Tracy Leigh Thompson o/b/o D. X. T., petitioner, Respondent,
The holding in the court’s own words
Id. Because respondent’s appointment gave her all of the guardianship powers under Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c), we conclude she has standing to seek an HRO on behalf of D.X.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Nodes 538 N.W.2d 158
- Dunham v. Roer 708 N.W.2d 552
- State v. Modern Recycling, Inc. 558 N.W.2d 770
- Witchell v. Witchell 606 N.W.2d 730
- Kush v. Mathison 683 N.W.2d 841
- Peterson v. Johnson 755 N.W.2d 758
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0309
Tracy Leigh Thompson o/b/o D. X. T., petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
David Winfred Thompson,
Appellant.
Filed November 26, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-17-6254
Tracy Leigh Thompson, Elk River, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
David Thompson, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that
(1) respondent-guardian lacked authority to seek an HRO on behalf of her ward and (2) the
record does not support an HRO. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant David Thompson married respondent Tracy Thompson in 2000, when her
son, D.X.T., was six years old. Appellant acted as a father figure to D.X.T. but did not
adopt him. The parties divorced in 2006 but had an ongoing relationship. Because D.X.T.
has a “mild mental impairment” and other health issues, when he turned 18, appellant and
respondent became his guardians. Over the years, the parties grew apart and experienced
conflict. In July 2016, appellant was discharged as D.X.T.’s co-guardian and respondent
became sole guardian.
In October 2017, respondent noticed that D.X.T. was “behaving differently” and
learned that D.X.T. was in contact with ap pellant. Respondent petitioned for an HRO
against respondent for D.X.T.’s benefit. At a hearing on the petition, respondent presented
evidence that appellant was calling D.X.T. late at night, disrupting his sleep schedule and
medication; contacting D.X.T. after work, contrary to her requests; and leaving D.X.T. in
a state where he behaved disrespectfully toward her and his foster-home host father. She
also testified that appellant and D.X.T. ’s relationship “has been explosive, really gott en
physical,” and she described a 2013 physical altercation during which appellant choked
D.X.T.
3
The district court found that appellant harassed D.X.T. by (1) physically assaulting
him in June 2013 and (2) repeatedly contacting D.X.T. in recent months contrary to
respondent’s directives, which has caused D.X.T. to “react[] negatively.” The court
granted a two-year HRO. David Thompson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Respondent has standing to seek an HRO on behalf of D.X.T.
Appellant argues that respondent lacks authority to seek an HRO on D.X.T.’s
behalf.1 We have recognized that the issue of whether a guardian may obtain an HRO on
behalf of her adult ward is a matter of standing. State v. Nodes, 538 N.W.2d 158 (Minn.
App. 1995), review granted (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 9,
1996). Whether a party has standing is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 563 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2006). Guardians have “broad” powers under Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c) (2016) to protect
the interests of their wards. Nodes, 538 N.W.2d at 161 (interpreting precursor to Minn.
Stat. § 524.5-313). “The powers of the guardian of the person . . . of an adult ward would
permit the guardian to seek [an HRO] on behalf of an adult ward.” Id. Because
respondent’s appointment gave her all of the guardianship powers under Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-313(c), we conclude she has standing to seek an HRO on behalf of D.X.T.
1 Appellant fails to support his argument with explanation or legal authority. While such
lapses may constitute waiver, see State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772
(Minn. App. 1997), we address the argument in the interests of justice.
4
II. The record supports the HRO.
We review the issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Witchell v. Witchell,
606 N.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Minn. App. 2000). We will not set aside a district court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the district court’s
opportunity to evaluate witness credibility. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Kush v. Mathison, 683
N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
A district court may issue an HRO if it finds that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that a person has engaged in harassment. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3)
(2016). “Harassment” is defined as “a single incident of physical or sexual assault ” or
“repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial
adverse effect . . . on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the
relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2016).
Appellant first argues that the record does not su pport the district court’s finding
that he physically assaulted D.X.T. by choking him, “causing him to turn red and causing
him to need medical attention.” To establish “harassment” by proof of a physical assault,
“a petitioner must prove that the respond ent intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict
bodily harm.” Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. App. 2008); see Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2016) (defining assault). Bodily harm means physical pain or
injury, illness, or any impairm ent of physical condition. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7
(2016).
Respondent testified that appellant “attacked” D.X.T. because D.X.T. “marked
[appellant’s] furniture with a scissors.” Appellant proceeded to choke D.X.T. until his face
5
turned red, stopping only when respondent intervened. Describing the situation as
“explosive,” r espondent took D.X.T. to the hospital . After checking D.X.T.’s status,
hospital personnel had respondent and D.X.T. stay “for hours” until “the situation was
calmed down.” Appellant cross-examined respondent about the altercation 2 but declined
to testify . This record amply establishes that appellant intentionally caused D.X.T.
physical pain and impaired his normal blood flow, which supports the district court’s
assault finding.
Appellant next asserts that, even if the record supports the finding that he physically
assaulted D.X.T., the record does not support an HRO because respondent did not prove
an “imminent threat or intention to do present harm.” This argument is unavailin g. The
district court also found that appellant’s recent involvement in D.X.T.’s life is unwanted
by his guardian and has negatively affected D.X.T. These unchallenged findings reflect
present harassment under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Because the record
demonstrates past and continuing harassment of D.X.T., we discern no abuse of discretion
by the district court in issuing the two-year HRO.
Affirmed.
2 Appellant contends the district court inappropriately interfered with his cross -
examination about the nature of the choke hold he used. We disagree. The record reflects
that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion to maintain decorum and focus
the proceeding on the relevant issues. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 2.02(e) (stating that a judge
is responsible for order and decorum in the court).