Sonja Jeanne Timmons, individually, and as mother and natural guardian of Jadyn Bentlie Haugen, Kaily Marie Timmons and Makena Joy Haugen, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0375

Sonja Jeanne Timmons, individually, and as mother and natural guardian of Jadyn
Bentlie Haugen, Kaily Marie Timmons and Makena Joy Haugen,
Appellant,

vs.

Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation, et al., Defendants,

Jerrold D. Parker a/k/a Jerry Parker,
Respondent,

and

Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation, et al., Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs,

vs.

Troy Haugen, Third Party Defendant.

Filed September 24, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CV-16-204

Matthew J. Barber, James S. Ballentine, Courtney A. Lawrence, Schwebel, Goetz &
Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

William L. Moran, Kari L. Gunderman, HKM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Pr esiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Sonja Timmons, indi vidually and on behalf of her minor children, sued
respondent Jerrold Parker after an open-ended gas line caused an explosion in a house sold
by Parker to third-party defendant Troy Haug en. Parker moved fo r summary judgment,
which the district court granted on the grounds that, as a matter of law, (1) Parker owed no
duty to Timmons or her children and (2) liability was precluded by the vendor rule, which
generally provides that prior owners of real estate are not liable for injuries caused by
conditions existing at the time the purchaser took possession. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Parker disputes many of the facts alle ged by Timmons. For purposes of summary
judgment, however, “all facts and the inferences arising from them must be considered in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. ,
898 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2017). We describe the facts in accordance with this rule.
Rental of the House
In July 2011, Timmons and Haugen reached out to Parke r, seeking to rent a home
for themselves and the minor children. Parker said he would prefer to sell the house instead
of renting it, and the parties eventually agreed that Timmons and Haugen would rent the
house for six months and then purchase it.
Before agreeing to rent the house, Timmons and Haugen toured it on July 8. Haugen
and Parker talked in the kitchen while Timmons and two of the children walked around the
house. At the time of this walk-through, th e house’s existing gas stove was disconnected

3
from the gas line and had been pulled away from the wall, making the gas line visible for
inspection. Haugen told Parker that the gas stove could be removed from the house because
he planned to install an electri c stove in its place. Parker re plied that the gas stove went
with the house, so Haugen should just move it to the basement. Parker also said that he
would “take care of the [gas] line, cap ever ything off, [and] make sure everything was
safe.”
Timmons and Haugen both look ed at the gas line on July 8. Timmons could not tell
whether the line was capped or uncapped at th e time, nor did she ever do anything after
moving in to verify whether the line had been capped. Haugen also could not tell whether
the line was capped on July 8 because he did not know what a capped line is supposed to
look like. However, he assumed, based on Pa rker’s statement that he would cap the line,
that the line was uncapped at that time.
Timmons, Haugen, and the children moved in to the house the weekend of July 23.
Before they moved in, a Minnesota Energy Re sources Corporation employee came to the
house and activated the gas service. When they moved in, Haugen moved the gas stove to
the basement of the house and, with the assistance of his brother-in-law, moved an electric
stove into the empty space in the kitchen. When he did so, Haugen did not see any changes
to the gas line, but he was not paying attention to it and “assumed it was taken care of.”
Purchase of the House
On December 29, 2011, Ha ugen executed a purchase ag reement for the house to
buy it for $25,000 on a contract for deed. As relevant to this case, the agreement said,
“Buyer has been made aware of the availab ility of property inspections. Buyer Declines

4
to have a property inspection performed at Buyer’s expense.” Haugen had considered
getting a home inspection, but chose not to do so after Parker said an inspection was not
needed. The purchase agreem ent also said, “This Purchase Agreement, any attached
exhibits and any adde nda or amendments si gned by the parties shall constitute the entire
agreement between Seller and Buyer and supersedes any other written or oral agreements
between Seller and Buyer.” In February of 2012, Haugen and Parker executed a contract
for deed. That contract said:
Seller shall be free from liability and claims for damages by
reason of injuries occurring on or after the date of this Contract
to any person or pers ons or property while on or about the
Property. Purchaser shall defend and indemnify Seller from all
liability, loss, costs and oblig ations, includi ng reasonable
attorneys’ fees, on account of or arising out of any such
injuries. However, Purchaser shall have no liability or
obligation to Seller for such injuries, which are caused by the
negligence or intentional wrongful acts or omissions of Seller.

