district court misapplied the rebuttable
presumption against awarding joint custody when domestic violence has occurred between
the parents. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (2018). Thornton further challenges
the district court’s application of the statutory best-interests factors, asserting that the
district court improperly considered the friendly-parent factor in its best-interests analysis.
See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11) (2018).
We conclude that the district court did not misapply the domestic-abuse
presumption or the friendly-parent factor, and appropriately exercised its broad discretion
in analyzing the best-interests factors. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Thornton and Bosquez first met when Thornton, an attorney, represented Bosquez
in a personal injury matter. They became intimate sometime in 2010, after the attorney-
client relationship ended. Until this lawsuit , the parties’ on-again-off-again relationship
was tumultuous, conflict-riven, and, as described by the referee, “toxic.” After Bosquez
became pregnant with the child in early 2014, she began living at Thornton’s house. The
parties never married, but they signed a Recognition of Parentage establishing Thornton as
the child’s father.
Bosquez and the child continued to live with Thornton until November 2015, when
Thornton sought an award of child custody and simultaneously petitioned for an ex parte
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order for protection on behalf of himself and the child. The district court granted a
temporary, ex parte order for protection for Thornton and the child and ordered an
evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Bosquez stipulated to an order for protection for
Thornton, without factual findings, and the district court dismissed the petition that sought
protection for the child. The referee ordered temporary custody to Thornton subject to
shared parenting time with Bosquez. The referee also appointed a guardian ad litem to
provide final recommendations on physical custody, legal custody, and parenting time.
Because Ramsey County follows a “one judicial officer per family” policy in family law
matters, the same referee presided over the order for protection matters and the custody
proceedings.
The guardian ad litem recommended that the parties share joint physical custody,
joint legal custody, and parenting time according to a court-ordered schedule. The
guardian’s findings and recommendations were based on court-ordered psychological
evaluations, parenting assessments, chemical dependency assessments, home visits with
the parties and the child, discussions with the child’s daycare provider, discussions with
the parties’ mental health care providers, and two personal references for each parent. The
guardian also reviewed court files, medical records, correspondence between the parties,
social media posts, and audio recordings.
At the 2-day bench trial in January 2017, Thornton testified and presented testimony
from eight witnesses and over 90 exhibits. Bosquez’s trial testimony was limited, but she
rested her case on the reports of the guardian ad litem, her counsel’s cross-examination of
Thornton and his witnesses, and Thornton’s documentary evidence.
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In May 2017, in a detailed 31-page order, the referee set forth his analysis of
statutory factors relevant to the child’s best interests and the custody determination . See
generally Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2018) (providing 12 factors to consider in a
determination of custody). To support an award of joint physical custody and sole legal
custody to Bosquez, the referee made the following findings.
The referee found that the parties’ relationship was “dysfunctional and unhealthy,”
with each alleging that the other has “serious behavioral problems.” Thornton presented
extensive testimony of Bosquez’s physical abuse including photographs of “scratch marks
and bruises on his shoulders and arms, a cut on his arm from a knife, and an obvious bruise
on the back of his neck.” Although the referee did not make any incident-specific findings
of domestic abuse, he concluded that “[t]hese injuries occurred from numerous incidents
