State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0354

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eddie Kamor James,
Appellant.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-9656

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Co unty Attorney, Patrick Lofton, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Roy G. Sp urbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ro ss, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judg e ; a n d J e s s o n ,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After an argument at a bar, appellant Eddie Kamor James chased L.L.’s car, grabbed
her by the hair, forced her into a van, and sexually assaulted her. A jury convicted James

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of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping, convictions which he now appeals.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion during voir dire or
by admitting evidence that member s of James’s family threatened a state witness, and
because James’s pro se claims do not warrant relief, we affirm James’s convictions. But
we reverse and remand for resenten cing because the district cou rt erred by sentencing
James for first-degree criminal sexual conduct before sentencing him for kidnapping.
FACTS
On March 7, 2017, after having a few drinks at her cousin’s house, 32-year-old L.L.
and her cousin went to a bar in Minneapolis for last call. At the bar, L.L. continued
drinking. She testified that although she was tipsy, she was not intoxicated.
The events surrounding L.L.’s departure from the bar are disputed. But what is not
in question is that at some point when L.L. and her cousin were leaving, L.L. began talking
to appellant Eddie Kamor James. L.L. testified that she did not know James well, but that
she had known of him for several years because he previously dated her best friend’s sister.
According to L.L., shortly after she left the bar with her cou sin and got into her
cousin’s car, James came out a s well. He then approached their car, and the group had a
conversation. The conversation became heated. L.L.’s cousin’s fiancé and a group of other
people approached the car. James then became belligerent, started shouting, and L.L. saw
James go to his vehicle and pop the trunk, which she thought meant he was getting a gun.
L.L. and her cousin drove away.
While they were driving, L.L. and her cousin noticed headlight s behind them and
thought it might be James chasing them. The vehicle, a white v an, pulled alongside their

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car. Once the van was next to their car, L.L. could tell that James was the driver and noticed
that he had his hand down as if he had a weapon. Although L.L. tried to call the police,
she panicked and dropped her phone. L.L.’s cousin, attempting to get away from James,
pulled over in a lawn, jumped out of the vehicle, and ran away, leaving the driver’s door
open. L.L. testified that she stayed in the car because she wa s afraid she might get shot.
According to L.L., James then got out of his van, took L.L.’s wallet and both women’s cell
phones, and grabbed her by her hair and made her get in the white van. L.L. testified that
she pleaded with James to not hurt her, but that he told her “[b]-tch, come on” and “[i]f you
try to run, I’ll shoot you.”
Once L.L. was in the passenger seat of the white van, James dr ove away quickly,
eventually stopping on a side street. During the drive, L.L. stated that she was crying and
that James continued to threaten her. When James stopped the van, he asked L.L. to “suck
his dick,” and when she told him no, he backhanded her in the face. Scared, L.L. performed
oral sex on James. Afterwards, James ordered L.L. to take her pants off and climb in the
back seat of the van. L.L., afraid that James would shoot her, did so. James proceeded to
rape L.L., putting his penis in her vagina while saying “[y]ou know I wanted this.” James
did not ejaculate and eventually became “limp,” so he asked L.L. to “suck it again.” L.L.
refused and told James she needed to urinate. After L.L. urina ted a bit in the van, James
let her out of the van to finish urinating.
While L.L. urinated outside the van, James went through her wallet and the phones,
and eventually drove away with the van’s passenger door still o pen. James then shut the
passenger door, backed up, asked L.L. if she wanted to get something to eat, and drove off.

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L.L. hid between two houses, and when she felt that it was safe , knocked on a stranger’s
door, who called the police. During that call, L.L. gave polic e the van’s license plate
number—which she memorized—and told them she was assaulted by a man named Eddie.
She later went to a hospital, where a sexual assault exam was performed.
Based on L.L.’s statement to po lice, police identified James as a potential suspect.
L.L. identified James from a photo police showed her. Police officers arrested James, and
the state charged him with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct1 and one count
of kidnapping.2
At trial, L.L. testified about what happened, as described abov e. L.L. further
testified that she never consented to having sex with James, that she had never previously
hung-out with James or had consensual sex with him, that she ha d never met his family,
and that she never agreed to give James money to purchase cocai ne. And L.L. testified
that she did not meet up with James at any point after that night.
Several witnesses corroborated L.L.’s account. L.L.’s cousin t estified, describing
how she saw L.L. and James arguing at the bar, that she saw Jam es open his trunk and
thought he had a gun, and that James followed them in his white van. She further testified
that L.L. later told her that sh e was raped. Both police offic ers who encountered L.L.
testified about what she told th em, which was consistent with L .L.’s testimony.
Additionally, the state played the 911 call and police officer body camera footage from the
night of the incident for the jury.

