In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Percy Jones.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0347

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Percy Jones.

Filed July 30, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-16-593

Kathleen K. Rauenhorst, Ra uenhorst & Associate, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for
appellant Percy Jones)

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Timothy Carey, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his indeterminate co mmitment as mentally ill and dangerous.
We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2016, respondent Ramsey County petitioned to commit appellant
Percy Jones as mentally ill and dangerous (MID). The district court ordered Jones’s initial
commitment and conducted a final determination hearing in October 2017. At the hearing,

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the district court received the following exhibits: the Minnesota Security Hospital (MSH)
60-day report by Dr. Stephanie Bruss, Dr. Thomas Alberg’s report, Dr. Peter Meyer’s
report, and MSH records from March 9, 2017 through July 17, 2017.
Following the hearing, the district c ourt concluded that “clear and convincing
evidence was presented . . . that [Jones] continues to be a person who is [MID],” and that
“there is no evidence of a less restrictive alternative that is available to meet both [Jones’s]
treatment needs and the needs of public safe ty other than treatment at the [MSH].” In
reaching it decision, the district court relied heavily upon the report submitted by Dr. Bruss,
who concluded that “the treatment program at MSH is most appropriate for Mr. Jones.”
Based on the reports of Dr. Meyers and Dr. Al berg, the district court also concluded that
Jones meets the statutory criteria for commi tment as MID and therefore committed Jones
as an MID person for an indeterminate period of time.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Under Minnesota law, a district court “s hall commit the person to a secure treatment
facility or to a treatment facility willing to accept the patient under commitment” if it “finds
by clear and convincing evidence that [a] proposed patient is a person who is [MID] to the
public.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a) (2016). A proposed patient is MID if he or she
(1) is mentally ill and (2) as a result of that mental illness, presents a “clear danger to the
safety of others” as demonstrated by the facts that the proposed patient has “engaged in an
overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to a nother” and there is a
“substantial likelihood” that the proposed patient “will engage in acts capable of inflicting

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serious physical harm.” Minn. Stat. § 253B. 02, subd. 17 (2016). The district court may
decline to commit a person who meets the MID criteria to a secure treatment facility only
if the proposed patient establishes by clear a nd convincing evidence that a less-restrictive
treatment program is available that is consis tent with the proposed patient’s treatment
needs and the requirements of public safety. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a).
This court reviews a district court’s civil-commitment decision to determine
whether the district court complied with the statute and whether the evidence in the record
supports the findings of fact. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). The district
court’s factual findings are reviewed for cl ear error to determin e whether they are
supported by the record as a whole. In re Civil Commitment of Ince , 847 N.W.2d 13, 22
(Minn. 2014). We view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision
and give due regard to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.
Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620. But we review de nov o the issue of whether the facts satisfy
the statutory criteria for commitment. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. 1994).
Jones challenges the district court’s order indeterminately committing him as MID.
Although Jones concedes that he “suffers from a mental illness,” he argues that (A) the
county did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he caused or attempted to cause
harm to another; (B) the county did not pr ove by clear and convincing evidence that a
substantial likelihood existed th at he would engage in acts capable of inflicting serious
physical harm to another; and (C) he dem onstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
a less-restrictive alternative to commitment was available.

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Harm to another
An individual may not be committed as MID unless the individual performed at
least one “overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.” Minn.
Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a)(2)(i). A person attempts to cause serious physical harm if the
overt dangerous act is capable of causing serious physical harm. In re Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d
192, 195 (Minn. 1989). Because the term “serious,” is not defined in the statute, Minnesota
courts have used the co mmon understanding of the word for interpretation. In re Lufsky,
388 N.W.2d 763, 765–66 (Minn. App. 1986).
Jones argues that he does not meet th e statutory criteria to be held for an
indeterminate period of time as MID because no evidence shows that he caused serious
physical harm or that he intended to cause physical harm. We disagree. The record here
reflects that from 1990 to 20 04, Jones was incarcerated in Indiana for voluntary
manslaughter, stemming from an incident in which Jones shot and killed a security guard
during an attempted automobile theft. The record also reflects that Jones was incarcerated
in Minnesota for several years following an assault in 2007. The events of the 2007 assault
involved Jones threatening to kill his girlfriend with a knife, cutting her “throat with the tip
of the knife,” and chasing her through her apartment. State v. Jones, No. A09-0932, 2010
WL 2265610, at *1 (Minn. App. June 8, 2010), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010). Jones
also woke his girlfriend’s infant daughter, and threatened to kill the infant unless his
girlfriend gave him money. Id. Also in 2007, Jones’s mother reported that Jones “violently
choked her on the kitchen floor after being pr ompted to take a bath.” She believed that
Jones “intended to kill her,” a nd that without her husband’s intervention, she would have