over an extended period of time ” and that Bosquez had committed domestic abuse under
Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 2(a) (2018). The referee also found that
Bosquez used threats of suicide, and one actual suicide attempt, to try to assert control over
Thornton.
In considering the “nature and context of the domestic abuse,” as required by
section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(9), the referee also found that Thornton was emotionally
abusive towards Bosquez. Thornton admitted to calling Bosquez “extremely vulgar and
degrading names and insults.” When Bosquez was pregnant, he frequently denied being
the father of the child and accused Bosquez of infidelity. Thornton regularly called
Bosquez names such as “whore” and “slut” and impugned her ability to be a good mother
with derisive comments. On occasion, he used this language in the child’s presence. The
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referee found that Bosquez testified credibly that this demeaning behavior was a “constant
and daily occurrence.”
In addition, the referee found that Thornton engaged in “coercive control and
manipulation” of Bosquez. For example, he secretly photographed pages from Bosquez’s
private diary and gathered information about her foster care background and the criminal
history of her family members; Bosquez told the guardian ad litem that he used this
information to threaten to take custody of the child. Thornton also secretly dumped out
Bosquez’s breastmilk on his unfounded suspicion that she was abusing alcohol. The
referee concluded that Thornton’s behavior did not amount to statutory domestic abuse,
but he found that this behavior was “offensive and demeaning and contribute[d] to an
unhealthy dynamic which is central to this case.”
Although Thornton was the victim of Bosquez’s physical abuse, the referee
specifically found that he retained the “vast majority of power” over Bosquez because of
his education and profession, and the fact that when the couple lived together, they lived
in Thornton’s home. The referee expressed concerns that Thornton was on a “campaign to
minimize the importance of [Bosquez’s] role in the minor child’s life,” noting one mental
health provider’s conclusion that the relationship between Thornton and Bosquez was not
salvageable because of Thornton’s “observable contempt and resentment” towards
Bosquez.
Crucially, the referee found that the child had suffered no abuse and that, in fact,
she thrived under the care of both parties. The referee found no incidents of physical abuse
by Bosquez since the parties ended their relationship. Despite Thornton’s strenuous
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assertions that Bosquez is not fit for parenting, the referee noted that every disinterested
evaluator praised Bosquez’s parenting abilities and commitment to the child’s well-being.
The referee further found that both parties are “loving parents who can and do provide for
all the child’s needs” and that the child was happy and healthy. Consequently, the referee
concluded that the child’s best interests required a health y relationship with both of her
parents.
Because the referee found that Bosquez committed domestic abuse against
Thornton, the referee was required to assess whether the statutory presumption that “joint
legal custody or joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child” had been
rebutted. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9). The referee provided the following analysis
of the presumption:
24. The Court has already made findings regarding the nature and
context of the domestic violence in this case. Father, the victim of domestic
violence, has superior power and control over Mother. Mother’s abusive
actions were in the context of how powerless she felt in the relationship. The
actions are not acceptable and, if the y continue, will be detrimental to the
minor child. There is evidence that Mother has respected the order for
protection. There is also evidence that what appeared to be Mother’s
obsession to maintain the relationship has ended. The Court will adopt [the
parental evaluator]’s recommendations for both parties to engage in therapy
to address the issues which impair their ability to effectively communicate
with each other.

25. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the
presumption against joint legal custody is not overcome. As noted above,
the Court is concerned that Father will use joint legal custody as a weapon.
Father has engaged in coercive control and manipulation of Mother
throughout their entire relationship. Despite being a victim of domestic
abuse, he has maintained the power and control in the parties’ relationship.

26. Joint physical custody, on the other hand, is defined as “the
routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is structured
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between the parties.” Minn. Stat. [§] 518.003, subd. 3(d). As noted above,
the parties have been able to have a jointly structured parenting time
arrangement which benefits the child by providing substantial time with each
parent and if exchanges and communication is addressed, the Court believes
the presumption against joint physical custody has been rebutted.

Having found that the presumption against joint legal custody was not rebutted, the referee
concluded that the child’s interests would be best served by awarding sole legal custody to
Bosquez and joint physical custody and parenting time according to a court-ordered
schedule. The district court approved the referee’s order.
Thornton challenged the custody award on appeal. He argued that the district
court’s award of sole custody to Bosquez was a misapplication of the presumption against
joint custody in cases of domestic abuse. In Thornton’s view, the presumption should
benefit the domestic-abuse victim and, conse quently, he should have been awarded sole
custody of the child because Bosquez did not provide evidence to rebut the presumption
against joint custody. He also argued that the district court’s analysis of the best-interests
factors was erroneous.
The court of appeals rejected Thornton’s arguments and affirmed the district court.
Thornton v. Ortiz Bosquez, No. A18-0223, 2018 WL 6442311, at *8 (Minn. App. Dec. 10,
2018). The court of appeals held that the district court did not err in its application of the
presumption, reasoning that the statutory language “does not necessarily favor one party
over the other party. The presumption simply expresses a preference for sole custody in
one parent or the other parent, unless the presumption has been rebutted.” Id. at *5. The
court also held that the district court did not clearly err in any of its best-interests findings.
Id. at *8.
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We granted Thornton’s petition for further review.
ANALYSIS
When a district court is deciding a custody dispute, a child’s best interests is the
court’s “paramount co mmitment.” Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1995).
“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interest[s] of the child.” Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985).
In considering the child’s best interests, a district court must “consider and evaluate
all relevant factors,” including 12 factors set forth by statute. 1 M inn. Stat. § 518.17,

1 Subdivision 1(a) of section 518.17 includes the following best-interests factors:

(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the
effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and development;

(2) any special medical, mental health, or educational needs that the child
may have that may require special parenting arrangements or access to
recommended services;

(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be
of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable
preference;

(4) whether domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred in
the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature and
context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for
parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs;

(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a parent that affects the
child’s safety or developmental needs;

(6) the history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing care for
the child;

(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide ongoing care for the
child; to meet the child’s ongoing developmental, emotional, spiritual, and
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subd. 1(a)(1)–(12). The court must provide “detailed findings” on each of the statutory
best-interests factors and explain how each “led to its conclusions and to the determination
of custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1).
In addition, the statute sets forth nine provisions that “govern the application of the
best interests of the child factors by the court.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1)−(9).
In undertaking a best-interests analysis, “[t]he court may not use one factor to the exclusion
of all others, and the court shall consider that the factors may be interrelated.” Id.,
subd. 1(b)(1). The court must also “consider that it is in the best interests of the child to
promote the child’s healthy growth and development through safe, stable, nurturing

cultural needs; and to maintain consistency and follow through with
parenting time;

(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development of changes to home,
school, and community;

(9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing relationships
between the child and each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in
the child’s life;

(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting time with both parents
and the detriment to the child in limiting parenting time with either parent;

(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse as described in clause (4) has
occurred, the disposition of each parent to support the child’s relationship
with the other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing
contact between the child and the other parent; and

(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their
child; to maximize sharing information and minimize exposure of the child
to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding
any major decision concerning the life of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)–(12).
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relationships between a child and both parents.” Id., subd. 1(b)(2). The court must further
“consider both parents as having the capacity to develop and sustain nurturing relationships
with their children unless there are substantial reasons to believe otherwise.” Id. ,
subd. 1(b)(3). As discussed below in detail, a district court must further employ certain
rebuttable presumptions when joint custody is requested by a parent or when domestic
abuse has occurred between the parents. Id., subd. 1(b)(9). The district court here
considered these relevant principles in arriving at its custody determination. 2
As with any question of law, we review the district court’s interpretation of the
custody statute de novo. See Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). But
when the issue turns on the district court’s findings of fact, we review the findings for clear
error, “giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility”
and reversing only if we are left “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This appellate deference reflects the
Legislature’s determination that a district court needs great leeway in making a custody
decision that serves a child’s best interests, in light of each child’s unique family
circumstance. See In re Custody of M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2018) (noting the

