Gabrielle Huson, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0317

Gabrielle Huson, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Benilde-St. Margaret’s School, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 17, 2018
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-16162

Lee A. Hutton, III, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Samuel J. Nelson, Thomas B. Wieser, Meier, Kennedy & Quinn, Chartered, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Benilde-St. Margaret’s School suspended one of its hockey standouts, Gabrielle
Huson, for two days, concluding that she hosted a party where students drank alcohol. The
suspension prevented her from attending part of the school’s varsity hockey t ryouts.
Gabrielle and her mother sued the school, alleging that its student handbook constituted a
2
contract that the school breached by suspending Gabrielle after an inadequate investigation,
that the school violated Gabrielle’s due process rights, and that the school defamed both of
them. The district court dismissed the Husons’ lawsuit at summary judgment and denied
their motion to amend the complaint . The Husons argue on appeal that disputed factual
issues prevent summary judgment, and they question the district court’s jurisdiction to deny
their motion to amend the complaint. We hold that the student handbook is not a contract
and makes no promise of any disciplinary procedure, that the Husons failed to allege a
defamatory statement and present evidence that Benilde-St. Margaret’s made any statement
with actual malice , and that the district court had jurisdiction to decide the Husons’
complaint-amendment motion. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Gabrielle Huson was a sophomore hockey player at Benilde-St. Margaret’s School
during the 2016 –2017 academic year. In N ovember 2016 , A ssistant Principal Seborn
Yancy heard from a teacher that photographs o n social media depicted students drinking
alcohol at a party at the Husons’ home the previous weekend. Yancy investigated whether
Gabrielle had violated the school’s policy prohibiting hosting a party where alcohol is
present.
Yancy promptly met separately with two students pictured in the photographs. Each
admitted to drinking alcohol. Yancy’s notes indicate that one of these students offered to
provide names of others attending the party and protested, “It’s not fair, if I get in trouble
and they don’t.” That student gave Yancy a list of 33 other sophomores who attended.
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Yancy also met with Gabrielle Huson. The facts here are somewhat in dispute.
According to Yancy, Gabrielle admitted that alcohol was present at the party but said that
the students drinking the alcohol attended a different school and that she tried to stop
students f rom drinking and kicked some offenders out . When Yancy intimated that
Gabrielle had violated the student handbook, he says that Gabrielle became upset and said,
“I’m not just any other student. I have too much to lose,” referring apparently to her ability
to qualify for a college athletic scholarship.
School administrators exchanged text messages expressing concern about whether
they could show that Gabrielle knew that alcohol was present at the party. The school
suspended Gabrielle that day.
The next mo rning, Gabrielle’s mother , Christina Huson , met with school
administrators and later sent an email saying that Gabrielle denied ever telling Yancy that
she knew anyone was drinking at the party. Yancy met with other students who attended
the party, and many denied seeing alcohol. He questioned some of the m about whether
they had been in a group discussion during which the Husons coach ed students to deny
having seen alcohol. Yancy doubted some of the students because their answers seemed
prepared. According to Yancy, one student said that she had heard that the Husons had
indeed contacted students to coach the ir responses . And he says that another disclosed
receiving an email from Gabrielle’s mother about the investigation . Christina Huson has
denied contacting any students and says that Gabrielle merely told other students to email
her “a statement about if they were there and if there was drinking happening.”
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The Husons moved the district court for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
suspension from taking effect. They alleged that Gabrielle’s suspension rested only on
rumors, violated Benilde -St. Margaret’s student handbook , and jeopardized Gabrielle’s
academic and athletic prospects. They immediately also fi led a six-count civil complaint,
alleging breach of contract, procedural and substantive due process violations of the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions, defamation by compelled self -publication,
defamation, and defamation per se. The district court denied the Husons’ restraining-order
motion, and the parties conducted discovery.
