Bridgette A. Allan, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0273

Bridgette A. Allan,
Appellant,

vs.

United Piping, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed September 24, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-17-400

Robert E. Mathias, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Gina K. Janeiro, Jennifer A. N odes, Jackson Lewis P.C., Minneap olis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Peters on, Presiding Judge; Cleary, C hief Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her host ile-work-
environment claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), asserting that the
district court erred by failing to view the facts in the light most favorable to her claim and

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by determining that there are no genuine issues of material fac t precluding summary
judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent United Piping, Inc. ( U P I ) i s a g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t i n g company that
performs services for the oil and gas pipeline industry. Bob S choneberger was UPI’s
president, Mel Olson was the vice president of construction, an d Shawn Helmer was the
risk-management director. UPI’s policy manual prohibited unlaw ful workplace
harassment and discrimination and set forth a procedure for rep orting and addressing
incidents of harassment and discrimination. The policy stated that UPI would “keep any
report of alleged harassment, discrimination or inappropriate c onduct as confidential as
possible” but that UPI might “need to disclose certain informat ion on a business need-to-
know basis, including in connection with an investigation into a complaint.” UPI also had
an open-door policy that stated: “The Company has an open door policy. If at any time
you have any questions or concerns about Company policies, procedures, or any workplace
problems, you are encouraged to raise them with your supervisor, or if you prefer, with any
management personnel.”
In June 2014, Chad Walsh, a UPI foreman and the half-brother o f appellant
Bridgette A. Allan, hired Allan to work as a laborer on a hydrovac crew. In October 2014,
Walsh moved Allan to the hydrova c s e r v i c e t r u c k , w h i c h w a s a m ore desirable job.
Supervisor Rich Oswskey testifie d in a deposition that some of Allan’s coworkers,
including Josh Myrhe and Justin H ultquist, complained about Allan’s work performance.
Oswskey testified that he addre ssed Allan’s work ethics and per formance twice with

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Walsh. Beginning in January 2015, Allan worked with Charles Ka ufman on a hydrovac
truck. Kaufman testified in a deposition that, once they began working together, during
morning safety meetings, he heard negative comments about Allan , some of which were
related to her being a woman on the job.
On February 6, 2015, Allan cont acted Olson to report issues th at she was having
with some of her co-workers, and he agreed to meet with her the next morning.
Schoneberger and Helmer also attended the meeting, Schoneberger began the meeting by
thanking Allan for contacting Olson and stating that he knew th at it took a lot of courage
for her to do so and that it was important for management to le arn about and address
problems promptly. Allan then described to them several incidents of harassment that she
had experienced.
At the end of the meeting, Ols on thanked Allan for contacting him, and
Schoneberger asked what outcome she wanted. Olson asked whethe r Allan believed that
the conduct she reported was based on the fact that she is a woman or was due to her being
Walsh’s sister, and Allan stated that it could be due to both f actors. Schoneberger stated
that Allan deserved to be treated with respect and that UPI would work to address the issues
that she had reported.
On February 9, 2015, Schoneberger and Helmer met with five of six employees
involved in the reported harassment. Schoneberger stated that UPI had been contacted by
an employee and that the employees at the meeting had been iden tified as having
interactions with Allan that cr eated a hostile work environment . Schoneberger stressed
that every employee deserves to be treated fairly and respectfu lly, and there was a

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discussion about fair and respectful treatment of employees. S choneberger warned that
further allegations of misconduct, including retaliation, would result in discharge from
employment, and written reprimands were placed in the personnel files of the employees
who attended the meeting and the employee involved in the harassment who did not attend
the meeting.
Helmer met with Allan on Februar y 26, 2015. Helmer asked whether Allan’s work
environment had improved since UPI had taken remedial measures, and Allan responded
that she felt like two of the employees were still harassing her. When asked “if there was
anything else,” Allan said, “No. ” Helmer asked “if there was a nything more [Allan]
wanted [him] to do to address he r concerns and [she] responded that she did not know.”
Shortly thereafter, Helmer met with Schoneberger and Olson to discuss Allan’s
continued concerns about the two employees. At Schoneberger’s request, Helmer
scheduled mandatory anti-discri mination and anti-harassment tra ining for all employees
on March 11, 2015. About 158 employees attended the training session, including Allan.
According to Helmer:
The training focused on UPI’s commitment to a harassment
and discrimination free working environment, UPI’s policies
prohibiting discrimination and harassment in the workplace,
reviewed UPI’s discrimination and harassment reporting
requirements, discussed the potential consequences for
engaging in discriminatory and/or harassing conduct, and
presented several workplace scenarios to reinforce core
learning concepts and UPI’s policies.

