In re the Civil Commitment of: Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0240

In re the Civil Commitment of:
Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen

Filed July 16, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Judicial Appeal Panel
File No. AP17-9049

Rick E. Mattox, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, R.J. Detr ick, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Stephen P. McLaughlin, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Arthur Senty-Haugen appeals fro m the judicial appeal panel’s denial of
his petition for provisional discharge, full discharge, or transfer, arguing that he established
a prima facie case for discharge and that th e preponderance of th e evidence supported
transfer. We affirm.

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FACTS
Treatment History
On March 29, 1996, Senty-Haugen wa s civilly committed as a sexually
psychopathic personality (SPP) and a sexually dangerous person (SDP). His special review
board (SRB) treatment report indicates that, since his commitment, Senty-Haugen has been
“intermittently” treated in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) “over the years;
however, his participation” has been “inconsistent” due to repeated transfers from MSOP
to either the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) or the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(FBP) to serve time for crimes committed while civilly committed.
MSOP is a three-phase treatment program. Phase I focuses on general self-
management, adherence to program rules, and treatment-interfering behaviors and beliefs.
Once committed persons have de monstrated the ability to ma nage their emotions and
behaviors and to recognize the necessity of making personal changes, they may be
considered for Phase II. Ph ase II focuses on the committed persons’ offending patterns
and the identification and resolution of underl ying issues and motivations related to the
offending behaviors. Once committed persons have adequa tely addressed their sexual
deviance and motivations in their offending behavior and developed effective strategies to
manage their risk for re-offens e, they progress to Phase III. Phase III is the transitional
phase of treatment and focuses on deinstitutio nalization and community reintegration.
Committed persons in Phase III who have demonstrated and maintained meaningful change
advance through gradually incr eased liberty and privileges that include staff-supervised
outings into the community.

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By 2000, Senty-Haugen had entered Phase III, but he was then transferred to DOC
after being convicted of financial-transaction fraud. When he returned to MSOP in 2003,
he was placed in Phase I. He progressed to Phase II in less than a year but was again
incarcerated in 2004 after plea ding guilty to federal tax fraud. He briefly returned to
MSOP, where he had more sex-offender-specifi c treatment, but was then transferred to
federal prison to serve his sentence in 2005. In federal prison, he participated in a sex-
offender management program. In January 2009, Senty-Haugen returned to MSOP, and
he was again placed in Phase I. From Janu ary 2015 to March 20 16, Senty-Haugen was
again incarcerated in state prison, for bribery.
In July 2016, Senty-Haugen again began Phase I at MSOP. He advanced to Phase
II by late September. However, in June 2017 , Senty-Haugen was moved back to Phase I
because he violated Phase II expectations by not attending therapeutic treatment for two
months and by possessing contraband.
In August 2017, Senty-Haug en was federally indicted on charges “related to
conspiracy to defraud.” Sent y-Haugen’s conditional federal bail required that he “avoid
all contact, directly or indirectly, with any pe rson who is or may be a victim or witness.”
Several individuals in Senty-Haugen’s living unit were potential witnesses, and, as a result,
MSOP moved Senty-Haugen to a more restric tive environment. Because of the transfer,
Senty-Haugen could not attend some of the sessions necessary to progress through the
phases of treatment.

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Procedural History
On July 13, 2016, Senty- Haugen filed a petition with the SRB for provisional
discharge, full discharge, or transfer to Community Preparation Services (CPS). The SRB
held a hearing on March 14, 2017, at which a sexual-violence risk assessor, an assessment
psychologist, the MSOP associate clinical di rector, and Senty-Hauge n testified. After
considering the testimony and written submissions, the SRB recommended denying Senty-
Haugen’s petition.
Senty-Haugen then filed a petition for rehearing and reconsideration with the
judicial appeal panel. The judicial appeal panel held a hearing on December 15, 2017,
where Senty-Haugen and a court-appointed reviewing psychologist testified. The
psychologist testified th at he did not support provisional or full discharge. Regarding
transfer, the psychologist testified:
I did not recommend [transfer to ] CPS because I did not see
that it was possible under the present conditions. [Senty-
Haugen] is now in isolation. He hasn’t been in treatment, and
they haven’t worked out a possibility to integrate him into the
program because of the fact that he is isolation, and I didn’t
feel if they do not think he is capable of participating in
treatment, that I can recommend over and above what they’re
doing that they should be forced to make him participate.