. . . .

The above-described real es tate, structures, dwellings,
improvements, fixtures, and personal property are not new, and
are being purchased “AS IS.” ANY WARRANTIES OF
PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE REAL PROPERTY,
PERSONAL PROPERTY, DWELLINGS, STRUCTURES,
IMPROVEMENTS, AND FIXT URES CONTAINED IN
THIS CONTRACT FOR DEED, OR EXPRESSED
PREVIOUSLY IN WRITING, OR ORALLY ARE VOID.
Sellers shall have no further responsibility or liability with
respect to the condition of this real estate.

At some point after Haugen executed th e contract for deed, Timmons and Haugen
purchased a new electric stove. The record does not indicate that Timmons or Haugen

5
made any observations about the state of the stove gas line when the first electric stove was
removed and the new one installed.
The Explosion
On September 14, 2012, Ha ugen wanted to turn on the furnace and went down to
the basement to open the valv e for the furnace gas line. Th e previous September (while
Timmons and Haugen were still renting the house), Haugen had turned on the furnace for
the first time by simply switc hing the thermostat over from “cool” to “heat”; he had not
had to do anything with a gas valve. On September 14, 2012, however, Haugen assumed
that he had shut off the gas to the furnace the previous sp ring because it was his usual
practice to do so, and he thus believed he needed to reopen the gas line to run the furnace.
In the basement, Haugen saw a closed valv e, opened it, went back upstairs, set the
thermostat to heat, felt heat coming out of the vents, and then went to bed. Unfortunately,
Haugen had mistakenly opened the valve to the uncapped gas line in the kitchen.
The next morning, Haugen got up and went to work. Later that morning, Timmons
got up and lit a cigarette in the living room. Within a couple of seconds, an explosion
occurred, burning Timmons and the three children.
Legal Action
Timmons filed four lawsuits, one for hersel f and one for each of the three children.
Minnesota Energy Resources Co rporation (the gas provide r), Chevron Phillips Chemical
Company, LLC (the gas-odorizer1 supplier), Don Paplow d/b/a Don’s Plumbing & Heating

1 A gas odorizer is a chemical that adds a scent to a gas so that the gas can be more easily
detected.

6
(the furnace servicer), and Parker were named as defendants. Parker impleaded Haugen as
a third-party defendant, alleging that Haugen had a duty under the contract for deed to
defend and indemnify him from all liability. The cases were removed to federal court,
consolidated, and ultimately remanded to state court. The state court then entered an order
approving settlement of the cl aims against the three corpor ate defendants, and Timmons
stipulated to dismissal of her claims against those parties.
Parker moved for summary judgment on th e claims against him, and the district
court held a hearing on that motion. The district court then granted the motion, determining
that, as a matter of law, the vendor rule pr ecluded liability and Parker did not owe a duty
to Timmons. Timmons appealed, but this cour t noted that it was unclear from the record
whether final judgment had been rendered on the claims against Paplow and Parker’s third-
party claim and dismissed the appeal as premat ure. The district court then dismissed the
claim against Paplow pursuant to a stipulated dismissal, and Timmons again appealed.
This court noted that the third-party claim ag ainst Haugen had still not been resolved and
again dismissed the appeal as premature. The parties then agreed that Parker’s claim
against Haugen was moot in light of the summary-judgment decision, and the district court
dismissed that claim without prejudice.
Timmons appeals, challenging the grant of summary judgment in favor of Parker.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from summary judgment, we re view whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. STAR Ctrs., Inc.
v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn 2002). “We view the evidence in

7
the light most favorable to the party agains t whom summary judgment was granted. We
review de novo whether a genu ine issue of material fact ex ists. We also review do novo
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Id. at 76-77 (citations
omitted).
Timmons argues that the district court e rred in determining that Parker owed no
duty and that the vendor rule forecloses liability. Parker disagrees, arguing that summary
judgment was appropriate for the additional reas ons that the “as-is” sale of the house to
Haugen precludes any liability on Parker’s part, Haugen’s negligence was a superseding
cause relieving Parker of any liability, and Timmons cannot establish proximate cause. We
address each issue in turn.
I. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Parker owed a duty
to Timmons and her children.