Benilde-St. Margaret’s moved for summary judgment. The Husons opposed the
motion and moved the district court for leave to amend their complaint to add a claim of
sex discrimination. While the litigation was ongoing, Gabrielle was selected to play on
Benilde-St. Margaret’s varsity hockey team, and she missed no games during the season.
But the school did not accept her enrollment for her next, junior year.
The district court granted Benilde-St. Margaret’s summary-judgment motion on all
counts. And it also denied the Husons’ request for leave to amend their complaint.
The Husons appeal.
D E C I S I O N
The Husons challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their
breach-of-contract and defamation claims. Summary judgment is appropriate when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment
decision. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170
5
(Minn. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists and requires reversal if a rational trier
of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the party against whom summary
judgment was granted. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp ., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn.
2008). We first consider whether any material facts prevent summary judgment against the
Husons’ breach-of-contract or defamation claims, and then we address their argument that
the district court improperly denied their motion to amend the complaint.
I
The Husons challenge the dismissal of their breach-of-contract claims, arguing that
the school’s student handbook creates an enforceable contract that it breached by
suspending Gabrielle without following the disciplinary procedures that the handbook
outlines. To prove a breach of contract, one must first have a contract. See Briggs Transp.
Co. v. Ranzenberger , 217 N.W.2d 198, 200 ( Minn. 1974) (identifying, among other
elements necessary to prove a claim of breach of contract, the formation of a contract). A
contract has not formed without an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and consideration for
its enforceability. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille , 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 –27 (Minn.
1983). At the threshold, we observe that no Minnesota court has held that the handbooks
of private schools generally constitute contracts between the school and the student. We
are likewise unaware of any Minnesota case in which the language of any particular
school’s handbook was held to constitute such a contract. And focusing on Benilde-
St. Margaret’s handbook, t he Husons’ complaint, their briefing to the district court, their
briefing to this court, and their oral argument to this court , we must conclude that the
Husons have chronically failed to identify any handbook language t hat satisfies the
6
requisite elements of a contract . We have also examined the handbook, and we see none.
Without identifying any language that constitutes a contract, the Husons have no legal basis
on which to claim any breach of contract.
Failing to identify any terms that form a contract expressly, the Husons instead offer
general references to the handbook and ask us to infer contract -creating terms. It is true
that w e have recognized that a student may assert a breach -of-contract claim against a
private educational institution when a private school fails to provide “specifically promised
educational services” it describes in its promotional materials. Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd.,
592 N.W.2d 468, 472–74 (Minn. App. 1999). But unlike the plaintiff in Alsides, the Husons
do not ask us to infer that the school, which enters into contracts for paid educational
services generally, is bound by its promotional materials to provide some specific category
of educational services based on promotional enticements that “specifically promised”
anything. The Husons seek a greater stretch. They cite language in the handbook laudably
describing Benilde -St. Margaret’s general expression s of commitment to provid ing a
positive educational environment and to preventing and punishing chemical abuse. They
also cite the school’s warning that “[a]ny student who is determined to have violated [the]
Alcohol and Drug Policy” is subject to punishment. From these general statements, t he
Husons ask us to infer that the school has made an enforceable promise not to impose
discipline on any student until after it determines that a student has violated the school’s
chemical-abuse policy, and that it will make that determination only after some type of
formal investigation. This is too far of a reach. The handbook nowhere puts these alleged
restrictions on the school or makes promises to abide by them . Nothing in the handbook
7
prevents the school from disciplining a student for perceived drug or alcohol offenses in
addition to those that are specifically de scribed in the handbook. And nothing in the
handbook defines any particular procedure the school must follow before it decides to
discipline a student.
The Husons suggest that a jury, not the district court, should be allowed to consider
whether a contract exists. It is true that “when the issues are in doubt the existence and
terms of a contract are questions for the factfinder.” McEwen v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 281
N.W.2d 843, 845–46 (Minn. 1979). But here the issue of contract formation is not in doubt.
