In re the Marriage of: Dennis D. Dickinson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0293

In re the Marriage of: Dennis D. Dickinson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Marymargaret Dickinson,
Respondent.

Filed December 3, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-15-4665

Viet-Hanh Winchell, Susan D. Olson, Galowitz  Olson, P.L.L.C., Lake Elmo, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Linda S.S. de Beer, Jenna K. Monson, de Beer & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge ; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant-husband challenges the district court’s modification order increasing his
spousal-maintenance obligation. He argues that, although the d istrict court found that he
had a substantial increase in income, respondent-wife must have shown an increased need
in order to justify modification. Additionally, he argues that the district court erred in

2
including his overtime income and profit-sharing bonus and that its calculation of
respondent’s income and expenses w a s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . B e c a u se the district court’s
factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the district court did not abuse its discretion
by increasing appellant’s spousal-maintenance obligation to $7,000 per month, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties were married in 1999 but dissolved the marriage in 2017. At the time
of the dissolution, the parties had a 16-year-old minor child. The parties were granted joint
legal and joint physical custody of the child, but the child’s primary residence was to be
with respondent. Appellant is a pilot for a commercial airline , and respondent is self-
employed as a stylist/cosmetologist. During their marriage, th e parties enjoyed a
comfortable standard of living. They owned multiple assets, including several real-estate
properties; vehicles; and bank, brokerage, and retirement accounts.
Following a two-day trial in De cember 2016, the district court found that appellant,
who had been the family’s prima ry wage-earner, had the ability to meet his own needs
while helping respondent meet hers. After considering each factor set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2 (2016), the court ordered appellant to pay respondent $5,000 per month
in permanent spousal maintenance.
The district court found that appellant had a gross monthly inc ome of $19,727 and
a net monthly income of $12,424. Although appellant earned sig nificantly more in 2013
and 2014, the district court found that—based on appellant’s te stimony—he would be
reducing his monthly average flight hours due to his health con dition, and, therefore,

3
bringing home less income. 1 The court also determined that he had reasonable monthly
expenses of $6,275.
The district court found that respondent had, before tax, month ly income of
approximately $2,512, and reason able monthly expenses of $7,200 f o r h e r s e l f a n d t h e
parties’ minor child. The court also noted that respondent would receive a cash equalizer
from appellant of approximately $100,000; one-half of the proce eds from the sale of the
homestead, which had a fair market value of $1,065,000; and one -half of the retirement
accounts.
The district court found that “[r]espondent lost earnings and employment
opportunities through the parties’ decision to have her remain home with the minor child”
while appellant worked significant hours as a pilot. The court concluded that “[r]espondent
lack[ed] sufficient resources, including marital property apportioned to her, to provide for
her reasonable needs.” It determ ined that awarding respondent spousal maintenance of
$5,000 per month and child suppor t of $1,094 per month would gi ve her approximately
$6,900 per month net income and leave appellant with a net inco me of approximately
$6,300 per month. The court stated:
While this maintenance award will leave each party
short of the expenses that they c laim are reasonable given the

1 Appellant suffered a heart attack in 2014 and was subsequently on medical leave and then
disability leave until October 2015. Although the average pilo t flies 75-85 hours per
month, appellant, prior to his heart attack, was flying signifi cantly more, often up to 120
hours per month. Appellant testif ied that his doctors advised him that the stress and
demands of his work, as well as a genetic predisposition, contributed to his heart condition.
He testified that his doctors discouraged him from flying more than 80 hours per month,
and that retirement was a possibility depending on his health. The district court found his
testimony about his work limitations to be credible.

4
standard of the marriage, and leave respondent short of her
expenses as reduced by the Court, it is not reasonable for the
parties to believe that they can maintain their marital lifesty le
given the health limitations on [appellant’s] earning potential.
The Court has taken this into account when awarding spousal
maintenance.

In the fall of 2017, respondent m oved the district court to mod ify the permanent
spousal-maintenance award. Through newly acquired information, respondent discovered
that appellant was earning approximately $18,000 more per month in gross income than he
had represented to the court. Under a workers’ agreement that went into effect two weeks
before the parties’ dissolution-of-marriage trial, appellant was entitled to a retroactive wage
increase beginning January 1, 2016.
Respondent also learned that appellant was averaging 84.46 flight hours per month,
which, she argued, contradicted h is testimony that he only inte nded to fly a monthly
average of 75 hours. Based on appellant’s 2016 W-2 and his wag es as of August 2017,
respondent argued there had been a substantial change in circum stances rendering the
original maintenance award unreasonable and unfair.
Appellant opposed respondent’s motion, arguing that he had not been made aware
before trial of the workers’ agreement retroactively increasing his pay, nor did he intend to
maintain the number of flight h ours he had recently been averag ing. He argued that he
temporarily had to fly more hours each month in order to meet h is financial obligations
resulting from the divorce decree, but that his intention to reduce his hours remained.
Following a hearing on respondent’s motion, the district court ordered appellant to
pay an additional $2,000 per month in spousal maintenance, totaling $7,000 per month and

