State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0389

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corrie Alexander Peterson,
Appellant.

Filed February 19, 2019
Reversed
Larkin, Judge

Lake County District Court
File No. 38-VB-17-989

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Russell H. Conrow, Lake County Attorney, Two Harbors, Minnesota (for respondent)

David R. Lundgren, Adam T. Johnson, Lundgren & Johnson, PSC, St. Paul, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm within a state game
refuge, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We reverse.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Corrie Alexander Peterson with
possession of a firearm within a state game refuge, a misdemeanor offense. The state
certified the charge as a petty misdemeanor, and the case was tried to the district court.
The state presented evidence showing that on October 24, 2017, Officer Donald
Murray of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) received a complaint
that a hunting blind had been constructed within a state game refuge. Officer Murray went
to a farmhouse on the property in question, knocked on the door, and no one answered. He
affixed his business card to the hunting blind and wrote a message on the back o f the card
asking the property owners to call him.
On November 12, DNR Officer Matthew Miller received an anonymous complaint
of “rifle shots coming from the area of the game refuge.” Officer Miller responded to that
location and observed a farmhouse at the end of a dead -end road. Officer Miller drove
down the dead-end road toward the farmhouse and observed a sign along the road that said
“State Game Refuge.” Officer Miller observed a hunting blind in a nearby field, but did
not see anyone on the property. During his investigation, Officer Miller looked into the
hunting blind and saw the business card that Officer Murray had left on October 24.

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Peterson exited the farmhouse and approached Officer Miller. Officer Miller
testified that he “asked [Peterson] if he’d been hunting today and told him that [the officer
had] received a complaint of somebody shooting down there.” Peterson stated that he
owned the property, and he admitted that he had hunted on the property one week earlier
and shot two deer. Peterson also stated that he had done some internet searches through
the DNR website regarding state game refuge s and hunting restrictions, but he had not
found any information indicating his property was within a game refuge.
Officer Murray arrived at the scene. Peterson told Officer Murray that he was not
aware that his property was with in a game refuge, but he admitted that he had seen the
state-game-refuge sign along the dead-end road to the farmhouse. Peterson also admitted
that he had possessed a firearm on his property. The officers issued Peterson a citation
based on his admissions.
Officer Miller testified that Peterson’s property was within a state game refuge that
had been “formed by petition” in the 1940s by Game Refuge Order #142 . Officer Miller
testified that the refuge included “everything from the old Highway 61 to the lakeshore of
Lake Superior, and everything between the city limits of Two Harbors to the village limits
of Knife River.”
Peterson represented himself at trial. He argued that he was unaware that his
property was within the boundaries of a state game refuge, due to a lack of proper signage.
He cross-examined Officers Murray and Miller about the statutory requirements for the
creation of a state game refuge. Officer Miller agreed that “along the boundary of a game
refuge, there [must] be signs less than 5 00 feet [apart].” Officer Murray testified that he

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believed that “ Game Refuge Order number 142 is enforceable because it is signed
properly.” However, each officer testified that he did not know whether game-refuge signs
were posted every 500 feet along the alleged game-refuge boundary.
The state introduced several photographs that Officer Miller took on or near
Peterson’s property. The photographs showed two state -game-refuge signs . One was
approximately 35 yards east of the hunting blind , and the other was along the road
approximately a quarter mile from Peterson’s property. As to the latter sign, Officer Miller
testified that “[a]s you drive in to the property, on the dead-end road, there’s a visible state
game refuge sign posted alongsi de the road.” Officer Murray testified that he observed
state-game-refuge signs “[o]n the drive in to the property, . . . on the right-hand side, and
also out where the hunting blind is.”
The district court found Peterson guilty as charged, reasoning t hat Peterson had
admitted his possession of a firearm on his property and that, although the state did not
prove that signs had been posted every 500 feet along the boundary of the game refuge,
Peterson was on “inquiry notice” that there was a game refuge in that area due to the signs
that were in place. The district court entered judgment of conviction, and Peterson
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.
D E C I S I O N
When considering a claim of insufficient e vidence, an appellate court carefully
analyzes the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the fact-finder to reach the verdict that
it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). An appellate court assumes that

5
the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses. State
v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). The court will not disturb a guilty verdict
if the fact-finder, a cting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was proved guilty of the offense charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465,
476-77 (Minn. 2004). An appellate court “review[s] criminal bench trials the same as jury
trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.” State v.
Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1998).
The state charged Peterson under Minn. Stat. § 97A.091, subd. 1 (2016), which
provides that “[a] person may not carry within a [state game] refuge . . . a firearm unless
the firearm is unloaded and contained in a cas e, or unloaded and broken down.” Peterson
argues, and the state agrees , that “an essential element of the offense is that the person
carried a firearm ‘within a refuge.’” Peterson further argues that “the State failed to prove
that [his] property was within a state game refuge because it faile d to offer any evidence
[that] the game refuge at issue ever became effective.”
The alleged game refuge was created by an order of the Minnesota Commissioner
of Conservation in 1946, Game Refuge Order #142, which states:
WHEREAS, a petition having the re quired number of
signatures has been presented to the Director of the Division of
Game and Fish, State of Minnesota, requesting that the
following described area in Lake County, Minnesota be
established as a game refuge:

All land lying between State Trun k
Highway Number 61 and Lake Superior,
extending from the City Limits of Two Harbors

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to the Village Limits of Knife River in Township
52 North, Range 11 West, in Lake County[.]