We hold that the breach-of-contract claim fails as a matter of law because the Husons failed
to proffer any handbook language from which a jury might reasonably conclude that the
school made an enforceable promise.
The Husons insist that they were treated unfairly because Benilde -St. Margaret’s
did not actually determine whether Gabrielle knew that alcohol was at the party before
disciplining her. The Husons point to the text message exchanged among the
administrators, apparently after at least one school official determined that Gabrielle should
be suspended, which stated, “We will have to make the determination about whether we
think she knew or not based on the accounts from other kids (we will not be telling her
that).” As a matter of law, the argument is unavailing because general complaints of
unfairness do not establish a breach of contract when no contract exists. As a more practical
matter, the policy described in the handbook might not be as demanding as the text message
suggests. A student violates the alcohol policy when she supplies alcohol at any time, and
the term “supply” includes “hosting a party in which alcohol . . . is present.” So even if
8
school officials doubted whether they could prove that Gabrielle knew alcohol was present,
the handbook suggests that she may have violated the policy if alcohol was present,
whether or not she knew it was present . Again, no contract regulating the substance or
process of the school’s disciplinary scheme exists, so we do not explore whether the
Husons’ party actually constituted a punishable policy violation.
Also concerning procedural fairness, the Husons add that the school’s discipline
lacked the necessary components of due process protected by the state and federal
constitutions and that the district court improperly rejected the constitutional due process
claims alleged in their complaint. But we do not consider arguments for reversal that were
not raised in an appellant’s principal brief. Hunter v. Anchor Bank, N.A. , 842 N.W.2d 10,
17 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014). And the Husons attempt to
raise the issue about the district court’s constitutional holding only in their reply brief on
appeal, not in their principal brief. Not only did their principal brief contain no citations to
constitutional cases or constitutional provisions, it argued specifically only that “a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether Benilde provided [Gabrielle] Huson with
sufficient notice of the allegations against h er and opportunity to be heard in accordance
with the handbook.” (Emphasis added). Likewise the Husons have not raised any claims of
due process in educational discipline sounding under common-law principles. See
Abbariao v. Hamline University School of Law , 258 N.W.2d 108, 11 2–13 (Minn. 1977)
(explaining that requirements imposed by the common law on private universities that seek
to discipline students mirror those imposed by the due process clause on public
universities). We have therefore confined our review to whether a rational trier of fact could
9
find that Benilde -St. Margaret’s discipline process breached any enforceable contract it
made with the Husons. We hold that it could not.
II
We turn to whether the Husons have identified a genuine issue of material fact to
support their claim that Benilde-St. Margaret’s defamed them. They have not. To establish
a prima facie claim of defamation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a false
and unprivileged statement to a third party , damaging the plaintiff’s reputation in the
community. Weinberger v. Maplewood Review , 668 N.W.2d 667, 673 (Minn. 2003). But
the Husons point to no specific allegedly defamatory statement at all. They again offer only
generalizations and c haracterizations. Under the well -settled rule requiring specific
pleading of defamatory language, the Husons’ failure is fatal to their defamation claim:
[I]t is well settled that the specific words which have been
published must be set out. It is not sufficient to merely state the
effect of the language, or that the publication was of a certain
defamatory tenor and import. The plaintiff cannot content
himself with drawing his own inference from the words
published, and then allege such inference, without apprising
the defendant of the words of which he complains.

American Book Co. v. Kingdom Pub. Co., 73 N.W. 1089, 1090 (Minn. 1898). This old rule
of law requiring specific defamatory language to be pleaded in the complaint survives still
under the relaxed, notice-pleading rules. See, e.g., Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 561 N.W.2d
530, 538 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997 ) (“Finally, the other
allegedly defamatory statemen ts were not contained in Benson’ s complaint. As such, the
statements were beyond the scope of his claim.”). The Husons’ complaint, discovery
10
responses, briefing to the district court, and briefing to this court on appeal fail to offer a
single, quoted, allegedly defamatory statement by anyone.