1 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2016).
2 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2016).

5
The state also presented testimony from the sexual assault nurs e examiner, who
testified that L.L. did not appe ar intoxicated and was crying t hroughout the exam. L.L.
allowed the nurse to take perineal and perianal swabs. A Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) scientist testified that D NA obtained from those swabs sh owed a combination of
DNA from two or more males, but that the major profile matched a DNA sample from
James.3
Finally, the state presented testimony from L.W., the owner of the white van with
whom James was living at the time of the alleged sexual assault. L.W. testified that James
had occasional access to the white van but that she did not give him permission to use it on
the night of the alleged assault. L.W. also testified that Jam es’s mother and brother
contacted her and told her to tell police that she didn’t know James, that he never used her
van, or that he stole it. These statements, which she interpreted as threats, made her uneasy
and uncomfortable. Finally, L.W. testified that she noticed cocaine residue in her van but
that she did not notice any bodily fluids.4
James testified that he was a drug addict whose drug of choice was cocaine, he had
known L.L. for about twelve years, and at times, they were in a consensual, sexual
relationship. In February 2017, James testified, he ran into L.L., and the two used cocaine
together and discussed a deal in which L.L. would loan him mone y to buy and resell

3 According to the BCA scientist, this meant that James and any of his paternal relatives
could not be excluded as the source of the major DNA profile found on the swabs.
4 A police officer testified that police never obtained a search warrant for the van.

6
cocaine. Although L.L. did not give James any money that day, James testified that the
plan was for L.L. to give him the money she got from her tax refund.
On March 7, 2017, James testified, he went to L.L.’s apartment, where they used
cocaine, drank alcohol, and had c onsensual sex. L.L. gave him about $1,200 cash in
accordance with their deal, and Ja mes told her that he would re turn the money in a few
hours. Later that night, James saw L.L. at the bar, and was wo rried because he had yet to
sell all of the cocaine, and as a result, he did not have L.L.’ s money. James testified that
he and L.L. got into an argument about money. James stated tha t because the argument
was drawing attention to them, he went to his car to put the dr ugs he was carrying in his
trunk, and that he followed L.L. and her cousin after they drove away from the bar to “make
sure everything was cool.” Acco rding to James, L.L.’s cousin p ulled over and ran away
for no reason. James testified that he never got out of his va n, but that L.L. approached
and got in the van. James was going to take L.L. back to her aunt’s house, but testified that
the two decided to park and use cocaine first. James testified that L.L. was upset he was
talking to a girl at the bar and that she kept asking him about her money, which was
“blowin’ [his] high,” so he tricked her into getting out of the car. James then drove away.
James stated that he saw L.L. again on April 12, 2017 and that they checked into a
motel together where they engaged in consensual sex. James tes tified that he never
threatened L.L. with a gun, pulled her by her hair, told her to suck his penis, or had sex
with her in the van.
Several witnesses testified on Ja mes’s behalf. James’s mother, cousin, and a few
friends all testified that they had seen James with L.L. on prior occasions and that the two