Kaufman testified that, during the training session, he saw many employees staring at Allan
and that the training session did not change employees’ behavior toward Allan.

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Foreman Lance Gaudet reported to Helmer that Allan said that s he felt
uncomfortable during the training. Allan stated in an affidavi t that she “was subjected to
intentional intimidation by [a pr esenter],” who “deliberately f ocused her remarks on
[Allan].” The day after the training, Schoneberger and Olson m et with Allan, and,
according to Schoneberger, Allan stated “that she felt ‘uncomfortable’ during the training
and felt that ‘everyone in the room’ was staring at her.” Schoneberger stated that UPI had
not intended to make her feel uncomfortable. Schoneberger explained that the purpose of
the training was to ensure that UPI’s employees understood UPI’s anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment policies and the consequences of violations and knew what to do if they
observed violations. Allan did not raise any additional concer ns or ask Schoneberger “to
take specific action on her behalf.”
On Monday, March 16, 2015, Allan called Helmer to further disc uss the March 11
training. When Helmer suggested that Allan meet with him and/or Olson, Allan stated that
she would only meet with them with her attorney present. Helmer asked Allan to have her
attorney contact him to schedule a meeting, but Allan’s attorne y did not contact Helmer.
On March 20, 2015, Helmer asked G audet to tell Allan that Helme r wanted to talk to her
about a meeting, but Allan did not contact Helmer. On Monday, March 23, 2015, Helmer
got Allan’s cell-phone number from Gaudet. Helmer and Allan talked by phone, and Allan
again stated that she would not meet with him without her attorney present.
Allan gave UPI permission to contact her attorney to schedule a meeting. UPI’s
attorney called Allan’s attorney and left a voicemail in which she identified herself as UPI’s
attorney and stated that she was calling about Allan, but Allan’s attorney did not return her

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call. On April 8, 2015, Helmer met Allan at her jobsite and sa id that her attorney had not
responded to UPI. Helmer again asked Allan to have her attorne y call him to schedule a
meeting. Helmer also gave her a letter, which stated:
Please know that [UPI] tak es your concerns very
seriously and wishes to address them in a manner that is both
expeditious and effective. In order to meet this goal, however,
we must further understand the basis of your concerns. We are
unable to do so without meeting with you to discuss further.
Thus, if you believe that furthe r action is required to address
this situation, I ask that you reach out to me, either personal ly
or through your attorney, to schedule a meeting.

On April 11, 2015, Helmer received a text message that he beli eved was from Allan,
requesting to meet. On April 14, Helmer met Allan at her jobsi te, acknowledged the text
message, and told Allan that her attorney had not returned UPI’ s many calls requesting a
meeting. Allan stated that she had not texted Helmer, and Helm er later learned that the
text came from Gaudet. Allan said that she had hired a new att orney and that she would
have him call Helmer.
Helmer gave Allan a letter stating that a meeting between her, Schoneberger, Olson,
and Helmer was scheduled for April 16, 2015, at 7:30 a.m. at UP I’s headquarters. The
letter also stated:
Please know that [UPI] t akes your concerns very
seriously and wishes to address them in a manner that is both
expeditious and effective. . . . This is not a disciplinary meeting
– this is a meeting solely to discuss your concerns with the
workplace and determine what, if anything, needs to be done
to further address the situation. Your attorney is not to be
present; however, you may bring a union representative with
you if you wish.