2 The district court also considered subdivision 1(b)(4) (stating that conduct of a party
that does not affect the party’s relationship with the child should be disregarded);
(5) (noting that “[d]isability alone . . . shall not be determinative” of custody); and
(7) (“There is no presumption for or against joint physical custody, except as provided in
clause (9).”)
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“principle that a district court has broad discretion in determining custody and parenting
time”).
I.
Thornton primarily contends that the district court misinterpreted the
domestic-abuse presumption of subdivision 1(b)(9) of section 518.17 by failing to apply
that presumption against the parent found to have committed domestic abuse. Citing
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 301, he claims that a domestically abusive parent is
necessarily “the party against whom [the presumption] is directed.” Because Thornton
believes that the burden of proof to rebut the presumption is on the domestic abuser, he
asserts that the court must award sole custody to the domestic- abuse victim if the
presumption is not rebutted. As discussed below, Thornton’s statutory interpretation
argument is not supported by the statute’s text.
Because this issue requires an interpretation of law, our review is de novo. Hansen,
908 N.W.2d at 596. We interpret statutory language to “ascertain and effectuate” the
Legislature’s intent and construe the law to “give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2018). “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are
clear and free from all ambiguity,” id., “our role is to enforce the language of the statute
and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532,
537 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, neither party
claims that subdivision 1(b)(9) is ambiguous, and we agree that it is not.
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Turning first to the language of the statute, subdivision 1(b)(9) of section 518.17
sets forth two presumptions concerning joint custody in specific situations, including when
domestic abuse has occurred. It provides in relevant part:
The court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon request of either or
both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child. However,
the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or joint
physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as
defined in section 518B.01,[3] has occurred between the parents . In
determining whether the presumption is rebutted, the court shall consider the
nature and context of the domestic abuse and the implications of the domestic
abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental
needs.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (emphasis added).
The second sentence in subdivision 1(b)(9) stands on its own to set forth a
presumption that when domestic abuse has occurred, a joint custodial arrangement does
not serve the child’s best interests. Contrary to Thornton’s contention, the plain language
of the statute does not state that a district court must award sole custody to the victim of
domestic violence. Notably, the provision contains no language stating that the
presumption operates for or against any particular party. No reference is made to a party
at all. The presumption does not mandate that a specific party receive sole custody if the
presumption goes unrebutted; nor does it expressly impose on any party the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption.

3 Domestic abuse is defined as: “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the
infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic
threats . . . ; criminal sexual conduct . . . ; or interference with an emergency call . . .” that
is “committed against a family or household member by a family or household member.”
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a).
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Rather than impose a presumption for or against a specific custodian, subdivision
1(b)(9) creates a rebuttable presumption against a custodial arrangement: joint custody.
Unless the presumption has been rebutted, the subdivision’s plain language expresses a
preference for sole legal and physical custody when domestic abuse has occurred. The
presumption focuses on the child’s needs and a custodial arrangement that is beneficial to
the child, and not on particular caregivers.
Other provisions of section 518.17 confirm our conclusion that the statutory scheme
does not categorically prohibit an award of custody to a parent who has committed
domestic abuse. First, an occurrence of domestic abuse between the parties is one factor
among the 12 statutory best-interests factors that the district court must consider before
awarding custody. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4). Although the existence of this
factor is often a critical one, a district court “may not use one factor to the exclusion of all
others.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1). Moreover, clauses (2) and (3) of subdivision 1(b) direct the
district court to consider it in the child’s best interests to develop “safe, stable, nurturing
relationships” with each parent, id., subd. 1(b)(2), and to “consider both parents as having
the capacity to develop and sustain nurturing relationships with their children unless there
are substantial reasons to believe oth erwise.” Id., subd. 1(b)(3). These clauses show that
the Legislature did not intend the presumption against joint custody to be mechanically
applied against a parent who has committed domestic abuse, but instead intended to enable
the district court to conduct a nuanced consideration of the child’s needs.
Second, other provisions of the custody statute show that the Legislature is capable
of directing custody presumptions against particular parties when it intends to do so. In
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cases where the parent seeking custody has been convicted of certain crimes, for example,
the statute specifically requires that parent to carry the burden to prove that awarding her
custody would be in the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 518.179, subd. 1 (2018)
(stating that the person convicted of a specific crime who is “seeking custody or parenting
time has the burden to prove that custody or parenting time by that person is in the best
interests of the child”). If the Legislature sought to impose the presumption in subdivision
1(b)(9) against the domestic abuser specifically, it would have done so expressly.4
Despite this lack of an express statutory assignment of the burden of rebutting the
presumption on one party or the other, Thornton asserts that Minnesota Rule of Evidence
3015 mandates that Bosquez bear the burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption. But Rule 301 is inapplicable here where, by the plain language of the
presumption, there is no “party against whom [the presumption] is directed.” Id.