7
had some type of relationship. Additionally, a motel employee testified that L.L. checked
in from April 12-14, 2017, and James entered into evidence exhi b i t s s h o w i n g L . L . ’ s
driver’s license and information card filled out at the motel. James’s friends testified that
James and L.L. were together at that motel on those dates.
The state presented rebuttal testimony from L.L.’s mother, who suffers from
end-stage multiple sclerosis, that she lived with L.L. and never saw James at the apartment.
The state also re-called L.L., who testified that she never wen t to a motel with James and
that the identification presente d to the motel was stolen from her on that night of the
assault.5
The jury found James guilty of both first-degree criminal sexua l conduct and
kidnapping, and found on a special verdict form that James did not release L.L. in a safe
place. The district court sentenced James to 306 months for th e first-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct charge a nd 48 months for the kidnapping charge, to be served
consecutively, for a total of 354 months. James appeals.
D E C I S I O N
James argues that the district court abused its discretion in two ways: by limiting his
ability to question jurors durin g voir dire and by admitting ev idence that members of his
family threatened a witness, L.W. In a pro se supplemental brief, James also contends that
his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and th at the district court made

5 L.L. also signed a paper and compared that signature with the signature from the motel,
her signature from her driver’s license, and her signature on the sexual assault exam form,
noting that the signature from the motel did not match the other signatures.

8
several evidentiary errors. Fina lly, James maintains that the district court erred by
sentencing him for first-degree criminal sexual conduct before sentencing him for
kidnapping because the kidnapping was completed first. We review each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not a buse its discretion during voir dire.

James first argues that the district court unduly limited his ability to question jurors
during voir dire, preventing him from making informed peremptor y challenges and
challenges for cause. James contends the district court’s rest rictions on voir dire violated
his right to a fair trial and warrant reversal of his convictions. We review a district court’s
decisions regarding how voir dire is conducted for an abuse of discretion. State v. Greer,
635 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. 2001).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. As part of this right,
criminal defendants are entitled “ to conduct an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified
jurors.” Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 87 (quotation om itted). Accordingly, it is an abuse of
discretion for the district court to “frustrate the purposes of voir dire by preventing
discovery of bases for challenge or inhibiting a defendant’s ab ility to make an informed
exercise of peremptory challenges.” Id. But district courts have the responsibility “to
‘restrict or prohibit questions [during voir dire] that are repetitious, irrelevant, or otherwise
improper.’” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, cmt.).
Here, during voir dire, James asked the panel if any of them kn ew someone whose
life was affected by addiction. Several jurors raised their ha nds, and defense counsel
questioned four jurors about the topic, particularly inquiring whether it would affect their

9
ability to be a fair juror. During defense counsel’s questioning of a fifth juror on the topic
of drug addiction—and after that juror stated that he could be fair—the district court
interrupted defense counsel, stating “[w]hy don’t you move on to a different area.” A brief
discussion was held off the record, and defense counsel moved o n to different potential
jurors, ultimately questioning nine more potential jurors about drug addiction and if their
experiences would prevent them from being fair jurors. All of the jurors indicated that they
could be fair and impartial juro rs despite the fact that drug a ddiction had impacted their
lives.
James’s counsel then asked the potential jurors if they would have an issue if James
decided not to testify. Before James began his voir dire, the district court asked the
potential jurors if anyone could not accept the rule that James was presumed innocent and
that he did not have to present a ny evidence. At that time, no ne of the potential jurors
indicated that they had an issue with this rule. But when Jame s’s counsel prompted one
potential juror on the subject, she stated that “I think as long as we’re getting the facts from
reliable sources from both sides, then that would be sufficient , sir.” As a follow-up
question, defense counsel asked how potential jurors would feel if the defense did not
submit any evidence, but the district court again interrupted counsel by suggesting he move
on to a different area. Another juror attempted to make a comm ent on this topic, but the
district court stated that it wa s going to move on. The next d ay, one potential juror
indicated that she had a question regarding defense counsel’s q uestioning about James’s
right not to testify, but the dis trict court stated that becaus e the court did not require an
answer to that question the previous day, the potential juror did not have to volunteer any

