A18-0742

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0358
A18-0742

Cindy Moshier,
Appellant,

vs.

Roger B. Jarvis,
Respondent.

Filed March 11, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-16-3867

Rene L’Esperance, Natalie Feidt, L’Esperance & Feidt, LLC, Hortonville, Wisconsin (for
appellant)

Paul A. Rajkowski, Steven A. Bader, Rajkowski Hansmeier LTD, St . Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks , Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Cindy Moshier, who was injured in a car accident cau sed by respondent
Roger Jarvis, appeals the district court’s denial of her motion s for a new trial and a
Schwartz hearing. Moshier further challenges the district court’s appli cation of the

2
collateral-source statute and calculations for cost-shifting under rule 68 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
denial of Moshier’s motions and conclude that the district court reached the correct result
when applying the collateral-source statute and rule 68, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, appellant Cindy Moshier was riding with her husband ne ar Highway 37
and Ames Road. Respondent Roger Jarvis—who was making a left-h and turn—collided
w i t h t h e M o s h i e r s ’ v e h i c l e i n a n almost head-on manner, causing t h e M o s h i e r s ’ c a r t o
speed off the road into a ditch. The car’s airbags deployed, causing significant bruising to
Moshier’s stomach, right shoulder, and left breast. Moshier’s husband was transported to
the hospital, but Moshier did not go to the hospital until a few days later to get her injuries
evaluated.1
Jarvis conceded liability for the accident. And in late 2017, a trial began on the
issues of causation and damages. Moshier testified that as a result of the car accident, she
suffers from significant neck pai n, post-traumatic stress disor der (PTSD), and some
memory loss. According to Moshier, she tried several treatment s to help her neck pain,
including physical therapy, six weeks of chiropractic care, and consultation and treatment
from a pain management doctor. After the accident, Moshier stated that she was unable to
work because of physical and mental health problems resulting f rom the accident and
because her boss at a new job was a bully. Although Moshier ma intained that her neck

1 Moshier’s husband settled his claim against Jarvis during mediation and is not part of this
appeal.

3
pain worsened significantly after the car accident, she also te stified about previous issues
with neck pain resulting from a three-wheeler accident, a previ o u s c a r a c c i d e n t , a n d
fibromyalgia. But Moshier testi fied that as a result of the 20 12 collision with Jarvis, she
cannot get in a car or enjoy the things she used to. According to Moshier, her children and
husband are worried about her becoming a recluse.
In support of her case, Moshier presented testimony from a witness to the accident,
her husband, and two expert witn esses. Moshier’s pain manageme nt doctor testified that
he believed Moshier’s injuries fr om the accident were an aggrav ation of pre-existing
injuries and that he did not feel that she was back to her pre-accident condition. He further
testified that that he believed Moshier had reached “maximum medical improvement” and
did not need further treatment, could do light work, and lead a fairly normal life. Moshier
also presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed her with PTSD and a
cognitive disorder with some memory impairment. The clinical psychologist testified that
she believed these conditions resulted from the car accident, t hat Moshier had permanent
psychological injury, and that she could not work in a competitive environment.
Jarvis presented his own expert witness, a pain management doct or who testified
that Moshier’s injury from the car accident would have resolved in six to twelve weeks and
continued to slowly get better with time. Jarvis’s expert testified that there was no evidence
Moshier would need further treatment. She also testified that Moshier could work. This
expert did not dispute that Moshier had PTSD but testified that the PTSD did not stem from
the car accident.