“Negligence is generally defined as the failu re to exercise such care as persons of
ordinary prudence usually exercise under such circumstances.” Domagala v. Rolland, 805
N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “The four elements of negligence are:
(1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and (4) the breach
of the duty being the proximate cause of the injury.” Engler v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. ,
706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005). “[D]uty is generally a legal question for the court to
decide,” which we review de novo. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629. Timmons argues
that the district court erred in holding that Parker owed no duty to her and her children.
Timmons first argues that Parker owed a duty as a landlord because Parker initially
leased the house to her and Haugen. We disagree. Although Parker had a duty to keep the

8
house “in reasonable repair during the term of the lease,” Minn. Stat. § 504B.161,
subd. 1(a)(2) (2016), that duty ended when “the term of the lease” ended, namely, when
Haugen bought the house in February 2012.
Timmons next argues that Parker owed a duty because he maintained a legal interest
in the house after it was sold on a contract for deed. This court has previously held that the
sale of property on a contract-for-deed basis is insufficient to support liability on the part
of the vendor. See Friberg v. Fagen , 404 N.W.2d 400, 403 (M inn. App. 1987) (“The
[vendors’] interest in the property was confined to bare legal title; they had no real authority
or power to regain possession of the resort or exercise control over the premises.”). This
holding straightforwardly applies to this case to preclude Parker’s legal interest in the house
from giving rise to a duty to Timmons at the time of the explosion.
Timmons also argues that Parker owed a duty as a result of promising to cap the gas
line and not doing so. “[G]enerally in law, we are not our brother’s keeper. Inaction by a
defendant . . . constitutes negligence only wh en the defendant has a duty to act for the
protection of others.” Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 22-23 (cita tion and quotation omitted).
Two theories of duty are relevant to this case . First, “general ne gligence law imposes a
general duty of reasonable ca re when the defendant’s own conduct creates a foreseeable
risk of injury to a fo reseeable plaintiff.” Id. at 23. Depending on the circumstances, that
general duty of reasonable care may include a duty to warn foreseea ble plaintiffs of
impending danger. See id. at 28-29. Second, a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff when
“the parties are in a special relationship and the harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable.” Id. at
23.

9
The district court analyzed duty under the second theory, holding that the parties
did not stand in a special relationship to each other at the time of the explosion. We agree
with that conclusion. However, Timmons’s claims against Parker are based on more than
just his failure to cap the gas line. The claims are based on that failure, coupled with his
promise to do so. In other words, the claims are based on the “defendant’s own conduct,”
which, under the first theory, gives rise to a general duty of reasonable care if it “creates a
foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff.” See id.
For reasons mostly addressed under different analytical frameworks in his briefs but
nonetheless relevant here, Parker argues that, regardless of his alleged promise to cap the
line and failure to do so, any risk of injury was not foreseeable, including because Haugen
and Timmons should have seen and properly handled the observable uncapped gas line.
Timmons challenges that assertion, arguing that the location and appearance of the gas line
and their reasonable reliance on Parker’s promis e made the risk of in jury foreseeable.
Although duty is generally a lega l question, “it is well estab lished that foreseeability is a
question for the jury if there is a specific fa ctual dispute concerning . . . awareness of a
risk.” Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted).
We conclude that, if a jury accepts Timmo ns’s version of the disputed facts about
Parker’s conduct, it could reasonably conclude that his conduct “create[d] a foreseeable
risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff,” namely Timmons, Haugen, and their children. See
Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 23. That foreseeable risk in turn would give rise to a general
duty of reasonable care on the part of Parker. We therefore conclude that the district court

10
erred when it held, on this disputed record, that Parker did not owe a duty of care to
Timmons or her children as a matter of law.
II. A genuine issue of material facts exis ts regarding whether an exception to the
vendor rule applies.

