State of Minnesota,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-0353

Court of Appeals Thissen, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
vs. Filed November 27, 2019
Office of Appellate Courts
James Wilmar Poehler,

Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Att orney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
respondent/cross-appellant.

Paul Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota, for
appellant/cross-respondent.

S Y L L A B U S

Reasonable suspicion of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2018),
exists when a law enforcement officer observes a driver not wearing a seat belt.
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellant/Cross-Respondent James Wilmar Poehler challenges his convictions for
driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), 169A.26, subd. 2
(2018), and violating a driver’s license restriction as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 171.09,
subd. 1(f)(1) (2018). The district court denied Poehler’s motion to suppress, finding that
the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The court of appeals affirmed. On
appeal, Poehler argues that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the
traffic stop that led to his arrest. We hold that , based on the officer’s observation that
Poehler was not wearing a seat belt, the officer formed a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Poehler violated Minnesota’s mandatory seat belt law. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
On August 26, 2016, Officer Matthew Giese of the Cambridge Police Department
was working a “Toward Zero Deaths” shift in Cambridge, patrolling for individuals driving
under the influence . Officer Giese passed a vehicle driving in the opposite direction.
Because he observed that the vehicle “had a cracked windshield” and it “appeared the
driver was not wearing a seat belt ,” Officer Giese initiated a traffic stop. The officer
approached the car and started a conversation with the driver, who he later identified as
James Poehler.
Officer Giese informed Poehler that he had been stopped because the car’s
windshield was cracked and because it did not appear that Poehler was wearing his

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seat belt.1 When Officer Giese stepped up to Poehler’s window, Poehler w as wearing his
seat belt and he told Officer Giese that he had been wearing it the whole time . Officer
Giese pointed to a piece of equipment hanging in the driver’s side window of Poehler’s car
that had led him to believe that Poehler was not wearing a seat belt. Officer Giese reiterated
that the stop was also due to the cracked windshield. Poehler acknowledged that his
windshield was cracked and stated that he had been meaning to have it repaired.
During this exchange, Officer Giese noticed that Poehler avoided direct eye contact,
had bloodshot, watery eyes, and slurred his speech . After running Poehler’s driver’s
license information, Officer Giese determined that Poehler had a restricted license that
prohibited him from using any alcohol or drugs. He asked Poehler if he had been drinking,
and Poehler admitted that he had a beer earlier in the day. Because the terms of his license
prohibited Poehler from consuming any drugs or alcohol, Officer Giese asked that Poehler
take a preliminary breath test. Poehler blew a .174, which is over twice the legal limit in
Minnesota. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2018). Officer Giese arrested Poehler.
The State charged Poehler with driving while impaired and violating his driver’s
license restriction. Poehler moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop,
alleging that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. The State argued that Officer Giese’s

1 Minnesota Statutes § 169.71, subd. 1(a) (2018), states that “[a] person shall not drive
or operate any motor vehicle with: (1) a windshield cracked or discolored to an extent to
limit or obstruct proper vision [.]” Minnesota Statutes § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2018),
requires that “a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt . . . be worn by the driver and
passengers of a passenger vehicle[.]”

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observation of the crack in Poehler’s windshield and his observation that Poehler was not
wearing a seat belt each independently justified the stop.
The district court denied Poehler’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
the stop. The court concluded that Officer Giese’s observation of the crack in Poehler’s
windshield provided the o fficer with a sufficient basis to stop Poehler. In its legal
conclusions, the court did not address the seat belt violation as a justification for the stop.
In its factual findings, however, the court stated that “[i]t did not appear to the detective
that the driver was wearing a seatbelt.”
To obtain appellate review of the pretrial ruling, Poehler and the State stipulated to
the prosecution’s case. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4; see also State v. Myhre, 875
N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 2016) (stating that Rule 26.01 “allows a criminal defendant to
plead not guilty; waive all trial -related rights, including his or her right to a jur y trial;
stipulate to the state’s evidence in a trial to the court; and then appeal a dispositive, pretrial
ruling”). The district court found Poehler guilty of driving while impaired and violating a
driver’s license restriction.
Poehler appealed the denial of his suppression motion . The court of appeals held
that Officer Giese was not justified in stopping Poehler for the crack in his windshield. See
State v. Poehler, 921 N.W.2d 577, 581 –82 (Minn. App. 2018). Nonetheless, the court of
appeals held that the evidence in the record supported a conclusion that Officer Giese had
reasonable suspicion that Poehler was not wearing his seat belt. See id. at 582. It therefore
affirmed the district court’s suppression order. Id. at 583.