Upon further questioning, however, the psyc hologist conceded th at “a fundamental
expectation of that therapeutic community at [CPS] is that th e clients who enter into that
community are motivated, are co mpliant, and are functioning at a very high level,” that
Senty-Haugen did not fit with that expectation, and that the failure to meet this expectation
was another reason “why [he] did not recommend transfer.”

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After Senty-Haugen concluded presenting his evidence, the commissioner of human
services moved to dismiss Senty-Haugen’s petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). The
judicial appeal panel took the motion under a dvisement and subsequently issued an order
granting the commissioner’s motion and denying Senty-Haugen’s petition.
Senty-Haugen appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Senty-Haugen failed to establish a prima facie case for discharge.
Senty-Haugen argues that the judicial appeal panel erred in granting the
commissioner’s motion to dismiss his petition for full or provisional discharge because he
presented a prima facie case showing he was entitled to discharge. We review de novo the
judicial appeal panel’s dismissal of a discharge petition at the close of a petitioner’s case-
in-chief. Foster v. Jesson, 857 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014).
The commissioner’s motion to dismiss was made pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P.
41.02(b), which provides:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence,
the defendant . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. In an action tried by th e court without a jury, the court
as trier of the fact may then determine the facts and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52.01.

“This rule operates differently depending on whether the judicial appeal panel is
considering a petition for transfer or for discharge.” Foster, 857 N.W.2d at 548.

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Generally, when a proceeding is a bench trial (as is the ca se in hearings before the
judicial appeal panel), the court may determine facts and is not required to view those facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff when ruling on a rule 41.02(b) motion. Coker v.
Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 489-90 (Minn. 2013). However, by statute, the party seeking
discharge or provisional discharge bears onl y “the burden of going forward with the
evidence, which means presenting a prima facie case with competent evidence to show that
the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d) (2016). If
that burden is met, the burden shifts to the party opposing such discharge, who “bears the
burden of proof by clear and convincing evid ence that the discharge or provisional
discharge should be denied.” Id. As a result, the judicial appeal panel “may not weigh the
evidence or make credibility de terminations when consider ing a motion to dismiss [a
discharge or provisional-discharge petition] un der Rule 41.02(b),” but rather “is required
to view the evidence pr oduced . . . in a light most favora ble to the committed person.”
Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 490-91.
To meet this burden for either provisional or full discharge, Senty-Haugen must
produce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case that he “is capable of making an
acceptable adjustment to open society.” Mi nn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(a) (2016)
(discussing provisional discharge); Minn . Stat. § 253D.31 (2016) (discussing full
discharge).
Senty-Haugen argues that he established his prima facie case by showing that he is
not receiving appropriat e treatment in MSOP and becau se the commissioner failed to
prepare a provisional-discharge plan. We are unpersuaded. Assuming, as we must, that

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Senty-Haugen is not receiving appropriate treatment, a lack of appropriate treatment is not
evidence that a maltreated committed person is capabl e of making an acceptable
adjustment to open society. Although it may give rise to other remedies, 1 a lack of
appropriate treatment does not entitle Senty-Haugen to discharge. For similar reasons, we
reject Senty-Haugen’s argument that the failure of the commissioner to prepare a
provisional-discharge plan created an obligation on the part of the judicial appeal panel to
accept his proposed provisional-discharge plan.
2
Finally, Senty-Haugen argues that he established a prima facie case for provisional
discharge because the co mponents of the provisional-disc harge plan that he created,
“coupled with six years in federal prisons and federal supervised release[,] will provide a
reasonable degree of protection to the public and will enable [him] to adjust successfully
to the community.” Th is argument is also unavailing. The court-appointed expert at the
judicial appeal panel hearing recommended against provisional discharge, and, other than
Senty-Haugen’s own self-serving testimony, no evidence presen ted at the judicial appeal
panel hearing supported provisional discharg e. If a committed person’s own, otherwise
unsupported, testimony were enough to estab lish a prima facie case, then every judicial
appeal panel hearing would devolve into th e committed person merely saying the “magic

1 At oral argument, Senty-Haugen suggested that he could obtain a remedy for not receiving
proper treatment by seeking a writ of ma ndamus against the commissioner. We take no
position on whether such a course of action is av ailable or likely to succeed in this case,
confining ourselves to what remedies are available under the civil commitment statutes.
2 As with his lack-of-appropriate-treatment argument, we take no position on whether other
remedies may be appropriate for such a failure on the part of the commissioner.

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words” in order to avoid a rule 41.02(b) motion. Cf. Banbury v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 533
N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. App. 1995) (“A self-serving affidavit . . . is not sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fa ct.”). We therefore conclude that Senty-Haugen failed to
establish a prima facie case for provisional or full discharge.
II. The judicial appeal panel’s determin ation that Senty-Haugen should not be
transferred is not clearly erroneous.