4
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the parties discussed the proper wording
of the special verdict form with respect to the tort threshold for recovery under the
Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Moshier objected to the use of the phrase
“diagnostic testing” instead of “diagnostic x-rays” on the special verdict form. The district
court left the phrasing on the sp ecial verdict form as “diagnos tic testing” but used the
phrase “diagnostic x-rays” when r eading the instructions to the jury. After deliberating,
the jury found that Jarvis’s negligence was a direct cause of the vehicle collision and, as a
result, Moshier sustained a disability for 60 days or more. Accordingly, the jury awarded
Moshier: $10,000 for past healthcare expenses excluding diagnostic testing; $2,000 for past
healthcare expenses for diagnostic testing; $2,500 for past pain, disfigurement, disability,
and emotional distress; and $500 for past wage loss. The verdict totaled $15,000. The jury
did not award Moshier damages for future suffering or diminished earning capacity.
After trial, Moshier learned th at the jury foreperson failed to disclose a prior felony
conviction during voir dire. Moshier moved for a Schwartz hearing2 and a new trial as a
result of juror misconduct, but the district court denied that motion. Moshier also moved
for a new trial on the basis of other errors of law, which the district court denied as well.
Shortly after the trial, the dis trict court found that Moshier was the prevailing party
but that her award needed to be reduced by any collateral source payments. After reducing
Moshier’s award to account for benefits she received from her a utomobile insurance, the

2 “A [Schwartz] hearing is a posttrial hearing in which jurors are examined und er oath to
address concerns of juror misconduct.” Pajunen v. Monson Trucking, Inc. , 612 N.W.2d
173, 174 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000).

5
district court concluded that her net award was $0. The court further found that Jarvis was
able to recover his costs and di sbursements because he made a t otal-obligation offer
pursuant to rule 68 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure t hat exceeded the jury
verdict. Accordingly, the distric t court entered judgment in f avor of Jarvis in the net
amount of $2,367.30. Moshier appeals.3
D E C I S I O N
Automobile accidents can often cause severe economic and noneco nomic distress
to victims if they are not compe nsated for their injuries. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(1)
(2018). Recognizing this problem , the legislature enacted the Minnesota No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Act to ensu re that automobile accident vic tims receive “prompt
payment” for specific basic costs like medical expenses, income loss, or funeral expenses.
Id.; Minn. Stat. § 65B.44 (2018). B ut, to prevent the overcompens ation of individuals
suffering minor injuries, the sta tute establishes certain tort thresholds that victims must
meet in order to recover additional noneconomic damages such as compensation for pain
and suffering. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(2), .51, subd. 3 (2018).
In addition to preventing overco mpensation, the Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act
also seeks to avoid double recovery. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(5) ( 2018). It does so by
providing that in cases where a car accident victim has been compensated for their injuries
by a collateral source, any subsequent award from a court must be reduced by that amount.

3 Moshier timely filed a notice of her appeal of the denial of h er motion for a new trial.
After the district court determined collateral sources and rule 68 cost-shifting calculations,
Moshier appealed those determinations. This court granted her motion to consolidate her
appeals.

6
Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1 (2018)
(defining collateral sources).
With this statutory framework in mind, we turn to Moshier’s ar guments. First,
Moshier argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new
trial, in part because of erroneous jury instructions explainin g the tort thresholds Moshier
needed to meet to recover noneconomic damages. Once Moshier re ceived a jury award,
she contends that the district court improperly applied the col lateral-source statute when
reducing her award to prevent double recovery. After the distr ict court calculated
Moshier’s net verdict, she furthe r maintains that the district court incorrectly applied the
cost-shifting procedures of rule 68 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. And finally,
according to Moshier, the distri ct court erred by not granting a Schwartz hearing or new
trial on the basis of alleged juror misconduct. We review each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying M oshier’s motion for
a new trial.

Moshier first argues that the district court incorrectly denie d her motion for a new
trial. Specifically, Moshier alleges that a new trial is warranted based on the district court’s
erroneous special verdict form and because the jury rendered a verdict contrary to the
weight of the evidence.
A new trial may be granted for reasons including errors of law objected to at trial or
if the verdict is contrary to law or not justified by the evidence. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(f),
(g). We review the decision to deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Christie v. Estate
of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).

