State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0338

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

R. M. S., a/k/a R. M. F., a/k/a R. M. W.,
Appellant.

Filed October 22, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-00-034065, 27-CR-03-075520, 27-CR-04-032211
27-CR-04-067060, 27-CR-04-076981, 27-CR-05-010543, 27-CR-06-024503,
27-CR-87-903018, 27-CR-88-900918, 27-CR-06-048539

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

R.M.F., Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her expungement petition. We
affirm.

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FACTS
In 2015, appellant R.M.S. filed a petition to expunge 15 criminal records . Th e
district court denied the petition with respect to ten records. R.M.S. did not appeal.
In August 2017, R.M.S. filed another petition to expunge the remaining ten criminal
records. R.M.S. claimed that she was seeking expungement for employment pur poses.
She stated that she had worked for a compan y for six years, but was let go after the
company merged with another and discovered her lengthy criminal record. R.M.S.
provided a copy of a lette r terminating her employment. R.M.S. stated that she has been
at her current job for three years, but earns half of what she earned at her last employment.
R.M.S. stated that she has no advancement opportunities and submitted a letter from a
prospective employer indicating that a background check included information having an
unfavorable effect on a conditional offer of employment. R.M.S. stated that she obtained
a degree in addiction counseling, but submitted a letter indicating that a background study
found factors disqualifying her from certain positions. R.M.S. stated that she has
guardianship of her granddaughter , and claimed that if she is unable to care for her, she
will “have to give her to the state.” R.M.S. stated that her house is in foreclosure, and
submitted a letter indicating that she did not qualify for public housing.
R.M.S. indicated that she was convicted of driving while impaired (DWI) in 2016,
and was currently on probation. R.M.S. argued that her DWI conviction was different from
her past convictions, and asserted tha t she has been a ble to maintain sobriety despite the
DWI conviction, because cocaine was her drug of choice, but she has not done it in many
years.

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In January 2018, the district court denied R.M.S.’s petition. The district court found
that R.M.S. pleaded guilty to:
1. gross-misdemeanor wrongfully obtaining public
assistance and was convicted and sentenced in July 2000;
2. felony temporarily taking a motor vehicle and was
convicted and sentenced in October 2003;
3. misdemeanor theft and was convicted and sentenced in
February 2005;
4. aiding and abetting felony offering a forged check and
was convicted and sentenced in February 2005;
5. felony offering a forged check and was convicted and
sentenced in February 2005;
6. gross-misdemeanor false information to police and . . .
failure to obey traffic control device and was convicted and
sentenced in April 2005;
7. felony check forgery and was convicted and sentenced
in June 2006;
8. felony attempt to offer a forged check and was
convicted and sentenced in March 2007;
9. felony offering a forged check and was convicted and
sentenced in August 1988; and
10. felony offering a forged check and was convicted and
sentenced in August 1988.

The district court concluded that, because R.M.S. has a recent conviction, she does
not qualify for statutory expungement. The district court denied the petition after applying
a five-part test in exercising its inherent authority. The district court concluded that R.M.S.
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits she would receive are
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and
burden on the court in issuing and enforcing the expungement order. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews a district court’ s expungement decision for an abuse of
discretion. State v. M.D.T. , 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013); State v. Ambaye , 616

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N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000) (stating that this court reviews a district court’s exercise of
its inherent authority to expunge criminal records for abuse of di scretion). We review a
district court’s findings of fact for clear error. State v. A.S.E., 835 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn.
App. 2013). This court will not reverse the decision unless the district court acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, the district court based its decision on an erroneous
interpretation of the law, or the district court’s ruling is against the facts in the record. State
v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Minn. 2012). T he “interpretation of the expungement
statute is a legal question subject to de novo review.” State v. D.R.F., 878 N.W.2d 33, 35
(Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
There are two bases in Minnesota for expungement of criminal records —pursuant
to statute or under a district court’s inherent authority. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609A.01-.04
(2016); M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. The district court determined that at the time R.M.S.
filed her petition she did not qualify for statutory expungement because of her DWI
conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3)-(5) (providing that, to qualify for
statutory expungement, a petitioner must not have been convicted of a new crime for at
least two years since discharge of a misdemeanor sentence, four years for a gross -
misdemeanor sentence, and five years for certain felony sentenc es); see also State v.
C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. App. 2018) (interpreting the statutory language of
section 609A.02, subdivision 3 “to mean that the two - and four -year conviction -free
periods must occur between the date of discharge of the sentence for the crime . . . and the
date of filing an expungement petition”).

