State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0328

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jamar Charles Young,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-31577

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Law onn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a Franks hearing
to challenge alleged misrepresentations in a search -warrant application, and the denial of
his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a no -knock provision in the wa rrant.
We affirm.
FACTS
On December 1, 2016, a detective with the Edina Police Department applied for ,
and received, a warrant to search the residence of appellant Jamar Charles Young, located
in Minneapolis. The warrant included authorization for an unannounced (no-knock) entry.
In his affidavit supporting the application, the detective stated that he met with a
concerned citizen (CC) within the previous month who reported being at that Minneapolis
residence. The CC reported observing a large amount of cocaine—approximately two
kilograms—and money, and provided a description of the person residing there . The CC
later identified Young as the person in the residence. The affidavit also included a
recitation of Young’s criminal history, which includes nu merous arrests and convictions
for drug and weapon -possession offenses. The affidavit states, without factual support,
that Young is a confirmed member of the Vice-Lord gang.
The affidavit states that in the 72 hours preceding the application for the wa rrant,
the detective performed a search of the residence’s trash. He found two dealer tear -offs
and two heat -seal bags . He also found mail addressed to Young at the address and a
prescription receipt in his name. The items collected from the garbage were ion scanned

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and alerted to the presence of cocaine. Through the course of discovery, it was revealed
that the mailer found in the garbage was addressed to Young, but bore a different address
than the residence searched , and the prescription receipt, while bearing the Minneapolis
address, was in the name of Ramaj Young (Jamar spelled backwards). Furthermore, the
affidavit did not disclose that the searched trash can was shared with another unit of the
duplex.
On December 6, 2016, officers executed a no-knock warrant to search the residence.
Among the items they recovered were: 189.19 grams of cocaine; 23.79 kilograms of
marijuana; 10 tabs of LSD; 72.5 Ecstasy pills; nearly $22,000 in cash; and a .25 caliber
handgun. The sta te charged Young with ni ne drug -related offenses and one count of
prohibited person in possession of a firearm.
Young moved to suppress the evidence due to an improperly authorized no -knock
provision in the search warrant, and for a Franks1 hearing to challenge asserted
misrepresentations contained in the application for the search warrant . The district court
denied both motions.
Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, Young waived his right to a court trial
and stipulated to the prosecution’s evidence, due to the parties’ agreement that appellate
review of the denial of Young’s pretrial motions would be dispositive. On January 4, 2018,
the district court found Young guilty of a first-degree aggravated controlled -substance

1 If a defendant makes a preliminary showing that an affidavit supporting a search warrant
contains intentional false statements necessary to the finding of probable cause, then the
Fourth Amendment requires a hearing be held at the defendant’s request to challenge the
affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978).

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crime with two aggravating factors, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(b)(2) (2016), and
prohibited person in possession of a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). The
district court sentenced Young to 135 months in prison for the controlled-substance crime
conviction, and to a concurrent 60 months in prison for the firearm conviction. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Franks Hearing
Young argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing
to challenge alleged misrepre sentations in the warrant application. The district court
determined that the misrepresentations were not material because even if the alleged
misrepresentations were removed from the warrant application and the omission supplied,
probable cause still existed to support issuance of the warrant.
In order to invalidate a search warrant on the basis of asserted misrepresentations,
Young must show that: “(1) the affiant deliberately made a statement that was false or in
reckless disregard of the truth, and (2 ) the statement was material to the probable cause
determination.” See State v. Anders en, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). “[I]f, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard
is set to one side, ther e remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a
finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-172, 98 S. Ct.
at 2684. A misrepresentation or omission is material if probable cause to issue the search
warrant no longer exists once the misrepresentation is omitted or the omission is supplied.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327.