Senty-Haugen also argues the judicial appeal panel erred in granting the
commissioner’s motion to dismiss his petition for transfer to CPS because a preponderance
of the evidence demonstrated that transfer was appropriate. “[U]nlike a discharge petition,
a petition for transfer imposes the burdens of production and persuasion on the petitioner
at the hearing before the judicial appeal panel.” Foster, 857 N.W.2d at 548 (citing Minn.
Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(e) (Supp. 2013)). Thus, the judicial appeal panel may weigh
evidence in evaluating such a motion. See id. (“Because the petition for transfer imposed
the burden of persuasion on appellant, ther e is no ‘conflict’ between the commitment
statute and rule 41.02(b); thus, the reasoning of Coker . . . is inapplicab le to his transfer
petition.”). We therefore review the dismissal of a transfer petition under Minn. R. Civ. P.
41.02(b) for clear error. Id.
To obtain a transfer to CPS, Senty-Haugen had to show that “the transfer is
appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(a) (2016). In determin ing whether transfer
is appropriate, the judicial appeal panel must consider: “(1) the person’s clinical progress
and present treatment needs; (2) the need for security to accomplish continuing treatment;
(3) the need for continued institutionalization; (4) which facility can best meet the person’s

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needs; and (5) whether transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of safety for
the public.” Id., subd. 1(b) (2016).
Senty-Haugen argues that it was clear error for the judicial appeal panel to dismiss
his transfer petition because the judicial app eal panel failed to “credit any of Mr. Senty-
Haugen’s prior sex offender treatment.” This past treatment goes to the first factor the
judicial appeal panel must consider: “the person’s clinical progress and present treatment
needs.”
The record indicates that the judicial appeal panel gave appropriate consideration to
Senty-Haugen’s past treatment. In the memo randum supporting its decision, the judicial
appeal panel noted that Senty-Haugen “has a history of attending sex offender treatment
through the MN-DOC, MSOP, and the Federa l Bureau of Prisons” and specifically
acknowledged his request that “he be given ‘credit’ for particip ating in these other
treatment programs or for completing certain units or modules through other programs.”
The judicial appeal panel rejected this request , weighing the evidence that “the treatment
records indicate that [Senty-Haugen] intermittently struggled with treatment participation.”
This evidence supports the judicial appeal pa nel’s decision, and we will not reweigh that
evidence on appeal. In re Civil Commitment of Fugelseth , 907 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn.
App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
Senty-Haugen also points to the court- appointed psychologist ’s testimony that
Senty-Haugen had the necessary foundation to be transferred to CPS and that “what he
needs to do is to begin to prep are to leave the facility and to go through the reintegration
materials.” Although this testimony, by itself, does support transfer, we must also consider

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that the psychologist ultimat ely did not recommend transfer because of the restrictions
created by Senty-Haugen’s federal bail conditions and because Senty-Haugen did not meet
the expectations of those tran sferred to CPS. Th ese other considerations counsel against
transfer, based on two of the other factors the judicial appeal panel is required to consider—
the need for security to accomplish continuing treatment and which facility can best meet
the person’s needs. The judicial appeal pa nel duly weighed these factors, found that
“[t]here was no evidence in the therapeutic r ecord that [Senty-Haugen] had advanced far
enough in treatment to successfully manage the program at CPS, where patients are
expected to be transparent and self-poli ce their own behaviors, ” and dismissed Senty-
Haugen’s petition. Based on our review of the record, that dismissal was not clearly
erroneous.
III. The judicial appeal panel is without authority to order additional treatment.
Finally, Senty-Haugen argues that, even if the judicial appeal panel properly
dismissed his petition for provisi onal discharge, full discharge, or transfer, the judicial
appeal panel should have ordered additional treatment. The commissioner argues that the
judicial appeal panel is without authority to do so. Whether a particular tribunal has the
authority to order a particular remedy presents a question of law that we review de novo.
See State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014).
“The Commitment Act only provides relief to a patient indeterminately committed
as an SDP or SPP through a transfer or a discharge.” In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan,
811 N.W.2d 635, 641-42 (Minn. 2012). This holding straightforwardly applies to this case.
Senty-Haugen cannot use the judicial-appeal-panel-petiti on process to obt ain review of

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treatment decisions made by MSOP. The judicial appeal panel did not err by refusing his
request to order additional treatment.
Affirmed.