The Husons ’ general assertion characterized in their brief is that Benilde-
St. Margaret’s falsely stated that Gabrielle violated the handbook by hosting a party where
alcohol was present, that Christina Huson willingly hosted a party at her home where
minors were consuming alcohol, and that Christina Huson coached students on what to say
when questioned by Yancy. The Husons do not attribute these statements —if the se
concepts were ever reduced to statements—to anyone in particular. They quote no one. We
have carefully considered the record, and we do not know precisely what was allegedly
said, who allegedly said it, to whom it was allegedly said, how it was allegedly said, or
when it was allegedly said. Because the pleadings allege only broad characterizations rather
than any specific defamatory statement , the Husons’ defamation claim cannot survive
summary judgment.
The Husons argue that Gabrielle herself may be compelled to make a defamatory
statement against herself. Under the doctrine of compelled self-publication, a defendant is
liable for putting the plaintiff in a position to mak e a self -defaming statement if the
defendant knows or should know “of circumstances whereby the def amed person has no
reasonable means of avoiding publication.” Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur ance Soc. of the
U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986). For example, when an employer discharges an
employee under the employer’s false assertion that the employee has engaged in gross
insubordination, that “former employer in a compelled self -publication case may be held
liable as if it had actually published the defamatory statement directly to prospective
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employers” if the employee must answer the question of why she was discharged from that
employment. Id. at 889. The Husons argue that Gab rielle will be similarly compelled to
report on college applications that she was suspended for hosting a party where alcohol
was present.
The school and the Husons argue about whether the claim is too speculative to avoid
dismissal in that the claim merely assumes that Gabrielle will apply to, and be rejected by,
a college that requires her to disclose a two-day suspension. We need not address whether
the Husons have presented sufficient evidence on that dispute because the Husons’
defamation-by-self-publication claim falls under Benilde-St. Margaret’s qualified
privilege. A defamatory statement may be privileged if it is made on a proper occasion,
with a proper motive, and on reasonable grounds. Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533
N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn. App. 1995) , review denied (Minn. July 27, 1995) . “Reasonable
grounds can exist if a person has valid reasons for believing a statement, even though the
statement later proves to be false.” Id. When a school administrator’s statements are based
on an investigation, reasonable grounds for making the statements exist. Id. Flawed or not,
the school’s suspension rested on an investigation of some substance. This supports the
privilege.
The Husons correctly argue that a qualified privilege can be lost if it is abused, and
they contend that Benilde -St. Margaret’s abused its qu alified privilege. To defeat the
defense of qualified privilege , the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actual malice
led to the statement. Stuempges v. Park, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980).
While actual malice is generally a question for the jury, id., no genuine issue of material
12
fact as to actual malice exists unless the evidence would support the finding that the
defendants entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the defamatory statement, Jadwin
v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 488 (Minn. 1985). The Husons
assert that Yancy laughed after Gabrielle complained about the possible adverse effects
that her suspension would have on her hockey career and insisted that she should receive
special treatment. This, they maintain, is proof of the school’s malice. We assume for the
sake of summary judgment that Yancy laughed. His laughter in this situation does not
present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Benilde-St. Margaret’s acted with
actual malice by suspending Gabrielle. Proving actual malice requires, among other things,
a showing that the defendant had serious doubts about the truth of the allegedly defamatory
statement. Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 56 . It is therefore not enough that Yancy expressed
some insensitivity toward Gabrielle or even amusement in her punishment. The Husons
have identified no evidence that anyone responsible for suspending Gabrielle for violating
the school’s alcohol policy had any serious doubts that she hosted a party where alcoh ol
was present. Yancy reported that p arty attendees told him they saw alcohol there. And,
although Gabrielle submitted her own deposition testimony contradicting Yancy’s account
by denying she had personally seen any alcohol, the Husons offered no admissible evidence
to contradict Yancy’s recounting of what other students reported. Because the Husons
presented no evidence that anyone at the school who was involved in the decision to
suspend Gabrielle actually knew any statement about Gabrielle was false or had serious
doubts about any statement’s truthfulness, the district court rightly granted summary
judgment against the claim of defamation by compelled self-publication.