10
information about that topic. None of the jurors who commented or attempted to comment
on the topic of James’s right not to testify or present evidence were seated as members of
the jury.6
James contends that the district court’s interruption of his counsel’s questioning on
the topics of drug addiction and James’s right not to testify u nduly limited his ability to
conduct voir dire and denied him the right to a fair trial. But on the issue of drug addiction,
the district court allowed defe nse counsel to extensively quest ion the potential jurors,
permitting individual questioning of fourteen total potential jurors, including nine potential
jurors after the district court suggested that defense counsel “move on.” Accordingly, the
district court properly exercised its discretion to conduct voir dire. See Greer, 635 N.W.2d
at 87-89 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting voir dire of
six potential jurors about the credibility of police officers where it was clear from the record
that counsel was permitted to extensively question potential jurors about police credibility).
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion with r espect to the topic of
James’s right not to testify. The district court inquired if a ny members of the panel had
any issues with the fact that James was presumed innocent and did not have to present any
evidence. No potential juror indicated a problem with that rule.
But James argues that the district court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to further
question jurors who appeared to indicate they had a question or comment about James’s

6 The juror who commented about being presented with facts from reliable sources from
both sides was the alternate juror but was dismissed before the jury began deliberations.

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right not to testify is analogous to State v. Ritter, 719 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. App. 2006). In
Ritter, this court held the district court abused its discretion by not allowing a defendant to
question jurors regarding potential biases in favor of police o fficers. 719 N.W.2d at 221.
This court reasoned that by not a llowing the question, the dist rict court prevented the
defendant from discovering if any of the potential jurors were biased in favor of law
enforcement, which was particularly relevant given that the sta te’s case was based solely
on the testimony of police officers. Id. at 220.
Ritter is distinguishable from the voir dire conducted here. In James’s case, before
the parties conducted voir dire, the district court asked the potential jurors about James not
being required to present evide nce. The district court’s quest ioning sufficiently covered
James’s right not to testify. And our review of the record on appeal does not lead us to the
conclusion that the district court’s limitations “prevent[ed] discovery of bases for challenge
or inhibit[ed] [James’s] ability t o make an informed exercise o f peremptory challenges.”
Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 87. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in the way
it conducted voir dire. See State v. Owens, 373 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1985) (noting that
the district court instructed the jury panel about the burden o f proof, presumption of
innocence, and other legal princi ples before concluding that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to disallow two questions).
Finally, we note that even if we concluded that the district court improperly limited
James’s questioning regarding his right not to testify, none of the jurors who indicated that
they may have had comments or concerns were members of the jury that convicted James.

12
Because none of these individuals were ultimately on the jury, we are confident that James
was not prejudiced by any alleged limitation of his ability to conduct voir dire.
II. The district court did not a buse its discretion by admitting evidence that
m e m b e r s o f J a m e s ’ s f a m i l y c o n t a c t e d a w i t n e s s a n d m a d e h e r f e e l
threatened.

James further contends that the district court abused its discr etion by allowing a
witness to testify that members of James’s family contacted her, causing her to feel uneasy
and uncomfortable. James argues that this “threat” evidence was not necessary to explain
inconsistencies or hesitancies i n the witness’s testimony and t hat it was inadmissible as
consciousness-of-guilt evidence because the threats were not connected to James.
A district court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed “ab sent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is contrary to facts in the record or based on an erroneous view
of the law. State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). James bears the burden
of establishing an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203.
Evidence of threats is admissibl e when directly related to witn ess credibility,
inconsistent statements, or a hesitancy in coming forward to sp eak to police.
State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 807 (Minn. 2013). While alleged threats agai nst
witnesses are typically relevant, the threats must be traced directly to a defendant in order
for a proper inference of a defendant’s knowledge or guilt to be made. State v. McArthur,
730 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Minn. 2007). Further, in most cases, the supreme court has stated that
a witness’s testimony about threat s is best left for cross-exam ination. Id. And in cases
where threat evidence is admissi ble, the district court should provide “cautionary

13
instructions to prevent the evidence from being misused.” State v. Clifton , 701 N.W.2d
793, 797 (Minn. 2005).
Here, the district court allowed the state to elicit testimony about the perceived
threats during its direct examination of L.W., the owner of the van. James objected to this
testimony on relevancy and hearsa y grounds and on the basis tha t the threats were not
connected to him.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting th is evidence. As the
state notes, the evidence that members of James’s family contacted L.W. and made her feel
uncomfortable was relevant to both the credibility of L.W. and James’s mother. See Hayes,
826 N.W.2d at 807. Because L.W.’s testimony was important in o rder to establish that
James was the man driving the white van on the night of the alleged assault, her credibility
was essential to the state’s case.7 Further, because L.W. had a previous relationship with
James, it was reasonable to think that she might change her sto ry. See McArthur, 730
N.W.2d at 51 (recognizing that in some cases, it “may be approp riate for a party to
anticipate a challenge to witn ess credibility and to attempt to explain expected issues of
credibility on direct examination”). 8 Accordingly, the threat evidence was relevant to