Having concluded that a genuine issue of mate rial fact exists as to whether Parker
owed a duty, we turn to the second basis on which the district court granted summary
judgment: that the vendor rule precludes any liability Parker woul d have to Timmons.
Timmons argues the district court erred in concluding that this case is subject to the vendor
rule and that no exception to the rule applies. Whether the vendor rule forecloses liability
on the part of Parker presents a question of law that we review de novo, but, in cases where
foreseeability is reasonabl y disputed, summary judgm ent is inappropriate. See
Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629 (addressing foreseeability in products-liability case).
“The general rule is that a prior owner of real estate is not liable for injury to a
purchaser or a third person caused by the condition of the premises existing at the time the
purchaser took possession.” Carlson v. Hampl, 169 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Minn. 1969); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 (1965) (“Except as stated in § 353, a vendor of land
is not subject to liability for physical harm ca used to his vendee or others while upon the
land after the vendee has taken possession by a ny dangerous condition . . . which existed
at the time that the vendee took possession.”). That general rule is subject to an exception,
however:
[A] “vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to
vendees any unreasonably da ngerous condition, whether
natural or artificial,” may be liable for vendee and third person
injuries if two conditions are met. The vendee must not know

11
of the condition or the risk in volved, and the vendor must
“know” or “have reason to know” of the condition, realize the
risks, and have reason to belie ve that the vendee will not
discover the condition or realize the risk.

Friberg, 404 N.W.2d at 402 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1965)). “If the
vendor actively conceals the condition, the vendor remains liable until the vendee discovers
it and has reasonable opportunity to take effe ctive precautions against it. Otherwise the
liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the
condition and to take such precautions.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 353).
Timmons’s initial argument on this issue is that the vendor ru le should not be
applied to this case at all because the facts are distinguishable from applicable caselaw.
However, she did not raise this argument belo w. “A reviewing court must generally
consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial
court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
We therefore decline to consider this argument on appeal.
In the alternative, Timmons argues that, if the vendor rule applies, its exception also
applies. Timmons did raise this argument in the district court, so we will consider it on the
merits.
The district court concluded that the excep tion to the vendor rule is inapplicable
because: (1) Parker’s disclosure of the fact that the gas line was not capped negated any
claim that Parker concealed th e gas line, (2) Haugen knew or had reason to know of the
uncapped gas line, (3) Parker had reason to believe Haugen would discover the uncapped

12
gas line, and (4) Haugen had a reasonable oppo rtunity to discover the uncapped gas line
and take precautions. These reasons essentia lly parallel the prongs and subprongs of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353, and we address each in turn.
We agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could conclude that Parker
concealed the status of the gas line. In arguing the opposite, Ti mmons contends that
“failing to follow through on his promise to cap the line, failing to disclose his failure three
times, and convincing Haugen against getting an inspection” constitute concealment. But
our caselaw and the Restatement are clear: c oncealment requires more than a failure to
disclose or discouraging inspection; it requires “active” concealment. See Friberg, 404
N.W.2d at 402. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favor able to Timmons, the
only active step Parker took was telling Haugen the house did not need a home inspection.
But this statement in no way prevented Haugen from nevertheless deciding to obtain one.
We therefore conclude that the district cour t did not err in holdin g that the vendor-rule
exception is not applicable based upon a concealment theory.
A lack of concealment, howe ver, is not the end of the inquiry. A vendor of land
may also be liable if he “fails to disclo se to [vendees] any [ unreasonably dangerous]
condition.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353). The
district court concluded that Parker disclosed the condition when he said on July 8, 2011,
that the gas line was uncapped. Timmons argues that “[a] disclosure coupled with a
promise to fix is not a disclosure of danger.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most fa vorable to Timmons, we conclude that a
genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue. Although no case in Minnesota has

13
squarely addressed this issue, comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353
express considerations relevant to this issu e. The comments note that liability may arise
when a vendor of land “deliberately states that the land is in safe condition when he knows
it to be dangerous.” Restatem ent (Second) of Torts § 353 cm t. d. Even under Timmons
and Haugen’s version of events, Parker admitted that the land was not safe; but Parker also
promised that he would make the land safe (by capping the gas line) before Timmons and
Haugen’s lease began. This promise could be construed in a similar manner as if he had
stated that the property was in fact safe. We therefore conclude that a reasonable jury could
find that Parker failed to disclose the unreasonably unsafe condition of the gas line.
Our analysis of the first subprong of the Restatement—whether the vendee knew or
had reason to know the condition or the risk involved—follows si milar reasoning. A
reasonable jury could conclude that Park er’s promise to cap the line negated his
disclosure—and therefore Haugen’s know ledge—of the line’s unsafe condition.
Regarding whether Haugen had reason to know of the uncapped lin e, although Haugen
twice installed new electric stoves in the kitchen, he stated in his deposition that he did not
“know what [a capped gas line] [is] supposed to look like.” Although one of Timmons’s
expert witnesses testified that Haugen “should be able to look at [the line] and see that
there’s not a cap on it,” we must resolve all factual disputes in Timmons’s favor, see
Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 628, and assume that, ev en having the opportunity to view
the gas line, Haugen would not be able to tell whether it was properly capped. We therefore
conclude that a reasonable ju ry could find that Haugen neith er knew nor had reason to
know of the condition of the gas line.