7
The special verdict form
Moshier contends that the district court erred as a matter of l aw in its construction
of the special verdict form and that, as a result, a new trial is warranted. According to
Moshier, the district court should have used a separate jury in terrogatory to determine if
she met the tort threshold requi red by Minnesota’s No-Fault Aut omobile Insurance Act,
and it was error for the district court to use the phrase “diag nostic testing” instead of
“diagnostic x-rays” on the special verdict form.
Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act allows the recove ry of
noneconomic damages—which includes compensation for pain and su ffering, loss of
consortium, and inconvenience—only in certain cases. Minn. Sta t. § 65B.51, subd. 3.
Among those cases are instances where the plaintiff’s statutorily outlined damages exceed
$4,000 or the plaintiff’s injury resulted in a disability for 60 days or more. Id. Accordingly,
in order to recover noneconomic damages, a plaintiff must prove that she satisfied this tort
threshold required by the statute. Nemanic v. Gopher Heatin g & Sheet Metal, Inc. ,
337 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Minn. 1983). If an issue is raised regard ing whether the tort
threshold requirement was satisfied, “the question should be su bmitted to the jury as part
of the special verdict.” Id. at 670 (citing Murray v. Walter , 269 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.
1978)). And, the district court “has broad discretion regarding the form and substance of
special verdict questions.” SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co. , 536 N.W.2d 305, 313
(Minn. 1995).
Here, through a special verdict f orm, the district court asked the jury to determine
whether Moshier sustained a permanent injury and whether Moshier sustained a disability

8
for 60 days or more. Further, the special verdict form require d the jury to determine the
amount that would fairly compensate Moshier for her past healthcare expenses “excluding
diagnostic testing,” and the amoun t that would fairly compensat e Moshier for her past
healthcare expenses for diagnostic testing. The jury determine d that Moshier sustained a
disability for 60 days or more and that her past healthcare exp enses excluding diagnostic
testing amounted to $10,000. Each of these determinations sepa rately and independently
meant that Moshier satisfied the tort threshold requirement to recover noneconomic
damages. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 3.
Although Moshier argues that it was error for the district court to not pose a separate
question asking whether Moshier’s medical expenses exceeded $4,000 and that it was error
to use the phrase “diagnostic t esting” instead of “diagnostic x -rays,” an erroneous jury
instruction only warrants reversal when it is prejudicial. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc’y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Minn. 1986). An instruction is prejudicial when
a “more accurate instruction would have changed the outcome of the case.” Domagala v.
Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 31 (Minn. 2011).
The outcome in this case would not have changed had the judge u sed the special
verdict form Moshier suggests. Here, the jury found that Moshi er sustained a 60 day
disability. Because the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act requires only one criterion to
be satisfied in order to meet t he tort threshold, this finding alone was sufficient to permit
Moshier to recover noneconomic damages. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 3. Further,
despite the alleged errors, the j u r y f o u n d t h a t M o s h i e r ’ s p a s t healthcare expenses,
excluding diagnostic testing, amo unted to $10,000, also satisfy ing the tort threshold.

9
Because the jury found that Moshier satisfied the tort threshol d, Moshier was not
prejudiced by the allegedly erro neous jury instruction and is n ot entitled to a new trial. 4
Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny her motion for
a new trial on this ground.
Verdict contrary to the evidence
Moshier also argues that the district court abused its discreti on by denying her
motion for a new trial because t he jury rendered a verdict cont rary to the evidence. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g). Moshier contends that the evidence established that she did not
have a PTSD diagnosis before the accident but that the jury did not award any future
damages and that it awarded past pain and suffering damages lower than what the defense
asked for. Moshier suggests that the only explanation for this verdict is that the jury was
influenced by passion and prejudice, especially because they deliberated for a short amount
of time.
In appeals from a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, we will not set
aside a jury verdict “unless it is manifestly and palpably cont rary to the evidence viewed
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Navarre v. S. Wash. Cty. Sch.,
652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn. 2002) ( quotations omitted). In cases w here a jury completes a

4 Moshier contends that a more acc urate instruction would have c hanged the outcome of
her trial because the jury was confused by the district court’s instructions and the special
verdict form, noting that the jury did not adopt either party’s proposed award amount for
past medical expenses. But there are a multitude of reasons wh y the jury could have
determined that both parties’ proposed awards were incorrect. And a jury award of alleged
inadequate damages does not necessarily demonstrate prejudice during jury deliberations.
Markowitz v. Ness, 413 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. App. 1987).