5
commencing October 1, 2017. The court found that through the r etroactively applied
workers’ agreement, appellant received an average of $25,682 gross income per month for
2016. Based on appellant’s August 15, 2017 paystub, the court found that he was averaging
$37,676 gross income per month, or $23,725 net income per month after subtracting the
average deductions and taxes.
The district court concluded th at, based on appellant’s increas e d w a ge s wi t h t he
adoption of the workers’ agreement, much of the effect of his h ealth limitations on his
income had been alleviated. The court determined that even if appellant reduced his work
schedule to 75 flying hours per month, the industry standard, he would still have $12,840
per month to satisfy his needs.
The district court also found that respondent’s financial circumstances had changed
since the initial maintenance order. The court determined that she had reasonable monthly
expenses of $7,714 and that her monthly gross income had decrea sed by approximately
$500, leaving her with $2,093 per month of gross income after business expenses.
Based on the above, the district court concluded there had been a substantial change
i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e n d e r i n g t h e original order of spousal mainte nance unfair and
unreasonable. The court found tha t the substantial increase in appellant’s income would
“allow an award of spousal mainten ance sufficient to meet the f inancial needs of
[r]espondent that were left unmet by the previous award.”
In January 2018, appellant moved for amended findings, proposin g, instead, a
modified amount of $5,500 per month in spousal maintenance. He argued that the district
court erred in its modification of spousal maintenance, contend ing that his average net

6
monthly income was substantially lower than the court had calculated. He also argued that
any hours he flew over the standard 75 per month was considered overtime and not subject
to respondent’s maintenance awa rd, and further, that respondent was not entitled to his
“post-divorce profit sharing bonus.”
Appellant also argued that the court’s calculation of responde nt’s income and
expenses was inaccurate. He contended that rather than increasing the maintenance award
by $2,000 per month, the court should have found an additional $500 per month sufficient
to meet respondent’s needs. Ultimat ely, the district court den ied appellant’s motion,
deeming it a request for reconsid eration of the modification or der pursuant to Minn. R.
Gen. Prac. 115.11,
2 and this appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by increasing appellant’s spousal-
maintenance obligation from $5,000 to $7,000 per month.

A. The district court’s calculation of appellant’s income was not clearly
erroneous.

Appellant argues that the distric t court abused its discretion in modifying spousal
maintenance from $5,000 to $7,0 00 per month based upon inaccura te calculations of the
parties’ incomes and monthly livi ng expenses. “A [district] co urt has wide discretion in
determining spousal maintenance.” Haasken v. Haasken , 396 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Minn.

2 Although appellant argued below that his motion was one for am ended findings and not
a motion for reconsideration, appellant has failed to raise the issue on appeal. Because
appellant has not briefed the issue, nor cited to any legal aut hority, we deem this issue
waived. See Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating an issue not
briefed on appeal “must be deemed waived”).

7
App. 1986). An appellate court reviews a district court’s deci sion regarding whether to
modify an existing maintenance award for an abuse of discretion . Hecker v. Hecker, 568
N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses its d iscretion regarding
maintenance if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies
the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Unless the district court’s findings of fact are clearly errone ous, they must be
upheld. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App.
1992); see also Peterka v. Peterka , 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004) (“A district
court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and is not set
aside unless clearly erroneous.”). We view the record in the l ight most favorable to the
district court’s findings and defer to its credibility determinations. Vangsness v. Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000).
A district court may modify an award of spousal maintenance based on a substantial
change in circumstances rendering the existing award “unreasona ble and unfair.” Minn.
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2016). The circumstances that may warrant modification include
a “substantially increased or decreased gross income of an obligor or obligee.” Id., subd.
2(a)(1). A district court also must consider the statutory fac tors that are relevant to an
initial award of spousal maintenance. Id., subd. 2(e) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.552). The
party moving to modify a spousal-maintenance award bears the burden of demonstrating a
substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing order unfair and unreasonable.
Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709.