14
We turn to the second subprong—whether the vendor knew or had reason to know
of the condition, realized the risk, and had reason to believe the vendee would not discover
the condition or realize the risk. All parties agree, for purposes of summary judgment, that
Parker had knowledge of the gas line’s uncappe d status. The district court concluded,
however, that Parker had no reason to believe Haugen would not discover it because of his
July 8 disclosure. We disagree and conclude that genuine issu es of material fact exist on
the issue. The district court determined that “[t]he statement that [Parker] would cap the
gas line indicated that . . . he had reason to believe that Timmons and Haugen were aware
of it . . . since he told them about it.” However, as discussed above, immediately after that
statement, Parker promised to cap the line, and a reasonable jury could find that Haugen
would believe the line was capped (and not discover the uncapped condition) based on this
promise. Parker would thus have reason to believe that Haugen would not discover the
dangerous condition of the ga s line, satisfying the second subprong of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 353.
Finally, we address whether, even assuming the subprongs for the exception were
met, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by the time of the explosion, Haugen did not
have a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and take precautions. The district
court concluded that no reasonable jury could reach this conclusion because (1) Parker told
Haugen that the line was uncapped and neve r told Haugen that he capped the line;
(2) Haugen had the choice to have a home inspection prior to purchase; (3) Haugen
operated the gas valves in the basement in the fall of 2011 and spring of 2012, giving him
a chance to discover issues with the valves; and (4) Haugen lived in the house continuously

15
for over a year. We reject these reasons because they fail to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Timmons.
Regarding the first reason, as already no ted, a reasonable jury could find that
Parker’s promise to cap negated any disclo sure he made. As for the second reason—
whether the option of a home inspection gave Haugen a reasonable opportunity to discover
the state of the gas line—the facts present a ques tion for a jury. It is for juries to decide
“what is reasonable under the circumstances of a particular case,” because that judgment
“is more likely than the judicial judgment to represent the community’s judgment of how
reasonable persons would conduct themselves.” Hartfiel v. McLennan, 430 N.W.2d 215,
224 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Mich. 1977)).
Under the circumstances in this case, a jury could conclude that a reasonable, prudent
person would not obtain a home inspection, and thus the mere op tion of obtaining one
would not present a reasonable opportunity to discover the uncapped status of the gas line.
Finally, regarding reasons three and four, as discussed above, Haugen testified that,
even if he had inspected the gas line, he would have had no way of telling whether it had
been capped or not. Thus, regardless of his opportunity to inspect the gas lines or the fact
that he had lived in the hous e for over a year, it is possibl e that he never would have
discovered the dangerous condition of the line. Again, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Timmons, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Haugen did
not have a reasonable opportunity to discover the uncapped ga s line. We therefore hold
that the district court erred when it granted su mmary judgment to Parker on the basis that
the exception to the vendor rule did not apply as a matter of law.

16
III. The as-is clause of the co ntract for deed does not preclude Parker’s liability to
Timmons or her children.

Having concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of duty
and application of the exception to the vendor rule, we turn to other arguments Parker raises
in favor of summary judgment. He first argues that the contract for deed said the property
was sold “as is,” making any further reliance on his promise to cap the gas line unjustified.
The rights and obligations created by a contract are a question of law, which we review de
novo. See Linn v. BCBSM, Inc., 905 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2018).
It is a foundational principle of contract law that generally, one must be a party to a
contract to obtain rights or incur obligations under it. See Caldas v. Affordable Granite &
Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Min n. 2012) (“Generally, one who is not a party to a
contract has no rights unde r the contract . . . .”); Johnston v. Tourangeau, 259 N.W. 187,
189 (Minn. 1935) (noting that “absent . . . assumption of duty under contract” a party owed
no duty to another).
Timmons was not a party to the purchase agreement or the contract for deed.
Therefore, whatever the contract for deed may say regarding the state of the property at the
time of sale, that contract cannot impact her right to recover damages for injuries caused
by the condition of the house. Although th e contract for deed—which contains an
indemnification clause—may impact Parker’s third-party claim against Haugen, we take
no position on that claim, which is not before us. But it does not impact Timmons’s ability
to rely on Parker’s promise to her and Haugen to cap the line, his failure to do so, and his
failure to warn, as a basis for negligence liability.

