State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0436

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Raymundo Zeferino-Sanchez,
Appellant.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-17-1279

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County A ttorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assista nt County Attorney,
Wesley J. Abrahamson, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Bruce Rivers, Rivers Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Ju dge; and Smith,
John P., Judge.
1

1 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by ap pointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
A f t e r a c o u r t t r i a l o n s t i p u l a ted evidence, the district court found appellant
Raymundo Zeferino-Sanchez guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually
abusing his stepdaughter. Zeferino-Sanchez challenges this determination on the basis that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not advise him of the
immigration consequences of waiving a jury trial. Because we c onclude that
Zeferino-Sanchez’s counsel’s performance was not deficient, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2016, L.R. (age 11 at the time) told her friend at school that her
stepfather, appellant Raymundo Zeferino-Sanchez, had been touching her inappropriately
since she was four years old. After receiving a child-protection report, police interviewed
L.R. at her home.
During the interview, L.R. told police that Zeferino-Sanchez t ouched her vaginal
area under her clothing and offered her a treat if she did not tell anyone. L.R. also disclosed
to police that Zeferino-Sanchez touched her breasts more than once when she was seven or
eight years old. Finally, L.R. told police that Zeferino-Sanchez tried to get her to sleep in
his bed with him and said he would not be able to protect her from zombies if she did not.
Zeferino-Sanchez voluntarily spoke with police about L.R.’s al legations against
him. Initially, and for much of the interview, he denied touch ing L.R. inappropriately.
According to Zeferino-Sanchez, he would sometimes tickle L.R., but was only playing with
her. But as the conversation progressed, Zeferino-Sanchez admi tted to police that he put

3
his hands down the front part of L.R.’s pants and underwear aft er she made a comment
about having “butt hair.” Zeferino-Sanchez also told police that he offered L.R. a donut if
she did not tell her mom what happened. Zeferino-Sanchez also admitted that he touched
L.R.’s bare breast on two occasi ons, but stated that he did not do it with the intention of
molesting her. Based on L.R.’s statements and Zeferino-Sanchez ’s admissions, the state
charged Zeferino-Sanchez with three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.2
On the day Zeferino-Sanchez’s trial was scheduled to begin, Ze ferino-Sanchez
waived his right to a jury trial, and both parties agreed that the district court would decide
the case based on stipulated evidence pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The stipulat ed evidence consisted of polic e records about L.R’s
allegations, including the incident report and child protection intake summaries, a transcript
of L.R.’s statement to police, a brief summary of an interview of L.R. conducted by defense
counsel,3 and a transcript of Zeferino-Sanchez’s statement to police. B ased on this
evidence, the district court foun d Zeferino-Sanchez guilty of a ll three counts of criminal
sexual conduct.
At sentencing, the district cour t followed the parties’ agreem ent and sentenced
Zeferino-Sanchez to a stay of adjudication with no additional jail time and up to five years
of probation. Zeferino-Sanchez appeals.

2 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2016).
3 In this summary, defense counsel asserted that L.R. recanted h er allegations against
Zeferino-Sanchez and asserted that she made up the allegations against him because she
was mad at him for grounding her and preventing her from using her cell phone.

4
D E C I S I O N
Zeferino-Sanchez argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to adequately advise him
regarding the immigration consequences of waiving a jury trial and agreeing to a trial based
upon stipulated evidence.
When an ineffective-assistance-o f-counsel claim is properly ra ised in a direct
appeal, we review the claim under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531,
535 (Minn. App. 2017). That test requires an appellant to show that (1) “counsel’s
representation fell below an obj ective standard of reasonablene ss” and (2) “there is a
reasonable probability that, but f or counsel’s unprofessional e rrors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at
2064, 2068. In evaluating ineffective-assistance claims, there is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was reasonable. Swaney v. State , 882 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Minn.
2016). And in cases where a claim fails to satisfy one prong o f the Strickland test, this
court does not have to consider both prongs to determine that the claim fails. Id.
First, we note that Zeferino-Sanchez does not argue that his waiver of his right to a
jury trial was somehow defective. Under Rule 26.01, subdivision 1(2)(a) of the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial on the issue of
guilt, but must do so on the recor d after an opportunity to consult with counsel and being
advised of the right to a trial by jury. Further, parties may agree that the issue of guilt may
be tried by the court on the basis of stipulated evidence, provided that after an opportunity

