State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0295

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan Sipola,
Appellant,

Mary Netzer,
Defendant.

Filed September 10, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-17-3447

C. Todd Koebele, William L. Moran, Lehoan T. Pham, HKM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Jenneane L. Jansen, Kris E. Palmer, Jansen & Palmer, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of respondent and abused its discretion by denying his motion to stay proceedings. We
affirm.
FACTS
In March 2017, A.H., her husband, and her mother filed a petition for damages
(complaint) against appellant Jonathan Sipola in Louisiana state court (underlying action).
The complaint alleged that in March 2016, A.H. and her mother visited New Orleans. One
night while A.H. dined alone, she began conversing with Sipola. Sipola bought A.H. a
glass of wine. “Within a few minutes of sipping the wine, [A.H.] lost all memory of the
night.” A.H. woke up naked with Sipola there. A.H. had “ a faint memory of being
showered off, given some water, and hearing two different men’s voices.” The complaint
alleged that as a result of being sexually assaulted, A.H. suffered “a large bloody gash on
her head . . . and . . . was bruised and extremely sore all over her body.”
The complaint asserted that “Sipola’s wrongful and criminal acts, including
drugging, brutally physically and sexually assaulting, raping, and kidnapping [A.H.],
caused [her, her husband , and her mother] extreme emotional distress.” The complaint
asserted that “Sipola is liable . . . for mental anguish and intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress” and is “further liable . . . pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article
2315, . . . and any other applicable Louisiana Civil Code article, law, or statute.”

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At the time of the alleged assault, Sipola was insured under a renters policy issued
by respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The policy covered claims against
Sipola “for damages because of bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence.” The policy
excluded coverage for bodily injury “expected or intended by the insured” or “which is the
result of willful and malicious acts of the insured.”
Sipola tendered the underlying action to State Farm seeking defense and
indemnification under his renters policy. State Farm defended under a reservation of rights
and filed a declaratory -judgment action in Ramsey County (coverage action) seeki ng a
determination that it had no further duty to defend and no duty to indemnify Sipola against
the claims in the underlying action.
State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the renters policy excluded
coverage because the underlying action alleged intentional acts resultin g in bodily injury.
Sipola moved to stay the coverage action until discovery was completed in the underlying
action. The district court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and denied
Sipola’s motion to stay proceedings, reasoning that the un derlying action “asserts causes
of action which are unmistakably intentional acts for which . . . State Farm would have no
duty to defend or indemnify . . . Sipola under the terms of the insurance policy issued to
him.” This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Summary judgment
Sipola argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
State Farm based on its conclusion that State Farm had no duty to defend or indemnify

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Sipola in the underlying action. This court reviews a district c ourt’s summary-judgment
decision de novo. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167,
170 (Minn. 2010). This court reviews the record “to determine whether there is any
genuine issue of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the
law.” Dahlin v. Kroening , 796 N.W.2d 503, 504 (Minn. 2011). “Interpretation of an
insurance policy, and whether a policy provides coverage in a particular situation, are
questions of law that we review de novo.” Eng’g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H.
Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2013).
“An insurer assumes two duties to its insured: the duty to defend an d the duty to
indemnify.” Reins. Ass’n of Minn. v. Timmer , 641 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 14, 2002). A duty to defend arises “when
any part of the claim is arguably within the scope of the policy’s coverage, and an insurer
who wishes to escape that duty has the burden of showing that all parts of the cause of
action fall clearly outside the scope of coverage.” Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co. , 387
N.W.2d 161, 165 –66 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted) . “ [T]o establish a duty to
indemnify, the insured must prove that all claims alleged in the complaint fall within the
policy coverage.” Timmer, 641 N.W.2d at 308. “The duty to defend is broader in scope
than the duty to indemnify.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Todd, 547 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn.
1996). In determining the existence of a duty to defend, courts compare the allegations in
the complaint in the underlying action with the relevant policy language. Meadowbrook,
Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 1997). This court may also consider
“extrinsic facts that could bring th[e] allegations within the scope of coverage.” Farm

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Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Earthsoils, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Minn. App. 2012), review
denied (Minn. June 27, 2012).
Here, the insurance policy covers claims against Sipola for bodily injury caused by
an occurrence. However, the policy does not cover bodily injury “which is either expected
or intended by the insured” or “which is the result of willful and malicious acts of the
insured[.]” The complaint in the underlying action asserted that “Sipola drugged [ A.H.],
and later that night brutally physically and sexually assaulted her, raped her, and kidnapped
her.” According to the complaint, A.H. suffered “a large bloody gash on her head” and
“was bruised and extremely sore all over her body.”
“[C]laims of nonconsensual sexual assault and battery invoke the intentional injury
exclusion as a matter of law.” R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Minn. 1995) (quotation
omitted). Therefore, to the extent the complaint alleged sexual assault and battery against
Sipola, those claims are not covered by the insurance policy. Sipola argues, however, that
because the complaint alleged damages as a result of Sipola’s negligence, State Farm owes
a duty to defend.
The complaint alleged that “Sipola is liable . . . for mental anguish and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distre ss.” The complaint also alleged that Sipola is
liable “pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, et seq.” Article 2315 states that
“[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315A (2018). Louisiana courts apply the
“duty/risk analysis” for negligence under article 2315. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16
So. 3d 1065, 1085 (La. 2009).