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Neither Allan nor her attorney contacted Helmer or any other me mber of UPI’s
management team, and neither showed up for the April 16 meeting.
Allan was laid off from UPI on about April 19, 2015. In February 2016, she began
this action against UPI. The district court granted summary judgment for UPI. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “that th ere is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, to determine whether any genuine issues of material fa ct exist and whether the
district court erred in applying the law. Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Title, LLP, 824
N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 2012). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre &
Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Minn. 2002). “However, summary judgment on a
claim is mandatory against a party who fails to establish an essential element of that claim,
if that party has the burden of proof, because this failure renders all other facts immaterial.”
Lloyd v. In Home Health, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn. App. 1994).
Under the MHRA, “[i]t is an unfair employment practice for an employer, because
o f . . . s e x . . . t o . . . d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t a p e r s o n w i t h respect to hiring, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgradin g, conditions, facilities, or priv ileges of employment.”
Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3 ) (2016). “[T]he MHRA permits a hostile work
environment claim based on sex,” and “verbal and physical haras sment directed at an

8
employee because of her sex may constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment.” LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Minn. 2012).
To succeed on a hostile wor k environment claim, a
plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) she was subject to u nwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on membership in a protected group;
(4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of her
employment; and (5) the employer knew of or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
remedial action.

Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court concluded that, as a woman, Allan is a memb er of a protected
class, but that she failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine fact issue on the
other four elements of her claim. With respect to the fifth element, Minnesota courts have
identified three types of remedia l action: “1) preventative mea sures, such as the
dissemination of a sexual harassment policy, or the establishme nt of a well-publicized
procedure for resolving such complaints; 2) the employer’s efforts to alleviate the victim’s
plight, such as transferring her to another shift or job site; and 3) the investigation of the
complaint and discipline of the offender.” Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc. ,
25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 976 (D. Minn. 1998).
UPI had anti-harassment and open-door policies in place that p rohibited unlawful
workplace harassment and encourag ed employees to address “any w orkplace problems”
with “any management personnel.” Allan availed herself of thes e preventative measures
by contacting Olson to report the harassment. UPI promptly addressed Allan’s harassment
allegations by meeting with her a nd then meeting with five of s ix employees involved in

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the reported harassment. At the meeting with the five employee s, Schoneberger stressed
the requirements of the anti-harassment policy, and there was a discussion about proper
treatment of employees. Allan objects to Schoneberger and Helmer identifying her during
the meeting. They did identify Allan as the target of the hara ssment but did not identify
the employee who reported the harassment, and Allan does not suggest any means by which
UPI could have addressed her harassment allegations with the involved employees without
identifying her as the target of the harassment. Written reprim ands were placed in the
personnel files of the employees at the meeting and in the pers onnel file of an employee
involved in the report ed harassment who did not attend the meet ing, and the employees
were warned that further allegations of misconduct could result in termination.
UPI followed up by meeting with Allan about two weeks later, an d, when she
reported continuing harassment, U PI held mandatory anti-discrim ination and anti-
harassment training for all employees. Although Allan stated i n an affidavit that the
presenter at the training sessi on intentionally intimidated All an and focused her remarks
on Allan, Allan cites no evidence of specific conduct by the pr esenter that supports this
assertion. Following the training session, UPI asked Allan if anything further needed to be
addressed, but Allan and her atto rney prevented UPI from taking any further remedial
action by failing to respond to UPI’s attempts to contact them to set up another meeting.
To withstand summary judgment, a party “must present specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial”; speculation and general as sertions are insufficient.
Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) (quotation
omitted). UPI promptly addressed Allan’s complaints and took remedial measures to end

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the harassment, and there is no evidence of any appropriate rem edial measures that UPI
failed to take. The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to create a genuine fact issue on the
fifth element of a hostile-w ork-environment claim. See Cont’l Can Co. v. State , 297
N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980) (citing Howard v. Nat’l Cash Register Co. , 388 F. Supp.
603 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (concluding that employer was not liable for racial harassment when
management transferred employee to another shift, held frequent meetings with him and
the head of his department, diss eminated the company’s anti-har assment policy to all
employees, and took disciplinary action against the harassers)); Fore v. Health Dimensions,
Inc., 509 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 1993) (citing Davis v. Tri–State Mack Distribs.,
Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that employer is not required to fire harasser
but must take action reasonably calculated to end harassment)).
Because Allan has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the fifth element
of her claim, we need not address the remaining elements. Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d
732, 737 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that summary judgment is required when a party fails
to establish an essential element of a claim for which that par ty has the burden of proof),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001).
Affirmed.