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sustained serious injury. This record provides ample evid ence supporting the district
court’s determination that Jones engaged in overt acts causing or attempting to cause
serious physical harm.
Substantial likelihood of future harm
Jones also challenges the district court’s determination that a substantial likelihood
exists that he will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious harm on another. To satisfy
this element, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Jones poses a
substantial likelihood of engaging in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm in the
future. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a)(2)(i) (defining MID). A district court’s
consideration of past conduct is appropriate in determining the likelihood of future danger.
See Carroll, 706 N.W.2d at 531 (considering patient’s records, which were “replete with
documentation of violent outbursts and physical assaults”). As discussed above, Jones has
a history of violent conduct, including convictions of manslaughter and assault. The record
also describes a tragic incident in 1992, du ring Jones’s incarceration in Indiana, when
inmates lit Jones on fire after pouring gasoline on him while he slept. As a result, Jones
suffered significant burns that re quired skin grafts. According to Dr. Bruss’s report, after
being burned, Jones began hearing voices and was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.
Jones nonetheless consistently denies his mental illness. He told Dr. Bruss that nothing is
wrong with him and denied any need for treatment.
Dr. Bruss reported that Jones “has a signi ficant history of noncompliance with his
medications, particularly wh en not under court supervis ion,” and has a history of
“becoming very violent when decompensated.” For example, Dr. Bruss reported that in

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August 2011, Jones made ‘“intimidating/threatening statements towards staff,”’ including
that if staff ‘“keep f-cking wi th me, they will see what’s up !’” The records also reflect a
report in March 2015 that other inmates were afraid of Jones. Dr. Bruss also recounted that
Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center reco rds indicate that be tween July 2015 and
March 2017, Jones had 14 documented incidents of aggression and threatening behaviors,
including several threats to kill staff members.
In addition to Jones’s viol ent behavior in correction an d treatment facilities, Jones
has displayed similar conduct toward relatives. As noted above, Jones “violently choked”
his mother. And in December 2015, shortly afte r being discharged from incarceration on
his sentence for assault, and while residing in his son’s home, J ones stopped taking his
medications and began showing “increased paranoia and di splaying bizarre behaviors,”
prompting his son to call police “due to concerns for the safety of small children.”
Based on Jones’s behaviors, Dr. Bruss concluded that a substantial likelihood exists
that Jones will engage in acts capable of in flicting serious physical harm on another.
Specifically, she determined:
overall, results of the HCR-20-V31 . . . suggests that Mr. Jones
is at an increased baseline risk of engaging in future violent
acts due to a number of historical risk factors. Moreover, his
risk for future violence if further elevated beyond the baseline
by the aforementioned dynamic (clinical) risk factors, and
when considering any reduction of supervision, such as a
return to the community, his risk is further elevated beyond
baseline by several risk management factors. Mr. Jones has

1 “The HCR-20-V3 is a research driven instrument designed to structure clinical judgments
and facilitate assessments of ri sk for interpersonal violence, defined as actual, attempted,
or threatened infliction of physical or serious psychological harm on another person, with
some degree of willfulness.”

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engaged in an overt act, resulting in the fatality of his victim.
It appears as though his ment al illness developed after this
overt act. However, since the development of his mental
illness, he has persistently and frequently acted out
aggressively both in the co mmunity and in institutional
settings. Mr. Jones has a signifi cant history of psychiatric
decompensation in the context of medication noncompliance
and a history of aggressi on and violence when he
decompensates. Mr. Jones has virtually no insight into his
mental illness or its link to his aggressive behavior, and his
concomitant need for treatment. Mr. Jones continues to exhibit
fixed, treatment refractory, delusional beliefs of paranoid
ideation (e.g., that others are trying to kill him), and has made
several comments that he will physically defend himself
against those trying to harm him.

(footnote added). The other two court-appoin ted examiners echoed Dr. Bruss’s concerns,
concluding that a substantial likelihood exists that Jones will engage in acts capable of
inflicting serious physical harm on another.
In sum, the record is repl ete with evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion
that a substantial likelihood ex ists that Jones will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious physical harm to others. The district court therefore did not err by concluding that
Jones meets the statutory requirements to be committed as MID.
Less-restrictive alternative
A district court may decline to commit a person who meets the criteria for MID to
a secure treatment facility only if the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that a less-restrictive treatment program is av ailable that is consistent with the person’s
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a).
We consider the record to determine whether the evidence as a whole substantially supports
the district court’s conclusion. Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 22.

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Jones argues that a less-restrictive a lternative treatment program is available
because “[b]y ordinary commitment as mentally ill under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13,
the county and court could establish conditions which would control his ability to commit
the acts upon which this commitment is predicated.” But Jones has the burden to establish
the availability of a less-restrictive alternative treatment program, and he offers no evidence
to support his position. Moreover, the reco rd overwhelmingly reflects that such an
alternative is not available. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a) (explaining requirements
for commitment). For example, Dr. Meyers’s report details Jones’s “Psychiatric Treatment
and Placement History.” Since Jones’s releas e from Indiana State Prison in 2005, and
notwithstanding his time served in Minnesota State Prison for his assault conviction, Jones
has spent the majority of the last 13 years in psychiatric-treatment facilities. As noted
above, he failed to adhere to his medication regimen after discharge to his son’s home in
December 2015 and quickly deco mpensated, resulting in polic e intervention. All of the
examiners opined that no less-restrictive alternative is available, and Jones failed to rebut
the evidence. Accordingly, th e district court did not err by indeterminately committing
Jones as MID.
Affirmed.