10
special verdict form, our review analyzes “whether the special verdict answers can be
reconciled in any reasonable manner consistent with the evidence and its fair inferences.”
Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Minn. 2008) (quotations and citation
omitted). Further, our review of a special verdict is even mor e limited where the jury’s
findings turn upon assessing th e credibility of witnesses. Kelly v. City of Minneapolis ,
598 N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (Minn. 1999).
Our review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Moshier is not
entitled to a new trial on this basis. Although Moshier presen ted evidence of her injuries
and their effects, Jarvis challenged the extent and nature of M oshier’s injuries through
cross-examination and his expert witness. Based on this evidence, the jury awarded some
damages for past healthcare expenses and past pain and sufferin g, but chose not to award
any future damages. While Moshier may disagree with the jury’s award, nothing in the
record suggests that it is manif estly contrary to the evidence. Accordingly, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Moshier’s mo tion for a new trial on this
ground.
II. The district court reached the correct conclusion in offsetting Moshier’s award.

Moshier also argues that the district court erred in its applic ation of the
collateral-source statute. Specifically, Moshier contends that a d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t
collaterally offset medical expens es paid by a participant in t he Medical Assistance 5

5 The Medical Assistance program is the state version of Medicaid.

11
program and that it was error for the district court to deduct any medical healthcare
expenses which were available to pay the asserted healthcare su brogation lien. Because
this is a mixed question of law and fact, we correct erroneous applications of law, but
review the district court’s conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Estate
of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App. 2015).
As part of the No-Fault Act’s goal of preventing double recover y, when an
individual injured in a car accident brings a negligence action, the district court is required
to offset any award by the value of no-fault benefits that are paid or payable by an insurer.
Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 779 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. 2010). Under Minnesota
Statutes section 65B.51, subdivision 1:
With respect to a cause of action in negligence accruing as a
result of injury arising out of the operation, ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . the court shall deduct
from any recovery the value of basic or optional economic loss
benefits paid or payable, or w hich would be payable but for
any applicable deductible.

The district court concluded that Moshier received $20,253.62 in medical expense
personal injury protection bene fits and $235.62 in wage loss pe rsonal injury protection
benefits from her automobile insurance carrier. Although the d istrict court offset these
amounts citing the general collate ral-source statute, Minnesota Statutes section 548.251
(2018),
6 it should have offset these amounts under the above statute, M innesota Statutes

6 Minnesota Statutes section 548. 251 is the more generally appli cable collateral-source
statute intended to prevent double recovery by plaintiffs. Und er that statute, a party may
file a motion requesting that the district court make a determi nation of collateral sources
and offset any recovery pursuant to the guidelines of that stat ute. Minn. Stat. § 548.251,
subds. 2, 3.

12
section 65B.51, subdivision 1, which specifically addresses the deduction of no-fault
benefits. That provision does n ot provide for any “adding back ” of the premiums that
Moshier paid for her automobile insurance, so the district court should not have considered
that amount. But in any event, Moshier’s award from the jury for past healthcare expenses
and past wage loss only totaled $12,500. When offsetting this amount by the value of the
personal injury protection benef its that Moshier received, the net award is clearly $0.
Accordingly, although the district court applied the wrong statute, it ultimately reached the
correct result.7
Because Moshier’s position is not supported by law and because the district court,
although incorrect in its reasoning, ultimately reached the cor rect result in offsetting
Moshier’s award, we affirm.
III. The district court correctly concluded that Jarvis was ent itled to cost-shifting
under rule 68 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moshier argues that the jury ve rdict exceeded the total-obliga tion offer made by
Jarvis and, as a result, the district court erred in its interp retation and application of the

7 Neither party argued that Minnesota Statutes section 65B.51, subdivision 1, governed the
procedure for offsetting Moshier’s award. Instead, the district court and both parties relied
on the more general collateral-source statute. But even if Min nesota Statutes section
548.251 applied, Moshier’s arguments are not persuasive. Although Moshier contends that
a district court is prohibited by law from collaterally offsetting medical expenses paid by a
participant in the Medicaid program, she points to no Minnesota or federal law to support
this assertion. And although Mos hier suggests that the distric t court should have applied
the jury verdict to pay the subrogation lien first, this positi on similarly lacks support in
statute or caselaw. Finally, Moshier contends that an asserted subrogation lien cannot be
collaterally offset pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 548.251, subdivision 2(1), which
is correct. But here, the district court did not collaterally offset the subrogation lien.

