Terry Reynolds, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0233

Terry Reynolds, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 24, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-15271

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Rich ardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
On appeal from a denial of his petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues
that the postconviction court abused its discretion because it did not review or analyze
whether, in light of the enactment of the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA),
he is entitled to a reduced sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Terry Reynolds was arrested twice for possessing cocaine during a two-
week period in May 2013. The first time, Reynolds possessed more than 25 grams; the
second time, he possessed more than 10 grams. The state charged him with first -degree
controlled-substance sale under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2012 ), and first-degree
controlled-substance possession under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2012).
On September 18, 2014, Reynolds pleaded guilty to the charges, admitting that he
possessed, with the intent to sell, the amounts of c ocaine alleged in the complaint. On
October 15, 2014, the district court sentenced Reynolds, who had a criminal-history score
of five, on the first -degree controlled -substance-sale conviction to 94 months’
imprisonment—a downward durational departure from the 146 -month pr esumptive
sentence under the then -existing sentencing guidelines. Reynolds did not appeal his
sentence.
On September 8, 2017, nearly three years after he was sentenced , Reynolds
petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that he is entitled to a sentence that is less than
94 months because (1) under the DSRA, the conduct for which he was convicted constitutes

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a second-degree controlled-substance crime and (2) under State v. Vazquez , 330 N.W.2d
110, 112 (Minn. 1983), the interests of fairness and uniformity in sentencing requires it.
The postconviction court denied Reynolds’s petition , reasoning that, under State v.
Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2017), and State v. Otto, 899 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Minn.
2017), the DSRA does not apply to Reynolds’s sentenc e because judgment in his case
became final before May 23, 2016, the date the DSRA became effective. The
postconviction court stated that “because the legislature specifically provided for an
effective date, and did not intend for the 2016 DSRA to apply t o conduct that occurred
before that date, the Act does not apply to the conduct for which [Reynolds] was
convicted.” T he postconviction court did not address whether Reynolds is entitled to a
reduced sentence in the interests of fairness and uniformity in sentencing under Vazquez.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Reynolds does not dispute the postconviction court’s conclusion that the
DSRA does not apply to his conviction and sentence. Instead, Reynolds argues that the
postconviction court abused its discretion because it did not analyze whether he is entitled
to a reduced sentence based on the interests of fairness and uniformity under Vazquez, 330
N.W.2d at 112. We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015).

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In Vazquez, the defendant argued that his sentence should be reduced because he
unjustifiably received a harsher sentence than that of his accomplice. 330 N.W.2d at 112.
The supreme court acknowledged that it “has discretion in individual cases to modify [a]
sentence . . . if that appears to be in the interests of fairness and uniformity .” Id. The
supreme court explained that e quality and fairness in sentencing involve s (1) “comparing
the sentence the appealing defendant received with the sentence his accomplices received”
and (2) “comparing the sentence of the defendant with those of other offenders.” Id. The
supreme cour t ultimat ely rejected Vazquez’s argument on the grounds that (1) his
accomplice entered into a plea agreement under which the accomplice received a reduced
sentence, and because the supreme court believed the accomplice’s sentence was “too
lenient,” reducing Vazquez’s sentence “would be to compound the error rather than to limit
it” and (2) compared to other offenders, he “was not treated relatively harshly.” Id. at
112-13.
Reynolds’s reliance on Vazquez is misplaced. The postconviction court could not
compare Reynolds’s sentence “with the sentence his accomplice[] received” because
Reynolds did not have an accomplice. Cf. id. Further, Reynolds’s 94-month sentence was
a downward durational departure from the 146-month presumptive sentence under the pre-
DSRA guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4. A. (2012). Therefore, Reynolds received a
sentence that was lower, not higher, than “other offenders similarly situated” —that is,
offenders who committed the same conduct under the pre-DSRA version of the guidelines
and whose judgments became final before the DSRA became effective.

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On this record, there was no basis for the postconviction court to determine that
Reynolds deserved a reduced sentence in the interest s of fairness and uniformity in
sentencing under Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d at 112. We conclude that the postconviction court
properly exercised its discretion.
Affirmed.