5
to consult with counsel the defendant, on the record, waives his right to a jury trial and his
rights to testify, have prosecution witnesses testify in court, question those witnesses, and
present his own witnesses. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(a) - ( c ) . H e r e ,
Zeferino-Sanchez waived his right to a jury trial on the record after stating he consulted
with counsel and knew about his right to a trial by jury. Zefe rino-Sanchez further agreed
to the stipulated evidence, waive d each of the stated rights, a nd told the court he did not
have any questions about the rig hts he was giving up. Nothing about the jury-waiver
process suggests that Zeferino-Sanchez did not receive effective assistance of counsel.
But Zeferino-Sanchez argues that his counsel’s failure to advis e him regarding the
immigration consequences of waiv ing a jury trial constituted in effective assistance of
counsel and that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was in adequate under
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), because it contained no
acknowledgement of collateral consequences.4
I n Padilla, the Supreme Court established that one aspect of constitution ally
effective representation requires defense counsel to advise noncitizen defendants regarding

4 At oral argument, Zeferino-Sanchez’s counsel asserted that a s tipulated-facts trial is the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea. But counsel admitted that no caselaw supports this
proposition. In fact, we have rejected the assertion that a st ipulated-facts trial is the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea. State v. Johnson, 689 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Minn. App.
2004), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2005). And we note that although not required in a
stipulated-facts trial, the district court was presented with evidence—namely the summary
of the defense interview of L.R. alleging that she recanted her accusations against
Zeferino-Sanchez—that could have supported a finding that Zefer ino-Sanchez was not
guilty. Even if we adopted the argument that a stipulated-fact s trial could serve as the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea, the stipulated-facts tr ial in this case did not operate
as such.

6
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, particularly the risk of being removed from
the United States. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. Applying Padilla, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has outlined defense counsel’s obligations as follows:
Padilla establishes that criminal-defense attorneys must
take some affirmative steps before allowing a noncitizen client
to accept a plea deal. First, at a minimum, an attorney must
review the relevant immigration statutes to determine whether
a conviction will subject the de fendant to a risk of removal
from the United States. Second, i f conviction of the charged
offense clearly subjects the defendant to removal from the
United States, the attorney has a constitutional obligation to
advise the defendant of this fact before he or she enters a guilty
plea. If it does not, then a general advisory warning about the
possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea is
sufficient.

Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. 2017).

B u t Padilla is not applicable to this case. Zeferino-Sanchez did not plead guilty to
the charged offenses; he waived his right to a jury trial and a sked the district court to
determine his guilt or innocence b ased on stipulated evidence. Padilla and Minnesota
cases applying Padilla’s holding all reference an attorney’s obligations when a clien t
pleads guilty. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; Sanchez, 890 N.W.2d at 721.
Nothing in Padilla or Minnesota caselaw establishes that an attorney must advise a client
regarding the immigration consequences of waiving a jury trial. In fact, Zeferino-Sanchez
has failed to identify any caselaw that suggests that attorneys have a duty to advise clients
regarding the immigration consequences of waiving a jury trial. Further, Zeferino-Sanchez
fails to identify any difference between a jury trial and a cou rt trial that would warrant an

7
immigration-consequences warning when a defendant waives a jury trial.5 Accordingly,
we conclude that Zeferino-Sanchez’ s attorney was not required t o advise him about the
immigration consequences of waiv ing a jury trial in order to pr ovide him with effective
assistance of counsel.
Because Padilla is inapplicable since Zeferino-Sanchez did not plead guilty and
because his counsel and the distr ict court followed the proper procedure for waiver of a
jury trial and for a court trial on stipulated evidence, we affirm.
Affirmed.

5 Although Zeferino-Sanchez cites rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the All-Writs Act, these authorities only apply in federal cour t. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651;
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson , 537 U.S. 28, 33, 123 S. Ct. 366, 370 (2002)
(determining that the All-Writs Act does not confer the origina l jurisdiction required to
support removal). Further, the analogous state rule, rule 15 o f the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, requires the district court to advise noncitizen defendants that “a guilty
plea may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization as a United States citizen.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(l) (emphasis
added). Again, Zeferino-Sanchez did not plead guilty, so the district court was not required
to advise him regarding collateral immigration consequences.