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cost-shifting provision of rule 68 of the Minnesota Rules of Ci vil Procedure. This again
presents a mixed question of fact and law, so we correct erroneous applications of law, but
review the district court’s conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard. Sullivan, 868
N.W.2d at 754.
Under rule 68, any party may make an offer of settlement anyti me more than ten
days before trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 68.01(a). If a rule 68 offer is not accepted, it can affect
a party’s ability to recover costs. Minn. R. Civ. P. 68.03. In cases where a defendant makes
an offer, if either the defendant prevails or if the relief awa rded to the plaintiff is less
favorable than the defendant’s offer, the plaintiff must pay th e defendant’s costs and
disbursements that he or she incurred after making the offer. Minn. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b)(1).
In order to determine if the relief awarded is less favorable than a total-obligation offer, the
“total-obligation offer is compa red with the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff,
plus applicable prejudgment interest, the plaintiff’s taxable c osts and disbursements, and
applicable attorney fees, all as accrued to the date of the off e r . ” M i n n . R . C i v . P .
68.03(c)(2).
Here, the district court concluded that Jarvis made a total-ob ligation offer of
$30,000 to Moshier, which exceeded her jury verdict, prejudgmen t interest, her taxable
costs and disbursements, and “applicable attorney fees.” Accor dingly, the district court
found that Jarvis was entitled to recover his costs from Moshie r, ultimately resulting in a
judgment in Jarvis’ favor in the amount of $2,367.30.
Moshier argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that the total obligation
offer exceeded Moshier’s total relief, contends that the district court should have calculated

14
the total amount of her relief before it was offset, 8 and maintains that she is entitled to
attorney fees. Moshier proposes that, had she accepted Jarvis’s $30,000 offer, that amount
would have been reduced by prejudgment interest, pre-offer costs and disbursements, and
accrued attorney fees. Once these costs were subtracted from the $30,000 offer, Moshier
contends that her net recovery w ould have been $13,986.81, an a mount less than the
$15,000 jury verdict.9
But Moshier’s proposed calculation method is incorrect. Although the district court
used erroneous figures, it followed the correct process for determining whether Moshier’s
total relief exceeded Jarvis’s total-obligation offer. Once Moshier’s jury verdict was offset
by no-fault benefits she previously received, her remaining award was $2,500 for past pain
and suffering and $264.38 for los t wages, amounting to a total award of $2,764.38.
Prejudgment interest on this amount totals $247.52. See Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd.
1(c)(1)(i) (2018). Moshier’s cos ts and disbursements totaled $ 3,328.03. When adding
Moshier’s costs and disbursements to her offset jury award, her total relief amounted to
$6,339.93, a figure that is clearly less than the $30,000 total-obligation offer.

8 Even if we adopted Moshier’s argument that, in its calculations, the district court should
have used the amount of the jury award before it was collateral ly offset, her relief would
have totaled $19,671.04 after adding the jury verdict ($15,000) , costs and disbursements
($3,328.03), and prejudgment in terest ($1,343.01). Although Mo shier is not entitled to
recover attorney fees, even if we included her attorney fees of $10,000, her total relief
would be $29,671. 04, an amount that is still less than Jarvis’s $30,000 total-obligation
offer.

9 Moshier cites no authority for her proposition that, for rule 68 cost-shifting purposes, a
district court compares an individual’s net recovery with a jury award. Further, the text of
the rule states that the total-obligation offer is compared with the jury verdict. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 68.03(c)(2).