4 Other states, we note, have imposed that burden expressly. See Cal. Fam. Code
§ 3044(a) (West 2019) (“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint
physical custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is
detrimental to the best interests of the child.”); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-06.2, subd.
1(j) (West 2019) (stating that after a qualifying incident of domestic abuse, there is “a
rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be
awarded residential responsibility for the child”).

5 Minnesota Rule of Evidence 301 provides:

In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,
but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom
it was originally cast.

Minn. R. Evid. 301.
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Moreover, in child-custody cases, neither party bears a burden of production or persuasion
concerning the best interests of the child so there is no “party on whom [the risk of
nonpersuasion] was originally cast .” Id. Instead, a district court determines custody
without regard to burdens of proof. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1.
Accordingly, under these circumstances, a presumption is “merely a procedural
device [that] dictates a decision only where there is an entire lack of competent evidence
to the contrary . . . .” Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691, 693–94 (Minn. 1952); accord
Frandsen v. Ford Motor Co., 801 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. 2011) (noting that a rebuttable
presumption is “a legal inference or assumption that a fact exists”) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A presumption ceases to function when “substantial
countervailing evidence appears from any source.” Kath, 55 N.W.2d at 694. Because the
district court’s foremost consideration is the best interests of the child, it is crucial that the
court weigh all evidence of the child’s best interests regardless of the source of the
evidence. Under subdivision 1(b)(9), therefore, the district court simply concludes that
joint custody is not appropriate unless substantial countervailing evidence from any source6
exists to satisfy the presumption’s rebuttal factors.

6 Parties can rely upon a variety of evidence from various sources to rebut the
presumption, including witness testimony, guardian ad litem reports, parenting
assessments, psychological or chemical health reports, supervised visitation reports, and
other materials when properly entered under the pertinent evidentiary rules. See Pikula,
374 N.W.2d at 706–10 (listing the evidence in the record as witness testimony, party
testimony, and reports from social workers and custody evaluators, one of whom evaluated
chemical health issues).
17
Thornton warns that this interpretation undermines the purpose of the
domestic-abuse provisions and risks placing children in a violent home environment—
concerns that are echoed by amici Standpoint, Battered Women’s Justice Project, and the
Minnesota Coalition of Battered Women. We take these concerns seriously. We disagree,
however, that applying the presumption only against a particular custodial arrangement,
and not against a domestic abuser, will have this effect under the current statutory scheme.
The custody statute has safeguards in place that protect children from the harmful
effects of domestic abuse. The fourth best-interests factor listed in the custody statute
requires the court to give special focus to “the nature and context of the domestic abuse[]
and the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety,
well-being, and developmental needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4). These same
factors must be also be considered by the court in determining whe ther the presumption
against joint custody is rebutted. See id., subd. 1(b)(9). Accordingly, district courts are
directed to address domestic abuse in whatever context it arises and to explicitly consider
its impact on the child.
These provisions ensure that the court will consider the risk that an environment of
domestic abuse will have serious detrimental effects on a child’s development and
well-being, even when the child herself is not the target of the abuse. Given the seriousness
of these effects, we ex pect that in many cases the existence of domestic abuse weighs—
and will continue to weigh—heavily in a district court’s analysis of the statutory
best-interests factors. But subdivision 1(b)(9) does not impose the rigid assumption that,
no matter the nature or the context of domestic violence, one parent or another is unable to
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serve a child’s best interests. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 225 (Minn. 1990)
(Yetka, J., dissenting) (explaining that custody decisions are not suited to “inflexible
presumptions about who is best able to care for a young child”).
Accordingly, we hold that subdivision 1(b)(9) imposes a rebuttable presumption
only against joint physical or joint legal custody arrangements in cases where domestic
abuse has occurred between the parties. The subdivision does not assign a burden of
production or persuasion to rebut the presumption to any particular party.
II.
With this interpretation of subdivision 1(b)(9) in mind, we next consider whether,
as Thornton contends, the district court erred in awarding joint physical custody 7 and sole
legal custody 8 to Bosquez. Thornton asserts that, even if Bosquez has no burden of
production, the record evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption against joint
custody here, and that the district court impermissibly weighed the so-called
friendly-parent factor of subdivision 1(a)(11) in its best-interests analysis. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11). Because these challenges turn on a balancing of the best interests
of the child, we review the district court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. See
Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 596. Given the ample evidence that supports the district court’s
custody award, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