7 Although James later testified that he was driving the van, the state had the obligation to
prove this fact.
8 James contends that the threat evidence was not necessary to explain any inconsistencies
or hesitancies in L.W.’s testimony because her testimony was consistent. But we note that
inconsistencies or hesitanci es in testimony are not the only reasons that threat evidence
may be admitted as relevant. The threat evidence was relevant to the credibility of L.W.
and to James’s mother, and the district court properly admitted it as such. See McArthur,
730 N.W.2d at 52 (stating that “[e]vidence of witnesses’ fears of testifying and of purported
threats against witnesses both tend to be relevant to general witness credibility”). Further,
because we affirm the admission of the threat evidence as relev ant to witness credibility,

14
bolster L.W.’s credibility. And t he threat evidence was releva nt to the credibility of
James’s mother, who testified as a defense witness. It was not an abuse of discretion for
the district court to admit the evidence.
Finally, although the district c ourt did not give a cautionary instruction regarding
the threat evidence, district courts have discretion to “fashio n appropriate safeguards”
when threat evidence is admitted. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d at 52. While a cautionary
instruction would have been prude nt, James did not request such an instruction and the
district court’s failure to sua sponte give one does not rise to the level of plain error. Id. at
53.
III. James’s pro se argument s do not warrant relief.
In addition to the arguments raised by his attorney, James raises several arguments
i n a p r o s e b r i e f . J a m e s c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t evidence to support his
conviction, the district court made several evidentiary errors, and the cumulative effect of
the errors prejudiced him and require a new trial.9
Sufficiency of the evidence
James first argues that there was not sufficient evidence to su pport his conviction.
James appears to contend that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and that
the “rational hypothesis” standard of review is applicable.

we do not address James’s argument regarding whether the evidence was properly admitted
as consciousness-of-guilt evidence.
9 Because we conclude that the district court’s alleged errors w ere not, in fact, errors, we
do not reach James’s cumulative effect argument.

15
But James’s conviction is supp orted by direct testimony from L. L . A n d w h i l e
corroboration of L.L.’s testimony is not required pursuant to M innesota Statutes section
609.347, subdivision 1 (2016), several witnesses including L.L.’s cousin, the officers who
interacted with L.L., and the sexual assault nurse corroborated L.L.’s testimony. The state
also presented circumstantial evidence—primarily the DNA eviden ce—of James’s guilt.
W h e n c o n s i d e r e d i n s u m , w e a r e satisfied that sufficient eviden ce supports James’s
convictions.
Evidentiary arguments
James also maintains that the d istrict court erred in its evid entiary decisions,
including its decision to exclude evidence that L.L. reported d omestic abuse by her
boyfriend to police, its ruling that certain evidence was inadmissible pursuant to rule 412
of the Minnesota Rules of Evid ence, and its decision to allow t he state to present
handwriting evidence. We review each claim in turn.
Domestic abuse evidence
James argues that the district court erred by preventing him f rom introducing
evidence about prior domestic abuse from L.L.’s boyfriend. He sought to call two police
officers to testify that L.L. reported domestic abuse in 2009 a nd 2012 in order to support
his theory that L.L. was afraid of her boyfriend and did not wa nt him to find out she had
sex with James or loaned him mone y. The district court allowed James to question L.L.
about how she did not want her b oyfriend to find out about the assault, but sustained the
state’s objection to a question about the previous domestic abu se because the domestic
incidents were too collateral and remote. We agree with the di strict court. The domestic