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III
The Husons argue that the district court improperly denied their motion to amend
their complaint to add a gender-discrimination claim on the contention that boys were given
favorable treatment and not suspended for similar infractions . According to the Husons,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to deny their amendment motion. We review claims of
subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction de novo. State v. Losh , 755 N.W.2d
736, 739 (Minn. 2008) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Volkman v. Hanover Invs., Inc. , 843
N.W.2d 789, 794 (Minn. App. 2014) (personal jurisdiction). The Husons maintain that the
district court had no jurisdiction to deny their motion to amend because the district court
had already granted Benilde-St. Margaret’s motion for summary judgment by the time it
addressed the amendment motion.
We reject the argument that the district court had no jurisdiction to deny the motion
to amend. A district court retains jurisdiction until it enters judgment and the judgment
becomes final. See N. Star Int ’l Trucks, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc. , 837 N.W.2d 320, 322 –23
(Minn. App. 2013). Under this framework, for example, a district court retains jurisdiction
and may even amend its prior orders until the order becomes final. Marzitelli v. City of
Little Canada, 582 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Minn. 1998). In this case, no judgment had yet been
entered on the summary judgment order, let alone become final, when the district court
decided the Husons’ motion to amend. The district court’s o rder granting the school’s
summary judgment motion did not divest the court of jurisdiction to decide the Hus ons’
pending motion to amend.
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The Husons cite the 1953 supreme court opinion of Love v. Anderson in maintaining
that the district court had no jur isdiction to decide the ir motion to amend their complaint
after deciding summary judgment against them. 61 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Minn. 1953). Their
reliance on Love is misplaced. In Love, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s fraud complaint, which the supreme court described as “ambiguous, incoherent,
contradictory, and largely unintelligible ,” for failure to state a claim . Id. at 421. The
plaintiff had also filed his own motion for summary judgment, and he argued on appeal
that the district court was bound to have decided that motion as well. The Love court
rejected the argument, stating, “The granting of defendant ’s motion to dismiss the action
ended the action. Thereafter the court was without jurisdiction to render any judgment
either for or against the plaintiff other than to enter judgment of dismissal.” Id. The Husons
attempt to unmoor the Love holding from its berth. Neither the supreme court nor this court
has ever extended the operative statement in Love to forbid a district court from resolving
issues that remain viable after it has made a dispositive decision on other issues. The Love
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was necessarily entirely resolved by the district
court’s order dismissing all of his claims under the defendant ’s competing dispositive
motion; so in that case, any decision either for or against Love’s summary judgment motion
was, in a literal sense, outside the district court’s authority on the jurisdictional ground of
mootness. By contrast here, the Husons’ motion to amend the pleading was not mooted by
summary judgment because the attempted amendment ostensibly raised claims that were
factually and legally independent of the claims dismissed by the district court’s summary
judgment order.
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It is true that appellate decisions have repeatedly declared that complaint
“amendments should be freely granted, except where to do so would result in prejudice to
the other party.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993); Metro Bldg. Cos.,
Inc. v. Ram Bldgs., Inc ., 783 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. App. 2010) , review denied (Minn.
Aug. 10, 2010) (“The district court should liberally grant motion s to amend when justice
requires and doing so will not result in prejudice to the adverse party.” ) (Quotation
omitted)). But we take no position on the question of whether the district court abused its
discretion by denying the Husons’ motion to am end their complaint. This is because on
appeal the Husons have challenged only the district court’s authority to deny their motion
to amend based on the jurisdiction of the court, not the propriety of the district court’s
exercise of its discretion based on the substance of their motion.
Affirmed.