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Although the complaint alleged negligence claims against Sipola as well as claims
for intentional conduct, the Minnesota Supeme Court has held that an “[i]nsurer does not
have a duty to defend or indemnify its insured for a negligence claim arising out of an
alleged sexual assault by the insured.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. S.F., 518 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn.
1994). In S.F., the complainant asserted claims for “assault, battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation and sexual
battery” against three alleged assailants. Id. at 39. The insured , one of the assailants,
tendered defense of the claims to Allstate, and Allstate denied it had a duty to defend or
indemnify any of the claims. Id.
The supreme court considered whether the “complaint alleges a claim of negligence
for which there would be coverage under Allst ate’s policy.” Id. at 40. The court
determined that there was no coverage for the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claim because that allegation “is just a variation of the intentional assault claims, which are
barred by the intentional act exc lusion.” Id. And, although the victim asserted that the
insured “negligently abandoned her ” when he left her alone with the other two men who
assaulted her, the supreme court rejected this reasoning on the grounds that “it attempts to
isolate one aspect of the insured’s conduct from his whole conduct that evening and then
label it negligence.” Id. at 40-41.
Similarly, in Todd, the supreme court considered whether an insurer owed a duty to
defend its insured when the complainant alleged claims for sexual abuse, battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. 547 N.W.2d at 698.
The court addressed whether the false-imprisonment claim was “inextricably linked” with

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the intentional sexual-assault claims such that the insurer o wed no duty to defend. Id. at
699. The supreme court, relying on its holding in S.F., stated that “courts should look to
the overall intentional plan of the insured” to determine whether the insurer owes a duty to
defend. Id. (quotation omitted). The s upreme court concluded that “Todd’s overall
intentional plan was to sexually assault his daughter, not to falsely imprison her.” Id.
Therefore, the false-imprisonment claim was “inextricably linked” with the sexual-assault
claims and “excluded from cover age under the intentional bodily harm provision of the
homeowner’s policy.” Id. at 700.
Here, the complaint asserted claims arising out of an alleged sexual assault.
Applying relevant precedent, we conclude that State Farm does not owe Sipola a duty to
defend a negligence claim arising out of an alleged sexual assault. See S.F., 518 N.W.2d
at 38 (holding that an “[i]nsurer does not have a duty to defend or indemnify its insured for
a negligence claim arising out of an alleged sexual assault by the insured”). Furthermore,
to the extent Sipola argues that A.H.’s alleged head injury was the result of negligence
rather than intentional conduct, the complaint indicated that the head injury was
inextricably linked with the sexual -assault claims. To conclude otherwise would be to
“isolate one aspect of the insured’s conduct from his whole conduct . . . and then label it
negligence.” See id. at 41. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.
Motion to stay proceedings
Sipola argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to stay
proceedings pending the completion of discovery in the underlying action. “One court, in

8
its discretion, may stay the proceedings before it to allow the proceedings before . . .
[an]other court to continue.” St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Mentor Corp., 503 N.W.2d
511, 515 (Minn. App. 1993). We review the district court’s decision whether to stay
proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, the district court denied Sipola’s motion to stay proceedings in the same order
in which it granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Sipola appears to argue that
the district court’s denial of his motion to stay proceedings rendered it impossible to defend
against State Farm’s summary -judgment motion because Sipola could not use materials
obtained in discovery in the underlying action to oppose State Farm’s motion. But, to
determine whether an insurer owes its insured a duty to defend, courts “compar e the
allegations in the complaint in the underlying action with the relevant language in the
insurance policy.” Meadowbrook, Inc., 559 N.W.2d at 415. Therefore, it does not appear
that discovery in the underlying action was necessary for the district co urt to rule on State
Farm’s motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Sipola chose to invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights during his deposition in the coverage action and refused to answer
questions about the alleged sexual assault rather than offer exculpa tory testimony. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sipola’s motion to stay proceedings
pending the completion of discovery in the underlying action.
Affirmed.