16
abuse incidents were five and eight years old at the time of tr ial and likely would have
distracted or confused the j ury about the issue at hand. See Minn. R. Evid. 403 (stating
that a district court may exclude evidence if its probative val ue is outweighed by the risk
of confusion or misleading the jury). Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to determine that the reports of domestic abuse were too collateral and remote.
See State v. Tovar , 605 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2000 ) (noting that district courts have
considerable latitude in evidentiary rulings).
Rule 412
James also contends that he was prejudiced because the distric t court excluded
certain evidence of sexual conduc t pursuant to Minnesota Rule o f Evidence 412, which
precludes certain evidence of a victim’s previous sexual conduct. But because the evidence
he references was presented at trial, these claims fail.
James appears to argue that he should have been able to introd uce evidence of his
past sexual conduct with L.L. T his argument is without merit b ecause James testified at
length about having a sexual relationship with L.L. on several occasions. First, James
suggests that evidence should have been presented that L.L. had another man’s semen on
her body. But the forensic scientist did testify that DNA was found from a mixture of two
or more males. Second, James ref erences the need to introduce motel records and
eyewitness testimony to corrobora te his claim, but again, both motel records and
eyewitness testimony about James and L.L. at the motel were pre sented. Third, James
appears to argue that he should have been able to introduce evidence that L.L. had financial
arrangements to have sex with other men, but James never attempted to introduce any such

17
evidence at trial. Accordingly, all of James’s alleged errors based on rule 412 lack a factual
basis.
Handwriting evidence
James finally argues that it was an abuse of discretion to all ow the jury to evaluate
L.L.’s handwriting sample, but he acknowledges that he does not have any law supporting
this argument. In cases where a handwriting expert does not te stify, jurors may be
permitted to evaluate handwriting samples on their own. State v. Houston , 153 N.W.2d
267, 269 (Minn. 1967). Accordingly, allowing L.L. to testify about whether her signature
on the motel information form was authentic was well within the district court’s discretion.
IV. The district court erred by sentencing James for first-deg ree criminal
sexual conduct before sentencing him for kidnapping.

James argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for first-degree criminal
sexual conduct before sentencing him for kidnapping. James maintains that when imposing
consecutive sentences, the district court must sentence the off enses in the order in which
they occurred, and that he completed the kidnapping before he completed the first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. This court reviews sentencing decisio ns for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelin es require that when imposing consecutive
sentences, the district court must sentence the offenses in the order in which they occurred.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F (2016). Here, the district court imposed consecutive sentences,
so it was required to sentence Ja mes in the order in which the offenses were completed.

18
Accordingly, the question is whe t h e r J a m e s c o m p l e t e d t h e k i d n a pping before the
first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Under Minnesota Statutes secti on 609.25, subdivision 1(2), a pe rson is guilty of
kidnapping when he “confines or removes from one place to anoth er, any person without
the person’s consent” in order to, among other reasons, “facili tate the commission of any
felony or flight thereafter.” Accordingly, under the statute, a person is guilty of kidnapping
at the moment they confine or remove a person without their consent to facilitate a felony,
regardless of whether the felony was actually completed.
Here, James grabbed L.L. by the hair, made her get in his van, and drove around
with her, presumably with the intent to sexually assault her. Thus, before James sexually
assaulted L.L., he had completed the crime of kidnapping. Beca use the kidnapping
occurred first, the district court should have sentenced James for the kidnapping first.
The state argues that the kidnapping was not complete until James released L.L. or
until L.L. escaped because the jury had to determine whether James released L.L. in a safe
place. The state contends that where L.L. was released is a substantive element of the
kidnapping offense. But this argument is contrary to the statu te. The statute clearly
identifies that the question of whether the victim is released in a safe place is a sentencing
consideration, not a substantiv e element of the offense. Minn. S t a t . § 6 0 9 . 2 5 , s u b d . 2
(2016). Because the kidnapping oc curred before the criminal se xual conduct, the district
court should have sentenced James for the kidnapping first. Ac cordingly, we reverse and
remand for resentencing.

19
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion during its conduct of voir dire
or by admitting evidence that Jam es’s family members threatened L.W. James’s pro se
arguments also lack merit. Accord ingly, we affirm James’s conv ictions of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping. But, because the district court erred by sentencing
James for the first-degree crimi nal sexual conduct before sente ncing him for the
kidnapping, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.