8
Appellant argues that “[a]n increase in the paying spouse’s income is not in itself a
reason to increase spousal maint enance” and that “[r]espondent must show an increased
need to justify modification.” We reject this argument. It is undisputed that the district
court acknowledged that the maintenance awarded to respondent i n the dissolution
judgment was insufficient to allo w her to meet her reasonable m onthly expenses at the
marital standard of living. This court has stated:
The purpose of a maintenance award is to allow the
recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that
approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is
equitable under the circumstances. Thus, a maintenance
obligor has a duty, to the extent equitable under the
circumstances, to support the maintenance recipient at the
marital standard of living. . . . Indeed, if a substantial increase
in the income of a maintenance obligor renders the existing
maintenance award unreasonable and unfair, a maintenance
obligation can be modified, despite the lack of an increase in
the maintenance recipient’s reasonable monthly expenses.

Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 358-59 (citations and footnote omitted). Further, at oral argument
before this court, appellant’s counsel candidly conceded there was a substantial change in
circumstances based solely on a ppellant’s increased income. We appreciate counsel’s
candor on this point.
Based on appellant’s increased income and the court’s initial f inding that the
original order was unable to sufficiently provide for responden t’s needs, we affirm the
district court’s determination that there was a substantial cha nge in circumstances
rendering the provisions of the original decree unreasonable and unfair.

9
Next, we consider whether the district court erred, as appellan t contends, in
including appellant’s overtime pay and profit-sharing bonus in its calculation of his 2017
income. Appellant argues that his overtime income should not h ave been included in the
calculation of his wages because his excess flying hours were voluntary, not a condition of
employment, and occurred subsequent to the dissolution as a means to manage his divorce-
related financial obligations. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the discussion of
overtime income in the modification statute, Minn. Stat. § 518A .39, subd. 2(e), applies
exclusively to child-support modifications.
Initially, we note that maintenance is an award of “payments from the future income
or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of th e other.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3a (2016). The supreme court has ruled that t he “income” from which
maintenance payments are made is the “gross income” defined in Minn. Stat. § 518A.29
(2016). Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635 n.5 (Minn. 2009). Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29,
and subject to certain exclusions and deductions not at issue here, “gross income includes
any form of periodic payment to an individual[.]” “Gross incom e,” however, “does not
include compensation received by a party for employment in exce ss of a 40-hour work
week, provided that [certain conditions are met.]” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29. Here, the district
court did not find the existence of the conditions allowing an exclusion of overtime income.
Therefore, the district court’s inclusion of appellant’s overti me in his income for
maintenance purposes is not inconsistent with the statutory definitions.
Regarding appellant’s argument that, under Minn. Stat. § 518A.3 9, subd. 2(e), his
overtime income should not be used to determine his ability to pay maintenance, his

10
argument requires us to examine the meaning of the statute. We review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). We
start by looking at the language of the statute to see whether it is clear or ambiguous. Am.
Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2 0 0 0 ) . I f t h e l a n g u a g e i s
unambiguous, we do not engage in a ny further construction; rath er, we interpret the
statute’s text according to its plain meaning. Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778
N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010).
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e), governs the modification of both spousal
maintenance and child support. It provides, in relevant part:
O n a m o t i o n f o r modification of maintenance ,
including a motion for the extension of the duration of a
maintenance award, the court shall apply, in addition to all
other relevant factors, the factors for an award of maintenance
under section 518.552 that exist at the time of the motion. On
a motion for modification of support, the court:
. . . .
(2) shall not consider compens ation received by a party for
employment in excess of a 40-hour work week, provided that
the party demonstrates, and the court finds, that:
(i) the excess employment began after entry of the existing
support order;
(ii) the excess employment is voluntary and not a condition of
employment . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (emphasis added). Based on a literal reading of the
statute, we conclude that the district court did not clearly er r in including appellant’s
“overtime income” because the statute does not explicitly preclude such a consideration.
3

3 Notwithstanding our conclusion that the district court was not precluded from considering
overtime pay in its calculation of income, we highlight the dis trict court’s finding that
“[e]ven without the additional hours, [appellant’s] increased income with the adoption of

11
Appellant also argues that the dis trict court erred in includin g his profit-sharing
bonus in the calculation of his 2017 gross income. The distric t court did not specifically
address this question. Therefor e, the district court either di d not consider the question or
it implicitly rejected appellant’s argument. If the former, th e question is not properly
before this court. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that,
generally, appellate courts address only those questions previo usly presented to and
considered by the district court). If the latter, the district court’s rejection of the question
is consistent with the idea that raising a question for the first time in a motion for amended
findings is “too late” for the question to be properly presente d to the district court. Allen
v. Central Motors, Inc. , 283 N.W. 490, 492 (Minn. 1939); see Antonson v. Ekvall , 186
N.W.2d 187, 189 (Minn. 1971) (stating that an issue is raised “ too late” if it is first raised
in a motion for a new trial); Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. App. 2002)
(citing these aspects of Antonson and Allen in a family law appeal), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 15, 2002). And a district court cannot abuse its discreti on by rejecting an argument
that is not properly before it.

