State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0423

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Israel Davis,
Appellant.

Filed August 27, 2018
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-15-9239

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Carl Ole Tvedten, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
On appeal after remand for resentencing, appellant Israel Davis challenges the
imposition of consecutive sentences for his convictions for promotion of prostitution and

2
sex trafficking in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a (2012), arguing that his total
sentence of 276 months is unrea sonable and exaggerates the cr iminality of his conduct.
Because the district court pr operly exercised its discre tion by imposing consecutive
sentences, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant recruited B.R., an adult female, to work as a prostitute in 2014. In the six
months after meeting appellant , B.R. engaged in prostituti on for appellant nearly every
day. Appellant arranged hotel rooms for B.R. to engage in prostitution, advertised her as
a prostitute on an internet website, communi cated with potential customers, managed
interactions between B.R. and customers, a nd provided her with alcohol and drugs.
Appellant received more than half of the proceeds of each tran saction. B.R. stated that
appellant controlled her throughout their relationship, threatened her on multiple occasions,
and once grabbed her by the throat and squeez ed it. B.R. ended her arrangement with
appellant in July of 2014.
In March of 2014, appellant recruited J.R., an adult female, to work as a prostitute.
Appellant and J.R. used methamphetamine t ogether and J.R. agreed to engage in
prostitution for appellant. Appellant told J.R. that she could earn $800 per day as a
prostitute and asked her to provide him with pictures to be used in an advertisement. J.R.
provided appellant with pictures and watched him place an advertisement with her picture
on an internet website. A few days later, J.R. met appellant at a hotel and appellant gave
her a script to read when communicating with potential customers. J.R. stated that calls

3
were placed to appellant’s phone in res ponse to the advertisement and she became
frightened, refused to answer the calls, fled the motel, and later contacted the police.
In 2015, B.R. provided a statement to law enforcement about appellant’s previous
involvement in sex trafficking. Later that year, law enforcement arrested appellant while
executing an unrelated search warrant. Appellant was charged with ten counts1 related to
the sex trafficking of B.R. and J.R.
J.R. testified at trial. Prior to trial, she was contacted by a friend of appellant’s, who
offered her $1,000 not to testify. After a court trial, the district court found appellant guilty
of six of the charges against him and sentenced him for two convictions of second-degree
solicitation, inducement, and promotion of pros titution in violati on of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.322, subd. 1a. Appellant was sentenced on one conviction for his conduct involving
B.R. and one conviction for his conduct involving J.R.
Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a carries a penalty of im prisonment up to 15 years.
Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a. But if aggravating factors are present, the penalty can be
up to 25 years. Id., subd. 1(b) (2012). A district court may impose an aggravated sentence
if: the defendant has committed a prior huma n-trafficking-related offense; the offense
involved a victim who suffered bodily harm during the commission of the offense; the
offense involved a time period lasting longer than 180 days; or the offense involved more
than one victim. Id. The district court determined that aggravating factors were present

1 The complaint was later amended to 14 counts of engaging in prostitution and promoting
prostitution, but four of the counts were dismissed when a third victim failed to appear at
trial.

4
with respect to both of appellant’s offenses, finding that B.R. suffered bodily harm during
the offense and that multiple victims were involved. The district court imposed aggravated
sentences, adding 48 months to the presumptive sentence for each conviction. The district
court sentenced appellant to 228 months on the second-degree sex-trafficking count related
to B.R., and to a sentence of 96 months on the second-degree sex-trafficking count related
to J.R.
The district court also determined that consecutive sentences were appropriate,
stating that:
[Appellant] trafficked B.R. for a long period of time
and . . . attempted to do the sa me with [J.R.]. And although
there was only one incident of physical violence, I do find it
egregious that [appellant] would take B.R. at a time when she
had been sober for a year a nd offer her meth and the life
[appellant] put her through for those six months.