7 “ ‘Physical custody . . .’ means the routine daily care and control . . . of the child.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2018).

8 “ ‘Legal custody ’ means the right to determine the child’s upbringing, including
education, health care, and religious training.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(a).
19
After the district court determined that Bosquez had committed domestic abuse, the
court properly considered “the nature and context” of the domestic abuse. 9 Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9). The court appropriately recognized that Bosquez’s actions were
“domestic abuse,” but then analyzed the context in which her actions occurred. After
weighing testimony from the parties and the reports of the guardian ad litem and a
psychological expert, the court observed that Bosquez’s abusive conduct was precipitated
by, or occurred along with, “coercive control and manipulation” by Thornton of Bosquez
“throughout their entire relationship.” Among its numerous findings on this issue, the
district court specifically found that Thornton, “the victim of domestic violence, has
superior power and control over [Bosquez]. [ Bosquez’s] abusive actions were in the
context of how powerless she felt in the relationship.” It noted that no incidents of domestic
abuse have occurred since the order for protection went into place.
In finding that the presumption was rebutted concerning joint physical custody, the
district court also properly considered the implications of the abuse on the child’s “safety,
well-being, and developmental needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9). The court
noted that the child has never been the victim of Bosquez’s domestic abuse, and that
domestic abuse does not occur in either parent’s home. It further observed Bosquez’s own

9 This consideration is necessary because “domestic abuse” under Chapter 518B
encompasses a broad range of behavior ranging in severity and frequency from , for
example, a single instance of family violence to long-term coercive controlling violence.
See Minn. Stat. § 518B, subd. 2(a); Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn.
2018) (noting the relevant circumstances in granting an OFP include “the timing,
frequency, and severity of any alleged incidents” once the court makes a finding of
domestic abuse).
20
improvement with the help of mental health treatment. Most importantly, the court found
that the child thrives under the care of each parent and that her well -being had improved
since the court ordered a shared parenting-time schedule. The district court further found
that “the child enjoys her time with both parties and the activities and routines each has
established while the child is in his or her care.” Expert parenting assessments supported
the district court’s finding that shared responsibility for providing the child a home and
routine daily care would further the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 3(b).
The court’s award of sole legal custody to Bosquez also has support in the record.
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the parties’ inability to cooperate made “a
traditional award of joint legal custody unworkable.” The court was concerned, given
Thornton’s past behavior towards Bosquez, that he would “use joint legal custody as a
weapon” to exclude Bosquez from participating in major decisions about the child’s
upbringing.
Thornton asserts that, in arriving at this conclusion, the district court impermissibly
considered the friendly-parent factor.10 Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11). Although the
district court specifically stated that it did not consider this factor, Thornton asserts that the