. . . .

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED
AREA BE AND IS HEREBY E STABLISHED
AS A STATE GAME REFUG E, TO BE
KNOWN AS THE TWO HARBORS GAME
REFUGE, FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF
TIME. THIS GAME REFUGE WILL BECOME
EFFECTIVE UPON DUE PUBLICATION
HEREOF AND COMPLETION OF POSTING
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

(Emphasis added.)
Minn. Stat. § 97A.085, subd. 7 (2016), provides:
(a) The designation of a state game refuge is not
effective until the boundary has been posted with notices that
measure at least 12 inches.

(b) The notices must be posted at intervals of no t more
than 500 feet or less along the boundary . The notices must
also be posted at all public road entrances to the refuges ,
except where the boundary is also an international or state
boundary in public waters. . . .

(c) A certification by the commissioner or the director
of the Wildlife Division, or a certification filed with the
commissioner or director by a conservation officer, refuge
supervisor, or other authorized officer or employee, stating that
the required notices have been pos ted is prima facie evidence
of the posting.

(Emphasis added.)1

1 The statute in effect when Game Refuge Order #142 was issued contained substantially
similar requirements. See Minn. Stat. § 99.25, subd. 7 (1945) (requiring the posting of

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The state did not present evidence that the boundary of the game refuge described
in Game Refuge Order #142—or any portion thereof—was posted in accordance with the
requirements of the order and Minn. Stat. § 97A.085, subd. 7. Officers Miller and Murray
testified regarding the locations of two state -game-refuge signs near Peterson’s property
and their belief that the game refuge was properly posted. But the officers could not say
that signs had been posted every 500 feet or less as required by statute. Nor did the state
present prima facie evidence of the posting in the form of a certification “stating that the
required notices have been posted.” Minn. Stat. § 97A.085, subd. 7(c).
The state argues that it
presented evidence, through conservation officers Miller and
Murray’s testimony and photographs, that [Peterson’s]
property, where he was hunting, was posted as a “State Game
Refuge.” The conservation officers also testified their
department has been enforcing game laws within the refuge for
years. The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the
verdict is sufficient to support the [district] court’s finding that
the land [Peterson] hunted on is a game refuge.

The evidence on which the state relies does not establish, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the statutory posting necessary to effectuate Game Refuge Order #142 ever
occurred. Perhaps the state’s evidence would have been sufficient if the state had also
offered prima facie evi dence of posting in the form of a certification under Minn. Stat.
§ 97A.085, subd. 7(c), but the state did not do so. Instead, the state relies on “the fact that
[Peterson] was cited for hunting on land that was posted.” (Emphasis added.) But proof

notices approximately 500 feet apart for a state -game-refuge designation to becom e
effective).

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that the land “was posted” with two signs does not establish compliance with the statutory
posting requirements. The issue is whether the land described in Game Refuge Order #142
was ever posted in accordance with statutory requirements, such that the game -refuge
designation became effective and the game refuge existed at the time of the alleged offense.
The state simply did not prove that such posting occurred.
Indeed, the district court found that the state did not establish compliance with the
statutory posting requirements. The district court explained , “[T]he statute requires that
notices be posted at intervals of not more than 500 feet or less along the boundary. I do
not necessarily find that it was established that . . . signage was posted at those intervals.”
Nonetheless, the district court found Peterson guilty, reasoning that “the purpose of that
portion of [section 97A.085] is to make sure that people have appropriate notice, . . . what
we call ‘inquiry notice,’” or “[a]t least enough notice to be aware that there’s a game refuge
in that area and [one needs] to be aware that [one] might be violating laws that would be
applicable to game refuges.” The district court further reasoned that “[t]estimony did
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that t here were signs in the immediate area or
immediate vicinity of where the discharge of the . . . rifle took place. That’s the purpose
of the notice, that’s the purpose of the signs. It’s not to serve as a technical defense.”
The district court’s reason ing regarding the purpose of the posting requirements
does not address the relevant issue: whether the state proved that the land on which
Peterson possessed a firearm was within a refuge . The statutory language regarding the
posting requirements is clear , and neither the district court nor the state has articulated a
basis to look beyond the unambiguous posting requirements when determining whether the

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state proved the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt . If a statute is unambiguous,
appellate cour ts must apply its plain meaning without resorting to canons of statutory
construction. State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013). We therefore apply the
plain language of the statute —and not the alleged purpose of the statute —in determining
whether the state proved compliance with the statutory posting requirements and, therefore,
the existence of a game refuge.
We hold that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the land on which Peterson possessed a firearm was within a state game refuge. We
therefore reverse his conviction without addressing his alternative argument that the
evidence was also insufficient to prove that he intentionally or knowingly possessed a
firearm within a state game refuge.
Reversed.