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“A warrant is supported by probable cause if, on th e totality of the circumstances,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” State v. Holland , 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This
court reviews de novo whether an allege d misrepresentation or omission is material to a
probable-cause determination. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327.
Young asserts that the detective’s misrepresentations2 regarding the items recovered
from the trash , and the failure to disclose the fact that the trash can was shared between
both units of a duplex, undermine the probable cause supporting the warrant. In his
affidavit, the detective stated that he found in his search of the trash for the Minneapolis
address, “a mailing with [that] address in Mpls, addressed to Jamar Young. And a
prescription receipt addressed Jamar Charles Young 10/02/75 at [that] address in Mpls .”
The affidavit makes no reference to the trash can being shared with another unit. The
mailing is addressed to “Jamar Young,” but bea rs a different address. The prescription
receipt includes the Minneapolis address, but is in the name: “Young, Ramaj” with a date
of birth of “[undecipherable] 03-96.”
The district court based its finding of probable cause, independent of the asserted
misrepresentations and including the omission, upon: (1) the CC’s report of observing a
large amount of cocaine and money at the residence; (2) the CC’s identification of Young
as the person observed in the home; (3) a mailer in the shared trash bearing Young’s name;

2 Because the di strict court treated the inaccuracies in the warrant application as
“misrepresentations” without making a finding under the first prong in Franks, this opinion
refers to them as “misrepresentations” for the purpose of the materiality analysis only.

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(4) the prescription receipt in the shared trash with the correct address bearing the name
Ramaj (Jamar backwards) Young; and (5) the heat-seal bags and dealer tear-offs found in
the shared trash that alerted for the presence of cocaine. The district court concluded that
the items in the trash corroborated the CC’s information, even if they could theoretically
have belonged to the residents in the other unit of the duplex.
Probable cause exists if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in Young’s residence. See
Holland, 865 N.W.2d at 673. As the district court concluded, the information provided by
the CC, along w ith the items recovered in the trash, all combine to provide a fair
probability, based upon the totality of the circumstances , that a search of Young’s home
would yield evidence of drug trafficking.
Because the totality of the circumstances support the probable-cause determination
independent of the misrepresentations and omission, the misrepresentations and omission
are not material to that determination. See State v. Mems , 708 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Minn.
2006) (“Misrepresentations invalidate a warrant when they are . . . material to establishing
probable cause, meaning probable cause could likely not be established without them.”
(quotation omitted)). As probable cause existed independent of the misrepresentations and
the omission, the district court properly denied Young’s motion for a Franks hearing.
No-Knock Warrant
Young argues that the evidence seized from his home should be suppressed because
there was insufficient factual support to justify the no -knock pro vision in the search
warrant. Authorization for an unannounced entry must be supported by a reasonable

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suspicion that announcing their entry will be dangerous to the officers executing the
warrant, or will result in the destruction of evidence . State v. Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40,
43 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). Reasonable suspicion is
“something more than an unarticulated hunch . . . [an] officer must be able to point to
something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d
316, 320 (Minn. 2000). When the material facts are not in dispute, the reviewing court
independently determines whether the evidence obtained during execution of a no -knock
warrant should be suppressed. Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d at 43.
Here, the district court determined that the warrant application lacked a reasonable
suspicion to support the no-knock authorization, but nevertheless declined to suppress the
evidence because the officers executed the no-knock search in accordance with a judicially
authorized procedure. The district court relied on State v. Botelho for the proposition that
“when an officer complies with established procedure and obtains judicial pre-approval for
an unannounced entry, this weighs against excluding the evid ence seized.” 638 N.W.2d
770, 778 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted). Botelho relied on Wasson, wherein our
supreme court stated: “in the unannounced search context, we may accept evidence of a
threat to officer safety of a less persuasive character w hen the officer presents the request
for a no-knock warrant to a magistrate.” 615 N.W.2d at 321. However, the supreme court
in Wasson explicitly stated that it did not need to decide whether to adopt a good -faith
exception to the knock-and-announce rule. Id.
Young argues that in deciding that the search was executed in accordance with
judicial authorization, the district court relied on a good-faith exception to the requirement