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R.M.S. does not argue that her convictions qualify for statutory expungement;
instead she claims that she does not understand why some records were expunged and
others were not. However, R.M.S. did not appeal the 2015 expungement order that granted
the expungement of five records and denied t he expungement of ten records. Rather, she
appeals the 2018 order that denied expungement of ten records. Thus, it is not properly
before this court to analyze the distinction between the two groups of criminal records.
R.M.S. also argues that the offenses are dated, and that other than Hennepin County,
there was no objection to expungement. But even if R.M.S.’s convictions qualified for
statutory expungement, the fact that some of the convictions occurred many years ago is
but one of twelve factors that a district court considers in determining whether to grant an
expungement pursuant to statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(c) (stating that a
district court considers: nature and severity of the underlying crime, petitioner’s risk to
society, how long ago the crime occurred, steps toward rehabilitation, aggravating or
mitigating factors relating to the u nderlying crime, reasons for expungement, criminal
record, employment and community involvement, recommendations of law enforcement
and prosecutors, recommendations of victims, outstanding restitution, and other relevant
factors). Additionally, R.M.S. is incorrect in asserting that only Hennepin County objected
to the petition. The record shows that the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Brooklyn
Park City Attorney’s office, and Hennepin County Attorney’s office objected to the
petition.
Here, the district court considered whether to exercise its inherent authority to grant
R.M.S.’s petition to expunge criminal records held by the judicial branch. See M.D.T., 831

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N.W.2d at 284 (concluding that a district court has inherent authority to expunge records
held by the judicial branch, but not records held by the executive branch). A district court
may exercise its inherent authority to expunge criminal records in two situations —when
the petitioner’s constitutional rights are infringed by retention of the rec ord or when the
district court decides that “expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate
with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on
the court in issuing, enforcing and moni toring an expunge ment order.” Ambaye, 616
N.W.2d at 258. R.M.S. does not claim that her constitutional rights are infringed; thus, the
district court weighed the benefits to R.M.S. if the expungement were granted against the
disadvantages to the public from elimination o f the record and the burden on the court in
enforcing the order. The district court considered five factors:
(a) the extent that a petitioner has demonstrated difficulties in
securing employment or housing as a result of the records
sought to be expunged; (b) the seriousness and nature of the
offense; (c) the potential risk that the petitioner poses and how
this affects the public’ s right to access the records; (d) any
additional offenses or rehabilitative efforts since the offense,
and (e) other objective evidence of hardship under the
circumstances.

See State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. 2006).

The district court found that R.M.S. has been employed for three years. The district
court found that R.M.S. claimed that her home may be foreclosed, but failed to offer
documentation of her housing issues. The district court found that R.M.S. has an extensive
criminal record, has many felony convictions, and was a “prolific forger.” The district
court determined that R.M.S.’s recent DWI conviction en dangered the public and

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evidenced that she has not achieved control over her use of chemicals. The district court
determined that R.M.S. “ has not shown rehabilitation.” The district court’s findings are
not clearly erroneous as they are supported by the record.
R.M.S. argues that only she should “bear the repercussions” of her criminal
behavior, but her granddaughter will unfairly “incur the effect.” T he district court
referenced its 2015 order in its 2018 order. In the 2015 order , the district court
acknowledged the “stark” contrast between R.M.S.’s “two-decade criminal lifestyle” and
more recent crime -free period. But the district court found that the public interest in
keeping the records accessible was “significant” and that while R.M.S.’s “recent good
conduct” was somewhat mitigating, “too little time has passed to conclude that [R.M.S.] is
fully rehabilitated.” These findings were made prior to R.M.S.’s DWI conviction. Thus,
while R.M.S. is concerned with how her criminal past could affect her granddaughter, the
district court is justifiably concerned with how R.M.S.’s criminal past could affect the
general public. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying R.M.S.’s petition.
Affirmed.