State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0324

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Isaias Hidalgo Morales,
Appellant.

Filed August 6, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-16-4470

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pi penhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Carrie H. Peltier, Peltier Law, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge ; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the jury disregarded the presum ption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Isaias Hidalgo Morales was charged with second-degree criminal sexual
conduct after 10-year-old C.F. told an inve stigator in August 2016 about sexual contact
that occurred between herself and appellant in December 2015.
At trial, C.F. testified that her aunt is married to appellant, and C.F. would regularly
visit her aunt. On two occasions in December 2015, appellant touched her inappropriately.
On both occasions, a group of family members was present at the home for a party. C.F.
continued to visit her aunt’s house after the incidents.
According to C.F., the first time it happe ned, “the little kids were fighting in the
room, and [she] tried to get them out.” Then , “[appellant] got [her] into the room and he
pushed [her] harshly on the bed.” C.F. tried to leave. One of appellant’s children got hurt
as appellant made the children leave the room. Appellant shut the door, ran to turn off the
lights, and then began touching her while sh e was on the bed. Appellant touched her
“breast and [her] private spot” with his ha nd over her clothes. He was standing and
“touching [her] over [her] clothes and he was trying to go under, but [she] kept on hitting
him so he would stop.” Appellant “tried to pus h in [her] private spot” over her clothes.
C.F. identified her “private spot” as her vagina.
The second time it happened, C.F. was exiting the bathroom when appellant “tried
to carry [her] . . . and he brou ght [her] into the room and th en he started—he closed the
door, he turned off the lights, and then one of the kids tried to get in and they hurt his
fingers, and then he started touching [her].” Appellant touched her “chest and [her] private
spot” over her clothes.

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C.F.’s statement to an investigator was al so played to the jury . Her statement to
investigators mirrors her testimony at trial. She described the incidents to the investigator
as occurring in her aunt’s room with appellant closing the door and keeping her in the room,
appellant turning off the light, a child getting hurt, appellant touching C.F.’s breast and
vaginal area over her clothes while she hit appe llant and tried to get away, and appellant
trying to “push into” her private spot with a finger.
Appellant waived his right to remain silent and testified in his defense. Appellant
testified that he “roughhouses” with his kids and would roughhouse with C.F. too when
she was playing with the kids, but he denied ever touching C.F.’s breast or vaginal area.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
In challenging the jury’s verdict, a ppellant argues the “timing, manner, and
surrounding facts make the victim’s story implausible.” He argues the presence of family
in the house, C.F.’s continued visits with appellant, the rushed touching, and the testimony
that appellant harmed his own children to get to C.F., make C.F.’s testimony “completely
unbelievable.” Therefore, he argues, the jury “fail[ed] in their duty to act with due regard
for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Appellant essentially challenges C.F.’s credibility and the evidence upon which the
jury relied. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, appellate courts review the record
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
is sufficient to allow the jury to reach a guilty verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426,
430 (Minn. 1989). We assume that the jury “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved

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any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We
will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acti ng with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably find
the defendant guilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn.
2004). Under Minnesota law, “the testimony of a [sexual-assault] victim need not be
corroborated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2016).
To convict appellant of se cond-degree criminal sexua l conduct, the state was
required to prove that appellant engaged in sexual contact with C.F. when she was under
13 years of age and that appellant is more than 36 months older than she is. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014). To prov e “sexual contact” the state must show that
appellant “intentional[ly] touch[ed] . . . the complainant’s intimate parts” or “the clothing
covering the immediate area of the intimate pa rts” and that he did so with “sexual or
aggressive intent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, su bd. 11(a)(i), (iv) (2014). “‘Intimate parts’
includes the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being.”
Id., subd. 5 (2014).
Intent “is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in
light of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn.
1996). This court has construed second-degree criminal sexual conduct to be a “specific-
intent crime,” requiring the state to prove the defendant “intend[ed] the specific result of
touching intimate body parts”; the statute does not criminalize “merely reckless or
negligent” conduct, State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792- 93 (Minn. App. 2010), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010), or a touch with a benign intent, such as in the course of

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caregiving activities, State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 691 (Minn. 2001). Because the state
was required to prove that appellant intentionally touched C.F.’s private parts with “sexual
or aggressive intent” a circumstantial-evidence analysis is required. We apply a two-step
analysis in determini ng whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a guilty
verdict. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010). First, we identify the
circumstances proved, deferring to the jury’s verdict and, second, independently determine
whether the circumstances proved are consis tent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
C.F.’s testimony establishes the following circumstances: (1) in December 2015,
C.F. was nine and appellant was 29; (2) C.F. routinely spent time w ith appellant and his
family; (3) on two occasions in December, appe llant hosted parties with C.F. and other
family members present; (4) on both occasions, appellant lifted C.F. and placed her on his
bed; (5) appellant turned off the lights and shut the door, after removing other children
from the room; (6) he then touched the clothing over C.F.’s breasts and vagina and tried to
“push in” C.F.’s genital area wi th a finger; (7) C.F. repeatedly hit appellant to get him to
stop and ran from the room.
These circumstances prove that contact occurred between appellant and the clothing
immediately over C.F.’s genital area and breasts. While an accidental touch during
horseplay would not be sufficient to establish guilt, the surrounding circumstances of this
case demonstrate the contact was not accidental and was with sexual intent. C.F. testified
that appellant turned off th e lights, shut the door, removed any other children from the
room, attempted to “push in” her genital area with a finger, and did so while C.F. struck at

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him with the intent to get him to stop touc hing her. The privacy and the location of the
touching are facts from which his intent is reasonably inferred. The circumstances are also
sufficient to infer that appellant’s contact with C.F.’s intimate parts was intentional and not
the result of accidental contact during horseplay. The circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any hypotheses other than guilt.
Affirmed.