10 Subdivision 1(a)(11) provides that “except in cases in which domestic abuse . . . has
occurred,” the district court, in its best-interests analysis, must consider “the disposition of
each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent and to encourage and
permit frequent continuing contact between the child and the other parent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11).
21
court considered his unwillingness to support the child’s relationship with Bosquez in its
consideration of other best-interests factors.
We disagree with Thornton’s interpretation of the order. Although the district court
referenced, for example, Thornton’s “unwillingness to support [Bosquez’s] relationship
with the child in a meaningful way,” Thornton takes these statements out of context. The
court was rightfully concerned that Thornton was not just unwilling to support the child’s
relationship with her mother, but was willing to interfere with that relationship despite the
child’s prevailing need for a healthy relationship with each of her parents. 11
Moreover, the district court did not misapply the law by considering how Thornton’s
efforts to interfere with the child’s relationship with Bosquez affected the other statutory
best-interests factors. According to the statute, the district court “ shall consider that the
factors may be interrelated.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1). A district court’s analysis
of the twelfth best-interests factor, for example, requires the court to weigh “the willingness
and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing
information and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to utilize methods
for resolving disputes regarding any major decision concerning the life of the child.” Id.,
subd. 1(a)(12) (emphasis added).

11 For example, the district court stated that Thornton’s “inability to even visualize a
schedule where Mother could have healthy parenting time with the minor child leaves the
Court with the conviction that unless the Court clearly outlines Mother’s parenting time,
Father will engage in activities designed to eliminate the minor child’s time with Mothe r
entirely.” (Emphasis added.)
22
The statute expressly contemplates that the twelfth factor will have weight in cases
of domestic abuse, notwithstanding the exception for considering the friendly -parent
factor. In considering whether the presumption against joint custody in cases of domestic
abuse is rebutted, the statute instructs that “[d]isagreement alone over whether to grant sole
or joint custody does not constitute an inability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of
their children as referenced in paragraph (a), clause (12) .” Id., subd. 1(b)(9) (emphasis
added).
To be sure, the overlapping provisions in this statutory framework required the
district court to strike a fine balance between acknowledging that a domestic-abuse victim
is not expected to support his or her child’s relationship with a domestic abuser, and giving
effect to a child’s need for cooperation between her parents when possible to promote “safe,
stable, nurturing relationships between a child and both parents.” Id., subd. 1(b)(2). The
district court ably recognized this fine line and provided ample support for its conclusions.
Accordingly, the district court’s best -interests analysis was not a misapplication of the
friendly-parent factor. Id., subd. 1(a)(11).
In sum, after considering the best-interests factors and the statutory presumption
against joint custody when domestic abuse has occurred, the district court concluded that
the child was best served by a joint physical custodial arrangement. The court reached this
conclusion because “[b]oth parties are capable, loving parents who can and do provide for
all the child’s needs” and because the child has “a close and loving attachment to each
parent and thrives in both parents’ homes.”
23
The court also concluded that granting Thornton legal custodial rights would not be
in the child’s best interests given its conclusion that Thornton would use legal custody “as
a weapon” against Bosquez. The district court found that the child “will benefit from the
insights [Thornton] has” about her best interests and that Bosquez “will see wisdom in
[Thornton’s] input when there is wisdom.” Accordingly, it determined that the child was
best served if Bosquez had sole legal custody with a method for Bosquez to solicit input
from Thornton “which is free of the unhealthy dynamics between the two.”
These conclusions were not an abuse of discretion. The district court based its
award on an exhaustive examination of the evidence and a well-reasoned application of the
law. We further note that, because of the Second Judicial District’s policy of assigning a
single judicial officer to preside over the entirety of each family court dispute, the district
court had many opportunities to observe the parties both before and during trial. The
district court’s observations of the parties’ demeanor, sincerity, and credibility are integral
to its balancing of the best-interests considerations, and we give great deference to its
custody award. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). That deference
is fully warranted here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.