the [workers’ agreement] has alle viated much of the effect of [ appellant’s] health
limitations on his income.” The district court found that even without the overtime pay,
appellant’s net income was “substantially more . . . than the [c]ourt previously found that
he earned for 2016.” Based on the findings in the district cou rt’s modification order, we
conclude there was a substantial change in circumstances based on appellant’s income with
or without the overtime pay.

12
B. The district court’s calculation of respondent’s income and expenses was
not clearly erroneous.

Appellant’s main contention at o ral argument before this court— since his counsel
conceded, after all, that there was a substantial change in cir cumstances based solely on
appellant’s increased income—was that the district court abused its discretion by
increasing his monthly maintenance obligation by $2,000 when re spondent’s financial
needs did not increase by more than $1,000.
The appellate courts will not usurp the district court’s role a s factfinder. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d at 202 (reiterating th at the supreme court has “crit icized before the court of
appeals’ misapplication of the scope of review when it has usurped the role of the [district]
court by reweighing the evidence and finding its own facts”) (quotation omitted). We are
“mindful of the [district] court’s extensive commentary on the record in its response to
appellant’s request for different findings of fact.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. To
successfully challenge a district court’s findings of fact, the moving party “must show that
despite viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to th e [district] court’s findings
. . . the record still requires the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id.
at 474. “That the record might s upport findings other than tho se made by the [district]
court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Id.
The dissolution judgment found th at respondent’s average monthl y expenditures
were $7,714 (exclusive of attorneys’ fees and the mortgage paym ent), but reduced her
monthly budget to $7,200 after noting that her expenses would d ecrease upon the sale of
the homestead. The court found that a spousal-maintenance award of $5,000 per month,

13
along with the court-ordered child support, would provide respo ndent with a monthly net
income of approximately $6,900—leaving her with a shortfall of $300 per month.
Less than twelve months later, the district court’s order modif ying spousal
maintenance, found that respondent maintained reasonable monthly expenses of $7,714—
of which approximately $500 per month was not being met with the original maintenance
award that reduced her monthly budget to $7,200. The court als o found that her gross
monthly income was approximately $2,093—about a $500 per month reduction since the
time of the decree. Based on a $1,300 monthly deficit ($300 + $500 + $500), combined
with the estimated tax consequen ces of a spousal-maintenance aw ard, the district court
found that an additional $2,000 per month would allow respondent to meet her expenses.
Neither party asserts that the district court’s estimated tax c alculation of $700 is
incorrect. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by increasing the
spousal-maintenance award by $2,000 per month; however, when as ked at oral argument
before this court how the district court clearly erred in its f actual determination about the
tax consequences, appellant’s counsel responded with, “I don’t know.”
Although a more comprehensive br eakdown from the district court of its findings
on the respective tax consequences would have been useful for o ur analysis, the district
court generally has discretion to estimate taxes on a maintenance award, so long as such a
calculation is not speculative. See Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d at 725 (applying the proposition
to the consideration of tax consequences of a distribution of marital property).
Here, we conclude that the district court’s estimated tax consequences were neither
speculative nor clearly erroneous. I n i t s o r d e r m o d i f y i n g s p o usal maintenance to an

14
additional $2,000 per month, the court referenced its original findings based on evidence
presented at trial, including a n after-tax cash flow submitted by a certified public
accountant. The court also expressly stated that, given the po ssible variables, it was not
able to determine the exact tax consequences of a maintenance award. But a district court’s
inability to provide the exact tax consequences of a spousal maintenance award does not
render its calculation clearly e rroneous, especially when its c alculation of those tax
consequences is not challenged, and there is no specific assertion of how the calculation is
incorrect. We, therefore, conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
increasing the spousal-maintenance award by $2,000.
C. Appellant fails to brief the district court’s denial of his mot ion for
amended findings, therefore, waiving this issue on appeal.

In appellant’s brief, he states his intention to challenge the district court’s denial of
his motion for amended findings, however, he fails to formally brief the issue. Generally,
appellate courts decline to address inadequately briefed questions. State Dep’t of Labor &
Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see also Braith
v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that the issue not properly
briefed was waived), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001).
As a result of appellant’s failure to brief the district court’s denial of his motion, we
conclude appellant waived this issue for consideration on appeal.
Affirmed.