The district court also noted appellant’s attempt to convince J.R. not to testify against him
in determining that a consecutive sentence was appropriate.
Appellant challenged his conviction and se ntence on multiple grounds. In an
unpublished decision, this co urt affirmed his convictions but reversed and remanded his
sentence after determining that the district court’s reliance on the same factor—the
presence of multiple victims—as the ground s for the imposition of an aggravated
presumptive sentence for his conviction rela ted to J.R., and permissive consecutive
sentences violates the principle that the di strict court may not impose a sentence that
punishes a defendant twice for the same conduct. State v. Davis, No. A16-1245, 2017 WL
3013214, at *4 (Minn. App. July 17, 2017), review denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017).

5
However, this court explicitly found that the district court acted within its discretion when
it imposed permissive consecutive sentence s based on appellant’s conduct and on the
sentences of similarly situated offenders. Id.
On remand, the district court explained that it intended to:
[F]ollow the directions of the appellate court as I understand
them. The appellate court said it was inappropriate to consider
the fact that there were multiple victims and, therefore . . . I
should not have sentenced [appellant] to the 96 months and I’m
going to take the appellate court decision into account in
resentencing. . . .

I’m not going to do anything to address the sentence that
was already pronounced on [the count involving B.R.] other
than to take that in to account when I aggreg ate the sentences.
For the reasons I stated . . . back at the original sentencing on
May 5, 2016, I continue to believe that this is an appropriate
case for a permissive consecutive sentencing.

But in calculating the amount of that sentence, I’m not
going to take into account or consider multiple victims because
that’s already a factor in the decision to make them
permissively consecutive.

The district court recalculated appellant’s pr esumptive sentence for the count related to
J.R. to be 48 months based on a modified crim inal-history score of zero and the offense-
severity level of B. The district court sentenced appellant to a term of 228 months for his
conviction on the coun t involving B.R. and 48 months for his conviction on the count
involving J.R., to be served consecutively. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
We review the district court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for a clear abuse
of discretion. State v. Smith , 541 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996). “A district court’s

6
decision regarding perm issive, consecutive sentencing w ill not be disturbed unless the
resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State
v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. App. 2004). We look to “past sentences imposed
on other offenders when dete rmining the propriety of c onsecutive sentencing.” State v.
Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 284 (Minn. 2003). Co nsecutive sentencing for appellant’s
sex-trafficking convictions with multiple convictions is “permissive and within the broad
discretion of the [district] court.” Id.; Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(ii) (2012 & Supp.
2013). Both of appellant’s sentences on remand were within the range set by the sentencing
guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.G.9.a., 4.B. (2012 & Supp. 2013).
This court previously determined that the imposition of consecutive sentences was
a proper exercise of the district court’s disc retion based on the facts of this case and the
sentences of similarly situated offenders. Davis, 2017 WL 3013214, at *4. The sole reason
that appellant’s sentence was reversed was due to the district court’s reliance on the
multiple-victims factor to impose both an aggravated sentence and consecutive sentences.
On remand, the district court corrected its error and relied on th e presence of multiple
victims solely to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an aggravated sentence of 228 months for
appellant’s sex trafficking of B.R. and the presumptive sentence of 48 months for his sex
trafficking of J.R., to be served consecutively.
Appellant argues that his consecutive sentences are unreasonable because his crimes
involved adults and one of the victims did not actually engage in sexual conduct. But as
the district court found, appe llant’s conduct was “egregious.” Appellant lured both B.R.

7
and J.R. into prostitution by providing them with access to methamphetamine, and preyed
on their status as drug addicts. Appellant exerted control over B.R. through intimidation
and at least one instance of physical violen ce. While under appellant’s control, B.R.
engaged in prostitution almost daily for six months. And while J.R. never engaged in any
acts of prostitution, the statutes prohibiting the promotion of prostitution and sex trafficking
are focused on appellant’s know ing promotion of prostitution and sex trafficking, not on
the actions of his victims. See Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subds. 7, 7a (2012) (defining
“[p]romotes the prostitution of an individual” and “[s]ex trafficking.”). Appellant
knowingly sex trafficked and pr omoted the prostitution of J.R.: he recruited her to work
as a prostitute; brought her to a location to engage in prostitution; advertised her as a
prostitute; and instructed her how to handle calls related to that advertisement.
Based on these facts, appellant’s consecutive sentences are not unreasonable and do
not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing consecutive sentences totaling 276 months.
Affirmed.