17
IV. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether negligence on the part
of others was a superseding cause.

Parker next argues that “Haugen’s negl igence is a superseding cause relieving
Parker of any alleged liability.” As with the issue of duty, on a motion for summary
judgment on causation, “all facts and the inferences arising from them must be considered
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 625.
For an intervening cause to be considered a superseding
cause, the intervening cause must satisfy four elements: 1) its
harmful effects must have occurred after the original
negligence; 2) it must not ha ve been brought about by the
original negligence; 3) it must have actively worked to bring
about a result which would not otherwise have followed from
the original negligence; and 4) it must not have been
reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.

Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy , 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997). “[I]t is well
established that foreseeability is a question for the jury if there is a specific factual dispute
concerning . . . awareness of a risk.” Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted).
We need only address the fourth prong of superseding cause here. A reasonable
jury could find that Haugen’s act of opening the valve to the uncapped line was foreseeable
to Parker. The installed gas line had two valves, one for the furnace and one for the stove
gas line. Those valves were close together, with the valve for the stove situated on a piece
of piping coming off of the line for the furnace. A reasonable jury could find that this setup
made confusion of the two lines foreseeable to Parker. We therefore conclude that
summary judgment is not proper on his defense of superseding causation.

18
V. A genuine issue of material fact exis ts regarding whether the failure to cap the
gas line was a proximate cause of Timmons’s and her children’s injuries.

Finally, Parker argues that Timmons’s neg ligence claims fail as a matter of law
because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause. Again, when
considering this issue, we vi ew all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
Timmons. See Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 625.
“In the context of general tort liability, such as neg ligence actions, [the supreme
court] long ago defined a proximate cause of a given result as a material element or a
substantial factor in the ha ppening of that result.” Frederick v. Wallerich , 907 N.W.2d
167, 179-80 (Minn. 2018) (quot ation omitted). Thus, the que stion is whether Parker’s
promise and failure to cap the gas line, followed by his failure to warn, were substantial
factors in causing Timmons’s injuries.
We have no hesitancy in concluding that th ere is a genuine issue of material fact on
this question. While the supreme court has rejected but-for causation because “it converts
events both near and far, which merely set the stage for an accident, into a convoluted series
of causes of the accident,” see Lubbers v. Anderson , 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995)
(quotation omitted), this case doe s not involve an attenuated causal chain like the one at
issue in Lubbers.
In Lubbers, the appellant led a group of snowm obilers toward a hazard and safely
navigated the hazard, but those behind him we re somehow injured because of the hazard.
Id. at 400-01. In holding that the appellant was entitled to summary judgment, the supreme
court observed that “[o]bviously something occurred behind [appellant],” but “[t]he record

19
. . . does not tell us anything about what that something was.” Id. at 402. The court further
noted that the first two people following made it past the hazard, and it was only the third
follower that suffered any harm. Id. Thus, without information regarding what happened
behind the appellant, “it is impossible to es tablish any link between [appellant’s] conduct
and the injuries sustained.” Id.
The facts in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to Timmons, on the
other hand, make such a link clear. In July 2011, Parker promised to cap the gas line but
then left it uncapped. A little over a year later, Haugen ope ned the valve to that gas line,
erroneously thinking he was opening the valve for gas to the furnace. Timmons then lit a
cigarette, and a gas explosion erupted. Parke r’s failure to cap the line is a “substantial
factor” in this series of events. See Frederick , 907 N.W.2d at 179- 80. We therefore
conclude that there is suffici ent evidence to create a genui ne issue of material fact
concerning whether Parker’s negligence was a proximate cause of Timmons’s injuries.
Reversed and remanded.