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of reasonable suspicion that is unauthorized either by caselaw 3 or statute. See Garza v.
State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn. 2001) (“ The good faith of the police cannot cure the
absence of particularized circumstances in the warrant application justifying an
unannounced entry.”). In Botelho, this court held that the evidence must b e suppressed
because “the unannounced entry was not supported by reasonable suspicion.” 638 N.W.2d
at 781.
On appeal, the state argues that the district court’s denial of the motion was proper
because the no-knock request was supported by a reasonable suspicion of a threat to officer
safety. “A respondent can raise alternative arguments on appeal in defense of the
underlying decision when there are sufficient facts in the record for the appellate court to
consider the alternative theories, there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative
grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.” State v. Grunig , 660 N.W.2d
134, 137 (Minn. 2003). Furthermore, when the material facts are undisputed, as is the case
here, we independently determine whether a no-knock entry was justified. See Goodwin,
686 N.W.2d at 43 . Therefore, we review the warrant application to determine whether a
no-knock entry was justified based upon a reasonable suspicion of a threat to officer safety.

3 The state relies on State v. Lindquist, for the proposition that suppression is not warranted
when the police “have acted in good -faith reliance on a judicial determination,” but
Lindquist is not applicable to the present matter. 869 N.W.2d 863, 871 (Minn. 2015) The
court in Lindquist noted the “narrowness of [its] holding.” Id. at 876. The court explained
that “the good-faith exception adopted here applies only when law enforcement officers
act pursuant to binding appellate precedent.” Id. There is no binding precedent authorizing
a good-faith exception to the requirement of reasonable suspicion supporting a no -knock
authorization.

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The United States Supreme Court has made clear that boilerplate allegations of drug
dealing are insufficient to justify aut horization of a no -knock search. See Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 (1997) (“[T]he fact that felony drug
investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no -knock entry cannot
remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police
decision not to knock and announce in a particular case.”). “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’
entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence . . . would be dangerous or futile, or . . . allow[] the destruction of evidence . . .
This showing is not high .” Id. at 395, 1422. In Wasson, our supreme court clarified the
low showing an officer must make: “the officer could point to a particular fact about this
particular residence . . . that led him to suspect that officer safety might be jeopardized. We
think that is all Richards requires.” 615 N.W.2d at 321.
Here, the detective’s affidavit contains sufficient particularized facts to support a
finding of reasonable suspicion of a threat to his safety. The affidavit recites that Young
has a history of weapons charges: on April 2 0, 1997, h e was convicted of carrying a
handgun; on July 31, 1998, he was arrested for weapons possession and a silencer; on
January 7, 2003, officers recovered a shotgun and bulletproof vest following Young’s
narcotics arrest; on April 9, 2003, officers recovered a handgun from Young while
executing a search warrant; and on June 15, 2006, officers recovered a .40 caliber shell that
matched a hole in the floor while searching Y oung’s residence. The detective states that
Young is a confirmed member of the Vice-Lord gang, and the CC identified Young as the

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person he observed i n the Minneapolis residence with approximately two kilograms of
cocaine and money.
These factual recitations are sufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion
of a threat to officer safety justifying a no-knock entry. In Botelho, this court held that the
warrant application failed to make a particularized showing of dangerousness when it relied
on unspecified prior offenses committed by unspecified visitors to the home to be searched,
such that “ [t]here [were] no specific allegations of when, or under what circumstances,
these offenses occurred.” 638 N.W.2d at 7 79. Here, however, the warrant application
details specific dates of Young’s prior conviction and arrests for multiple weapon -based
offenses, along with the CC’s identification of Young and the detective’s statement that
Young is a gang member. These recitations set forth a particularized showing of a threat
to officer safety connected to the particular place to be searched.
The determination that Young’s prior weapons -offense history satisfies the
particularity requirement is consistent with State v. Barnes, wherein this court held that a
warrant application that showed that the defendant “had a prior criminal record and that
the level of drug trafficking was very high . . . . did not rely on the simple generalization,
rejected in Richards, that all drug dealing involves weapons.” 618 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Minn.
App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
The detective’s affidavit provides particular facts about Young’s criminal record,
and his connection to the residence, to satisfy the particularity requirement for a showing
of reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would endanger the
officers’ safety. The district court’s denial of Young’s mo tion to suppress is therefore

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affirmed, not upon the district court’s reliance on Botelho, but instead upon the alternative
theory raised by the state that reasonable suspicion existed to support the no -knock
authorization.
Affirmed.