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We granted Poehler’s petition for review on the seat-belt violation and granted the
State’s conditional petition for cross-review on the cracked-windshield violation.
ANALYSIS
On appeal of a district court’s denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn.
2009). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10,
of the Minnesota Constitution govern the legality of seizures of a person, including brief
investigatory stops of automobiles. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981);
see also State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004). 2 To justify a sto p, an
officer must have reasonable grounds for doing so. Reasonable grounds exist when the
officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped

2 Poehler does not argue that the Minnesota Constitution provides broader protection
for him under the circumstances of this case. Poehler’s only mention of broader protections
under the Minnesota Constitution is a citation to State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361–
63 (Minn. 2004). In Askerooth, we held that a warrantless arrest for a traffic violation must
be reasonable and supported by individualized suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 365.
To determine w hether the warrantless arrest i s reasonable, the Minnesota C onstitution
requires that the individual’s privacy interests be balanced against the police officer’s need
to arrest the individual. Id. We stated that such a balancing inquiry was required under
the Minnesota Constitution for warrantless arrests supported by probable cause even if such
a balancing of interests was no longer required under the Fourth Amendment following the
United States Supreme Court decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista , 532 U.S. 318
(2001). Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 363. In this case, no one disagrees that both the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions require a reasonable , articulable, objective suspicion
of individualized criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. And Poehler does not articulate
any higher standard for a traffic stop under the Min nesota Constitution. Accordingly, we
do not consider whether the Minnesota Constitution provides broader protections in a case
such as this one.

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of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 –18. The officer must be able to articulate
more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[.]’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 99 (Minn. 1999).
If the facts upon which the officer relies turn out to be mistaken, those mistake n
facts may still support a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a person of
criminal activity. This is true as long as the officer’s mistake was itself objectively
reasonable and consistent with the purpose for the officer’s intrusion on individual privacy
under the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177 , 185–86
(1990); State v. Sanders , 339 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. 1983) ; cf. State v. Frazier , 318
N.W.2d 42, 43–44 (Minn. 1982) (affirming the grant of a suppression motion because the
officers’ mistake was unreasonable).
We examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a trained police
officer to determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists. State v. Lemert, 843
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014). When an officer observes a violation of the traffic law s,
there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Minn. 1997).
Driving without a seat belt is a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2018).
When an officer observes a driver not wearing a seat belt, he has a reasonable suspicion to
stop that person for criminal activity. But the officer must be able to articulate facts—more
than an undeveloped hunch —that support the conclusion that the officer observed the
driver not wearing a seat belt.

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The district court did not clearly err by finding that “it did not appear to the [officer]
that [Poehler] was wearing a seatbelt.”3 When he first approached the car, Officer Gi ese
told Poehler that he had been stopped for two reasons: the windshield violation and the seat
belt violation. Officer Giese reiterated this explanation at least one more time during the
course of the stop and arrest. In the incident report, Officer Gi ese noted Poehler’s failure
to wear a seat belt as a reason for the stop. He wrote that he initiated the traffic stop after
observing that “it appeared the driver was not wearing his seatbelt.” Finally, during his
testimony before the district court, Off icer Giese stated that he stopped Poehler “for him
not wearing his seat belt.” These statements show that Officer Giese observed Poehler not
wearing a seat belt.
Poehler argues that Officer Giese’s phrasing that “it appeared” Poehler was not
wearing a seat belt is too equivocal to conclude that the officer actually saw Poehler without
a seat belt on. But after reviewing the entire record, we conclude that Officer Giese’s use
of the word “appeared” is, under the circumstances of this case, a clear enough w ay of

3 Poehler argues that the record is not developed enough for us to reach the question
of whether reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation existed. We disagree. When the
State has raised and argued before the district court that a stop was justified for several
independent reasons, and the State creates a record to support each reason, an appellate
court may affirm a decision when “there are sufficient facts in the record for the appellate
court to consider the alternative theories, there is legal support for the arguments, and the
alternative grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.” State v. Grunig, 660
N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.04, subd. 6 (“The court may
permit a party, without filing a cross -petition, to defend a decision or judgment on any
ground that the law and record permit that would not expand the relief that has been granted
to the party.”). Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the record is
sufficiently developed for us to reach this issue.

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saying that he observed that Poehler was not wearing a seat belt. Officer Giese’s word
choice therefore does not leave us “with the definite and firm conviction” that the district
court erred. See Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).4
Poehler also argues that he was in fact wearing a seat belt when Officer Giese passed
him, rendering the stop invalid . As support, Poehler points out that it is uncontested that
he was wearing a seat belt when Officer Giese approached his car within minutes after the
officer’s initial observation. After our review of the totality of t he circumstances
surrounding this stop, we do not agree that the stop becomes invalid because Poehler was
wearing a seat belt after he was stopped . Officer Giese testified (and the district court
found) that when he passed Poehler, it appeared to Officer Giese that Poehler was not
wearing his seat belt. After Officer Giese walked up to Poehler’s window following the
stop, he observed a vehicle part hanging down , which was consistent with his
observation—even if mistaken —that Poehler’s seat belt was off. This case is unusual
because generally little ambiguity exists as to whether a person’s seat belt is buckled. But
based on our deferential review of the district cour t’s finding about the seat belt , we
conclude that, even if Officer Giese’s observation that Poehler was wearing his seat belt
was mistaken, the mistake was objectively reasonable in the cont ext of the purpose of the

4 Poehler does not argue that Officer Giese’s reliance on a seat belt violation to justify
the stop was mere pretext for conducting a broader investigation into whether Poehler was
drinking and driving.

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stop and the totality of the circumstances. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 18 5–86; Sanders,
339 N.W.2d at 560.5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

5 Because we conclude that Officer Giese had reasonable suspicion of a seat belt
violation, we need not reach the question of whether he had a reasonable suspicion of a
violation of the statute prohibiting “windshield[s] cracked or discolored to an extent to limit
or obstruct proper vision[.]” See Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1(a)(1).