15
Even if we included Moshier’s attorney fees in our analysis, as Moshier urges us to
do, her total relief ($16,339.93) would still be less than Jarvis’s total-obligation offer. But
we note that Moshier is not entitled to recover any of her atto rney’s fees. Although rule
68.03 states that applicable attorney fees should be considered when determining whether
a total-obligation offer exceeded a plaintiff’s recovery, rule 68.04 makes clear that the rule
does not create a right to attorney fees that is not provided for under applicable substantive
law. Rule 68.04 states that “a pplicable attorney fees” under r ule 68 means “any attorney
fees to which a party is entitled by statute, common law, or contract for one or more of the
claims resolved by an offer made under the rule.” (Emphasis added.) Certain statutes, like
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, provide that a prevailing party may recover reasonable
attorney fees as part of their costs. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 7 (2018). But nothing
in Minnesota statutes or specific to this case suggests the Mos hier would be entitled to
recover her attorney fees from Jarvis.10 Without the inclusion of attorney fees, it is evident
that Moshier’s relief was less t han Jarvis’s total-obligation o ffer for rule 68 cost-shifting
purposes. As such, the district court correctly concluded that Jarvis’s total-obligation offer
exceeded Moshier’s relief.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moshier’s motion for
a Schwartz hearing and a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.

Finally, Moshier contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to
deny her motion for a Schwartz hearing and a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.

10 Although Moshier presumably had a contract with her attorney r egarding her payment
of attorney fees, Moshier has not alleged any contractual basis that would entitle her to
recover her attorney fees from Jarvis.

16
Moshier contends that the jury foreperson lied during voir dire by failing to reveal felony
convictions and that this prejudiced her and warrants a new trial.
The purpose of a Schwartz hearing is “to investigate potential juror misconduct and
prevent the practice of attorneys contacting and questioning jurors after a verdict has been
rendered.” Pajunen, 612 N.W.2d at 175. In general, district courts should liberally grant
Schwartz hearings. Quinn v. Winkel’s, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 1979). But, before
a Schwartz hearing will be granted, a prima facie showing of juror miscon duct must be
made. State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1979). A Schwartz hearing is only
warranted if the “evidence which , standing alone and unchalleng ed, would warrant the
conclusion of jury misconduct.” Id. We review the denial of a Schwartz hearing for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Church, 577 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1998).
The district court, in denying Moshier’s motion for a Schwartz hearing, found that
a Schwartz hearing was unnecessary because th ere was no evidence that the foreperson
gave false testimony. Voir dir e was not recorded, and there wa s no evidence that the
alleged misconduct prejudiced the verdict.
We agree with the district cour t. Although Moshier argues that there was some
indication of juror misconduct because the jury foreperson’s concealment of his past was
indicative of deception, Moshier did not provide any evidence—other than speculation—
that the alleged misconduct prejudiced the verdict. The distri ct court’s conclusions that
Moshier did not make the requisite evidentiary showing that juror misconduct occurred to
warrant a Schwartz hearing and that Moshier did not show that the foreperson’s undisclosed
conviction impacted the verdict and rendered an unfair outcome are supported by the

17
record. Accordingly, it was not a n abuse of discretion for the district court to deny
Moshier’s motion for a Schwartz hearing. See State v. Benedict , 397 N.W.2d 337, 340
(Minn. 1986) (noting that while the district court could have o rdered a Schwartz hearing,
it was not an abuse of discretion for it to refuse to do so where the defendant failed to make
a sufficient showing that the juror lied); Blatz v. Allina Health System , 622 N.W.2d 376,
394 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting that it was not an abuse of discr etion for the district court
to deny a Schwartz hearing where the moving party failed to establish the a juror’s answer
was untruthful or misconduct in light of the absence of a trans cript and the dismissal of
charges), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2001). Similarly, the district court did not ab use
its discretion by denying Moshier’s motion for a new trial base d on juror misconduct
because Moshier again failed to demonstrate a connection betwee n the alleged juror
misconduct and the verdict in the case.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny ing Moshier’s motion
for a new trial and a Schwartz hearing. Further, the district court reached the correct result
when applying both the collateral- source statute and rule 68’s cost-shifting process and
concluding that Jarvis’s total-obligation offer exceeded Moshier’s relief. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Affirmed.